I BROADCAST THE CRISIS
To my co-workers of the Columbia Broadcasting System who made these broadcasts possible
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I BROADCAST THE CRISIS
In September, war came closer than it has come since the Armistice. We were saved from war, I am convinced, by the mobilization of world opinion for peace. When the crisis came, we had mastered a force of which we knew almost nothing in 1914. Through it and because of it, the peoples of the world demanded and got an exact accounting of every important move by their leaders. The people heard not merely from their own leaders, but, even in countries where censors may try to plug up the ether itself, from the leaders of all nations involved in the crisis. The medium worked both ways, and through it, the people carried back to their leaders their response to every move. Their response was a demand for peace which even the most hardened dictator could not but obey. The medium was radio.

America, with the only free radio system in the world today, led the way. Our great broadcasting systems mobilized their facilities to bring this country a coverage of events so swift, so sure, so complete, that radio became of itself one of the most significant events of the crisis. It was significant because it showed that in every great crisis in which it plays a part the ultimate issue of peace or war is to be decided by all mankind in the great forum of the air. The air has become the battleground; and in the war which is waged there night and day between arguments for war and arguments for peace, I think that the arguments for
peace will finally prevail. The best argument for peace is not argument at all, but complete information. In the efforts of one great broadcasting system to bring the American people complete information on the September crisis, I played a part. This book is a record of it. In it, you will find, as completely as I was able to give it to you, information on the events which led up to the final truce at Munich. The news from Europe today traces back to those events, and without an understanding of them, we can hardly hope to appraise our present or future chances for peace.

I look upon most of you who are reading this book as old traveling companions. We traveled far together in September. "America calling Prague." "America calling London." "America calling Berlin." Again and again we heard the voice of our New York announcers calling the names of Europe's news centers, and lo, the answer came: "Hello, America." It was thus that we heard personally from every leading figure in the crisis—Hitler, Chamberlain, Mussolini, Daladier, Hodza, Benes, Anthony Eden, Jan Masaryk, all. It was thus that we heard, from Columbia's news staffs in each capital direct, eye-witness accounts of the news from that source. Sometimes I held transatlantic interviews with these men in cities from three to five thousand miles away. I called them by name: "Hello, Stephen King-Hall. This is H. V. Kaltenborn calling London, calling Stephen King-Hall." In calling Prague, I asked for Maurice Hindus. When I got my man, we talked as easily as though we were both in the same building, talking over inter-office telephone. You and the other American listeners tuned in to Columbia's one hundred and fifteen stations, heard our 5,000-mile interviews more clearly than you could have eavesdropped on a party line at home. Frequently you heard me give Hindus in Prague important items of news of which the entire Czechoslovakian capital was still in ignorance. Hindus, on the other hand, always had news of some fresh development from the Sudeten battlefronts or from Prague itself. Twice when I talked thus with Prague, Hindus and I brought to the world
the only news to be transmitted from there, for cable and telephone service had failed entirely.

The intimate grasp of a complex situation, which these conversations gave to listeners, the very familiarity they lent to the whole European problem, was a great step forward in world understanding. When, hour after hour, Columbia brought the voices of Europe into our very homes, the blind, head-in-sand isolationist view of foreign affairs was no longer tenable, and the way was opened to intelligent planning of means to protect ourselves from the chaos which seemed about to descend on Europe. It appeared very simple when we heard it in our homes — “America calling Prague...London...Paris...Godesberg...Munich.”

It came to seem very natural to us that at any hour of day or night the regularly scheduled program — from New York, Hollywood, or Chicago — should be interrupted in order that we might hear from “Studio Nine” the latest news bulletin on the crisis. I am sure that, following every important new development, whether reported directly from abroad or through a cabled news dispatch, you came to take it for granted that I would come on the air with an analysis of the news, fitting it into its place in the whole picture and thus preparing you for the next eventuality.

That, of course, was as it should have been; for Columbia never desired to let the mechanics behind the broadcasts intrude upon the listeners’ attention; while, for my part, I tried to keep my comments entirely free of any personal elements whatsoever. But now that the crisis has ended for the time being and the broadcasts themselves are matters of historic record, let us inquire into the means by which radio was able to bring us nearer to momentous events than we have ever been brought before. People often ask me how radio would cover a general European war if it came. I think that during September, the broadcasters gave us a fair sample of their probable coverage.

On this side of the Atlantic, the problem is how, on a moment’s notice, the Columbia network covering the entire
country and comprising one hundred and fifteen stations, was able to switch us from its studios in New York or Hollywood to the Sportspalast in Berlin, the Munich airport or a street corner in Prague; then switch us back again to various parts of this country without the slightest hitch in broadcast service. The regular daily operation of a great network is cause enough for wonder. At times, during the day, the stations are split up into regional groups, each carrying a different program from a different studio. All of these programs have been timed in advance to the split second, so that each quarter hour, station identification can be made and an entirely new grouping of the network effected at master-control switchboards in New York, Chicago and Los Angeles. On this side of the Atlantic, in order to concentrate this huge network on European news centers with the speed and precision of a sharply focused beam of light, it was necessary to center in New York constant and instantaneous control over 150,000 miles of land circuits linking the stations together in a chain.

On the other side of the Atlantic, broadcasts do not arrange themselves automatically. Columbia does not merely pick out of the ether the broadcasts you hear from Europe. The network here must be placed in exact synchronization with foreign broadcasting systems — at times, as many as five in a single broadcast. Speakers — expert journalists, commentators with the latest news or the national leaders themselves — must be at the microphone. Facilities must be in readiness for carrying their words to powerful short-wave stations for relay to New York. In Columbia’s five-nation hook-ups, the technique for which was perfected during the Austrian crisis in March, the complexity of arrangements staggers the imagination.

Within a few hours after the first German troops crossed the Austrian border in March, Columbia was on the air with an eye-witness description of conditions in the threatened capital, followed soon after by broadcasts in swift succession not only from Vienna, but from London, Berlin,
RADIO MOBILIZES

Paris, Rome and Washington, D. C. During the six days when tension was at its height, the network presented sixteen of these transatlantic pick-ups. During those six days, radio established itself as a new factor in international politics. It showed national leaders that hereafter they would have to act on a stage to which the whole world was an audience.

After Austria, we knew what was next. It was Czecho-
slovakia. The only question was when the blow would fall. Immediately Columbia set about preparations to cover the crisis whenever it came. In New York, by cable and transatlantic telephone, Paul White, Columbia’s Public Affairs Director, worked closely with Edward Murrow, the network’s European Director in London; and with William Shirer, Murrow’s continental representative. First consideration was to line up in every capital in Europe a staff of expert journalists and commentators, ready on an instant’s notice to broadcast to America. Friendly and efficient working relations had long been established with the radio systems of every government in Europe. Technically, the problem centered on Prague. As in the case of Vienna, programs had to be piped by landwire through Berlin to short-wave transmitters powerful enough to relay them across the Atlantic. Berlin straddled wire communications from every capital in Central and Eastern Europe. In case of emergency, Berlin could clamp down a censorship which would entirely isolate Czechoslovakia from radio communication with the outside world. There was only one solution: a Prague transmitter capable of reaching New York direct.

Czech radio authorities acted quickly, and within a month they were testing a new transmitter, powerful enough to send clear signals to North America. Shirer, working with the Czech radio bureau, “Radiojournal,” cabled us the new station’s frequency schedule, and thereafter for weeks, Prague and New York cooperated on test broadcasts to determine the most effective operating conditions for transmission to North America. Then Columbia worked out a
“talk-back” system which enabled the speaker in Prague to get his cue on the New York announcement, “We take you now to Prague. . . .” In April, Columbia stations carried the first program to be short-waved directly across the Atlantic by the Prague transmitter.

In its preparations for covering events and during the actual broadcasting of events in September, Columbia received the most extraordinary cooperation from European radio systems—all government controlled. In this fact lies a clue to the coverage American broadcasters will be able to give their listeners of the next war—if it comes. American public opinion in world affairs is too tremendous to neglect. One side of any European conflict would be quick to take advantage of any attempt by the other to cut off broadcasts to America.

Focal point of Columbia’s entire coverage in September was, of course, New York, where administration of broadcasts centered on Paul White—and commentary on me. In addition, there was Washington, where a staff of the CBS station, WJSV, kept us informed of the activities of the State Department and White House in connection with events in Europe.

The one heart and center of the entire organization was “Studio Nine”—where I kept vigil by the microphone night and day from Hitler’s Nuremberg speech on September 12th until the day after the signing of the four-power agreement in Munich on the 29th. The studio is about the size of an average family living room. It is furnished with three desks, on each of which rests a microphone. One of the walls is hung with a sound-absorbent curtain to control acoustics. The room’s one window looks into the “control room,” where the engineer sits behind his panel of instruments. The room has two entrances—one through the control room, the other through a small chamber where teletype machines pound out the cable news from the three great press associations. Adjoining the ticker room on the opposite side is Paul White’s office, where telephone calls are put
through to the various cities in Europe, and to the various departments in the network—all of which must function together as smoothly as clockwork.

Out of Studio Nine, in a period of eighteen days, I made eighty-five broadcasts—easily a record for continuous broadcasting by an individual. Every one of these talks was entirely unprepared, being an analysis of the news as it was occurring. The talks were made under a pressure I have not experienced in seventeen years of broadcasting—not even excepting the broadcast I made two years ago from a haystack on a Spanish battlefield, when you heard the bullets that were whizzing past my ears. Night and day, through Studio Nine milled engineers and announcers. Even as I talked, I was under constant bombardment of fresh news dispatches, carried to my desk from the ticker room. I read and digested them as I talked. Despite the crisis, the network still observed split-second timing, even of special programs. I had to watch the control-room engineer for my cues. Earphones clamped over my head as I broadcast brought me the voice of the speakers abroad whose words I followed with my commentary. At times, while I talked, my attention had to focus on four things at once—in addition to the words I was speaking.

Between talks, there was still no time for rest. Four tickers just outside Studio Nine ground out cable dispatches on continuous sheets, hundreds of feet of them every hour, miles of them by the time the crisis was well advanced. Every word had to be reviewed in order to get the complete picture in my mind. Queries had to be cabled out to our own men in Europe on this and that gap in the news which had not been filled by the tickers; their responses had to be read and digested. My telephones rang constantly—listeners from coast to coast, eager to discuss what I had said. Most of them were friendly, congratulating me for fairness. Some of them were angry, telling me, always in equal number, that I had leaned to this or the other side of the question. But I had time to answer few of these phone
calls — and none of the telegrams and letters which poured in hourly.

After the first few sleepless nights, I found alongside my desk an article of furniture which has probably never before appeared beside a microphone. It was an army cot, supplied with an old army blanket which one of the porters had dug up from somewhere. On this cot I took the few hours of rest that I could spare — and several times I got down to the Harvard Club for a swim, a steam-bath and a hearty pummeling by my good friend “George,” the Swedish masseur.

While Paul White and I and some of the department heads worked continuously, a complete emergency staff was drafted from each department to work in shifts with Studio Nine as its nucleus. Every word that was uttered was transcribed by Ediphone. A corps of typists copied the material, which the publicity department edited and sent by messengers to newspaper offices. The sales department was in attendance to clear time sold to advertisers. The production department was on the alert to rearrange program schedules, supply special announcements, and see that “stand-by” performers were ready to fill in if an announced program failed to come through. The traffic department arranged the countless communications details involved in bringing the programs to this side by short-wave, then getting them out by landwire here to all the stations. And, of course, there were the engineers. It was refreshing to me to look through the double plate-glass window which separated Studio Nine from the control room and to see at least one face that was not drawn and haggard from sleeplessness.

But there were always plenty of engineers, in and out of the studio. It was their job to make the studio a concentration point for all operation. They are an amazing lot, these engineers, prosaic supermen, ever ready with some new gadget which seemed indispensable the moment it was installed. Even as I broadcast my commentary on the first Hitler speech, I saw them installing one of their workaday
miracles on a small table near my desk. In size, it resembled a small, desk-size receiving set—except that it had but a single button on the panel. I soon learned the purpose of this mysterious box. Suppose, as happened, that in the normal course of a broadcasting period, the Columbia network, split up into regional chains, was receiving from various sources throughout the country a half-dozen or so different programs of various kinds. Suppose then that in the midst of this complex distribution of programs, the news tickers clanged their bells and pounded out an important bulletin. Before the ticker has completed the bulletin, Paul White has rushed into Studio Nine. “A flash, Hans,” he says, and pushes the button on that little box. Immediately, all other programs are cut off the air, and all stations are connected with my microphone, and that of the announcer at my side. While the announcer tells listeners where they are, an attendant brings me the bulletin, which I read and on which I comment. Then the engineer in the control room is given his cue to restore the network once more to normal operations. The programs originally scheduled for that period are “faded in” to the proper station groups; the performers continue their shows, unaware that they have been cut off in the first place.

Another of the Studio Nine gadgets which fascinated me was a special type of telephone receiver on my desk. A corresponding instrument was before the engineer in the control room and on the desk of every department head in the network. Whenever the receiver was lifted from any one of them, red signal lights flashed on all the others. Thus, Mr. White, in scheduling a special European program, could pick up this phone, make the announcement to all departments simultaneously. Then, while they worked together to arrange facilities, Mr. White could complete details of the broadcast by transatlantic calls to his European representatives. In this way, five-nation hook-ups were arranged on as little as three hours’ notice.

In my role of interpreter throughout the crisis, I was
fitted into this huge communications instrument in a manner somewhat resembling the lens in an aerial camera. On the one hand, the instrument into which I fitted commanded a news panorama of two continents. To my desk at every hour of day and night it brought the voices of corps of trained news gatherers as well as many distinguished commentators—and all the principal leaders in the crisis. On the other hand, it brought my words as I uttered them to millions of homes, to cars speeding over our highways, to factories, shops—to every spot where the radio was turned on and anxious groups gathered round to hear what the news would bring—war or peace.

Had I allowed myself to think on the power which this great instrument gave to every word I uttered, or had I paused to wonder at the view of the world's developments which it brought to my desk, I think I should not have been able to go on, night after night, with millions of my countrymen looking to me to throw light on a situation which might have meant death to so many of them—had events taken another course. That the crisis did take the turn for peace is due in significant measure, I think, to radio—not only as it served this country, but in its service to the whole world in informing all peoples instantly of events which were occurring far away but which might nevertheless vitally affect—and continue to affect—their destinies.
Saturday, September 10

7:45-8:00 A.M. — Morning News Report
Announcer: Today's news is — Europe in suspense! Hitler spoke to 50,000 members of the Hitler Youth Organization today and be told them that the annexation of Austria was only the beginning.

1:30-2:06 P.M. — President Benes — Prague, Czechoslovakia
Announcer: At this time, the Columbia Broadcasting System presents a talk by President Edouard Benes of Czechoslovakia. This talk will, of course, come to you in President Benes' native tongue and will be translated from time to time during its delivery. We take you now to Prague, Czechoslovakia.

President Benes: I speak to you at a moment of international crisis — the most serious since the World War . . . For over twenty years our Republic has developed in peace. . . . While dangerous movements have swept over other parts of the world, we have settled our problems reasonably — without resort to blind passion. In this spirit, our Government has entered upon negotiations with the representatives of the individual nationalities of our Republic, beginning with the Sudeten German Party. Today I appeal
to every citizen of this state, without regard to nationality. Each of you, by your good-will, can perform a service for peace. I speak not in fear for the future. I have never been afraid in my life. Let us all be firm and have faith in our state, in its health and its strength, in the indestructible spirit and devotion of its people. . . . Let us be prepared for sacrifices, but let us be optimistic, never forgetting that faith and good-will can move mountains and deliver us out of the most difficult times. . . .

ANNOUNCER (New York): You have been listening to an address from Prague by President Edouard Benes. . . . The Press Radio Bureau brings word of another speech, made at Nuremberg today, by Field Marshal Hermann Goering to the Nazi Labor Front. . . . The climax of the address which caused a sensation in the great assembly hall was the sentence: "If fate should win and another world war come, Germany will conquer!"

11:00 P.M. — Evening News Report

ANNOUNCER: War alarm has reached an unequaled pitch in Europe tonight. . . . The world is anxiously awaiting Monday's speech by Chancellor Hitler, which may cast the die for war, or for peace. . . .

Sunday, September 11

10:30-11:00 P.M. — "Headlines and By-lines"

KALTENBORN: Good evening, everybody!

I am convinced of one thing with reference to the crisis in Europe: War is not going to be announced by Adolf Hitler's speech tomorrow or by any speech. Modern wars are not announced. They are started, suddenly, secretly, terribly, with all the deadly impact that can be delivered by an army equipped to strike the lightning-like blow.
The defensive under modern war conditions is so strong that no army which permits the development of a full defensive before it launches its offensive is going to get very far. Herr Hitler knows that, and he is not going to confer a favor upon his prospective foes by telling them in eloquent language that he proposes to start a war in Czechoslovakia. If Hitler announces a war against a world that would oppose his entry into Czechoslovakia and against Czechoslovakia itself, he will announce it as something that has already begun. You will read headlines concerning the invasion, before you read headlines that tell you what Hitler said. Hitler talked today. It seemed to me that what he said can be taken as a theme song for what he will say tomorrow. I’ve heard him say the same thing myself. He said it repeatedly before, and he'll say it tomorrow with that peculiar force and eloquence which is his, and which you will have an opportunity of hearing tomorrow via the Columbia Broadcasting System. And what did he say today? He said this: “A new Germany stands before us and we have the good fortune to live in it. To other Germans this is still denied for the time being. Our hearts go out to them just as we know their hearts are with us and they are in spirit right amongst us. Times are such today that it’s necessary to remember that Nazism came to power, not alone through staunch hope, but by militant struggle and that it is determined under all circumstances to maintain its position and that of the Reich.”

Well, that is what you’d expect Hitler to say. And I doubt, frankly, that he will say very much more, although he will say these particular things in a great many words that will sound very militant and very ominous, as you hear them tomorrow.

To me there are things much more disturbing in the situation than the prospect of this Hitler speech. One of them is that Great Britain’s position has not yet been clearly indicated, even though we have heard so much about it; even though there have been various meetings of the
British Cabinet, which is summoned once again to meet tomorrow afternoon, just before the Hitler speech begins. I would feel more encouraged if we had had a clear declaration from that British Cabinet meeting of yesterday to Adolf Hitler today, delivered through Sir Neville Henderson, who was in Nuremberg with Herr Hitler, and who yet did not have direct contact with him.

There is one other thing in tonight’s news that disturbs me. It is the dispatch with reference to the spreading of disorders across the Sudeten districts and the free-for-all fight between the Sudetens and the Czechs. I’ve studied Hitler’s methods on the spot. I was present with Storm Troopers in Germany before Hitler came to power. I talked with them and I marched with them and I know what their instructions are and how they work. Whenever Hitler thinks it necessary to have disorders, word goes out to create them. Word may have gone out to the Sudeten Germans to create disorders in the next twenty-four hours. That, of course, would give Hitler fresh inflammatory material for both speech and action.

Interesting, also, is the fact that Italy’s chief press spokesman completely ignores the Czechoslovak situation and devotes his latest editorial to scolding the President of the United States and the American Secretary of State because of the things they have said about certain aggressive nations that are causing trouble in the world. Well, if Italy’s chief spokesman chooses to discuss America’s attitude toward the general world problem of dictatorships, instead of saying what Italy would do if war came over Czechoslovakia, you can depend upon it that, as matters stand, Benito Mussolini has no intention of standing back of friend Adolf Hitler with the armies of Italy. Oh, no! He’ll wait, as Italy waited in 1914, when she had an even more binding military alliance with Germany—and then decided to join with the side which seemed the strongest. Anyone can make a fair estimate of Germany’s strength, as opposed to the united strength of France, plus Russia, plus
Czechoslovakia, and probably plus Britain. For even though Britain does not speak, she is very likely to act. As Mussolini considers that balance of power, even Mr. Goering’s speech is not going to convince him that Germany is going to win. But what is it all about? What are the demands of the Sudeten Germans and what does the Czech Government offer? The most important demands were voiced by Henlein at Carlsbad on April 24th. These have become the basis of all these discussions. He asks equality of Sudeten Germans and Czechs. He asks recognition of the Sudeten Party as a legal personality, thus able to defend its position with complete equality as against the Czechs. He wants a recognition of the boundaries of Czechoslovak territories in which Germans live. He asks complete German autonomy in this German-peopled territory. The Czechs have sought to meet these demands in four separate proposals. The last was made this week and it goes so far that certain Czech elements threaten to oppose it. Here are the Czech offers to meet these important Sudeten demands:

1. The establishment of cantonal governments, on the Swiss model, to provide complete local self-government, but with protection for all minorities.

2. Public order to be preserved by a division of authority, between local and state police.

And (3) in all official matters, German, Polish, Hungarian and Ruthenian minorities to be on an equality with the Czechoslovaks in language and in other matters.

Certainly the chief demands are granted in all important particulars. All that the Czechs ask is that their nation be permitted to stand; that national interests be not sacrificed to local interest. Of course, when Henlein adds the demand that Czechoslovakia give up her alliances with France and Russia and that she view with benevolent neutrality Germany’s march to the East, in defiance of her own interest, well, that is too much to expect any nation to grant. Czechoslovakia would fight before she gave in. But every reasonable demand of the Sudeten Germans is now
met by Czechoslovakia, and that is the thing that we should understand as we listen on Monday to Hitler’s oratorical proclamations of the injustices committed against that minority. Minorities always suffer injustice. But I can assure you, having studied the minority problem in a score of countries, that in Czechoslovakia the German minority suffers less than do minorities anywhere else.

We had our choice this week between the two ideologies as expressed yesterday by President Benes of Czechoslovakia and as expressed by Goering on behalf of the Nazis. Of course, Goering’s speech was edited, as so frequently the speeches by leading Nazis are. Nevertheless, he certainly proclaimed Germany’s militant determination to have her way. He called Czechoslovakia “a little chip of a race, devoid of culture,” and, heaping insult on the Czech nation, he gloried in Germany’s strength. And what did Benes say? He proposed that Czechs and Germans take to peace. He asked for freedom of thought and national rights. “We wish to contribute,” he said, “to a settlement of European problems and to an establishment of good relations with all of our neighbors, especially with great Germany.” There you have the ideology of a great liberal and a great thinker, a man who sees that in peace is Europe’s only salvation, as contrasted with the blatant, arrogant, militaristic declaration of a man who knows not whereof he speaks and who may lead his people to its doom.
Monday, September 12

7:45-8:00 P.M. — MORNING NEWS REPORT
ANNOUNCER: Adolf Hitler will tell the world this afternoon whether he decrees peace or war for the world. . . .

9:25-9:30 P.M. — MORNING NEWS REPORT
ANNOUNCER: This morning the entire civilized world is anxiously awaiting the speech of Adolf Hitler, whose single word may plunge all of Europe into another world war. . . .

2:15-3:35 P.M. — Chancellor Adolf Hitler (From Nuremberg, Germany, via Berlin Short-Wave Station)
ANNOUNCER: We interrupt the program of Enoch Light in order to bring our listeners the world-awaited talk on Germany's foreign policy to be delivered by Adolf Hitler to the Nazi Congress at Nuremberg. Throughout the Hitler address, a translator will interrupt to paraphrase in English the Chancellor's remarks. We take you now to Nuremberg, Germany. . . . (See Appendix, Page 259.)

HITLER (As translated): . . . Today we again see plotters, from democrats down to Bolsheviki, fighting against the Nazi State. . . . We are being insulted today, but we thank God that we are in a position to prevent any attempt at plundering Germany or doing her violence. . . . It becomes
unbearable for us at a moment when a great German people, apparently defenseless, is delivered to shameless ill-treatment and exposed to threats. I am speaking of Czechoslovakia. . . . Whoever opposes the regime is beaten down or murdered. . . .

Economically, these Germans have been systematically ruined. Their distress is terrible and their oppression terrible. . . . The German nation cannot tolerate this oppression and I most earnestly ask foreign statesmen to believe that this is not a mere phrase. . . . No European state has done more for peace, but there are limits. . . .

3:36-3:45 P.M.

KALTENBORN: Adolf Hitler has spoken and the world has listened. The world has listened because it feared that this speech might mean war.

It may mean war, but not immediate war. It is clear from what Hitler said so forcibly, with the cheers of his supporters ringing in his ears, that he has no immediate intention of forcing a crisis. There was nothing in the speech that was tantamount to an immediate ultimatum. There was in it, and through it all, a very definite declaration that Germany would no longer tolerate the oppression, as he called it, of the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia, and that Czechoslovakia would have to reach a settlement with the Sudeten Germans or the Germans would see to it that a settlement was reached.

That is, in a word, the substance of the speech. However, it contained much interesting material, some of it not directly relevant to the Czechoslovakian situation, except insofar as Hitler sought to emphasize throughout Germany's complete preparation for the next war. He told us, for example, that the Germans on the Western Front had realized one of the mightiest achievements of all time in creating there a fifty-kilometer depth of fortifications made in the most modern style, with concrete and steel, on which at this very moment, 278,000 Germans are at work day and
night, and on which, as he said, they had been at work for two years. He cited such things as the 8,000 carloads of materials which are going to that Western Front in order to complete these fortifications, which he says will be ready, completely ready, before snow flies. He made a very direct personal attack on President Benes of Czechoslovakia, charged him with being hypocritical, with tossing about empty phrases, with telling lies about German mobilization. You will remember last May that it was universally reported that the Germans had mobilized opposite to the Czechoslovakian frontier. We do know that the Czechs mobilized and that May 21st was a very important date in the history of that whole situation because it marked the first great crisis. It is generally believed in the United States that war was averted then because France and England stood together, threatening to intervene if Germany marched into Czechoslovakia and because the Czechs themselves mobilized their strong little army and kept it on the frontier. Hitler says that this is a contemptible lie. Germany, he declares, did not mobilize. Germany did not call out a single soldier. Germany is not going to stand for any further falsification of the facts in connection with her attitude toward Czechoslovakia.

He says that the Czechs have denied to the Sudeten Germans the right of self-determination—a right which, as he emphasizes, is inherent in the democratic principle. That, he says, is something that Germany insists must be changed. President Benes, he says, is not in a position to make presents to the Sudeten Germans, but the Sudeten Germans demand their rights and Germany is going to stand back of them to see that they get them. Hitler adds that he should be very sorry if that would create trouble between Germany and other European powers. He calls upon the world to realize the contributions he has made to peace. He cites the fact that he is coming to an understanding in a ten-year pact with Poland; emphasizes that Germany could build a navy very much larger than 35 per
cent of the British Navy and that yet he has freely accepted a pact with Britain to limit the German Navy in that way. He cites the fact that although Germany possessed Alsace-Lorraine from 1871 until the World War, she has voluntarily renounced it in the interests of peace. But, he insists, there must be no misunderstanding of Germany's attitude. He cites the glory of Germany in the distant past, five hundred years before Columbus discovered America.

Now, he says, there is a new Germany, as there is a new Italy, and both these nations need never again subject themselves to control from the outside. They are determined to defend their hard-won achievements. Opposition to the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia and to their natural rights, he says, must cease. German patience, he declares, is nearly at an end and he calls upon President Benes to arrive very definitely and very promptly at an understanding with the three and one-half million Germans in Czechoslovakia—or else! And there his threat is unmistakable. It is the threat to use Germany's military might in order to enforce what he considers the rights of the German minority in Czechoslovakia. He insists that those rights will be enforced regardless of what France or Britain may think.

In substance, then, the speech was very belligerent. It was a threatening speech, hurling defiance to all the world—a speech that emphasized Germany's growing military might. But it was not a speech that creates an immediate crisis. For that we must look to action rather than to words. Good afternoon.

7:30-8:00 P.M.—INTERNATIONAL NEWS BROADCAST:
ROBERT TROUT (CBS Announcer): Tonight, as nations of the world digest the long-anticipated talk of Chancellor Adolf Hitler at Nuremberg, we will hear in rapid succession from London, Berlin, Prague and Paris... The four
speakers are to be: Edward R. Murrow, chief of Columbia's European staff, speaking from London; Melvin White-leather of the Associated Press, speaking from Berlin; William L. Shirer, Columbia's Central European representative, speaking from Prague; and John T. Whitaker, of the Chicago Daily News Syndicate, speaking from Paris. Mr. Murrow will speak to you now from London, England.

MURROW: ... There is little optimism in London, tonight.

WHITELEATHER (From Berlin): ... Nazi interpreters of Hitler's thoughts say a plebiscite in the Sudeten region might be acceptable.

SHIRER (From Prague): ... Everybody here went about his business as usual. ... Don't think the Czech people are gloomy or depressed or frightened. Not a bit of it!

WHITAKER (From Paris): ... If he were going to make war within the next few weeks, reason Frenchmen, why would he tell the Germans that their forts would not be ready until winter? ...
Tuesday, September 13

7:45-8:00 P.M. — MORNING NEWS REPORT
ANNOUNCER: The Czechoslovakian Government took a long chance today and declared martial law in five Sudeten German towns. . .

2:56 P.M. — SPECIAL BULLETIN
ANNOUNCER: The Sudeten German Party delivered an ultimatum to the Czech Government at 7:30 P.M., which is 2:30 EDT here. The ultimatum demands that military rule and extraordinary police measures imposed on Sudeten communities be canceled within six hours. The ultimatum therefore expires at 8:30 tonight, New York Time. If the terms are not complied with, the ultimatum declares, the Sudetens will not be responsible for the consequences. (See Appendix, Page 270.)

3:05 P.M. — SPECIAL BULLETIN
ANNOUNCER: Prime Minister Chamberlain immediately called the heads of defense into a conference at 10 Downing Street. Prices in Wall Street fell several points and the stock ticker ran as much as five minutes behind. Old-timers recalled similar conditions of 1914, just before the World War broke out. . .
ANNOUNCER: Word is flashed from Prague that the Czech Government has decided to ignore the Sudeten German ultimatum!

8:30-9:00 P.M. — Edward Murrow, Vernon Bartlett, London.

ANNOUNCER: I will now attempt to bring in London, where you will hear from Edward Murrow, Columbia's key representative in Europe, and Vernon Bartlett, British journalist, speaking from London, England.

MURROW: ... At London newsreel theatres tonight, pictures of Hitler were received in complete silence. ... BARTLETT: ... The main impression here at this time is that the situation is just a little better, but only a very little better. ... 

ANNOUNCER: Listening to our transatlantic calls from London is Mr. H. V. Kaltenborn, Columbia's commentator, who will interpret the late news we've been giving you.

KALTENBORN: Fundamentally, the crisis that we saw in the United States when we got the evening editions of our newspapers has abated temporarily at least. It is not now in that acute stage which sent the stock market down today, which brought these eight-column screamer heads and which made all of us think that perhaps, after all, the worst was at hand.

Let's just for a moment go over the succession of events that made that crisis seem so real: Yesterday, Adolf Hitler makes an inflammatory speech in Europe. That speech demands freedom for the Sudeten Germans. Hearing that speech, the Sudeten Germans become very much excited, and those of you who listened to Columbia's transmission of the Hitler address from Nuremberg know what that kind of excitement means.

They became very much excited; there were riots; there were clashes with the police, and as a result there were eleven deaths and nineteen injured in the Sudeten areas.
Following those riots and killings, the Czech Government immediately declared martial law. Martial law in a Republic means an attempt to prevent people from going about their normal contacts; to prevent those contacts from resulting in further bloodshed. That, then, is the event that created the excitement.

Following that declaration of martial law, Konrad Henlein, leader of the Sudetens, acted without apparently consulting Adolf Hitler or the leaders in Germany. Remember that Henlein occupies an anomalous position. He is a subject of Czechoslovakia and is not in any real sense a German, although we know that he has taken orders from Germany repeatedly. And so, I assume, on the basis of dispatches that I will discuss in just a moment, that he issued his ultimatum, which Bob Trout has read to you, without direct consultation with anyone in authority in Germany. Now, that ultimatum demands the repeal of martial law. It demands the withdrawal of the Czech police and turning over to the burgomasters the power to organize a substitute force. The reason for that demand is that the burgomaster is a German official elected by the Germans of the Sudeten district. The police, on the other hand, are under Czech control. Eliminating the Czechs and substituting Germans means turning the police power completely over to the Sudeten Nazis. This is, of course, one of the eight Carlsbad demands that Konrad Henlein made of the Czech Government.

In the third place, Henlein asks limitation of state's security officers to the normal strength, meaning that no military should be brought in. Fourth, that the military barracks should be separated from the civilian population to prevent the soldiers from exercising direct pressure upon the Germans in the area. Then, Henlein added, the ultimatum bearing these demands must be accepted within six hours. That is primarily what caused the excitement — the imposition of a time limit. Now, according to all the later dispatches, there is some doubt as to whether any such time
limit was set. My own conclusion is that there was no such exact time limit. Because, remember this, we've just had another dispatch stating that the Sudetens are to go to Prague tomorrow to demand directly from Benes that they have the right of self-determination; in other words, that they have a plebiscite. Well, you don't go to begin negotiations about a plebiscite when you have issued an ultimatum which has already expired and on the basis of which you say that you are going to decline all responsibility for everything that happens. So there is something not quite straight or complete about this six-hour ultimatum which, as I have said, was one of the prime reasons for the increase in general excitement tonight.

Prague naturally rejects the ultimatum. No government could accept an ultimatum of that kind from a minority of its population and continue to call itself a government. But with that usual diplomacy which characterizes Czech leaders, they say "Yes, we'll discuss it." It is perhaps in response to the Government's willingness to discuss it that the Sudetens are going to Prague tomorrow.

There is one curious point that has come up in the course of the dispatches, a very significant one. The Propaganda Ministry in Germany has declared that it does not consider the Sudeten demand as an ultimatum, and that it is the affair of the Sudeten Germans themselves. In other words, everything that we have heard from Berlin as to what Goering's newspaper has said about not wishing to throw Europe into war because of the three and a half million Sudeten Germans, everything that we've heard from Prague, everything that we've heard from London, or from Paris, suggests that we are not, as we thought a few hours ago, confronted with an ultimatum that carries us to the edge of war. Rather, it suggests that we are confronted with a further state in negotiations which are going to be supremely difficult and which may continue for a long time before we will be finally confronted with that fatal choice of complete yielding or war. Good night.
Wednesday, September 14

6:00 A.M. — PRESS RADIO BULLETIN
ANNOUNCER: This may be the day which will decide the burning question of whether Europe is to have war. The situation became more critical as the Czech Government received reports that three Czech policemen and one Sudeten German had been killed in disorders last night. New riotings bring to a total of twenty the violent deaths, which have occurred in the Sudeten area since Hitler made his Nuremberg speech on Monday.

6:30 A.M. — PRESS RADIO BULLETIN
ANNOUNCER: On orders from Washington, the United States Cruiser Nashville sailed from Portland for Gravesend, just below London, suddenly this morning. . . . In Eger, Czechoslovakia, thousands of German Jews, German Socialists and Czechs filled the railroad station seeking trains out of the city. Thousands have already left for the interior, fleeing, as they believe, for their lives. In London, stock and bonds broke on the stock exchange today. . . .

7:45-8:00 A.M. — MORNING NEWS REPORT
ANNOUNCER: In Czechoslovakia, at Schwaderbach this morning, one thousand Sudetens, many of them armed, are reported to be besieging the police station.
9:25 A.M. — Special Bulletin
Announcer: Adolf Hitler has called a conference of all his high military and political chiefs at his Bavarian home for this afternoon, the Belgian Ambassador to Berlin has just informed the Foreign Office. . . .

12:44 P.M. — Special Bulletin
Announcer: The United Press reports that fighting has broken out between Czech soldiers and Sudeten Germans in the town of Habersbirk, near Eger. First reports say that about two thousand are engaged in the outbreak. Details are lacking. . . .

3:30 P.M. — Special Bulletin
Announcer: From the Sudeten German battlefront comes the report that at least forty have been killed in the bloody fighting at Schwaderbach. The Czech authorities had ordered their men not to fire back because they feared shots might strike Germans across the border. After retiring from the police station, the Czech militia finally opened fire and the fight is still going on. . . .

4:00 P.M. — News Bulletin
Announcer: The French Government has completed plans for mobilizing two million reservists, in addition to the regular army, so as to have four million men under arms within a short time. . . .

4:16 P.M. — Special Bulletin
Announcer: Prime Minister Chamberlain has announced that he will fly to Germany tomorrow to meet Chancellor Hitler at Berchtesgaden in a final effort to head off European war.

6:30 P.M. — "Today" with Bob Trout
Trout: . . . At 8:30 tomorrow morning, London time, the Prime Minister will take off from Heston Airdrome near
London, accompanied by Sir Horace Wilson and William Strang. At 1:00 P.M., German time, the plane is due to drop out of the skies at Munich, whence Mr. Chamberlain will proceed to Adolf Hitler's mountain retreat at Berchtesgaden.

9:30-10:00 P.M. — Special London Broadcast —
Murrow Interviewing Lord Strabolgi — Kaltenborn Commenting from New York.


MURROW: Hello, America. Greetings from London. . . . (Rest of talk interrupted by static. KALTENBORN listens with earphones while TROUT comments.)

TROUT: . . . Mr. H. V. Kaltenborn, dean of radio commentators, has been listening here with me to the pick-ups from abroad, and now he is going to tell you what he thinks about these headlines.

KALTENBORN: I caught one or two things from the interview between Mr. Murrow and Lord Strabolgi which will interest you, if you were unable to catch them on your receivers. In the first place, he stated that British opinion greets the Chamberlain flight to Herr Hitler with relief and hope. In other words, there is the general feeling in Britain that this is a gesture which definitely makes for peace. That, I believe, will be the first reaction throughout the world. Certainly it is the response that came to me when I heard of this unprecedented journey. But, there was another note sounded in the discussion between Murrow and Lord Strabolgi. Mr. Murrow called the attention of Lord Strabolgi to the fact that there was a considerable opinion in England which recalled the unhappy results of the Hoare-Laval negotiations. You will remember that those negotiations resulted in the presentation of a plan which was rejected by Ethiopia, not commented on by Italy, and rejected so vig-
orously by the public opinion of Britain that it resulted in Mr. Hoare's resignation. That would indeed be an unhappy precedent for the Chamberlain attempt.

I should be inclined to agree that this move on Chamberlain's part showed courage. Mr. Chamberlain doesn't like to fly. This is the first occasion on which he has made a long air journey, and, moreover, he is going into the lion's den. He received no commitments from Hitler before he went. He went following Hitler's extremely belligerent speech. Under the circumstances, he comes as the petitioner, whereas Herr Hitler stands pat on what he said at Nuremberg and can respond or not, as he pleases.

I recalled, when I heard of Chamberlain's going, the events that preceded the World War and I couldn't think of a single important visit that the leader of one country paid to the leader of any other country in order to prevent that conflict. I could only remember the last time the head of a foreign state visited Herr Hitler at Berchtesgaden. That was the ill-fated visit of Chancellor Schuschnigg, which was the beginning of the end of Schuschnigg and of Austria. Also, a most unhappy analogy.

Now, what led directly to this flight? It was the fighting in the Sudeten areas. That has continued long enough to prove Adolf Hitler tolerates it even though he may not have ordered it. Henlein's followers may have interpreted Hitler's speech at Nuremberg as his order to go ahead and create a crisis. You remember that last night the big news was the Sudeten ultimatum. Today that has been forgotten, even though it was not complied with. As I said last night, the Sudeten Germans are in a dual position. Some things they do on their own account; others they do on orders from Berlin. I imagine that there is quite a little conflict there as to the exact steps which should be taken and how they should be taken.

The Czech Government ignored the Sudeten demands. It has declared martial law; it has mobilized army units; it has moved into the Sudeten areas and it is keeping control
of the entire territory. Not without bloodshed, because the fighting continues and the casualties are increasing. The most violent clashes—and here is the danger of immediate war—have been, at times almost on the German frontier. Remember that the Czechs have threatened to declare courts-martial and on the decision of these courts-martial to execute some of the civilian Sudetens who are responsible for the riots. Knowing what we do about the Nazis, we realize that their immediate reaction to such executions would be fresh propaganda to inflame Germany against the Czechs. From Hitler's point of view, this would be an ethical excuse for invasion. It is that situation which Chamberlain senses and which leads him at this time to make what is, after all, the most dramatic gesture that he could make. He is risking his prestige, risking his position, risking almost everything upon this journey. And the amazing thing, to me, is that he's risking it now, before things have actually come to the point where war does seem inevitable.

He has a plan—and perhaps that's the reason that he's going now. He has a plan that's been worked out between Britain and France. What can that plan be? Well, it can't be a plan for the immediate settlement of this problem. I don't believe that it would be possible to settle it as the result of a conversation between Chamberlain and Hitler alone. But, if the British follow the technique in which they are so adept and which they have used successfully in Spain and elsewhere, it will be a plan of postponement. The Czechoslovak delegate from Geneva said today: “Do we go on the butcher's block or have we found a champion who is going forth to battle?” Translated into other terms, that delegate is asking this: Must we Czechs give up to Germany our only dependable frontier, our richest industrial area and our right to exist as an independent nation? If not, then Chamberlain must have the courage to make it clear to Hitler that without Bohemia, Czechoslovakia would only be another Austria, incapable of independent life.

It's hard for me to believe that France has capitulated
on the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany without something in the background to offset that cession. And yet that is the dispatch which has come from France tonight. My feeling is that that is probably a part of the general plan. Perhaps it is the first step in an attempt to bring together into a general conference Germany and Italy, France and Britain, and possibly Russia, in order to try and work out something that will prevent a constant recurrence of crisis after crisis. But, if Chamberlain is ready to give up the Sudeten areas to Germany, it means the sacrifice of Czechoslovakia as an independent state. What would be left could not live either economically or politically. It would be overwhelmed by the power on the outside. Premier Daladier has, of course, a tremendous task on his hands if he is going to persuade the French people to accept the sacrifice of Czechoslovakia. There is an increasing feeling in France that it is a case of one thing happening after the other; and that it would not be long before Hitler would demand Alsace-Lorraine. You remember that Hitler referred to it in Nuremberg and said that when he gazed at the spires of the Cathedral of Strasbourg, it meant something to him and to the German people to make the "sacrifice," of permanently ceding Strasbourg to France.

A great deal depends on the personal mood in which Hitler receives Chamberlain. Hitler is a man of moods. I've noticed that each time I've had personal contact with him. Berchtesgaden is one of the loveliest places in all the world. There Hitler has a beautiful Swiss chalet halfway up the green-covered mountainside, where he can stand and look into Austria. I was told that that was one reason why he chose it—because he could look across into his native Austria. I remember that when he invited me to Berchtesgaden he sent his private car with his chauffeur and the head of his Foreign Press service to Munich to meet me. I'm just wondering whether he's going to come to Munich himself to greet the Prime Minister of Britain.

If he does not, I rather think that it will indicate that
he receives Chamberlain in the mood of a conqueror and that he considers that Chamberlain is coming to bargain. It will be a happy sign if he does come to Munich and has the interview with Chamberlain in Munich, as he could very well arrange to do at the Brown House. Hitler has a permanent apartment in Munich; he is there a great deal during the time he is at Berchtesgaden. He could readily save Chamberlain the three-hour journey from Munich to his country home. Well, we'll know more tomorrow as to what happened. We probably won't know until tomorrow afternoon because such conferences require more time than we anticipate.

I am convinced that Chamberlain will not go away empty-handed. He is bound to get something. The Prime Minister of Britain who would visit the leader of Germany won't return completely empty-handed. Chamberlain is skillful enough, and the two men with him are sufficiently skillful in matters of diplomacy, to bring back something. But my own feeling is that it will be little more than a truce. There is grave doubt as to whether or not the visit will bring peace.

11:00 P.M. — Evening News Report

ANNOUNCER: ... Chamberlain expects to land in Munich at 8:00 A.M., Eastern Daylight Time. ... Conditions seem to be growing worse in Sudetenland. ...
Thursday, September 15

7:45 A.M. — SPECIAL BULLETIN

8:47 A.M. — SPECIAL BULLETIN
Announcer: Prime Minister Chamberlain has just left Munich for Berchtesgaden by special train for his meeting with Adolf Hitler.

12:00 NOON — SPECIAL BULLETIN
Announcer: Prime Minister Chamberlain has just arrived at Chancellor Hitler's mountain home. . . .

2:30-2:45 P.M.
KALTENBORN: There are one or two factors that are worth consideration in the development of Mr. Chamberlain's visit to Herr Hitler. The first is that Adolf Hitler did not take the trouble to come to Munich to meet the British Prime Minister. He didn't need to do that because he had extended the invitation to come to Berchtesgaden. Nevertheless, it would have been much easier for Mr. Hitler to have made the short journey from Berchtesgaden to Munich than it was for the British Prime Minister to go all the way
from London to Berchtesgaden. In other words, if Adolf Hitler had been in a conciliatory mood, and had intended to show that he was ready to meet the British Chancellor half way in this negotiation, I believe he would have made that short journey to Munich.

The Grand Hotel in Berchtesgaden is not as grand as its name implies and has the disadvantage of being quite a number of miles away from Mr. Hitler’s chalet. And after all, Mr. Chamberlain is seventy years old. Recently he has suffered from gout.

This meeting comes at a crucial time. It comes at the height of the crisis. The situation in Czechoslovakia is steadily becoming worse and it has become worse since Chamberlain started on his journey. The news that we have had about the proclamation of martial law in additional districts, the news with reference to the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of additional Czech soldiers—all that indicates the Czech-German relations are at the boiling point. On the part of the Sudetens, we have a definite proclamation now that they don’t want compromise, or any further negotiation. They want union with the Reich. They have broken off negotiations; they have issued a defiant ultimatum. So we are confronted with a situation which might make German intervention extremely probable. It was the anticipation of the development of that crisis that brought Mr. Chamberlain to Berchtesgaden to confer with Hitler.

Here’s another interesting point—he’s met there by Dr. Otto Meissner. Meissner, whom I’ve met several times in the Hindenburg days, was President Hindenburg’s right-hand man. He’s the chief of the German Chancellery, one of the most experienced of the old-line German statesmen and diplomats. This is the first time that he has appeared prominently in the diplomatic picture in recent years. But Meissner is the sort of man who would appeal to Chamberlain. He can speak some English and he can help direct communication with Chamberlain which Hitler himself
cannot, because he doesn't speak a word of English. Ribbentrop, before he became Prime Minister, was the German Ambassador in London and he knows Mr. Chamberlain well. So in the presence of these two men, we have two mediators between Chamberlain and Hitler. That may help, because I can assure you that Mr. Hitler needs mediators. He gets very excited in conference. He's apt to start on a speech. He has been accumulating his material to present to Mr. Chamberlain and I know just how that will go. He'll start to relate what he calls the "atrocities" that have been committed by the Czechs against the Sudetens and he'll get into a fever of excitement; likely as not, he will continue to harangue Mr. Chamberlain for thirty minutes before anybody can get in a word edgewise. The presence of two mediators should be helpful, as will the presence of the two men whom Mr. Chamberlain has taken with him. One of them is Sir Horace John Wilson. He is the brain trust of the Chamberlain regime. He's one of Britain's first ranking civil servants and had a great deal to do with breaking that General Strike which was England's greatest crisis in 1926. The other man whom Mr. Chamberlain took along on his historic mission — and he only took two — is William Strang. Strang is the head of the British Foreign Office's Central European Department and he knows German and the German situation thoroughly.

What is most notable about the developments since we've had the first announcement of Mr. Chamberlain's visit is that this is to be not merely a quick negotiation to eliminate a crisis; later it is likely to develop into a general conference to settle Europe's problems.

My own feeling is that it is quite possible that Prime Minister Daladier and Premier Mussolini will be summoned to take some part in this conference before it ends. In other words, we'll be going back to the four-power idea which was launched by Mussolini some years ago and which at that time failed to meet with warm response. We may yet see, as a result of this striking development, a definite move-
ment by the leading Powers of Europe for the pacification of Europe.

4:45 P.M. — Special Bulletin
ANNOUNCER: The first conference between Chancellor Hitler and Prime Minister Chamberlain is now ended and the British visitors have returned to their headquarters in the Grand Hotel in Berchtesgaden. The British Prime Minister has announced that he will return to London tomorrow and come back to Berchtesgaden for another conference with Hitler within a few days.

6:30-6:45 P.M. — “Today” with Bob Trout
TROUT: . . . The very latest news is that Konrad Henlein, rumored to be in Germany on his way to Berchtesgaden, has been ordered arrested by the Czech Government on charges of treason. The order came after a proclamation broadcast by Henlein demanding annexation of Sudeten territory by Germany and denouncing the Czechs as murderers. This proclamation brought a fresh outburst of rioting in Sudeten towns. . . .

8:45-9:00 P.M.
KALTENBORN: Prime Minister Chamberlain leaves Berchtesgaden tomorrow morning with his first purpose accomplished. The fierce tension which gripped all Europe forty-eight hours ago has been relaxed as a result, first, of the Prime Minister’s determination to visit Hitler at Berchtesgaden; and secondly, because of the fact that he and Hitler have made sufficient progress to justify further conferences. It would have been quite possible that two men, of such different temperaments, each presenting such a different point of view, and representing countries so opposite in their characteristics, in their political policy and philosophy, would be unable to arrive at any agreement, and would have preferred to separate permanently after their first contact than to continue negotiations. But that has not happened. They have agreed sufficiently so that they can discuss
further the matters which they took up in their initial three-hour conference. We can rest assured that this conference concerned itself not only with the immediate problem of what was to be done about three and one-half million Sudeten Germans, but more largely with the fundamental problem of European peace.

I am convinced that the suggestion made by Prime Minister Daladier and his colleagues, transmitted to Mr. Chamberlain, just before Mr. Chamberlain announced his intention to visit Mr. Hitler, was a proposal that was broader in scope than the immediate issue in Czechoslovakia. It is on that account that it must be considered again in another conference, to take place somewhere else than Berchtesgaden, probably including representatives of at least two other Powers—France and Italy.

Chamberlain asked for the conference, then took the trouble to go right up to Hitler's home in the mountains of Bavaria. But the next move is going to be joint. Mr. Hitler must also physically transfer himself to some other place. And you know, very frequently, the shift in physical position means a shift in mental position.

The question is will that new place be in Germany? The very fact that a few days are to elapse in organizing the next conference, in notifying the delegates, brings about an easing of the situation.

Now let's go back a moment to Czechoslovakia itself. Events there are no longer nearly as important as they were. Forty-eight hours ago the world became tremendously excited because one of Henlein's deputies telephoned an ultimatum to Prague. That in itself was sufficient to give the whole world the jitters. Well, today Henlein, the leader of the Sudeten Germans, definitely proclaims that he intends to separate from Czechoslovakia and to have Sudetenland incorporated in the German ranks. That emphasizes the shift in the situation. The shift tonight is away from Czechoslovakia and toward the larger European picture.

Now what's going to happen when Mr. Chamberlain
gets back to London? Already the liberal elements in England are anxiously wondering what has their Prime Minister promised to the German Fuehrer; to what extent has he sold out Czechoslovakia; to what extent has he committed Britain to a general plan of settlement with Europe's dictators. They remember that Mr. Chamberlain right along has had a pro-dictator policy, at least a policy that pushed negotiations with them, and made concessions to them. He has advocated dealing with dictator states just as though they were ordinary representative governments. How many in England are apprehensive that perhaps this personal move on Chamberlain's part will result in bringing about a change in the European situation which will be in defiance of Britain's liberal traditions? I should imagine that tonight in England there is agitation not to permit Mr. Chamberlain to go back to another European conference without calling Parliament into session. This afternoon there was a meeting of the Speaker of the House of Commons and his technical associates to prepare plans for calling the House of Commons into session. It will be interesting to see whether Mr. Chamberlain will be able to continue his negotiations in the larger sphere in which they are now developing without being obliged to make a preliminary report to the House of Commons on his three-hour conversation with Adolf Hitler.

Mussolini, himself, has come out with a letter in which he urges the annexation of Sudetenland to Germany. Perhaps Czechoslovakia will counter with a suggestion for other plebiscites, plebiscites in the Italian Tyrol peopled by Germans, plebiscites in Danzig peopled by Germans, plebiscites in Memel, peopled by Germans.

11:00 P.M. — Evening News Report
ANNOUNCER: Chancellor Hitler has set the price on Europe's peace. That price, according to high Nazi spokesmen tonight, is the surrender by Czechoslovakia of all direct control of the Sudeten border areas.
**Friday, September 16**

6:31 A.M. — **NEWS BULLETIN**

**ANNOUNCER:** Prime Minister Chamberlain left Berchtesgaden in a pouring rain shortly after 9:00 A.M., German Time, or 4:00 A.M., Eastern Daylight Time. He should arrive in the British capital at about noon, New York Time.

12:44 P.M. — **SPECIAL BULLETIN**

**ANNOUNCER:** Prime Minister Chamberlain made this statement when he arrived a few minutes ago at Heston Airport, London: "Yesterday afternoon, I had a long talk with Herr Hitler. It was a frank talk but a friendly one. ... You won't, of course, expect me to discuss now what may be the results of the talk. ... Later on ... I am going to have another talk with Herr Hitler, only this time he has told me that it is his intention to come half way to meet me. He wishes to spare an old man another such long journey."

2:00-2:30 P.M. — **Shirer, Prague; Kaltenborn, New York**

**ANNOUNCER:** Ted Husing's description of the Men's and Women's Singles Tennis Championship matches, originally scheduled for this time, will be heard immediately after the following special broadcast. At this time we introduce William L. Shirer, Columbia's Central European representative,
who will speak to you from Prague, Czechoslovakia, followed by the comments of H. V. Kaltenborn. And now Mr. Shirer.

Shirer: Hello, America. This is Prague calling.

What this country would like to know tonight is whether Mr. Chamberlain has agreed to sacrifice Czechoslovakia to Hitler. No one, of course, in these rapidly changing hours can afford to be a prophet. But I get the very definite impression on all sides that the Czechs will not accept dismemberment, that they will not lie down and trust their fate even to a conference of the four big Western Powers. People here make it very plain that they'd rather go down fighting than surrender to German force and threats.

If the League Covenant, with the signatures of France and Britain on it, does not mean anything—what would be a new four-power guarantee be worth, they ask, the first moment a big neighbor wanted to break it?

Here in Prague the people remain as cool as ever. It really is fantastic, almost unbelievable.

Europe has been prey to the most fantastic rumors the last couple of days about the situation here. This morning, for instance, an Englishwoman, a friend of ours, came bursting into my room. She had driven all through the night from Vienna. Her husband was here. In Vienna last night she had heard the local radio announce that Prague had been set on fire. As there was a lot of static on the air she thought she could hear the flames crackling. She could not get her husband on the phone; so she rushed up here in a real panic. Needless to say, there was no fire. Not a word of truth in reports of riots here either. There hasn't been even the slightest demonstration.

One of the saddest sights I saw here today was the arrival of refugees from the Sudeten territory. There were three thousand or more, most German non-Nazis and a few Czechs, including some of the oldest officials up there, and almost all the incoming trains from the border were jammed
with women and children, and it was rather tragic to see them walking out of the station with their few belongings in bundles and baskets. The Red Cross got to work at once and is finding them lodging and food tonight.

KALTENBORN: Undoubtedly we are in now for a discussion of the general European problem in which, alas, poor little Czechoslovakia is only going to be a pawn.

I can quite understand what Mr. Shirer has just told us about the alarm in Prague, and his impression that the Czechs will not accept a compromise. Well, naturally, the Czechs are going to do their best to give that impression in order that the compromise, when it is offered, will be as favorable to them as possible.

But I am afraid that the poor Czechs will have to accept whatever the Allied Powers decree. For we cannot forget that Czechoslovakia was the creation of those Allied Powers. And they will contend that what they created they can destroy. What they did, they can undo. Czechoslovakia's boundaries are thus liable to readjustment, not only as far as Sudetenland is concerned, but concerning 700,000 discontented Hungarians, 100,000 discontented Poles. Just as soon as a definite cession of Sudetenland to Germany is up for consideration, Poland will demand the Teschen district and Hungary will demand that part of Slovakia, peopled by Hungarians, which is contiguous to her territory. The news is not particularly good this afternoon. In the first place, notice Prime Minister Chamberlain's extreme caution. He says that his talks with Hitler were "frank and friendly." And then he adds, "At least we now understand what is in one another's minds."

In the first place, that shows he did not really know what Hitler wanted and expected before he went to Berchtesgaden. We know that he was unable to direct negotiations with Hitler, through his Ambassador, either before or after the Nuremberg speech. Obviously the reason is that Herr Hitler knew that his own demands would not be pleasing to the Prime Minister.
I get the impression that it is not going to be an easy settlement. And the Czechs know that. Note the way the Czechs are acting. They realize that they have got to create a situation which will put them in bargaining position. So what do they do? They dissolve the Sudeten Party. They issue an order of arrest for Henlein, the leader. They confiscate all weapons. We are confronted with a situation now where Prime Minister Chamberlain is carrying to his own Cabinet tonight, to France tomorrow, and perhaps back to Herr Hitler in a general conference next Wednesday, a very definite suggestion that Czechoslovakia can no longer exist as it has existed in the past. There will be some readjustment at the expense of Czechoslovakia, to secure a general settlement of the European situation.

6:00 P.M. — News Bulletin

Announcer: ... Prime Minister Chamberlain has been closeted with King George in Buckingham Palace tonight after a series of conferences with his chief ministers at No. 10 Downing Street.

7:15-7:30 P.M. — London: Murrow; Sir Frederick Whyte

Announcer: Today has been particularly exciting in London following the return of Prime Minister Chamberlain from Berchtesgaden. In order to give you a first-hand report, Columbia presents now a special transatlantic broadcast, during which Edward R. Murrow, head of Columbia’s European staff, will speak from a vantage point overlooking No. 10 Downing Street, and during which he will introduce Sir Frederick Whyte, prominent London journalist, to comment on latest developments. We take you now to London, England.

Murrow: Sir Frederick Whyte is sitting before a microphone in another section of London, where he can give you his expert interpretation of the situation in London tonight. Many of you will remember his talks from London at the time of the abdication of Edward VIII. Listen now to his
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 16

analysis of the latest developments. Sir Frederick Whyte.

WHYTE: It's past midnight in London and people here are going to bed with the words the Prime Minister used on arriving at the distant airport later this afternoon. . . . But what is the attitude here? People say, well, if the Czechs don't like the plebiscite, Czechoslovakia is perhaps really not worth the worrying over. That if the Czechs have got to swallow something they don't like, maybe that's the necessary price to pay for preserving peace.

11:00-11:15 P.M.

KALTENBORN: The dominant thing in the news is the fact that the Czechs are going to have to pay the bill when the accounts are cashed up.

Now Prime Minister Chamberlain told us, when he landed, after his flight back from Germany, not to accept prematurely any unauthorized report of what took place. Well, since he has not told the world what took place, there is bound to be speculation. And the speculation and comment, from well-informed quarters, agrees on the one point: that Hitler has insisted that the Sudetenland must be ceded to Germany. I know Louis Lochner, who represents the Associated Press in Berlin, as a very careful correspondent, and he cites four demands that Herr Hitler made.

First, cede the Sudetenland.

Second, bring the Czech foreign policy into sympathy with Germany. That means, of course, the elimination of the Russian alliance and of the French alliance.

Third, develop economic conditions that favor Germany in Czechoslovakia. In other words, surrender to Germany from the economic point of view.

Fourth, direct the policy of the Skoda Munition Works in line with German interests. In other words, see that the Skoda Works produce the kind of munitions that the German Army needs and stop producing the kind of munitions that the French Army needs.

Mr. Eric Gould of the United Press declares that Prime
Minister Chamberlain told King George today that he is prepared to make any settlement, no matter what is involved, to keep Europe out of war. Well, Mr. Chamberlain, we know, has been in favor of making a settlement with dictators on almost any basis. But is he going to be able to win the rest of the British Cabinet to that point of view? Is he going to be able to win the British Parliament to that point of view? Now Ed Murrow and Sir Frederick Whyte, who talked to us tonight, on Columbia's special broadcast from London, both agreed that for the moment British opinion is absolutely behind Mr. Chamberlain. I can understand that. Mr. Chamberlain has made an extremely dramatic gesture. Why, it's the first time that he has delivered a piece of political showmanship and naturally it has caught the popular imagination. Sir Frederick Whyte quoted the words with which the German Charge d'Affairs in London characterized Mr. Chamberlain's undertaking. That German Charge d'Affairs called it "magnanimous initiative." Now when you can get that kind of a compliment from a Nazi, believe me you are going somewhere, because Nazi officials rarely compliment any action undertaken by a Britisher.

Sir Frederick Whyte feels that the House of Commons for the moment will support the Prime Minister's demand for the plebiscite. Now that's quite possible. The plebiscite itself is, of course, a democratic invention and when you put it on that basis it's pretty hard to resist the idea of having one. Of course, everything depends on conditions of the plebiscite and on the particular places where you are going to have it.

It's evident to me that the Czechs realize what's in the wind. Two members of the Czech Cabinet this evening make strong statements declaring that the Czech Government will resist any attempt to dismember Czechoslovakia through a plebiscite and that they will resist by whatever means are necessary. This shows that the Czechs realize they are put in a fair way to pay the price of European peace
and they are going to fight against it to the best of their ability. There’s only one thing that has happened today that has strengthened the Czech position, and that’s the decision of the Slovak minority party to break off all relations with the Sudeten Party and to cease all agitation against the Czech authorities. They say if they must be ruled they prefer the Czechs to the Nazis.

In a situation like this, which changes almost from hour to hour, something may happen. But for the moment there isn’t anything that tends to bring about an immediate crisis; to that extent the British Prime Minister has achieved his purpose. He knows that we were rapidly coming to a point where an explosion was absolutely certain, so his first and greatest concern was to gain time. That he has accomplished. That’s why he flew to Berchtesgaden. From a land of riot, Sudetenland has been transformed tonight to a land of quiet. Ominous quiet perhaps, but at least the world is discussing the terms of possible peace rather than the imminence of war. Still, I’d hate to have Lord Runciman’s job when Mr. Chamberlain sends him back to Prague to tell the Czechs what Hitler demands they sacrifice to save Europe’s peace.
Saturday, September 17

7:45 A.M. — MORNING NEWS REPORT
ANNOUNCER: . . . Prime Minister Chamberlain and his Cabinet are at this moment gathered round the polished oak table at No. 10 Downing Street, deciding whether to surrender to Hitler's demands or send Europe to war. . . . Hitler is waiting impatiently in Germany for the decision, and there are intimations that it must come soon if hostilities are to be averted. . . .

8:45 A.M. — NEWS BULLETIN
ANNOUNCER: . . . The British Cabinet has just adjourned.

ANNOUNCER: We have brought you a special transatlantic broadcast in which you heard Edward R. Murrow, chief of Columbia's European staff, from London. Here is H. V. Kaltenborn, Columbia's foreign news editor, from our New York studios.

KALTENBORN: Good morning, everybody.

Ed Murrow, speaking from London, emphasized British interest in the American point of view. The Britishers are asking: "What will the United States do?" They have noted the keen interest that President Roosevelt, that Secretary of State Hull, and that our Ambassador in London, Mr.
Kennedy, are taking in the day-to-day—yes, hour-to-hour—developments. Already some alarm has been expressed by our isolationists lest that interest be translated into tangible terms.

Well, knowing Mr. Hull and having followed very closely our European policy, I think I know what it means. It means that we are sympathetic with the efforts of Britain and France to restrain Herr Hitler from declaring war. It means that we want to express that sympathy, that we want to cooperate with England and France in the prevention of war, but at the same time we do not wish to become involved in war. The delicate and difficult problem which our State Department is confronted with is: How can we make the pressure of this great Republic felt at Berchtesgaden without committing us to actual intervention? That is the problem which Mr. Hull and the President are pondering every hour. They want to use our influence on the side of peace and yet they are apprehensive lest any incautious word or action should so arouse isolationist sentiment in the United States that the free expression of that sentiment would be carried to Herr Hitler in Berchtesgaden in some rude terms as "Oh, well, the Americans aren't going to do anything anyhow because the isolationists won't let them."

My feeling is that we are going to continue to express privately to the British our keen interest in a peaceful solution and our hope that they will be successful in exercising some restraining influence on the German Fuehrer. But for political reasons, it's going to be difficult for us to translate that expression into terms which would carry conviction in Berchtesgaden itself. Yet I am convinced that, our public opinion being what it is, if war should come, we would certainly show at least benevolent neutrality to the French and British in their effort to curb an act of German aggression.

Mr. Murrow also mentioned Spain and pointed out that Czechoslovakia is not an isolated issue. No, it is not.
Poland, as you have heard, asks for the Teschen district. Hungary is asking for the district contiguous to Hungary. In addition to those two demands on Czechoslovakia, there are a score of other problems that require adjustment in Europe before there can be peace. Some of them will be aired by Mussolini at Trieste today. So let no one assume that some sort of temporizing settlement of the Czechoslovakian situation, the ceding of some small portion of Czechoslovakia to Germany, will ultimately and finally settle anything.

No, it's a case where the appetite might well grow by what it is fed on. The compromise that violated the fundamental conditions of peace might make for war instead of peace. Good morning.

9:30 A.M. — NEWS BULLETIN
ANNOUNCER: Ward Price, London Daily Mail correspondent close to Hitler, reports from Berchtesgaden that the Fuehrer may not wait till next week for another conference, but may strike at once — perhaps within forty-eight hours. Price said thousands of German airplanes are poised for immediate take off. . . . Tomorrow Mussolini will make an important speech in Trieste. . . . Gas-mask distribution to the British and French public being speeded. . . .

12:51-1:09 P.M.
KALTENBORN: The British Cabinet has just ended its second emergency session of the day. The first was held earlier this morning. The second meeting lasted for two hours and forty minutes. As before, there has been no announcement, except of course the decision which came out an hour ago that the Prime Minister of France, M. Daladier, and the Foreign Minister, M. Bonnet, have been summoned to London. Meantime, as British diplomacy is doing its best to avert a culmination of the crisis, it is evident from the dispatches that the situation is growing more tense between Germany and Czechoslovakia. Lord Runciman is supposed
to have told the British Cabinet this morning that the Czechs will fight if any part of their territory is menaced. The controlled press in Germany is whipping up as best it can German feeling against Czechoslovakia. It is printing stories of atrocities, printing stories with reference to the refugees who are pouring across the frontier from Czechoslovakia into Germany. All that, too, is done in response to German orders, because if Germany said to the Sudetens, "Stay in Czechoslovakia," they'd stay. But they're coming out, and why?

Well, one reason is that Konrad Henlein, the Sudeten Party leader, has issued in Germany an appeal to his supporters in Czechoslovakia and in Germany to form a new organization around the Czechoslovak-German border. This new organization is to take the place of the Sudeten storm troopers who were outlawed by the Czech Government. That's exactly the technique followed by the Nazis with reference to Austria. After the Austrian Nazis carried on in a way that was treasonable, they were welcomed into Germany, organized there as the Austrian Legion and kept on the frontier with the idea that they would be used in the invasion of Austria when the time came. So we're seeing exactly the same technique now. No one should underestimate the ability of Propaganda Leader Goebbels and Dictator Hitler to exploit a crisis of this kind. They're on the job now.

The Czechs, however, realize the importance of the effect on public opinion of what they do. They have just created a propaganda ministry themselves. If their propaganda minister is wise, he'll make it clear to the world that the Sudetens, the Germans inhabiting the disputed districts, are divided among themselves as to exactly what they want. It's perfectly evident from what Mr. Shirer in Prague transmitted to us, through Ed Murrow this morning from London, that the split in the Sudeten Party is very deep. Yes, they did get a decisive majority in the municipal elections. But the demand for complete secession from
Czechoslovakia and union with Germany—that's something else again! There are a great many Sudetens who want complete autonomy within Czechoslovakia but who do not want union with Nazi Germany. That fact ought to be emphasized by the Czechs themselves because it is an excellent argument against a plebiscite so managed that it would turn over to Germany perhaps millions of people in Czechoslovakia who have no desire to go to Germany.

There's danger of course in the use of the word “plebiscite.” It suggests the Wilsonian ideas of self-determination and of democracy. But everything depends on how it’s used or where it’s used as to whether it is merely an excuse to act in the interest of the big powers. The Czechs are making it clear that they intend to fight to preserve their boundary lines. They have inquired of the United States whether it would be prepared to handle Czech affairs in Berlin in the face of a break in diplomatic relations. The inquiry was natural, since the United States, in a sense, was the godfather of the Czech Republic. The inspiration of the Czechoslovak Republic really came from Czechs in the United States and it was with our own Liberty Bell in Philadelphia that the Czech Republic was proclaimed. So it's natural that Czechoslovakia turns to its old friend and says, “If there is trouble—if we do break relations—will you, Uncle Sam, handle our affairs for us in Berlin?” Germany, meantime, has halted traffic on the Elbe River between Czechoslovakia and Germany. And hostages have been taken in Vienna. Germany denies that they have been taken in Berlin but perhaps it's a “protective custody” or whatever else they choose to call it. There again you've got to remember that you can give the thing a different name and yet it remains the same thing. That's why we've got to study all these dispatches from Europe with the utmost care.

The great difficulty today and the one that is facing all those who would seek a peaceful solution of the controversy is a definite division of opinion in Britain itself. It was
clearly reflected in this morning's British papers. The London *Times* came out again in an editorial suggesting a new frontier for Czechoslovakia—one that would put 500,000 Czechs under Nazi rule. Then at the head of the column the writer adds, "But these Czechs can migrate. They can shift into the Slavic part of Czechoslovakia." Why, yes, but so can the Germans migrate. That's what they're doing today. If the Czechs should be asked to leave their own country, well, certainly the Germans might well be asked to leave a country to which they have been treasonable and go to the country which they evidently love. After all, populations have been moved since the close of the World War and something could be done to transfer Germans who want to go into Germany under conditions that would make their continued economic existence possible.

Then there is the liberal press which takes issue with the *Times*. The *Daily Herald* fears a big power bloc against the Czechs. There is another demand for a session of Parliament, voiced this morning by the *News Chronicle*. So you've got to remember that in democratic countries like France and Britain, Prime Ministers can't settle everything. Chamberlain can't tell Adolf Hitler, "All right, have your way in Czechoslovakia, if you promise that you'll be good from now on." Oh, no, there are other voices that will be raised in the French Cabinet, even in the British Cabinet, certainly in the British House of Commons, certainly in the French Chamber of Deputies. They will say, "No, concession only makes the democracies weaker. Concession only makes the dictatorships stronger. There is an issue on which we must stand. We must be true to our pledges to little Czechoslovakia." And that is going to win an echo of popular sentiment in both Britain and France.

6:00 P.M. — NEWS BULLETIN

ANNOUNCER: ... Konrad Henlein, from his hide-out in Germany, is urging his followers to take up arms. ... Already the formation of a Sudeten fighting corps of armed
men on both sides of the Czech-German border has begun.

The Czech Government now has about 800,000 men under arms. The Czech Government leaders declare they are ready to fight if invaded.

6:45 P.M. — Philip Jordan, London

ANNOUNCER: Philip Jordan, correspondent of the London News Chronicle, will speak to you from London.

JORDAN: Just as I walked into this studio tonight, about a minute ago, a message came through from Prague to say that the Czech Government has just decreed a three months' state of emergency in their country. . . . London isn't as cheerful today as it was yesterday. . . . I saw Mr. Chamberlain return to Downing Street yesterday and the silence in which he was received by the crowd was a formidable silence. . . . Government secrecy is the order of the day over here. . . . I'm sure you'll be extremely glad to know that at the League Assembly today in Geneva, the British delegate announced with solemnity that this country was in favor of naval disarmament. It's good to find a laugh out of all this somehow. . . .

9:30-9:38 P.M.

KALTENBORN: Tomorrow's headlines will be justified if they emphasize the closer, harsher tension between Germany and Czechoslovakia. While statesmen are talking in London, military forces on both sides of the Czech frontier are acting. But we must remember that there is a good deal of attempt to propagandize in the moves that are being made on both sides of that frontier tonight. For the simple reason that whatever is done is intended to have a definite effect upon the negotiations that are proceeding in London. These negotiations will reach their climax tomorrow when the Prime Minister and the French Foreign Minister come to consult with their British colleagues and to determine finally upon a policy that is to be presented to Adolf Hitler on Tuesday — if they decide to have the meeting on Tuesday.
Therefore, Czechoslovakia is naturally anxious to show the entire world that she is prepared to fight. And so tonight she declares a state of emergency, which is the state that immediately precedes complete mobilization and war; the state that several countries declared in those fateful days of July and August, 1914, just before the war came. She declares it also in direct answer to Germany. But Germany is organizing a Henlein army on her frontier. Konrad Henlein has issued the proclamation. The refugees, so-called, are being rounded up and put into military service. They stand ready to march in. Remember that Germany is entirely mobilized. Remember that Czechoslovakia has 800,000 men under arms. It is a situation fraught with great danger, a situation that is tense. But at the same time, don't forget that both Czechoslovakia and Germany are trying to impress upon the statesmen of France and Britain the fact that they are ready and determined to fight. Germany wants to make that impression because she feels that then she can get what she wants because of the desire of the French and the British to preserve peace. And Czechoslovakia emphasizes her willingness to fight because she wants to restrain Britain and France from making those concessions which they might make if they thought that Czechoslovakia would peacefully accept them. You have then a situation that naturally leads to the most militant proclamations on both sides.

Britain is less cheerful tonight, as Philip Jordan told us. The reason is the Cabinet's secrecy. Remember that nothing official has been said as to exactly what passed between Prime Minister Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler—a most unusual circumstance in British tradition. Because, as a general thing, some inkling of what had passed would be given to the British public. Of course the reason is that it was not good news that Chamberlain brought back. He has an ultimatum from Adolf Hitler. He is trying now to work out some mitigation of that ultimatum and in that way to have a counter-proposal to carry back to Germany next week.
Sunday, September 18

5:00-6:15 A.M. — Arrival of French Ministers, Croydon Airport
Mussolini’s Address, Trieste, Italy
Kaltenborn, New York

ANNOUNCER: The Columbia network has opened its stations unusually early this Sunday to bring you the news from Europe. In our studio is H. V. Kaltenborn to break in from time to time to give you the significance of latest happenings. We take you first to London for a description of the arrival of the French Ministers at Croydon Airport. . . .

CROYDON ANNOUNCER: They arrived at 9:30 this morning, London Time. There was a thin, misty rain. The Prime Minister and Lord Halifax smilingly greeted M. Daladier and M. Bonnet as they descended from the plane. . . . The waiting crowds stirred a bit, but there was no noise, no shout of greeting. . . . Within three minutes after the plane descended, the four statesmen were on their way to Downing Street. . . .

MURROW (London): Latest information is that the French Ministers will return this evening. . . . Very few people here today believe that any real release from tension has been achieved. . . .

NEW YORK ANNOUNCER: . . . And now to Trieste, Italy.

TRIESTE ANNOUNCER (While Mussolini is heard speaking): The tremendous applause you hear tells you of the warm reception accorded Il Duce. . . . Il Duce is about to speak.

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The crowd is calling to Il Duce. Il Duce is speaking now. He has just told the people of Trieste that they belong to Italy and have always belonged. He says that what he is about to propose is suggested from a sense of European justice. He says the solution of the Czechoslovakian problem has only one answer—plebiscites—that all minorities in Czechoslovakia must have a plebiscite. Il Duce is saying that in case of war the place of Italy is already chosen. Il Duce is saying that the Hebrew is the enemy of Fascism.

KALTENBORN: The speech was significant, of course, chiefly with regard to what it said to the world concerning Italy's position on the Czechoslovakian problem. According to Il Duce, there is only one answer. That answer is the plebiscite. The interesting aspect of Mussolini's suggestion is that it is to be a plebiscite not only for the Sudeten Germans, but for all the races within Czechoslovakia.

Remember that means that in the district which adjoins Poland, something like 100,000 Poles are to have the opportunity of deciding whether their particular district is to go back to Poland. And there is no question but that their answer will be in the affirmative. That means that something like 700,000 Hungarians, and perhaps, several hundred thousand Slovaks, who for many years lived in close association with those Hungarians within the borders of Hungary, are to decide by their own free will, as to whether or not they are to go back to Hungary. And there is little question as to what their decision will be.

When something like a million and a half Russians and Ruthenians and Ukranians are given their choice, which is what will happen if Mussolini has his way, as to whether they are to remain subjects of dismembered Czechoslovakia, or achieve autonomy, there is little doubt as to what their choice will be. And what then, you ask, will be left of Czechoslovakia? Very little besides seven and a half million Czechs.

So you have just heard from Italy the presentation of
an entirely new point of view, which, we must assume, is not only Italy’s but to some extent Germany’s as well. We know that Germany has declared her friendship for Hungary, her desire to see Hungary’s boundaries changed. We know therefore that the proposal Mr. Chamberlain brought back to London—and I assume that Mussolini has been thoroughly informed as to the conversation between Hitler and Chamberlain—not only involves, as we have perhaps supposed up to now, the three and a half million Germans within Czechoslovakia, but concerns every one of the races which were incorporated into that newly created post-war state.

“We hope,” Mussolini declared, “for a quick and pacific solution!” Although, he added, “Moscow hopes otherwise.” There again you have one of the rare references to Soviet Russia since the beginning of the crisis. Mussolini’s apparent suggestion here is that Moscow actually wants a war. Well, those of us who have studied the internal situation of Russia, those of us who know her preoccupation with the situation in the Far East, have been inclined to doubt that. But Mussolini expresses it as his opinion that Moscow would like to fish in the troubled waters of another European war.

Of course, he is undoubtedly referring to the general Communist ideology, which has always favored fishing in troubled waters, which has always felt that capitalism is going to destroy itself by capitalist war between nations. When that happens, so their ideology tells us, the Communists will step in and realize their hopes for this great international brotherhood which is expressed in their slogan—“Workers of the World Unite.”

Mussolini referred briefly to the position of the Jews in Italy. There he was much more restrained, much more conscious of the important role that the Jews have played in Italian life, than Hitler has been with reference to the Jews in Germany. He declares that, generally speaking, many Jews for the past sixteen years have been enemies of Fascism. He points out that those Jews who have been patriotic
and have rendered services in the Italian army, or otherwise cooperated with the new Italian state, have nothing to fear. But he adds a word of advice to the Jews, outside the boundaries of Italy, cautioning them not to interfere with his new Jewish policy at the cost of injuring rather than helping Italian Jews.

Those were the main points of the Mussolini address insofar as they affect the outside world. But perhaps the most important phrase of all was Mussolini's statement that in case of war Italy's side was already chosen. Now the natural implication is that since Italy is a part of the Rome-Berlin axis, Italy's choice would be on the side of Germany. But Mussolini is enough of a diplomat, enough of a shrewd student of world affairs, enough of a patriotic Italian leader, not to have made any decisive, definite commitment of Italy to Germany's side. He might have said that Germany under the great Hitler and Italy under Mussolini will march together in the ranks of battle. He might have said that the interests of Germany and Italy are so closely allied that in case of war they must stand together against the common enemy. He said none of those things. Only in one phrase did he declare that Italy's place is already chosen.

What if Italy should decide to choose a place that was not at Germany's side but that was at the side of her traditional, historic friend, Great Britain, or at the side of her Latin sister, France, with whom for so long, up to the time of the Triple Alliance, Italy was in close intimate friendship and relationship? If that should be the final choice, Mussolini could say afterwards to a questioning world, "I said that Italy's place had already been chosen." And it had been chosen. But not as the world supposed.

There then are the salient facts of Mussolini's address before the people of Trieste.

7:01-7:35 A.M. - Premier Hodza, Prague
ANNOUNCER: . . . Calling Prague. Calling Prague. We take you now to Prague, Czechoslovakia.
SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 18

Premier Hodza: It is not only a question of peace. It is a question of the unity and the integrity of our whole Republic. This whole problem is now coming to a head.

Czechoslovakia has met all of her responsibilities. It now lies with all the others to do the same.

The so-called plebiscite can produce no solution whatsoever which will make for European peace. If a plebiscite were the real solution in the regulation of nationalities in Czechoslovakia it would have been a welcome instrument in the hands of the Peace Conference. Therefore a plebiscite in Czechoslovakia would create a series of entirely new problems.

In the name of the Government, I thank my countrymen with all my heart for the way in which you have resisted unfriendly propaganda and political agitation. Keep your patience. Do not accept rumors. All of us, the Government, the army, the population are at one. We are ready for whatever may come. We desire peace and freedom. We do not need to use strong words. We need and we have strong hearts and strong minds.

8:25-8:45 A.M.

Kaltenborn: We have had a busy and an interesting morning, listening to the short-wave stations from various parts of Europe, hearing Prime Minister Mussolini of Italy address the citizens of Trieste; hearing Premier Hodza, of Czechoslovakia, speaking from Prague. Each one of these speeches, naturally, was tremendously important as a factor in the rapidly developing European crisis. It is only a little while ago that Prime Minister Hodza of Czechoslovakia concluded his half-hour address in which he spoke to the Czech people at the time of their greatest crisis. He began by stating that Czechoslovakia flatly rejects the idea of any plebiscite. It would mean, he declares, a whole series of nationalities problems. By that he meant, of course, that just as soon as Czechoslovakia had the Sudeten portion of its population to secede and to join with Germany, some 700,000 Hun-
garians would vote to rejoin Hungary, 100,000 Poles would vote to rejoin Poland, and even a part of the Russian, Ruthenian and Ukranian population might, in preference to living in a Czechoslovakia that then would be dominated by Germany, decide to break away or to join with Russia.

Nevertheless, added the Premier of Czechoslovakia, "Our work for peace will continue, despite Konrad Henlein, despite the work of his agents, despite what has been done by the Sudetens, our attitude toward them is unchanged. We don't need Henlein to settle the Sudeten problem. We don't need Henlein's leaders. They have fled from their country because of the collapse of their uprising, and their leaving shows us that the majority of the Sudeten Germans want peace and desire to live in peace. The Government will not persecute them. It will continue its effort to settle the problem of the minorities within the framework of the Czechoslovak Republic."

Thus spoke the Premier of little Czechoslovakia, definitely warning the Prime Ministers of England and France who are in conference at this very moment at 10 Downing Street, that though they may decide on the plebiscite in Sudetenland, little Czechoslovakia will not accept their decision, but will, if she must, undertake the burden of war alone.

Earlier, Premier Mussolini spoke from Trieste, before the European crisis reached its present high point. It was evident that the address was not primarily intended for the outside world, but for the people of Trieste, telling them of the prospective greatness of their city and of their port, the development of which he has in mind. He mentioned the fact that a great change has taken place in the position of Trieste since March, 1938. By that he meant a new nearness to the German frontier. For with Austria incorporated, Germany is very much closer to Trieste. Those of us who have followed German policy know that there is a very definite ambition among pan-Germans to secure a port on the Adriatic. And the logical port for Germany is Trieste. If the time
ever comes when Hitler transfers his concern for minorities to the German minority in the Tyrol, it is certain that he would not rest content with taking that relatively small strip of Italy in which these 250,000 Germans live. He would carry on across the small distance to the important port of Trieste.

Mussolini declared that this position of Germany in Austria has created a new situation. And he then went on to say that a man who leads a great nation in a time of crisis must definitely take certain responsibilities.

Now let us glance for a moment at the situation in London, where, as I have told you, the French and British Prime Ministers are meeting this morning. There is divided opinion. As we caught from Ed Murrow his summary of the British press, it is perfectly obvious that there is a sharp clash of opinion that runs right squarely through the British public. Commander Stephen King-Hall, for example, declared in a signed article this morning, published in London, that the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia would definitely create a split, not only in the Cabinet, but in British public opinion. Reference has been made in England to the fact that the economic strangulation of Czechoslovakia by Germany has already begun because of the action of German steamship companies in refusing to cross the frontier and thereby stopping that very important transit of manufactured goods and raw materials which go down the Elbe River from Czechoslovakia into Germany and out to the world through the great German port of Hamburg. For remember that the Elbe is Czechoslovakia's principal lane of communication with the outside world.

The London Sunday Times declared that the Czechs have delayed appeasement too long, and that if France and Britain are to go to war, they have the right to lay down the conditions. In other words, that suggests, unless Czechoslovakia accepts what France and Britain decide in their conference this morning, Britain will wash her hands of the whole matter. The People, which is another British publica-
tion, has cited the three conditions which Hitler is supposed to have given to Mr. Chamberlain, and these again agree with those conditions which I have repeatedly outlined for you as coming to us from various capitals, from Berlin, from France, and from London. In other words, all correspondents who have had contact with the personalities who know what transpired between Prime Minister Chamberlain and Fuehrer Hitler have declared that these three conditions were laid down by the German leader. (1) A completecession of the German parts of Sudetenland to Germany by Czechoslovakia. (2) Complete autonomy within Czechoslovakia for those districts in which there is a strong German minority. And (3) some kind of European guarantee—perhaps a four-power guarantee in which Italy, Germany, France and England would join, and which would guarantee to Czechoslovakia the balance of her territory. But what could that guarantee be worth, particularly in the light of Mussolini’s insistence this morning that the plebiscite should apply not only to the Sudetenland, but to every minority within Czechoslovakia? The guarantee, if that suggestion were accepted, would then finally come down to only the seven and a half million Czechs who would occupy a small portion of the Czechoslovakian state and whose capacity for continued economic existence would certainly be far less than that of Austria before her absorption into Germany.

The London *Standard* wants to bring Germany into another alliance of peace. And it declares that the impression grows in London that the French are going to support Chamberlain.

Well, let us turn for a moment to France and see if that impression is justified. Public opinion in France is sharply divided. There is no question about that. The French press, of course, always represents two extremes of opinion, the royalist and the communist, and you have all shades in between. But French leaders such as Flandin, such as ex-Premier Laval, such as M. Tardieu, very definitely oppose
France's going to war to keep her commitments to Czechoslovakia. They, according to the public statements they have made, would be perfectly willing to accept the plebiscite idea, and feel that if Czechoslovakia does not accept that suggestion, then France should refuse to go to war on her behalf.

On the other hand, the press of the left, representing the Socialists, the Communists, the Radical Socialists and certain other liberal groups, definitely maintains that France should keep to her obligations; that this is the time for France to strike; that France and the other democracies will never be stronger with reference to Germany than they are today; and that if further demands are permitted, French territory itself will eventually be invaded. And so they say the time for us to stand up for our rights, the time to stand up for our obligations is now, and not later.

In Berlin, meanwhile, we have continued emphasis on what they call the "disorders," on what they call "the cruel oppression of the Sudetens." They are evidently welcoming refugees across the frontier. They are establishing camps for them. They are emphasizing the numbers that are fleeing from Czechoslovakia into Germany and they are organizing a Czechoslovakian army — an army made up of Sudeten Germans who are subjects of Czechoslovakia. They are organizing that army on the Czech frontier to be prepared to strike when Germany gives the word.

On the other side of the frontier, the Czechs are standing firm. They have declared a state of national emergency, the last step preparatory to a declaration of war. Their Premier has just announced to the world that Czechoslovakia will not yield in the matter of a plebiscite. And so we have the impasse. The firm desire of the Prime Minister of Great Britain and his chief aides to make such concessions to Germany as will prevent war, opposed to the determination of the Czechs to defend their national independence. That is the way matters stand this Sunday morning.
ANNOUNCER: We take you now to Prague, Czechoslovakia.

SHIRER: Hello, America... this is Prague calling. The news from here today is that Czechoslovakia finally refuses the plebiscite.

Let's take a look this nice Sabbath afternoon at a city in a country that for a week now has seemed to be on the verge of war. How do people look? What do they do? Let's look at Prague. Everyone here realizes that if the worst comes to the worst it'll be very much different than in 1914. Then, in the cities at least, people were safe. The danger was for the soldier at the front. But everyone in Prague knows that this sprawling capital of a million people can be reached by enemy bombers in just twenty-one minutes. Most of them know that there is no absolute defense against aerial bombardment. They know about high explosives and they know about gas. And yet, here is a strange thing: knowing that, the population of this city has maintained the most amazing coldbloodedness I have ever seen in all my experience of revolutions and war. All the American correspondents who have seen the fighting in the Sudetenland this week agree on two things: First, that the fighting in each case was started by the Sudetens, who were well armed with German guns; second, that the Czech police and troops in the circumstances acted with remarkable reserve. They used their arms only when they were being fired at and they made very few arrests.

And now, Mr. Houghton of the Toronto Star has just come in. You've just come from Sudeten country, I take it. Do you find any tension or excitement up there?

HOUGHTON: Yes, I have just this minute returned. I was with Mr. Morrison and Mr. Vincent Sheehan. We drove yesterday and today through the Northwestern Bohemian valleys where Czechoslovakia may have to meet her destiny. We found men, women and children living in suspense on top of a volcano.
Shirer: A volcano?
HoUGHTON: If ever I saw a volcano it was today. We left the beautiful city of Carlsbad early today and drove to the frontiers, through Eger and Asch where men have died this week and up in that narrow Czechoslovakian territory that runs like a fortified sore thumb into Bavaria. We found enormous, ominous and preternatural calm in all those towns and villages. We would stop at the entrance to a town and show our pass and then drive down streets without seeing a living soul except soldiers and policemen. The nearer we got to the frontier the fewer soldiers we saw.
Shirer: Well, Mr. Houghton, where were the people?
HoUGHTON: In the houses and in the cafés, but not walking and gossiping in the streets. Assembling in the street is forbidden now in those Sudeten districts; assembly means trouble. Occasionally we saw the proclamations with the glaring warning that violation of the special regulations could be punished with death. No one was taking chances. Several times we heard a "Heil Hitler" as we passed. But I must say, even in those districts which are said to be 80 per cent Nazi, we were greeted with the clenched fist of the popular, or anti-Fascist front as often as with the Nazi greeting. What we never heard was laughter.
Shirer: Did you see any fighting up there between the Sudetens and the gendarmes?
HoUGHTON: None whatever. We saw at Eger the hotels and railroad stations which had been battered and dented by bullets, and the places where Czech policemen were killed.
Shirer: But what about the refugees? Did you see any refugees?
HoUGHTON: We saw the refugee camps where hundreds of German Social Democrats, men, women and children, had taken refuge from the wrath to come. And wherever we saw these refugees and wherever we saw Czech soldiers or civilians, we were talking to representatives of a small democracy, who assuredly will, if fate demands it, sell their freedom high in defense of democracy.
KALTENBORN: The outstanding thing in Mr. Shirer's interesting talk from Prague is his emphasis on the no-plebiscite decision of the Czechoslovaks. That no-plebiscite decision was expressed, as some of you may have heard, by the Prime Minister of that country in a very forceful, vigorous, well-tempered speech which he made this morning. But some of you who were up early enough may have also heard the Prime Minister of Italy speak. He said "there must be a plebiscite." Thus we had the interesting experience this morning of hearing the Prime Ministers of two countries engage in a far-flung radio debate as to the best means of solving the present crisis in Czechoslovakia.

Czechoslovakia is emphasizing the fact that she must maintain order, and it was interesting to get from both Mr. Shirer and his colleague, who had just returned from Sudetenland, the fact that order is being preserved. That is a tribute to the efficiency of Czechoslovakian police organization. It also indicates that a good part of the dissident elements in Sudetenland have now fled across the border into Germany. It makes one wonder just how much agitation there would be for complete independence and for union with Germany if inspiration directly from Germany were lacking. We have the unprejudiced eye-witness story of American and British correspondents who are unanimous in saying that they observed no oppression of Sudetens by the Czechs. On the contrary, they make two points — first, that the fighting was started by Sudetens who had German guns. These bloody clashes of which we have been reading so much were initiated by the Sudetens themselves, probably on orders from Germany, and they were carried through with German weapons, the possession of which is illegal in Czechoslovakia and has been illegal for some time.

The second point is that the Czech police, despite provocation, despite the fact that their associates were being killed and wounded, showed remarkable restraint. Czechoslovakia is obviously keeping its nerve.
It is interesting that these American correspondents who have traveled through Sudetenland saw the clenched fist of the Popular Front as often as they heard the Heil Hitler salutation. That suggests that there is at least a considerable minority of those who do not agree with Konrad Henlein in the Sudeten area. That brings us to the very heart of this problem of the plebiscite which has now been debated for four hours between the French and British Premiers at 10 Downing Street, London, in a conference that seems to be without end. The heart of the problem is this: If we transfer by a majority plebiscite the Sudeten Germans to Germany, what is to be done about the almost 1,000,000 inhabitants of that territory, including Germans who are democratic in principle and purpose, including Jews, including Czechs, who would then be subjected to the tender mercies of Nazidom in Germany?

5:30-6:00 P.M. — EUROPEAN ROUNDUP, LONDON, BERLIN

Kaltenborn, New York

ANNOUNCER: The program originally scheduled for this time has been canceled. . . . At this time, we plan to bring you to London for commentary by Edward Murrow . . . to Berlin for commentary by Pierre Huss, chief of the International News Bureau there . . . then back to New York for an interpretation by H. V. Kaltenborn.

Murrow (London): The French Ministers, M. Daladier and M. Bonnet, so far today have spent seven and a half hours in conference with the so-called Inner Cabinet here in London. Just fifteen minutes ago, at about quarter past ten in London, they returned again to Downing Street to pursue their discussions.

There have been large crowds in Whitehall today. . . . There was an orderly demonstration by Left Wing groups in Trafalgar Square this afternoon. It's just been 'semi-officially announced that Mr. Chamberlain will not return to Germany before Tuesday of this week. It has been officially announced that the British Cabinet will meet at
eleven o'clock tomorrow morning. The conviction seems to be growing here that some solution will be found on a basis of what is called by certain newspapers in London "rough" justice. Some of the Government's critics are inquiring just how rough the justice will be.

A little while ago the Czech Minister in London, Mr. Jan Masaryk, informed Downing Street that the Czechoslovakian Government will not be a party to any arrangement negotiated in their absence.

Within the last hour I've talked with competent observers in Paris and in Rome. There seems to be little change in the situation in Paris. . . . Premier Mussolini's speech at Trieste this morning created no surprise in London. The feeling seems to be that he's watching and waiting. The observers in Italy, however, think that the axis remains firm, and they urged me by phone not to be misled by rumors of internal dissension in Italy. It is stated tonight in Rome that Premier Mussolini will speak again on Wednesday, and according to certain of the correspondents in Rome, he is expected at that time to reply to the speech made today by Premier Hodza of Czechoslovakia.

Mr. Frank Garvelle is here in the studio tonight. I think I should tell you that he is a member of the Liberal Party, a professor, an author, a lecturer and that he has traveled widely both in the United States and in Great Britain, and on the Continent as well.

Garvelle: I really believe that British opinion is more nearly unanimous this week-end than it has been for a long time past. Mr. Chamberlain, by his initiative of last week, has captured the imagination even of his political opponents. The Opposition still feel it to be politically impossible to criticize the Chamberlain line.

I have spent part of the last week down in Dorset, a county some one hundred miles from London. The villagers in Dorset, a few months ago, were utterly uninterested. The very name Czechoslovakia meant nothing to them. Today those villagers know Czechoslovakia. They would, if neces-
sary, fight for it, if their Government asked them to do so.

If Mr. Chamberlain were to announce before or after his next talk with Herr Hitler that the British Government believes that a plebiscite of Sudeten Germany would be a satisfactory solution, then, Mr. Chamberlain, I think, can be sure of the overwhelming backing of the British public.

Murrow: Where do you see Mr. Eden's position in all this?

Garvelle: Mr. Eden would be one of those people who would be most unwilling to see Czechoslovakia really surrender. On the other hand, Mr. Eden would not adopt the dangerous policy of saying, "Czechoslovakia must be defended," if that seemed to mean war.

New York Announcer: ... Now to Berlin...

Pierre Huss (Berlin): The German radio throughout the day reminded the public that the Fuehrer has said he will not leave the Sudetens in the lurch. The German press is simply blazing with alarming accounts of alleged Czech atrocities against the Sudetens, with hair-raising descriptions of the flight of some eighty-five thousand Sudeten Germans into Germany, and with editorials predicting the day of reckoning. Yet the German public in all sections of the land, perhaps with the exception in districts neighboring directly around the Czech frontier, has seemed to enjoy this critical Sunday to the fullest extent.

Konrad Heinlein issued a new appeal to the Sudetens tonight in which he says, "The hour of liberation nears; therefore show resistance everywhere." Thousands of Sudetens are now streaming into the ranks of the Free Corps, ready to stake life and blood for liberation of the Homeland from the Czech yoke. It is announced tonight that these Legionnaires number already 40,000 men. ...

Kaltenborn: Well, they were certainly interestingly flavored — those comments you've just heard. That is part of our job at this time — to take you to the various capitals of the world and to give you an interpretation of the point of
view as it is expressed in those capitals. For only in that way can America, which desires to stay out of war and which is naturally a keenly interested spectator in the events of Europe, make up its mind as to what to do or what not to do.

Mr. Murrow told you that the Czech Minister, with the very good Czech name, Masaryk, informed Downing Street in the course of its memorable conference this afternoon that the attitude of Czechoslovakia is unchanged. The statement made by the Premier of Czechoslovakia which many of you heard over this network this morning stands. That statement was an unequivocal declaration that Czechoslovakia would not submit peacefully to mutilation by plebiscite.

It's interesting that the feeling in Paris is one of doubt and of hesitation because that reflects the feeling which, I am convinced, has been expressed by the French Premier and the French Foreign Minister in these long protracted conferences in London today. We were told by Mr. Murrow that Mussolini's speech created no surprise either in London or elsewhere. The feeling is that he is watching and waiting. Well, that is suggested by that doubtful phrase in Mussolini's speech — "If war comes, Italy has chosen the side on which she will act." It indicates exactly what London thinks it does — a watching and a waiting attitude. It was interesting to get the conservative viewpoint on probable British action and British opinion, as you had it this afternoon from Mr. Garvelle. You will remember that yesterday Columbia brought you the viewpoint of a representative of the London News Chronicle, one of the outstanding liberal papers. Today we had the reaction of another Englishman, and he summarized his point of view with the statement that if Chamberlain proposes a solution that means peace. No political party, whether it be the Labor Party or the Liberal Party, could oppose it without committing political suicide. And then we had the comments of Mr. Huss of the International News Service giving us
the Berlin point of view. He gave us the interesting information that there are now 40,000 men in the Henlein force and expressed the perfectly natural question as to whether these 40,000 men with guns in their hands, and with a very definite antagonism toward the Czech Government, can be controlled. And he cited the question which he had put to a prominent German official: "Can you prevent action precipitated from the German side?" His reply was "It depends upon Czech behavior." Well, then we can ask — "What has Czech behavior been?" The unanimous opinion of the American correspondents in Czechoslovakia, which Mr. Shirer conveyed to you from Prague this morning, is that the Czechs have shown remarkable restraint and that there has been positive aggression from the Sudetens with German arms.

That is confirmed in another AP dispatch which the Press Radio Bureau has just placed on my desk. It's a dispatch from Melvin K. Whiteleather who reports the details of the first attack led by Konrad Henlein's armed forces against the Czechoslovakian territory and Czechoslovakian subjects. One guard was seriously injured, a custom-house was partially destroyed, and when it was over, a Sudeten spokesman in Germany announced that this attack was only the first. That statement was issued as an official military communiqué, signed "Staff of the Sudeten German Free Corps." So we have the unusual circumstance of a group of free-lance soldiers, armed by Germany, established on German territory, declaring their intention to engage in continuous hostilities against a neighboring country with which Germany is still supposed to be at peace. Well, that's something that will be conveyed to the statesmen who are now conferring. It may be something that will play its part in their final decisions.

Here are two other dispatches that have just come in. One from Warsaw, Poland. The newspaper of the Government Party in Poland has come out with a demand declaring in effect that the Silesia area in Czechoslovakia is to
be ceded to Poland. Another dispatch—Budapest, Hungary—500 Hungarian Nazis marched in the downtown streets of Budapest shouting “Down with the Czechs.” The demonstrators cheered Mussolini’s address at Trieste, in which he demanded plebiscites for all minorities in Czechoslovakia.

Here we have the definite beginning of the movement for the complete disintegration of Czechoslovakia.

A plebiscite in the Sudeten area would be the beginning, not the end, of the disintegration of this little Czech Republic.

Mr. Huss in Berlin made an interesting point expressing undoubtedly a view that is freely voiced in Berlin—that no one in Berlin can see why Uncle Sam should take any particular interest in this problem. I’ve just contacted the State Department, calling their attention to certain dispatches that have come in here during the day and inquiring whether there was any official or unofficial comment. I find that the State Department prefers silence at this time. Undoubtedly, it is a discreet attitude. The President of the United States is extremely unlikely to step into so complicated and difficult a picture as is presented by the European situation just now. And yet, I am convinced, that beginning tomorrow there will be a whole series of conferences as to what the United States must do, can do, or must refrain from doing in order to preserve its peace if the peace of Europe should disappear. That is indeed a grievous problem; that explains why United States Ambassador Kennedy has been in such constant close touch with the British officials, why he saw Prime Minister Chamberlain within a few minutes after he had returned from his momentous visit to Berchtesgaden. Because the question of peace and war concerns not only Europe but the United States and all the world.

7:29 P.M. NEWS BULLETIN

ANNOUNCER: The conference between the French and British Government leaders has now disbanded. . . . The con-
ferees were together for a total of nine hours. . . . No decision is announced as yet. . . . It is not known whether a decision has been reached.

7:50 P.M. News Bulletin
Announcer: The British and French officials have issued an official communiqué, stating that France and Britain are in complete agreement on a policy for a peaceful solution of the Czechoslovakian question and possibly a general European settlement. . . . At this moment, the decisions have not yet been made clear. . . .

10:30-11:00 p.m. - "Headlines and By-lines"

Kaltenborn: My day began at 5:00 a.m. with Premier Mussolini's speech at Trieste. He complimented Prime Minister Chamberlain as a messenger of peace. He urged general plebiscites as the most logical solution. Later in the morning, Columbia broadcast the significant address of the Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia. The long delay before Prague transmitted the official English translation makes me believe that it was revised, so that the Czech Premier might answer the Italian Duce. In effect, Premier and Duce engaged in a radio debate with half the world listening in. What a change in the relations among statesmen, when they fly to their appointments and when now they stage their debates before all the world!

. . . Later in the day we heard from William Shirer, who is also stationed in Prague. He brought us the unanimous testimony of the American correspondents in Czechoslovakia on two points: First, that the Czech troops and police had exercised great restraint in restoring order in the Sudeten districts; second, that the fighting in each case was started by the Sudetens. Then we heard that Konrad Henlein was organizing guerrilla bands in Germany to make armed raids across the Czech frontier.

Every one of our frequent transmissions from London has emphasized the sharp division in British public opinion.
It runs through press, Parliament and Cabinet. We have just heard that France and Britain in today's protracted conferences reached an agreement to yield to Hitler and partition Czechoslovakia. But to become effective that plan must be ratified by the French and the British Cabinets. It must then be submitted to Adolf Hitler and must be approved by him. Czechoslovakia must be persuaded to accept partition without fighting.

That seven-power guarantee referred to in tonight's dispatches sounds fantastic to me. How can Hungary guarantee a frontier she has sworn to revise? How can Czechoslovakia attribute the slightest value to guarantees from Germany and Poland? Such a guarantee following dismemberment would be adding insult to injury.

What about mighty Russia? Why does she remain silent while the fate of Europe is in the balance? Russia is aloof because she says "a plague on both your houses." She dislikes Neville Chamberlain and all his works. Pravda, the Government organ in Moscow, has voiced bitter sarcasm over the Chamberlain proposal to save peace by giving Hitler what he wants. If France and Britain go to war against Germany to save the Czechs, Soviet Russia might help defeat her implacable enemy. But for the moment Russia waits and ponders and remembers that she has business in the Far East as well as in Europe.

And what about the position of America? What do we, the mightiest republic of them all, say now that Czechoslovakia—to which Uncle Sam was the proud godfather only so few years ago—makes her last desperate stand? Mighty America says that silence is golden. She refuses to speak.

We are primarily concerned in keeping out of war. The question is what is the best method, for our country, for any country, to keep out of war? Is concession, which is sometimes the easiest, also always the surest way to preserve peace? That is the question in the mind of every peace-minded man the world over tonight.
Monday, September 19

7:45 A.M. — MORNING NEWS REPORT
ANNOUNCER: . . . Chamberlain has called another meeting of the Cabinet. . . . The Czechs still refuse to let themselves be “sold down the river.” . . . More Czech army reserves have been called to the frontier and barbed wire entanglements and tank traps are being placed around Prague. . . . Foreigners are leaving Berlin with all possible speed. . . . So far as the Czechs alone are concerned, Germans look forward to a military adventure of only a few days at most. . . .

9:25 A.M. — NEWS BULLETIN
ANNOUNCER: . . . In Paris, the text of the French-British program for peaceful settlement has been handed to Dr. Stefan Osusky, Czech Minister, for transmission to Prague.

12:15-12:30 P.M.
ANNOUNCER: . . . The Ministers are meeting in Prague to consider the French-British plan for handing over the Sudeten German territories to Adolf Hitler. . . . Resentment is increasing among the Czech people. . . . Premier Musolini announces that he is going to make another speech tomorrow at the town of Udine, close to the border of Germany-Austria. . . .
KALLENBORN: Let's just make a survey of one country after
another and get a picture of exactly what the situation is in each this morning. Let’s begin with that little country which is in the very heart and center of this great crisis which involves today Europe, tomorrow perhaps the world.

Czechoslovakia has indicated to us, through the address yesterday of its Premier Hodza, that it is definitely determined to resist dismemberment. It has made that pledge not in belligerent or strident terms, but in a very quiet and very determined manner. This morning, as you have just heard, the Czechoslovak Government is meeting under the leadership of President Benes. That shrewd, able diplomat has sat in on many European crises. His cool judgment and far view have helped to settle many. Today he confronts the greatest crisis of his career. His little country is placed before the most difficult choice with which it could possibly be confronted, or which any statesman could possibly be asked to decide. For it looks at the moment as though Czechoslovakia had been forsaken by all her pledged allies, as though Britain and France and even Russia had decided that there was no way of checking the will of Adolf Hitler, no way of preventing him from carrying out his declared intentions.

The decision has not yet been made. Let me tell you this. It will not at once be an outright decision. Knowing both Benes and Hodza, I know that they are too shrewd to come out at once with a definite yes or a definite no. Naturally their best play is a play for time. Why? Because already there is rising in France and in Britain and in other countries a volume of indignation, which as the hours and the days pass, will increase and will develop and will threaten the existence of governments in democratic countries, where governments can be threatened by public opinion. So naturally the Czechs will play for time.

Perhaps they will accept certain phases of the suggestions made, reject others. In any case you can depend upon this: They’re not going to give an outright affirmative answer to the proposal that they amputate the Sudetenland
from Czechoslovakia and without *quid pro quo* turn it over to Adolf Hitler. If there is insistence on the part of France and Britain that they do that immediately, then the Czechs will fight.

However, we have not yet completed the negotiation stage of this crisis. I expect that Czechoslovakia will send back some sort of partial acceptance, some sort of counter-proposal, something that both the British and the French will have to take up before they can go back to Adolf Hitler on the Rhine, in order to discuss with him the final proposal. We have just had a telegram which is to the effect that the meeting with Hitler will only come on Wednesday or Thursday, whereas I remember that yesterday we repeatedly brought you news that it would probably be on Tuesday. That postponement suggests the expectation in London and in Paris that there will not be unqualified acceptance from Prague.

I mentioned that there is some reaction of public opinion against Hitler's plan, the details of which we do not yet know. We don't know them for the good reason that both leaders of France and of England realize that a great public reaction against those plans will arise when the details are published. Consequently they have been completely secretive from the moment that Chamberlain talked with Adolf Hitler. There has not been a single official comment or explanation of exactly what it was that Hitler asked or exactly what it is that Chamberlain and Daladier have decided to grant. Not one. And remember that everything that we have heard, all these headlines that are flashed across the press this morning, are headlines that are based on what well-informed, authoritative sources are supposed to have said.

I believe that what is quoted is substantially accurate, but the fact that it is still kept secret suggests the possibility of modification.

As you look at the situation in France, Leon Blum, the Socialist leader, a man with a tremendous following, a man
who was twice Premier of France, and who organized the first Popular Front, a man of great power with both pen and word, has called a meeting of the French Socialist Members of the Chamber of Deputies. I'm convinced that that party will decisively reject the kind of surrender which Mr. Chamberlain and M. Daladier have agreed to make. For remember that the Socialist Party together with the Radical Socialist Party constitute the majority of the French Chamber of Deputies. In both France and England, if there is general parliamentary objection to this procedure, both Governments will be obliged to listen to Parliament. I do not believe that either Daladier or Chamberlain will be able to put this thing over in final form without getting the approval of the French Chamber of Deputies and the House of Commons. I'm convinced that public sentiment in both countries will concentrate on the demand that Parliament be asked to approve these terms before there is the final yielding.

In Britain we have word of riotous demonstrations following the Cabinet's decision. While there are, of course, no definite specific commitments on the part of England to fight for Czechoslovakia, nevertheless there is very definite commitment on the part of England to the Covenant of the League of Nations which, in Article 10, guarantees the territorial integrity of every member of the League. If that territorial integrity is violated by aggression, it means that England and France and Russia and fifty other countries are pledged to help the Czechs. Don't forget that the pledge to help the Czechs, which France has specifically undertaken and which Russia has undertaken on the provision that France first comes to the aid of Czechoslovakia, holds even though the Czechs may reject the plan completely and decide to fight. If they fight for the preservation of their territorial integrity against the kind of attack which Germany is planning, then France is still definitely pledged by her commitment of alliance with Czechoslovakia to step in. That is another matter, I am convinced, that the French
Chamber of Deputies will have to act upon before there can be a final decision one way or another.

In the case of Britain there is no such specific commitment. You will remember ex-Premier Baldwin's statement: "Britain's frontier today is on the Rhine." Well, the British can well say that that does not mean that their frontier is on the Moldau. But at the same time there are definite commitments on the part of Britain to France and there is the realization in Britain that if Germany moves against France undoubtedly Britain will be involved. After all, French-British cooperation is the only basis of possible resistance to the future demands of Adolf Hitler. It's perfectly obvious that with the prestige that he has accumulated during this past week, those future demands will not even wait for the few months that elapsed between the cession of Austria and the demand for Czechoslovakia. Those future demands will be such that both Britain and France will have to combine to meet them. That's the realization that is gradually dawning upon the people of both France and England; that's what's going to bring about popular reaction. Czechoslovakia's fate is not yet settled.


Announcer: . . . Czechoslovakia is appealing to Soviet Russia as her last friend. . . .

Kaltenborn: But Russia is separated from Czechoslovakia geographically. Get out your map and see what a difficult thing it would be for the Soviet Union to bring aid to Czechoslovakia. You will see that Rumania and Poland lie between, and while she might get permission to cross Rumania, even then she'd be at the extreme end of Czechoslovakia, with three mountain ranges intervening and practically no railroads running directly to Prague and to the farther German border of Czechoslovakia. And so her strategic problem is immense. But, before we consider strategy, diplomacy has the word, and the last diplomatic word has not yet been spoken.
MURROW (London): Good evening.

For the time being the Downing Street phase of the diplomatic war over Czechoslovakia seems to have ended. The question that's being asked in London tonight is, "Will Czechoslovakia accept the French-British proposal?"

The feeling in London seems to be that the agreement has been reached under the threat of force. The result is likely to be unpleasant but the decision should be made soon. That decision will probably be made in Prague, and tonight Britain looks to Prague.

ANNOUNCER (New York): And now for the latest news from France, let's call in Kenneth Downs, Chief of the International News Service Bureau in the French capital. We take you now to Paris, France.

DOWNS (Paris): All eyes here are on Prague tonight as France continues its tense watching and waiting.

At 1:30 P.M., Mr. Osusky, Czech Minister to France, departed from the Quai D'Orsay. He was visibly moved. There were tears in his eyes. He said "Our country has been condemned without being heard." Mr. Osusky would say no more. He jumped into an automobile and drove away. Perhaps for the first time it is being realized what Hitler's reaction will mean to the international setup. It must not be considered that the visit to Berchtesgaden received unlimited approbation even in conservative quarters. No matter which great English Cabinet members who have great influence in the Cabinet lacked character, it is almost certain that if France had not weakened, the British Cabinet of Downing Street would have remained faithful to the Franco-British accord of April 29, concerning Czechoslovakia, and which this afternoon no one dares discuss.

The next move in this delicate, dangerous game must come from Adolf Hitler and from the Prague Government, to whom the Franco-British plan has been submitted. Until then, France continues to prepare with the utmost care for
any eventuality. She continues her tense watching and waiting.

ANNOUNCER (New York): Those were the thoughts of London and Paris. And now let us get the picture of Berlin tonight. William Shirer has paused in Germany's capital on his way to Godesberg, where in that city he will report the highlights of the second meeting between Neville Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler. We take you now to Berlin, Germany.

SHIRER: This is Berlin calling. Germany like the rest of Europe is waiting on Prague tonight. But if I judge the temper of the people on the street right, and I've talked with many of them since flying up here from Prague this morning, they are waiting with a sense of relief. "Isn't it wonderful," I've been told 100 times today by scores of people who do not hide their sense of relief, "isn't it wonderful there's to be no war?" Today as the news came in that Britain and France—Britain and France, mind you—had agreed on a settlement which would hand over most of the Sudetens to this country, all felt that Chancellor Hitler had brought them undoubtedly the greatest victory of his career. However, the excitement on the Sudeten frontier, especially among the Sudetens who came over to this side, is at a furious pitch. I spent most of the evening at the side of a loudspeaker listening to a broadcast of a great Sudeten mass meeting tonight with thousands crowded into a great hall. They went literally mad with excitement.

"Sudeten brothers at home," the speaker roared, "keep your courage. The hour of your liberation nears." And then there was pandemonium of yelling. Here in Berlin the press is full of little other news except the Sudeten crisis. Here are some of tonight's typical headlines: "Women and Children Mowed Down by Armored Cars, Sudetens Complain." "Under the Bloody Regime. New Czech Murders of Germans." And the editor of the paper had a two-column editorial on the front page entitled, "Desperados," referring to the Czechs. The Berlin Zeitung has a front-page
headline, "Poison Gas Attack on Aussig," alleging a Czech plan to use poison gas on the German inhabitants of the town of Aussig. A Hamburg paper has this headline, "Extortion, Plundering, Shooting. Czech Terror in Sudeten German Land Grows Worse from Day to Day."

Now I don't say that that is my opinion of conditions there but I think it's interesting for you to get the picture as presented in the newspapers here in Berlin today. Day after tomorrow there is to be a meeting in Godesberg between Prime Minister Chamberlain and Chancellor Hitler, as you know. That little town is a hive of activity tonight. The whole town is being gaily decorated with pine-tree branches and bunting and thousands of flags and not only swastika flags, mind you, the Union Jack, too. One thing is certain, Mr. Chamberlain will certainly get a warm welcome. In fact, I get the impression in Berlin today that Mr. Chamberlain is a pretty popular figure around here.

10:30-11:00 P.M.

KALTENBORN: We have appraised American public opinion as we flashed from city to city and gave you the excerpts of editorials that will appear tomorrow morning. They mirror America's disappointment at the action of her two great sister democracies, France and Britain, in selling, as the phrase has it, poor Czechoslovakia down the river. For that is what it is. As I listened to these excerpts, I noted that the foreign press, as it was reflected to us this evening in Columbia's broadcasts from Berlin and Paris and in a telephone conversation which I had with Prague, says very much the same thing.

In Britain too among all newspapers of any liberal persuasion there is deep disappointment tonight. The News Chronicle, for example, is bitter because British papers have had no official news as to what terms are being proposed to Czechoslovakia, declaring that the controlled German press has actually gotten more news concerning this proposal than the free press of Britain. And Mr. Ed
Murrow who spoke to us from London gave us the resolution that the Council of Labor representing the Labor Party will present in Parliament at its first opportunity. This Party has adopted a resolution in which they “view with dismay the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia under the brutal threat of force.” And the resolution goes on to call it a base betrayal.

Mr. Murrow told us that there are many in Britain tonight who believe that the British Government would rather forget that it had ever sent Lord Runciman to Prague, for you will remember that he had worked out a compromise, a compromise which seemed fair to both sides, which Czechoslovakia had accepted and which it was expected the Sudetens could be persuaded to accept. Lord Runciman is now in London and Lady Runciman left Prague yesterday. There is no prospect that Lord Runciman will return to the Czechoslovak capital.

It is also said that we are facing the prospective end in Britain of the “watch, wait and trust Chamberlain” movement, because there is deep disappointment in large sections of British public opinion that this should be the result of what was hailed as the noble flight of the British Prime Minister across the Channel and across Germany in order to save the peace. And there is much sarcasm in Britain tonight about Mr. Henlein’s Volunteer Movement, which is organizing an army at the Czechoslovak border. One of the newspapers suggests that probably German tanks and German airplanes and German artillery are also going to volunteer very soon.

Mr. Downs, in speaking from Paris, told us how Daladier and Bonnet on their return from Britain brushed aside all questions, refusing to say even a word in response to questions of the newspaper men. And in France too there was no official announcement of any kind. Yet the newspapers there, as the newspapers in Britain and the newspapers in Germany and Czechoslovakia, have published terms that agree in the main points: the surrender of
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Sudetenland to Germany; something in the way of autonomy in some of its other divided districts; and then the greatest piece of sarcasm of all—a guarantee by France and Britain of the new frontiers.

There is an interesting comment by Pertinax, that veteran observer of foreign affairs who has made his contribution to the French press for so many years and who is often quoted. He says, "The whole game is the establishment of a German Middle Europe. It presents a greater danger of war than has been presented so far, a greater danger than if there had been a failure of the negotiations. The British and the French General Staff are agreed that with Germany dominating Middle Europe, the danger of war is greater than ever." And he adds this surprising statement: "If France had not weakened, Britain would have remained faithful to previous agreements."

Mr. Shirer gave us an interesting talk from Berlin in which he told us that the German people are sure that there will be no war. He declared that the publication in Berlin of the news that Britain and France had agreed to hand over the Sudetenland was greeted with an enormous sense of relief; that the Germans breathed more freely because they realized that now probably war would not come. He cited the opinion that he had found in Berlin that this meant a tremendous addition to Adolf Hitler's prestige, not only in Germany but all over the world. He said that the Germans were almost unanimous in their certainty that the Czechs would accept the proposal. He cited tonight's mass meeting at Dresden, told how he had listened to it on the loudspeaker, the great excitement, the mass hysteria, the tremendous enthusiasm that greeted the announcement that the Sudetenland would soon be free. He told of the cries that went up from the crowd, chanted in that peculiar fashion which many of you have heard as you have listened to broadcasts from Germany in recent years. He cited the Czech leader of the Sudeten with whom he had talked only two weeks ago in Prague.
and who at that time had argued only for autonomy and who tonight cried out for complete separation. And then he gave us a little sample of the headlines that are appearing in the Berlin press tonight, stating: "women and children mowed down by cars under the bloodthirsty Czech murderers."

Of course we who have had the reports of the American correspondents who have gone up and down from the Sudetenland these last few days know that these headlines are propaganda and not truth. One other point that Mr. Shirer brought us is extremely interesting and significant. There is one place where Prime Minister Chamberlain is extremely popular tonight, and that is Germany. We were told that the British Union Jack is being used to decorate Godesberg, that lovely little town on the Rhine where day after tomorrow the statesmen of Britain and Germany will meet to seal the fate of Czechoslovakia.

A few minutes ago I called up Prague, Czechoslovakia, and spoke there with Maurice Hindus, well-known lecturer and correspondent, and here is his story of the situation. It is the last word that comes from Prague and probably gives the truth of that doubtful situation on which, as Bob Trout told you a few moments ago, the two great press associations are still disagreed. Here is what Maurice Hindus told me over the telephone: "Before I left my Prague hotel to come to the telephone office, I asked the waiter who served my dinner — 'What is Czechoslovakia going to do?' 'We'll fight,' he replied. Going out the front door I asked the porter the same question. 'We'll fight' was his answer. There were three children on the sidewalk playing. 'What will your country do now?' I said to them. 'The Czechs are going to fight,' they answered. And the taxicab driver who brought me here repeated the same thing." Hindus went on to talk about the meeting of the Cabinet, and here is what he says about that: "When it comes to the Cabinet meeting, I have a different story to tell you. The Czech Cabinet has made up its mind to accept the British-French
proposal. It looks as though nine out of the ten members are for it and only one against it. The Prague press tonight is more heavily censored than ever before. The most significant thing is the contrast between the tenor of the editorials today and yesterday. Twenty-four hours ago every newspaper was urging the Government to stand firm and fight, and today all the editorial comment is tame. That means that the Prague Government is trying to prepare the Czech people for surrender.”

Maurice Hindus, as many of you know, is an expert on Russia. I asked him what Russia would do and he replied, “Russia will not fight unless France does.” That is the report of an expert on Czech and Russian affairs on the situation as it stands in the Czech capital tonight. I’ve just had a bulletin placed before me which states that the Czech Cabinet has recessed with no announcement, and that it will resume its session after a few hours’ rest.

I’ve said to you several times in the course of these broadcasts, we cannot expect an unequivocal answer from Czechoslovakia. It will not be a yes or no answer. Maurice Hindus gives us his opinion, and I’m inclined to agree that he’s right. From all that I have read and all that I have heard and all that I know, I don’t see how the Czech Cabinet can do otherwise. Russia, its last hope, has now declared that it would only hold to the terms of its alliance with both France and with Czechoslovakia, and no one could expect Russia to do anything more. Those terms require Russia to intervene only after France has intervened in case of an invasion of Czechoslovakia. There is no invasion, hence no cause for intervention by France, hence no cause for intervention by Russia.

After Manchuria, after Ethiopia, after China, after Spain, well, Czechoslovakia merely confirms the opinion that many have held: that once you grant complete leeway to force, it’s very difficult to bring into play once more the moral element of cooperation on behalf of peace.

Now, what’s the lesson for our own country? Naturally,
the lesson that is being emphasized in the press, the lesson that almost inevitably grows out of events is that the United States must stand aloof from a continent that for the moment is devoted to the glorification of force; that America must hold its own way; must continue to believe that ultimately something can be done to save those precious things which we hoped had come out of the World War, but which we realize, alas, have not yet come.

And here is a bulletin from Moscow, a *United Press* bulletin: "Military experts reveal tonight that Soviet Russia has six and a half million soldiers on the Ukraine and White Russian frontiers. Russia is said to be ready to deal with any situation which may arise from the German-Czech crisis." Ready, yes, but I doubt that Russia will act — not the way things stand tonight. And so while Europe seems destined to remain at peace, it is only a truce; force has triumphed, in the end, alas. The world will have to pay for the concessions that it makes tonight.
ANNOUNCER: This morning the Czech Cabinet has met again to determine the Government's course in regard to the French-British proposals. . . . Premier Mussolini will make another speech at Udine today . . . Admiral Horthy, regent of Hungary, has been conferring with Field Marshal Goering of Germany about the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. . . .

ANNOUNCER: Poland served notice today that she must be advised of any plan involving the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. . . .

ANNOUNCER: It is reported that Hitler will insist that his demands be met in full within a brief time limit. . . .

KALTENBORN: This so far has been one of the most quiet days since the crisis began, quiet because there is no decisive news from any one of the capitals with which we have been in such frequent contact during the past eight days.

But there will be news, news of the decision by Czechoslovakia which we hope to have when we broadcast from
Prague at 2:45 and bring you the voice of Maurice Hindus, analyzing the latest news from the hard-beset capital of the Czechoslovak nation. But early this afternoon (evening in Udine, Italy) Benito Mussolin made another address in which he made references to the present situation and here approximately is what he says: In 1922, the Italian people suffered grievously from a peace that was not commensurate with the sacrifices Italy made. . . . Today we are a proud state, and more than a state, we are an empire. We are stronger than ever on land, on sea and in the air. In addition to military power, we have power of the spirit. . . . We have the right to despise envious foreigners. The Italian people do not exist for the sole purpose of interesting or entertaining foreigners. . . . We choose, we prefer, to be held in fear. The world must sense that there is a new Italy, a hard Italy, an enduring Italy, a Fascist Italy. . . .

Only a few minutes before Benito Mussolini went on the air I was on the telephone with Mr. Shirer. He has been in Berlin, on his way to Godesberg on the Rhine, where Hitler and Chamberlain are to meet tomorrow. I chatted with him about the situation as it looks from Berlin this morning and he told me this:

Germany is absolutely confident today that the Czechs will yield Sudetenland, that they will not fight to retain the German districts of Czechoslovakia. Germany, he said, is absolutely quiet; there is no sense of crisis anywhere in Germany. He read to me the headlines from today's German newspapers and here as a few of them. "Serious situation in Prague." "The Reds riot in Czech territory." "Battles on the border." "Czechs start firing at dawn." You will catch from that the natural tendency on the part of the German press to emphasize the strange situation on the Czechoslovak-German frontier. Germany wants to impress on France and Britain a feeling of necessity to make every concession that Hitler has asked in order to prevent sporadic border fighting from developing into a war.

We are hopeful that soon we will get Prague's decision
on the proposal presented by Britain and France yesterday, which the Czech Cabinet has been discussing in all sessions, and which, perhaps within an hour, will be concluded.

2:45-3:00 P.M. — HINDUS, Prague
HINDUS: Hello, America. This is Prague talking. This morning a Czech woman said to me: “We have a bomb-proof cellar. Don’t hesitate to come over if we have any trouble.” I turned and asked: “Do you expect war?” She said, “I expect anything but the acceptance of the Anglo-French demand that would turn over to Hitler the land which is the greatest defense of our country. I have two children,” she went on, “but it’s better to fight than to give in.” There wasn’t a tremor in her voice when she spoke.

A little later in a café I ran into a group of men who were legionnaires and I asked them if they thought the Government would accept the proposal submitted by England and France. One man actually laughed and the others in one voice said, “No Government that would accept that proposal could remain in power.” “What might happen?” I said. “Anything, perhaps even a military dictatorship.” “And war?” I asked again. “Well, resistance,” said the man cautiously. “Czechs have never in their history submitted without a battle, and they are not going to now.”

A college student from a nearby village said to me: “Even if our older people were willing to accept the proposal, our youths would fight against them. We are not yet ready to cut our own throats.” I could go and multiply similar expressions of opinion of common people to whom I spoke today all over the city. I have yet to meet the man or the woman, the boy or the girl, who would say, “Anything is better than war.”

With such wholehearted resolution on the part of the people not to give in, what will the Czech Cabinet actually do? Last night it seemed for a moment that it was leaning
toward acceptance. But this afternoon the situation was very much changed. Newspapers came out with vigorous protests, leaving the unmistakable impression that the proposals were utterly unacceptable. The man in the street was more talkative than ever, more resolute than ever to fight rather than to yield. "If we don't fight," said an elderly shoemaker, "we're done for anyway. We might as well die fighting." So whatever the hesitations and deliberations of the Cabinet, the people stand firm. In this country the people really do matter; they have mattered since the very beginning of the Republic. It seems inconceivable that a Cabinet would disregard the will of the people.

The Cabinet's answer may be an acceptance with so many reservations that it will be tantamount to rejection, or a rejection with so many reservations that it may leave room open for further negotiations. At any rate, today, there is hardly anyone among the foreigners — I'm not talking about the Czechs now — in Prague with whom I talked who believes that the answer of the Cabinet will be an unqualified acceptance of the proposals submitted by France and England.

It should also be remembered that the army has not yet made its opinion manifest — not in public anyway. The army is not only loyal, but is superbly trained. It has the best possible equipment and plenty of everything. It is literally bursting with fighting spirit. Such an army, in my judgment, could not possibly tolerate the kind of submission that a Franco-British proposal would demand.

It looks at present as though the situation is as critical as it has been during the whole of the past week. Feeling against England and France is indescribably bitter. Four of us American writers went the other night to a Czech restaurant for dinner and when the manager heard us speak English, he told us he had no table for us, though there were many vacant tables in the restaurant. This morning a Canadian journalist was refused a cup of coffee in a Czech coffee house. One American journalist proposed that
Americans pin American flags on their coats to distinguish them from Britishers. The feeling against the French is even more pronounced than against the English. The Czechs were sure that whatever the British might do, the French would never desert them. As one man said to me, "The French tell us that her word is no better than Hitler's." This is very strong language, I admit, but it came from a very honest man and I'm sure that he was expressing the feeling of a great many of his compatriots.

Meanwhile more and more people are buying gas masks. Even foreigners are doing it. Last night there was a rumor that there would be an air raid and the streets were partly blackened out. More police have been seen in the streets, yet outwardly the city is as normal as though no threat of war had hung over it. The restaurants are crowded, the cafés are crowded, the motion-picture houses are crowded. Late last night or rather early this morning I dropped in at a number of wine cellars. Music was playing; young people were dancing and singing.

We have just received an official announcement of the Government as to the decision of the Cabinet. At Prague this evening the first communiqué was issued concerning the reply of the Czechoslovak Government to the proposal recommended to it by Great Britain and France. This communiqué reads: "The Czechoslovak Government has handed to the British and French Ministers in Prague a note in which the Government expresses its point of view with regard to the proposal which has been interpreted to it by Great Britain and France. This point of view makes further negotiations possible in the spirit of conciliation which the Czechoslovak Government has always shown."

KALTENBORN: That was a highly dramatic conclusion to the talk of Maurice Hindus from Prague. It gave the world first news of the answer of the Czech Government to the Franco-British proposals that it surrender Sudetenland to Germany. The answer is as I ventured to predict it would be when yesterday I said that the Czech Government would
naturally play for time; that it was not likely to give an unequivocal "yes" or "no" in reply to the proposals that had been made. As you heard the official communiqué read: "The point of view of the Czech Government makes further negotiations possible in the spirit of conciliation which the Czech Government has always shown."

In other words, the official communiqué does not reveal the text of the answer. And that is quite natural, for when Governments communicate with one another upon important subjects, they do not immediately issue the texts of those communications unless they desire to accomplish a propaganda purpose by doing so. Where negotiations are to be carried on, in a spirit of amity and conciliation (which is the spirit the Czech Government desires to emphasize), the communications are kept secret until they have reached the Government to which they are addressed. Then both Governments usually agree upon a simultaneous release. But we must remember that since we have not had any official statement as to the text of the original proposals — only probably 90 per cent accurate guesswork — it is only natural that the Czechoslovak Government's official answer is not yet released.

However, we do not know now that it is not an acceptance of the proposal. Nor is it a rejection of the proposals. It is the expression of a willingness to discuss what must be done to preserve peace, an expression in which the Czech Government emphasizes its desires for peace, its spirit of conciliation, demonstrated by the Czechoslovak Government in all the negotiations that have been carried on so far.

Mr. Hindus gave you an extremely interesting account of the spirit of the Czechoslovak people and that spirit, remember, is always tremendously important in a democratic government, where public opinion controls what a government can and must do.

Last night he pointed out to us that the Czech Government was definitely leaning toward acceptance. But the session last night was not final. And this morning the atmos-
phere and the situation have changed. One important point stressed by Mr. Hindus that has not previously been brought out in anything that I have seen from Prague is the part that the Czech Army might play in this situation.

That army, as he told you, has been trained for twenty years. It was generally recognized as one of the most powerful, one of the best-equipped, one of the finest-spirited armies of all Europe. And that army, on which the Czech people at a great sacrifice have expended a billion dollars in the two decades in which they have built it up—that army representing also the Czech people, for it is an army that comes from the people—will not be willing to surrender. That explains the statement that was made to Mr. Hindus by one of the Czech observers, that if the Cabinet should be unwise enough to make complete acceptance of this proposal, that then there might be a military dictatorship in which the army itself would act to create a government that would resist the German demands.

In a few hours the whole temper and the character of the situation in Europe have once more changed. Reflect for just a moment as to the effect of that change on the projected meeting tomorrow of Prime Minister Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler at Godesberg. They will have before them a reply from the Czech Government that is not direct acceptance. It is a reply that will require careful and delicate and patient negotiation. Knowing Adolf Hitler as I do, knowing his temper, knowing his spirit, knowing the attitude that he has shown, again and again, toward international problems, I am convinced that he personally cannot and will not enter such negotiations.

The chances are that the Godesberg meeting will be postponed because certainly the time is not ripe for a final showdown between the French representatives and the British representatives.

Here is a cable from Běšín. It just came in and it bears out what I just told you. It is not often that a commentator has the good fortune to be confirmed when he
has only just made his guess. But our Mr. Shirer in Berlin has just sent us word at this very moment that the special train scheduled to take the correspondents to Godesberg tonight will not leave. That is the immediate response from Germany to the answer that has come from Czechoslovakia. For these things are flashed instantaneously to the capitals of the world and decisions are instantaneously made. So what I said a moment ago is true: the negotiations are postponed. We are now confronted by a situation that may break out in military action on the Czechoslovakian frontier any time.

I read to you a little while ago the headlines from the German press this morning. Those headlines show that Germany is emphasizing the idea that Czech military forces are attacking Germans; that they are conducting raids on German soil. Now I must say again that the American correspondents who have been at the front in Sudetenland again and again and who are there today have found no evidence of any such aggression on the part of the Czech soldiers. On the contrary, there are two points on which all the Americans agree: That aggression has come entirely from the Sudetens. Second, that the Czech police and the Czech soldiers have acted with remarkable restraint. It is well that we should heed this testimony from neutral American sources, because our country has been bombarded and will continue to be bombarded with propaganda of every type and kind. Public opinion in the United States should be based on the truth and not on propaganda.

One more dispatch, yes—the discussion that has been taken up by Adolf Hitler with representatives of Poland and Hungary. Now that is important, because it is clear today that there can be no settlement of the Sudeten problem without the corresponding settlement for that part of Czechoslovakia which is inhabited by the Poles, the so-called Teschen district adjoining Silesia where there are 100,000 Poles who have not been particularly happy under Czech rule. Also, there is that much more important part of
Czechoslovakia lying contiguous to Hungary, taken from Hungary after the World War, and including 700,000 Hungarians. I am convinced that when we come to a final settlement of this problem, the Polish minority and the Hungarian minority will probably be taken care of on exactly the same basis as the German minority—that is, unless events get beyond control and war comes. If that happens, no one can tell what will come to pass. It is fortunate, though, that we have had this respite. It has given the world a chance to catch its second breath, so to speak. We were not hurried into an immediate crisis because in France, in Britain, in Czechoslovakia, even in Germany, there is perhaps a heartfelt appreciation of what a war might mean. That justifies some hope that we may be able to continue along the painful path of negotiations toward final peace.

5:00 to 5:36 P.M.—Shirer, Berlin, Godesberg Special Train Kaltenborn, New York

ANNOUNCER: The program of Let's Pretend, originally scheduled to be heard at this time over most of these same stations, has been cancelled in order that we may bring you another transatlantic broadcast of events from Berlin, Germany, by William L. Shirer. We take you now to Berlin, Germany.

SHIRER: This is Berlin calling. We are talking to you tonight from the Friedrichstrasse Bahnhof, probably Berlin's best-known railroad station. In a few minutes, at 10:20 P.M. our time (we are five hours ahead of you there in New York), we are off on a special train to Godesberg. We are not sure when Mr. Chamberlain is due there or even if he is coming, but the feeling here in Berlin and up here on the station platform as the foreign correspondents, British, American, Italian, Scandinavian and others, gather here, is that Mr. Chamberlain is coming, either tomorrow morning, tomorrow evening or the next day. If he does, we all agreed that it will certainly be the most important meeting Europe
has seen in this city because it will decide peace or war. By Thursday, therefore, we ought to know.

I see that the correspondents are gathering about, British and American correspondents. They usually wait until the last moment. One of them here I see is Mr. Pierre J. Huss of the International News Service. Pete, will you come up to the microphone?

Mr. Huss of the International News Service in Berlin.

Huss: Hello, folks. . . . The Czechs have been sold down the river, but the Czechs have not yet given up. . . .

Well, here's Bill Shirer again with the next act.

SHIRER: Pete, thank you very much.

There are a lot of British correspondents here, as well as American correspondents, and I suggest now we see how they look at the picture. Here is Mr. Cedric Patten of the London Daily Express.

PATTERN: . . . In London they thought that the crisis was practically over but tonight I was told on the phone "My God, it's just beginning." And that's what most of us think.

SHIRER: One of my friends, Ralph Barnes of the New York Herald Tribune, has just come up and he is going to tell us what he thinks.

BARNES: . . . I think that the strengthening of the Hungarian and Polish claims for slices of Czechoslovakia territory has been very noticeable over the last twenty-four hours. It complicates the situation very much. Certainly these factors will be noted in the talks which occur at Godesberg over the next day or two. . . .

SHIRER: Well, thank you very much, Ralph. And now I see we have found Webb Miller of the United Press. He has been looking for his baggage, and here he is.

WEBB MILLER: Good evening, Bill. In the last few days we have seen and the next few days we are going to see history in the making very rapidly. I think that the events of the past few days are going to change international affairs profoundly in Europe and especially in Central Europe. . . .
SHIRER: Here comes our train. We'll be at Godesberg in the morning. (Sound of train pulling out.)

ANNOUNCER: Columbia has just brought you an "on the scene" picture of events in the Friedrichstrasse Bahnhof, Berlin, Germany. For an analysis of the remarks in this broadcast and of the latest news, we present H. V. Kaltenborn.

KALTENBORN: When you get a whole sheaf of correspondents, Italian, French, English, American, male and female, you ought to get a lot of information. We got some, but it is necessary to read a little bit between the lines. You will remember that Mr. Shirer led off by telling you that attacks on Czechoslovakia were still being featured in the German papers. That is significant because the German papers feature what the Government wants them to feature. What they are playing up now prepares the German public, and perhaps a larger public, for a declaration by Germany at any time that this so-called warfare can no longer be tolerated and that the German Government must take steps to stop it. That is the significance of this continued press emphasis on incidents about which we hear nothing from Czechoslovakia or from any of the American correspondents.

Mr. Shirer also emphasized the importance of the presence in Germany of the Hungarian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, both of whom conferred in Berchtesgaden with Adolf Hitler and the fact that Regent Horthy, the head of the Hungarian nation, spent the day hunting with Field Marshal Goering in East Prussia, and presumably discussed with him what Hungary expects to get when the division of Czechoslovakia begins.

The Polish Ambassador to Germany also made the trip to Berchtesgaden and had a talk with the Chancellor. . . . The situation as yet is on the knees of the gods. We will know much more forty-eight hours from now than we know tonight.
9:00 P.M. — News Bulletin

Announcer: The United Press cables that Great Britain and France have notified Czechoslovakia that her answer is unsatisfactory, that unconditional acceptance must be delivered within twenty-four hours or Czechoslovakia will bear the consequences of invasion.

10:30-11:00 P.M. — Edward R. Murrow, London

Announcer: On the frontier of Czechoslovakia and Germany thousands of green-shirt Sudeten army men have been rushed into the battle lines on the German side of the frontier. The United Press says that the Germans have made the claim that Czech troops were preparing to attack with tanks and artillery. There is no indication from Czechoslovakia that any such attack is planned.

Hitler, himself, is now on his way to Godesberg from Munich, Germany, to meet Prime Minister Chamberlain flying from London Thursday. The French Government has taken steps to safeguard Paris by putting all work on air-raid protection in the Paris region under military rule.

In Warsaw, reports are current of Polish troop concentrations and in Teschen, Poland, at the Czechoslovakian border, a big demonstration was held against Czechoslovakia in the Polish half of the town. And now we're going to hear the chief of Columbia's European correspondents, Mr. Edward R. Murrow, in London. America calling Ed Murrow in London.

Murrow (London): This morning the British Press announced with what amounted to unanimity that Prague had accepted the Anglo-French proposals. Then late this afternoon came word that they hadn't done anything of the kind. The phrase "self-determination" has wide appeal in Europe, but the Czechs met it with a very attractive word, "arbitration." The Czechs appealed to the German-Czechoslovak treaty of arbitration continued at the time of and as part of the Locarno Treaty. And it's perhaps important
to remember that that treaty was reaffirmed by Germany at the time of the re-occupation of the Rhineland. Now this move pleased Mr. Chamberlain's opponents and irritated his supporters. The Labor Party wants to delay definite action. They feel that public opinion is hardening against Mr. Chamberlain, and that in a few days the situation may change. That's why Mr. Attlee, leader of the opposition, renewed his request that Parliament should be called. He wants to use Parliament as a sounding board to rally the country. Mr. Chamberlain refused his request on the grounds that at the present time he was engaged in exceedingly delicate negotiations and that Parliament would be called as soon as he was able to make a complete statement.

Now for a summary of the questions asked by the opposition. They ask why, if the Czechs were to be abandoned in the long run in spite of our pledge to respect and preserve their independence and frontiers, did our Government allow them to spend hard-earned millions on frontier defenses? Why did we allow them to incur the violent hatred of Germany? Why did we allow their police and officials to be murdered in defense of their posts? How do the English and French Cabinets suggest that we shall dress up the sentiment for American consumption, in view of the way we have been trying to cultivate opinion there and to gain support in the name of democracy and freedom?

The ultra-conservative press continues to object to the giving of guarantees to any country in Central Europe, including even a reduced Czechoslovakia. . . . I think perhaps you will be interested in England's reaction to American press comment concerning the Anglo-French plan. In the first place, it has been unfailingly quoted over here both in the papers and on the radio. I think that few people in London would say that today's events have improved Anglo-American relations. I've heard resentment of American press comment expressed by several men who have always been pro-American and who now oppose Mr.
Chamberlain's policy. Here is how one of them put it: "The United States was really responsible for the creation of Czechoslovakia," he said, "and that was one phase of the peace treaty that never came under fire in the United States Senate. Mr. Kennedy has been going in and out of Downing Street for the past week, so presumably Washington was fully informed of the plan, but did nothing." And he went on to say, "It's easy for them, 3,000 miles away, to take up a holier-than-thou attitude and condemn us for not fighting to preserve the independence of a country that's hardly been heard of by many of our citizens." Now that may be an extreme view of the case, but it comes from an Englishman who has spent a great deal of time in the United States. . . . We're trying to recite in the London talks what you would see and hear if you were in London, trying to condense and summarize editorial opinions, radio news and conversations with all kinds of people. Their personal opinion certainly isn't any more important than yours. We're trying to hold up the mirror for you.

KALTENBORN: Just as Edward Murrow is trying to hold the mirror up to us from London, so we here in the United States are trying to hold that same mirror up for you, reflecting the news as it comes and trying to interpret its meaning. It is significant that the Labor Party joins the Czechs in seeking delay. They realize that playing for time is to the advantage of those who object to the carving up of the Czechoslovak state. They feel that if they can once give the rising tide of popular opposition a chance in France and in England that the Chamberlain Government may be dissuaded from yielding completely to Adolf Hitler.

Edward Murrow says that in England tonight they are raising certain questions that of course have also been raised here in the United States by those who have wondered what might happen if Hitler had his way. How can new guarantees by England and France for the remainder of Czechoslovakia mean anything when such guarantees that the Czechs have had before have meant absolutely nothing?
What about the Sudetenland minorities? For they too deserve consideration as a minority. What about those Germans who disagree with the kind of persecution which Hitler has now launched against minorities in Austria? What will be the effect on the anti-Hitler elements in Germany? Everyone must realize how tremendously the complete victory in this issue would strengthen Hitler.

And what of the effects on America? There Mr. Murrow gives us the sad news that Anglo-American relations have certainly not been improved by what has happened. And that is perfectly natural, because exactly as the liberal press in Britain objects to what Chamberlain has done, so practically the entire press of the United States, as it was interpreted for you last night over this network in brief excerpts from American editorials, disapproves of that same action. We acknowledge here that it is easy for the United States to condemn Britain at a distance of 3,000 miles. And yet, merely because we are not taking the same chance that England is taking, should we as human beings who realize that a grave injustice is being done, remain silent on that account? Certainly we have the right as part-creators of Czechoslovakia to object to her destruction, even though we may not be willing to fly immediately to arms from a distance of 3,000 miles to prevent that destruction. It's evident that Prague's reply has seriously embarrassed both the French and the British Premiers. It was, after all, a quiet, patient, conciliatory reply to what amounted to an insulting demand. The Czechoslovakian Government only asked today for a reprieve and perhaps for an appeal. But the Nazi executioner today is demanding immediate delivery of the victim. Berlin stresses the fact that it has a million men ready to go into action, as one Nazi put it, "Whenever Hitler pulls the plug." To have ready the convenient excuse of defensive action, Berlin propaganda is still being manufactured from rumors of frontier incidents.

In France they are beginning to realize some of the
implications of recent events. The disappearance of Czechoslovakia as a barrier between Germany and the Near East will revolutionize Central Europe. Germany becomes its master. Rumania, Jugoslavia, Hungary, Bulgaria become satellites of Germany. The Little Entente, France's post-war treaty creation, disappears. Poland will break with France and compromise with Germany. The Baltic states must choose between Nazi Germany or a Communist government. And the Soviet Union resumes that isolation in foreign affairs to which it had retreated before it joined the League of Nations. Hitler emerges as Europe's strong man, bestriding Europe, like a new Colossus, from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

The German press has launched a campaign tonight to force President Benes of Czechoslovakia to resign. A Berlin newspaper says, "Only the resignation of Benes and his whole Government, whose policy is revealed to have been dictated exclusively by Moscow, may perhaps save a sort of Czech rump state." The implication there is that if President Benes does not resign, if Czechoslovakia dares to defend herself, Germany will not be content with Sude- tenland, but will insist on incorporating the entire Czechoslovak Republic.

This recalls what Maurice Hindus said to us from Prague this morning about a possible successor to the Benes Government. He told us, you may remember, that no Czech Government could surrender to Hitler's demand and remain in power. If it accepted the Franco-British demands, it would be swept out of office. A military dictatorship, created by the efficient Czech army would fight Hitler's forces, with or without foreign help.

Germany tonight is threatening to begin war against Czechoslovakia on Thursday if Prague does not yield. The threat may be pure propaganda. Having obtained so much by the mere threat of force, Hitler would be a fool not to use this weapon to the limit. The question is: what will he do the first time the threat fails to work? We may know
by Thursday or Friday. The conference of Prime Minister Chamberlain with Adolf Hitler has been postponed from Wednesday until Thursday. We are told now that it is to take place on Thursday afternoon. In the meantime, the French and the British are putting pressure upon Czechoslovakia to give a yes, an unequivocal yes, in answer to the demands that are being made. And yet, from all the dispatches that we have had from Prague, it is evident that the unequivocal yes will not be given.

What then? Will France and Britain at once and completely wash their hands of the entire affair and say to Czechoslovakia, "Your sins are upon your head; you must submit to what happens; we can do nothing for you?" That's not certain. It's not certain because of the rising tide of feeling in both England and France against complete surrender to Adolf Hitler's will. Perhaps by the time Mr. Chamberlain reaches Godesberg on Thursday he may have some other plan that will bring further delay.
CALLENBORN: Perhaps the most salient phrase in the news this morning is this: "Britain and France are to plead with Adolf Hitler for concessions." There you have the unhappy state of Europe in a matter of seven words. The great British Empire and the great French Empire together are joining pleading hands to appeal to a young European dictator — young because he has emerged into the forefront of European affairs within only five years. Here is one of those revolutionary situations which occur but once in a century. Why has this happened? What is there about this situation that has brought about this astonishing result?

Fundamentally we're confronted by a new kind of technique, the dictator technique — remorseless, unrelenting, shrewd. It takes advantage of every element of human psychology, has at its disposal all those marvelous propaganda means which modern civilization provides. Just see what unremitting pressure has been brought to bear on Prague from every side, how constantly, hour by hour, since the first meeting of the Prime Minister of Great Britain with the German Chancellor down at Berchtesgaden, the propaganda machine has been at work. Its unremitting pressure exploited every element of fear and terror and apprehension in the hearts of the unhappy
Czechoslovakian statesmen whose duty it was to make the final decision. Under this pressure, the Cabinet of Czechoslovakia had to yield. Czechoslovakia's leaders have given in—Dr. Benes, the President; Hozda, the Premier, who you will remember spoke so bravely over this network in what seems now a long, long time ago, although it can be counted in hours. But not the entire Cabinet has given in. Czech popular opinion, which we know from the broadcasts by Maurice Hindus, is definitely opposed to this surrender. And this may be more important still—so is the Czech army. There is a possibility of some kind of revolt in Czechoslovakia when this Cabinet decision is announced.

I spoke a minute ago of Hitler's unremitting pressure on Chamberlain and Daladier. That pressure is backed by the threat of force, immediate force. The Germans have been very clever in using every instrument of propaganda in order to make it clear to Britain and to France that there is a situation on the Czechoslovakian frontier which from hour to hour may result in war.

Last night as I listened to a short-wave broadcast in English from a powerful German station, practically every word was intended to convince the world that the Czech soldiers on the frontier were carrying out aggression against the Germans. We know from our neutral dispatches that that is not true. We know therefore that it is deliberate German propaganda constantly to keep before the world the imminence of war unless Germany has her way. That pressure evidently has frightened M. Daladier and Prime Minister Chamberlain to the point where they have lost all sense of restraint in statements to Mr. Hitler. They must have communicated with him, pleading with him to "hold off until we can force the Prague Government to consent." Public opinion, however, is also a factor in both France and Britain. In Britain during the last few hours we've heard from such men as Lord Cecil. We've heard from a good part of the British press. We've heard from certain members of the Cabinet who are definitely opposed
to this complete surrender. The Labor Party in Britain called it a "shameful betrayal," and while the Labor Party is a minority, it exercises a much larger pressure on public opinion than the number its members in Parliament might suggest. The Labor Party will continue to be heard from. Then there are such men as Winston Churchill and Lloyd George and Anthony Eden. Anthony Eden, by the way, is to speak over this network this afternoon. It will be the first address during this European crisis that has come from the young ex-Foreign Minister of Britain, who, we know, represented a radically different point of view with respect to the dictators than is represented by Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax.

France has clamped down prohibitions on popular meetings; but in spite of that, popular meetings are held. France does not often try to prevent popular meetings. It is an extreme step for the Cabinet to take, and the Socialist Party under the leadership of Leon Blum is swinging into action in order to organize opposition in the Chamber of Deputies itself. He's attempting to force a session which by a majority vote could repudiate the Daladier Government and repudiate its action, thereby creating an entirely different situation. The entire Left, comprising all of the Popular Front which has twice recently held complete power in the French Government, has swung into action in order to attempt to stop this concession to dictator Hitler. And contrary to reports, those who are working on national defense have not been put under military rule.

You heard that Rumania is disturbed. Why? Because Rumania knows that once territorial division begins, Hungary, demanding the incorporation of certain parts of Czechoslovakia, will also demand the incorporation of Rumanian Transylvania, where there are even more ex-Hungarians than there are in Czechoslovakia. Rumania has moved troops to both the Russian and the Hungarian borders and is very apprehensive lest this situation mean
that she too is to be broken up. We still don't have any settlement of the European problem. What we have is a rushing into a series of difficulties which may be greater than those which Mr. Chamberlain hopes to avoid.

8:15-8:21 A.M. — News Bulletin

Announcer: In Geneva, before the League of Nations Assembly, Maxim Litvinoff, Soviet Russia's Foreign Minister, has just accused Britain and France of avoiding a problematical war today in return for a certain and large-scale war tomorrow. . . . (See Appendix, Page 272.) He blamed France for the present plight of the Czechs, said that the British policy of non-resistance has strengthened the bloc of Germany, Italy and Japan. He flatly declared: "Russia's War Department is ready immediately to participate in a conference with representatives of the French and Czechoslovakian War Departments to discuss measures appropriate to the moment. . . ."

8:16-8:22 A.M.

Kaltenborn: M. Litvinoff's statement is a clear declaration in forcible terms that Russia is ready to meet her obligations under her engagements to France and to Czechoslovakia. Litvinoff, with that eloquence to which I have frequently listened at Geneva and elsewhere in international conferences and with that peculiar biting sarcasm and vigor of which he is capable, certainly reflects very definitely upon the policy of France and Britain. The Soviet Union, it appears, through its War Department has been ready for consultation and for action. We had a bulletin, you will remember, two days ago that its troops to the number of a million were concentrated on the Ukrainian frontier ready for the word. The word did not come. It did not come from France. It did not come from England. It did not even come from little Czechoslovakia. And so today, Litvinoff, representative of Communist Russia, stands before
the League Assembly and is able to proclaim that the world's only communist state is faithful to its obligations, ready to do its duty, ready to use military force to insure respect for the treaties which it has signed, but that France and Britain, the great democratic nations of the world, are unready and unwilling to do the same thing. That is, perhaps, the climax of humiliation for those two great democratic states of Europe. Certainly, Litvinoff has a case to make. After all, it was easy for him to point to Ethiopia, to Manchuria, to Spain, to China— one successive violation of the League Covenant after the other. In no instances were Articles 10 to 16 applied. Here was a case, where the obligation arose not only with respect to the League Covenant but went beyond that to include separate and distinct treaties that had been signed voluntarily by the Governments concerned. In these latter, the obligation was specific and definite and carefully circumscribed—that France would go to the aid of Czechoslovakia if she were invaded; that Russia would go to the aid of Czechoslovakia if France complied with that obligation.

Litvinoff told us, as you heard a moment ago, that his country was asked whether it would be faithful to its obligations. The request came at a time when it seemed likely that those obligations would have to be met; when it was no longer a question of signing a treaty which might or might not come in force, but when it was a question of marshalling troops and ordering their advance. Under those conditions, when requested by France as to what she would do, Russia replied, "Our War Department is ready to participate in conference with the French to discuss measures that are appropriate to the moment." Now, naturally, that is a very definite declaration on Russia's part that she was ready yesterday, that she is ready today, that she will be ready tomorrow, to participate with the French and British Governments in military action. It may be that when word of that declaration reaches Chamberlain as he is about to start for Berchtesgaden, when it reaches Paris, where it
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is blazoned forth in the headlines of the newspapers of Europe—it may be that it will have some influence in stiffening resistance to Adolf Hitler's demands. It is for that purpose that Litvinoff stated it so forcibly in Geneva today.

9:25 A.M.—NEWS BULLETIN
ANNOUNCER: Czechoslovakia has accepted Adolf Hitler's terms and will surrender her Sudeten territory to Germany, assured by Britain and France. . . . German newspapers are lashing the public temper to a high pitch with stories of Czech atrocities. . . . Chamberlain will leave for Godesberg tomorrow for his second conference with Hitler.

11:00-11:15 P.M.
KALTENBORN: And what news it is! Rarely has there been on a single morning such a combination of events so startling in their implication. Nothing would be easier than to picture for you a world of alarms and of imminent war. And yet, on the basis of the very first dispatch that came in this morning, the one announcing the complete yielding of Czechoslovakia to the second ultimatum presented to the Czechs by the British and the French, we know that this morning we are farther away from immediate war than yesterday. It's quite true, however, that once we get the Czech situation settled we've got the Rumanian situation coming up; we've got the colonies question to consider; we've got the increasing appetite of the dictator for this, that and the other thing to take into account. It's quite natural that the sixty-nine-year-old Chamberlain should think of resigning, once this is out of the way, for it's difficult to see at this moment how either his Government or that of Prime Minister Daladier of France can derive any credit out of the events of these last few memorable days.

So, although 300,000 men are massed on the Czech frontier, although the British fleet maneuvers are taking a new and somewhat more menacing aspect in the Mediter-
ranean, the truth still holds that we are farther away from war—and for the simple reason that the concessions which the dictator asks have been granted. How far they have been granted we do not yet know. We do know this: that the Czech Government has placed its fate in the hands of Britain and France and has begged those two powers to secure for it some concession when they meet with Adolf Hitler at Godesberg tomorrow.

It's rare that the Foreign Minister of any country can step before the world as Maxim Litvinoff did this morning and challenge so decisively, so sarcastically and so truthfully the policies of the world's two greatest democracies. I wonder what Anthony Eden will say when he talks to Columbia's listeners this afternoon at 2:30. I should expect that he will try to defend the British Government, for he knows, as the British press knows, what the American sentiment is and he knows how bitterly Americans feel about the way things are going in Europe. Oh, yes, it's quite right, as the London Times points out this morning—it's easy enough for us to be critical, but what contribution have we made, besides pious but totally unimportant declarations? We must agree that the United States has not played its full part in seeking solutions for a crisis like the one that now confronts the world.

We're beginning to hear from France and from England, their excuses for acting as they have. From Britain we are told that Lord Runciman's report, as read to the fateful Cabinet meeting, declared that the Czechs had always been stubborn and unyielding; that they had had many opportunities to get things settled and always neglected them; that they could have granted autonomy in May and closed the issue. There is some truth in those assertions, but I don't believe the honest Britisher believes that the mere concession of autonomy to Sudetenland would have settled the issue. Not according to what Herr Hitler has told us again and again. Besides that, we've had some very interesting revelations with respect to the military
situation. We know now that both in Paris and in London there is tremendous fear of the effect of air raids. Defenses are ready, yes, but we know that defenses could not prevent enormous destruction and the snuffing out of tens of thousands of lives. In France, faced by strikes in this moment of crisis, the same labor leaders who are crying out against the foreign policy of the French Government have themselves weakened in opposition to that policy. The Socialists and the Communists are supporting a general strike of the building trades which is paralyzing activity in France, and giving the outside world a view of a divided France the very moment when unity is essential. French labor is selfishly pursuing its own ends and must therefore bear some part of the responsibility for the weakness of its Government.

These are considerations that must also count when we estimate the general situation. However, there is, I believe, a growing movement in both France and Britain toward making some sort of a front at Godesberg tomorrow. Russia has spoken strongly and that will give some support. Public opinion is also beginning to speak in both Britain and France, and perhaps something can yet be rescued from the fire.

11:15-11:25 A.M.

KALTENBORN: I did not have the full text of Mussolini's address when I spoke to you a few minutes ago. But we have been listening in on short wave and have now secured a complete summary of it. This address was not heard in the United States. So it will interest you to know what the Italian Premier, who spoke this morning, for the third time in three successive days, had to say with reference to the European crisis.

The address this morning was primarily for the purpose of dedicating a monument to the fallen Italian soldiers.

So far as the Czechoslovakian situation is concerned, he cited the polyglot population of Czechoslovakia, pointing out to his audience that it included Czechs, Hungarians,
Poles, Ruthenians, Germans, Russians, Ukranians. He said that where there was a population of this kind, any attempt to wield it into a single state was, naturally; beset with many obstacles. He added: "Now that this problem is up for solution, it should be entirely solved."

He declared that Neville Chamberlain, Prime Minister of Britain, was steering the ship of state toward the haven of peace. And he expressed his pride in the fact that in this time of crisis, Italy had remained more calm than most other European nations.

It was, then, an address in which there was nothing striking, outside perhaps of his reference to the fact that we must have a "totalitarian" solution of the Czechoslovakian problem. That is becoming evident from all the dispatches that have reached us during the past forty-eight hours.

Poland insists on getting the Teschen district as her slice of Czechoslovakia; Hungary insists on getting her slice in the part of Czechoslovakia that lies beyond the Danube. It seems to me that all the dispatches and all the public addresses by outstanding men indicate that tomorrow's meeting at Godesberg will be the beginning, not only of a settlement of the Czechoslovakian problem, but of an attempt completely to revise all the post-war treaties. That perhaps is the most significant thing which we have the right to read into the address of the Italian Premier.

12:15-12:21 P.M.

ANNOUNCER: London, England. It has just been announced that British Prime Minister Chamberlain will leave London by plane at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning, British Time. This is 5 o'clock Eastern Daylight Time. Chamberlain will fly to Cologne, Germany, and proceed to the town of Godesberg for his conference with Chancellor Hitler at 10:00 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time.

KALTENBORN: News has certainly poured in rapidly this morning. One interesting event after another, and once
again we are wondering just what the situation is this morning in Prague, Czechoslovakia.

Early this morning, we gave you the news that Prague had definitely responded affirmatively to the British and French ultimatum, for that it must be called. The day before, they had answered, stating, yes, they were willing to make certain concessions, but it was perfectly obvious that they were fighting for time. Britain and France thereupon immediately sent urgent communications to the Czech Government, stating that it must accept the ultimatum unconditionally, or they could not guarantee Czechoslovakia against invasion by Germany, which, they added might begin tomorrow. Early this morning, the Prague Government sent an affirmative acknowledgment of that bulletin. In Paris it was definitely interpreted as a complete acceptance and an official of the French Foreign Office so stated. Godesberg, representing the German point of view, interpreted it on the basis of its information, as full acceptance. So did London. Now comes the suggestion that the Czech Cabinet is still in session and that it has not yet fully phrased its answer. I just called up Maurice Hindus, Columbia's correspondent in Prague, and talked with him over the telephone. Here is the picture of the situation in the capital of Czechoslovakia as he gave it to me a few minutes ago.

He said the Czech people are totally unaware that their Government has capitulated. They do not believe that it has capitulated. He talked with half a dozen different people, ranging from elevator boys to officials and each one told him, "No, the Government will not yield, that there would be a revolution if they did. We'd have a military dictatorship," they said. It was Hindus' belief, however, that the Czech Cabinet had submitted to the terms sent by France and Britain. I asked him about the Czech press. His reply was that naturally they are under a very close censorship and that they don't dare say anything. He cited the headlines to me. One paper says "situation is serious." Another,
“situation decisive”; another, “urgent situation has developed”; another, “we are facing another earnest moment.”

All this is what we call stalling. It says nothing. The Czech people don’t need an eight-column streamer head to tell them that the situation is either serious or decisive or urgent, or earnest. My own conclusion on the basis of all the dispatches, and all the information that I have direct from Prague is that the Cabinet has undoubtedly sent a communication to France and Britain in which it accepts their terms and that it is now trying to phrase that acceptance so that it can be presented to the Czech people without stirring them to the point of revolution.

What a hard, bitter, situation for the nation! The future looks dark for that unhappy Central European Republic, the last outpost of Western democracy in that part of the world.

2:25-2:30 P.M.

KALtenborn: Czechoslovakia has now, finally, officially decided to surrender three and one-half million of her inhabitants and her richest industrial area and her most strongly fortified frontier to Germany. The Czech Government announces that it has accepted the French and British ultimatum. It makes it clear that it acted only under pressure from France and from Britain, its supposed friends.

In Prague, the special committee of the Czech Parliament, authorized by that Parliament to act during its recess, has also approved the action of the Czech Cabinet. This makes it constitutional. There was nothing for the Czech Government to do but to come out and notify its people. Naturally, the news created intense excitement throughout Prague. At 3:45, Eastern Daylight Time, Maurice Hindus will be on the air to give you a first-hand account of the feelings of the Czech people in the face of this disaster to their country.

The British Cabinet has been in session for two hours — has given its approval to Prime Minister Chamberlain
and the plans that he will outline to Herr Hitler in Godesberg tomorrow.

You will remember that he will arrive in Godesberg at 10 A.M., Eastern Daylight Time, and throughout tomorrow morning you may expect to hear from us the latest developments in that crucial situation. For the situation is still crucial. Remember Poland and Hungary have definitely indicated that they too must share in the division of Czechoslovakia. Mussolini has indicated in three successive speeches that he approves that sharing. And there is evidence that it is also approved by Adolf Hitler, free to act on behalf of Poland and on behalf of Hungary when he meets Chamberlain tomorrow.

Within a few minutes, Anthony Eden, former Foreign Minister of Great Britain, who resigned because he disagreed with Chamberlain’s policy of conciliation with Mussolini and with Hitler, will be on the air to explain his own and his country’s point of view. Will Eden back Chamberlain? Will Eden announce a definite division of British public opinion? In a few minutes we shall know. My guess is that Eden backs Chamberlain. . . . Good afternoon.

2:30-2:52 P.M.—Anthony Eden, Stratford-on-Avon
ANNOUNCER: . . . We take you now to Stratford-on-Avon, where Anthony Eden is addressing the annual dinner of the English-Speaking Union.
ENGLISH ANNOUNCER: I’m speaking from the Concert Hall of the Memorial Theatre. . . . Our guest of honor is the Right Honorable Anthony Eden. . . . Here is Mr. Eden.
EDEN: Ladies and gentlemen. We are met, you and I, tonight to speak of the friendships of the English and the American peoples, and to replenish that heritage of position and literature which we share in common. Yet tonight it is impossible to avoid consideration of the present international situation.

There are some people who believe that if the immediate issues could somehow be resolved, without resort to
force, the ambitions of all the Powers in Europe would have been largely met and the crisis over. Ladies and gentlemen, I can find no justification for such opinion. . . . Appeasement will be neither long nor lasting at such a price. It merely makes real appeasement more difficult at a later date. There must always be a point at which we as a nation must make a stand. . . . That is the only assured guide in private or in public relations. The truth is that each recurrent crisis brings us nearer to war. Under such conditions the world cannot progress. The best that the world can hope for is an uncertain peace with soaring armaments and shrinking trade, leading ultimately either to war or to general disintegration. . . .

British people have not changed. They are as stable and resolute as ever before in their history. It is as well that foreign countries should recognize this. It is not yet too late for a comprehension that in the words of Mr. Hull, Foreign Secretary of the United States, all nations have a primary interest in peace with justice, in economic well-being with stability and a condition of order under law. If, however, this truth continues to be derided or ignored, there can be no escape from their final calamity, which it is the supreme task of statesmanship to avert.

Ladies and gentlemen, for our own people the issue becomes terrifying. They are ready to make sacrifices in order to strengthen the foundations of peace. The conviction is growing that continual retreat can only lead to ever-widening confusion. They know that a stand must be made. They say, "Let it be not made too late."

KALTENBORN: That was a moving speech. Anthony Eden, as you heard him, spoke with intense seriousness to an intensely serious audience, an audience that had no time or thought for the usual clamor of enthusiastic applause. Eden declared that the audience had primarily gathered together to speak of the friendship of the English-speaking peoples but he spoke not in banalities of Anglo-American friendship at a time when editorial comment on both sides
of the water differs so sharply. As I ventured to predict a moment ago, he did not attack the Government. The British Parliament, he said, is clearly the place for a detailed discussion of the issues now confronting us. That indicated at once that he did not intend to make this an occasion for attacking Mr. Chamberlain's policy. But what he said after making that statement indicates the very serious reservations with respect to that policy that he has in his mind. He declared that no Englishman and no American could be indifferent to the use of the threat of force by a big country toward a small country. The Government, conscious of its responsibility, must decide its policy in view of all the facts. Then Eden added this significant comment—that after government action the people of the free countries must pass on what has been done.

Some of you will recall, he said, the several warnings I have given you against optimism. He referred to the fact that he had repeatedly in the past declared that in the face of the present international situation, optimism is unfounded. Then he added that he was sorry that he had not been wrong. He declared that the situation today is infinitely worse than six months ago and that it is still steadily deteriorating. Some people, he said—and we can well imagine what people he had in mind—think that if the immediate issues are resolved, they can hope for betterment. But I, said the ex-Foreign Minister, cannot believe that.

No one, he said, quarrels with the effort of appeasement, but appeasement cannot come by sacrifice of reputation or by giving up our sense of fair dealing. There must be a point where we must make a stand to keep our respect. He went on to point out that today we are facing a different world order. Certain appetites have been whetted, and he believes that the situation has become intolerable. Each crisis, in the opinion of this shrewd student of world affairs, brings us closer to war. And under such conditions, he added, the world cannot progress, conditions cannot
improve. We have a soaring of armaments and a shrinking of trade and the choice will soon be faced between war and general disintegration.

Britain, he declared, is not faced with a challenge for the first time. Foreign autocracies in Europe are no novelty, and he added that the conceptions of liberty which Britain has cherished can provide the only true basis of civilization. The British people, he said, have not changed and there was an intimation there that in certain respects perhaps the British Government of the moment has changed. The British people, he said, are as resolute as ever before in their history and it is just as well, was his word of warning, for foreign countries to recognize that. He quoted Secretary of State Hull's memorable phrase about "peace with justice, order under law." Of it he says that if this is the truth, and if we fail to live up to that truth, there is no escape from the final calamity.

The people, he declared, are ready to make sacrifices to strengthen the foundations of peace and freedom of thought, freedom of race, freedom of belief.

And then he pointed out that continued retreat ran only lead to failure at the end. A stand must be made. Eden hoped that that stand would not be made too late. It isn't necessary to add much comment to that address. It shows the deep feeling of those Englishmen whom we have so long known and so long respected for standing out at all times on behalf of the decencies of civilization which must be observed to make and keep a nation great.

3:45-3:55 P.M.

KALTENBORN: During the time that we have been waiting for the comments of Maurice Hindus to come in, several Press Radio Bulletins have been placed on my desk. The British Foreign Office has announced that it has received Czechoslovakia's note, accepting the French and the British proposals for meeting the demands of Adolf Hitler. But the news from Godesberg and the news from Prague which
comes in two separate Press Radio Bulletins shows an interesting contradiction. The statement of the Czech Government, issued just now in Prague, states that the question of what Czechoslovakia is to give up is still the subject of negotiations. A declaration which is signed by Premier Hodza adds, “Our friends to whom we have been attached for twenty years advised us to secure peace by making territorial sacrifices. Your Government, in the interests of peace, decided to make some sacrifice to avoid suffering and the loss of its whole existence.”

He goes on to tell us that it will take time before they can agree on the exact mechanism by which these Sudeten areas are to be turned over to Germany and the exact point at which the frontier is to run. But listen to this bulletin from Godesberg, where Adolf Hitler has been since this morning. According to the United Press Adolf Hitler wants a complete settlement of the Sudeten controversy in Czechoslovakia by October 1st at the latest.

One demand is made after the other. Just a few minutes ago we heard another ultimatum from Hitler as to what would have to be done. Mr. Chamberlain arrives at Godesberg tomorrow to find an Adolf Hitler who still issues ultimatums. He also finds a Czechoslovakia which has surrendered but asks that a few decencies be observed in organizing the detailed terms of that surrender. So there will be the real problem. Will these decencies be observed? Or will Adolf Hitler give the word to the 100,000 or 200,000 troops now gathered at the Czechoslovak frontier to advance into Czechoslovakia and to seize the territory by force?

4:18-4:27 P.M. — Prague - New York
Conversation — Hindus - Kaltenborn
ANNOUNCER: Mr. Kaltenborn is now speaking with Mr. Hindus in Prague, Czechoslovakia.
KALTENBORN (New York): ... through the announcement that the Cabinet has surrendered. Evidently the people are
protesting. How is that protest manifesting itself? Has there been any violence?
HINDUS (in Prague): Yes, in a way. They are demanding certain things.

KALTENBORN: What are the people of Prague demanding?
HINDUS: The following are the slogans.

KALTENBORN: All right, the following are the slogans. . . . Let me have them, will you?
HINDUS: We want the army!

KALTENBORN: We want the army. Yes, and the others?
HINDUS: Long live the army!

KALTENBORN: Long live the army. Now tell me, would you interpret that as being a call upon the part of the people for a military dictatorship?

HINDUS: Yes, that is the way it would seem to me. They are calling also for General Syrovy. He is the head of the Czech Army.

KALTENBORN: The assumption is that they are calling for him as a military dictator? Is that right? (Pause) Hello, Maurice. . . . Is that right— they are calling for him as military dictator?

HINDUS: Yes, and they are denouncing both France and England.

KALTENBORN: Denunciations of both France and England. Well, tell me, are there any more slogans?

HINDUS: Chamberlain has sold us out! Down with France! Shame on France! Down with Hitler! Hello, did you get that?

KALTENBORN: Yes, I did. Tell me now, what do you think this will bring about?

HINDUS: Nobody can tell. The situation is changing from minute to minute.

KALTENBORN: I see. And there are definite demonstrations in the streets at Prague at this moment?

HINDUS: Well, just at the moment demonstrations have quieted down somewhat in the city of Prague because there is a broadcast going on in the city.
KALTENBORN: Who is giving that broadcast?
HINDUS: I haven't any idea. I have been in my room for about a half hour, waiting for the telephone call, and I don't know what has happened. There is a broadcast going on, though, at this very minute. And so the demonstrations of the crowd have quieted down. For four hours there were demonstrations on the main streets.
KALTENBORN: Now is it your judgment that those demonstrations will result in any definite action against the Cabinet?
HINDUS: I have no idea.
KALTENBORN: I notice that you do not say, in listing the cries, that the people are crying "Down with the Cabinet" or "Down with Benes or down with Hodza."
HINDUS: No, all they are crying is "Long live the army! We want the army in power! Long live General Syrovy!"
KALTENBORN: Well, that then is a definite appeal for this General of the Czech Army to take over the Government.
HINDUS: I could tell you some very interesting things about him.
KALTENBORN: Yes, do that please. Because he may be the man of the hour in Prague!
HINDUS: He is blind in one eye as a result of the World War, has great historic feeling.
KALTENBORN: Yes, naturally, because he was one of those who helped create the Republic. And is he a man who has the capacity to be a dictator?
HINDUS: I know nothing of his political capacities. But I do know that he is regarded as one of the most brilliant military strategists in the world.
KALTENBORN: Well, you can send us a cable telling us about him and keep me up to date on anything that develops with reference to him and with reference to what is going on.
HINDUS: No cables can go through.
KALTENBORN: All right. Now I imagine the broadcast which you say is going on in Prague at this moment is giving the
people the Government's explanation. Don't you think that's probably it?
HINDUS: That's what it is. As a matter of fact, I ended my speech saying that the Government explanation is coming, but it didn't get through evidently.
KALTENBORN: No, the antennae out on Long Island which were to receive your broadcast have been blown down by a severe windstorm. And that is the reason that it did not come in. We are now working on the reestablishment of those communications and we hope to get them up, and if we do we will communicate with you and arrange another time.
HINDUS: All right, fine. If anything important develops, what shall I do? Call London or you?
KALTENBORN: I think you'd better call us right here.
HINDUS: Call New York?
KALTENBORN: Yes.
HINDUS: It may not be possible for me to send a cable.
KALTENBORN: Yes.
HINDUS: The censorship is very rigorous.
KALTENBORN: If anything is important don't hesitate to telephone us and I will then take it down and we can put it on the air.

6:00 P.M. — NEWS BULLETIN

ANNOUNCER: ... Truckloads of swastika flags are being rushed toward Czechoslovakia in anticipation of a triumphal entry into Sudetenland.

9:30-10:00 P.M. — MURROW, PRITT, SMILES — LONDON
KALTENBORN INTERVIEWS HINDUS — PRAGUE-NEW YORK
MURROW (London): Hello, America. It's two-thirty in the morning here and in a few hours Mr. Chamberlain leaves for Godesberg. All day political leaders have been meeting here in London. Discussion has been almost endless. To-
night from London Columbia brings you statements by two members of Parliament. This isn't a debate. It's simply the statement of two points of view. First, you hear from Mr. Denis M. Pritt, Labor Member of Parliament.

PRITT: I have passed most of today in conference in the National Executive of the British Labor Party. We feel a sense of humiliation and betrayal. We feel this as Labor people, as Britishers and as plain human beings. . . . A tremendous betrayal has been carried out by Mr. Chamberlain's Government behind the back of the British public. Our British press has been more severely censored than in any period of its history. Our people probably know less than even the German public of what Hitler said to Chamberlain. The British Government in the last few years has cynically abandoned the rule of law in international relations. . . . It has retreated before Hitler and other Fascist countries and now it has found itself faced with a situation in which, as one critic said, it had to choose between shame and war. The tragedy is that it has almost certainly chosen both. It may have avoided war for the moment, but if it has done so, it only made war more certain than ever in the fairly near future. Mr. Chamberlain accepted everything that Hitler said at its face value and responded to every demand that Hitler made. He in effect gave the Hitler salute with both hands.

Mr. Chamberlain cannot have served the cause of peace, as may be claimed for him, because it is obvious that all we are buying by our terrible betrayal is a few weeks or months of uneasy truce at the price of soon being confronted by a new demand from Hitler which we shall again either have to accept with shame or refuse at the risk of war.

MURROW: . . . and here is Sir Walter Smiles, Conservative Member of Parliament. . . .

SMILES: Now I feel that these Sudeten Germans have a case. And as I know our own feeling in Northern Ireland about remaining a part of the British Empire, I have great sym-
pathy with these Sudeten Germans in becoming a part of the German Empire.

No doubt you Americans realize your good fortune in having some 3000 miles of the Atlantic Ocean between you and war. If we were as lucky as you, we would be giving the advice now instead of getting it. The difficulty I see is that if we are in this war next week, are we going to help the Czechs? Look at the map and you will see the difficulty of sending French and British Army corps to help the Czechs. Even when France and our fellows win at the end of one year or six years, I don’t think there will be many Czechs alive at the end of this new war which will end war to live in a land that is fit for heroes to live in.

Your doughboys know jolly well what the Front in France was like in November, 1918. And I suppose Prague and Berlin would make just as pretty ruins at least as the towns in the Argonne.

We are surely not so petty as to care for standing on our dignity when millions of lives may be at stake. I am prepared for an income tax of 50 per cent; I am prepared for national service for all. I have even been prepared to see a million British lives lost in another war. But I want to feel very sure that our cause is a just one and that real, honest negotiations and compromise have failed before we condemn some millions of innocent people to death.

ANNOUNCER (New York): That was London speaking. And now Maurice Hindus in Prague, Czechoslovakia, is to be interviewed by H. V. Kaltenborn.

KALTENBORN: Hello, is this Prague? Who is talking, please?
HINDUS: Is this Columbia?
KALTENBORN: Maurice Hindus, is that you?
HINDUS: Speaking.
KALTENBORN: This is going to be an interview and I don’t know whether they have it on the air. In any case I’m going to fire ahead and ask you a few questions about the aspect or rather about different aspects that we don’t know
here. We want to know whether Prague had any report of Litvinoff's speech at Geneva today. Is that published in Prague?

HINDUS: I haven't seen any of it in any of the papers. KALTENBORN: Have you had all of the evening papers?

HINDUS: I have all the evening papers. KALTENBORN: And there is nothing about Litvinoff's speech?

HINDUS: Not a word that I have read. KALTENBORN: Well, he made a very important address in which he stated the fact that Russia was ready to consult with the General Staffs two weeks ago but that France turned them down. Let me ask you this: Have you any reports about Sudeten volunteers crossing the frontier into Czechoslovakia?

HINDUS: There was a story here today that Hitler threatened to send Sudeten volunteers into the Sudeten territory and that as soon as the Russians heard of it they told the Czech Government that they would send into the Czech territory as many volunteers as Hitler would, with as much equipment. KALTENBORN: That is a very important piece of information, if true. Because that would suggest military action by Russia.

HINDUS: It is.

KALTENBORN: Well, we shall try to check up on that because that is very important. Tell me this: What is the situation on the streets of Prague?

HINDUS: It is about half past two in the morning in Prague now and I can still hear some rioting outside. KALTENBORN: What are they crying? You gave me some of the slogans in this afternoon's broadcast. HINDUS: They were shouting about five o'clock this afternoon mostly one thing. "We are not going to have our Fatherland mutilated," and then there were cries, "Down with Chamberlain. He has sold us out." "Down with the French."

KALTENBORN: Do these cries suggest to you that you have
the beginning of a revolution? There is of course a street demonstration. Do you think it means any more?

HINDUS: I don’t think that it is a revolution. It is an expression of impassioned protest against Hitler.

KALTENBORN: Do you remember when we talked two days ago you thought things had definitely changed?

HINDUS: Yes, that is true. When I went out on the street the one cry uppermost was “We want to fight!” “We want a military dictatorship!”

KALTENBORN: Do you think the army wants that? And do you think the army will help the people to get that? What about General Syrovy, whom we talked about this afternoon? Has he been in the picture at all?

HINDUS: One report is that President Benes and General Syrovy came out on the balcony where the President lives and the General, according to this report, made a speech very briefly. And he said “We have been betrayed. But you must be calm.”

KALTENBORN: Well, to me that would indicate that the General is with Benes and the Government, and has no desire or intention to create a revolution. Do you agree with that conclusion?

HINDUS: Yes, I agree with that absolutely.

KALTENBORN: Then there is not likely to be a revolution as matters stand today.

HINDUS: The situation changes every five minutes. No one knows what the early morning will bring. Nobody knows what tomorrow morning will bring.

KALTENBORN: Tomorrow, as you know, Chamberlain reaches Godesberg and tomorrow morning the negotiations begin. Do you believe that negotiations will continue between Godesberg and the Czech Government?

HINDUS: Contact?

KALTENBORN: Yes, in the sense that they will try to work out. . .

HINDUS: Not at all. One of the pet grievances of the Czech press, as expressed through the morning papers here, is that
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Chamberlain never consulted the Czechs about any deal he made with Hitler.

KALTENBORN: Maurice, thanks. This is very interesting information. We will follow it up here and we will get in touch with you again tomorrow. All right. You have earned a good night’s rest. Good night.

HINDUS: Good night. And thank you.
Thursday, September 22

6:05 A.M. — News Bulletin
Announcer: Prime Minister Chamberlain is now in a plane en route to Godesberg to hand over to Adolf Hitler the surrender of Czechoslovakia. Their first talk is scheduled for ten this morning, Eastern Daylight Time.

7:45 A.M. — News Bulletin
Announcer: In Godesberg . . . Germans in the streets shouted, wept, laughed as the Fuehrer rode, standing up, arm outstretched, from the railroad station to his hotel.

12:15-12:30 P.M.
Kaltenborn: It's inevitable that there should be a certain amount of fighting on the border between Germany and Czechoslovakia. As matters stand today in Sudetenland, you have something like perhaps 100,000 armed Sudetens backed by their German allies, lined up before the frontier, waiting for the word to enter. They have had word that Czechoslovakia has surrendered and that the area is to be given over to them, and naturally they are on pins and needles ready to march in. Under those circumstances, groups, individual groups of these so-called volunteers are likely to break across the frontier at points where that frontier is weakly held and to occupy certain towns and certain areas.
The Czech police and the Czech soldiers, who are in those towns, will perhaps fight violence with violence, but will retire.

However, it's quite possible that if the excited Germans go too far, there will be definite resistance. Then it's quite possible that larger units will be engaged. In any case, I expect to hear more news of fighting on the Sudetenland border during the next few hours. Also we know that German police are being organized to go in. We've had word that some are coming up from Austria. They too may force their way in, despite the fact that the surrender is not yet ready. There are apt to be clashes at almost any point. We may also hear that Polish troops, or Hungarian troops, have done the same thing.

As for the conference in Godesberg, that will be protracted. There will be clashes. Remember that Hitler considers it a conference to organize the terms for a surrender. Chamberlain considers it a negotiation in order to work out a voluntary surrender of territory. Those two points of view are bound to clash. When it comes to working out the details of how Sudetenland is to be turned over to Hitler, we are in for long negotiations with occasional respites for reference of problems back to governments. There will be no final solution of the situation today.

ANNOUNCER: Members of Konrad Henlein's free corps have already taken over the city of Eger. They marched in from Germany shortly after dawn, equipped with rifles and hand grenades. They were welcomed enthusiastically by Sudeten German residents. Overnight, merchants had decorated their windows with German flags and pictures of Hitler.

Mr. Kaltenborn upon leaving the microphone talked by telephone with Prague and he will tell you what was said during that conversation.

KALTENBORN: Yes, I have just talked with Maurice Hindus in Prague and he has brought me up to date on the situation there.

The marching through the streets of Prague, Czecho-
slovakia, which has been going on all night, stopped around noon today. That indicates that the population in the Czechoslovakian capital is calming down. Mr. Hindus told me that the negotiations for the formation of the new Cabinet have not yet been completed. The ministers are conferring and they expect to have a decision of the makeup of the Cabinet very soon.

It has already been agreed that two Generals are to be included in the Cabinet, giving it a military or emergency character. This means that the army is going to play a considerable part in the next Czech Government. This means a government which will make it its first business to keep disorder down. I asked him about the Sudetenland invasions and he tells me that Prague has had confirmation of the entry of the Sudeten volunteers into two towns. He said, however, that, according to the information available in Prague, these Sudetenlanders were not accompanied by any organized German forces. The Czechs did not resist them, obviously because they felt that here were inhabitants of Czechoslovakia who were returning to their own territory. The orders evidently are that the Czechs are not to create incidents where they can possibly be avoided. Hindus does not expect any violent scenes in the capital. However, the situation changes there every five minutes, and it is very unsafe to make predictions.

2:15-2:51 P.M.

Announcer. (New York): Mr. Kaltenborn, who has been listening to the talks from Godesberg, will give you his interpretation.

Kaltenborn: The most essential point in Mr. Shirer’s talk was the news that the negotiations will be continued tomorrow. When it was announced that Mr. Chamberlain had left Mr. Hitler, the implication for the first few moments was that there had been a break in negotiations. There is for the moment no evidence of any sharp disagreement. Mr. Shirer gave us the three conditions that were
brought by Mr. Chamberlain when he arrived at Godesberg this morning. Condition No. 1 — an international commission for the Sudetenland to arrange the transfer of authority from Czechoslovakia to Germany. The important point there is that it would check the movement across the frontier by German troops, correspondents and Sudeten soldiers into several frontier areas at Asch and at Eger. If that should continue, there would be no reason for an international commission to arrange the transfer. There is a little piece of Czech territory at this point which is very narrow and which projects some distance into Germany. Germans might take over there at once. The chances are that other frontier towns will also be occupied.

Condition No. 2 — an appeal by the four Western Powers for peace. That suggests the revival of that Four-Power group which Mussolini had in mind several years ago and which he at that time unsuccessfully attempted to create. Both France and Britain at that time were reluctant to join with Italy and Germany in such a Four-Power undertaking, France for the very obvious reason that it would eliminate her alliance with Soviet Russia on which she placed great importance. Since France has practically abandoned her alliance with Russia, refusing to respond to Russia's suggestion that the General Staffs confer for action on Czechoslovakia, it is quite possible that she feels that she is now so entirely dependent upon Britain and that Hitler is so strong now in Germany that it is useless to attempt to resist bringing Germany and Italy together into a consortium of European big Powers. That involves a tremendous change in the balance of power of Europe, which will deserve more discussion later on.

Condition No. 3 — An international guarantee for what is left of Czechoslovakia. That is one point to which the British object. The British are naturally a little apprehensive at this moment about making guarantees for anything in Europe and when you say, what is left of Czechoslovakia, the question is: what will be left of it? So much
for Mr. Shirer's three points. He gave you a picturesque description of the entry of the first Germans into Czechoslovakian territory and then he put on Mr. Matthew Houghton of the Toronto Star. Now Mr. Houghton realized that he was not working in a country where the press was completely free while he was talking to us from Germany. Obviously, Mr. Houghton, when he said that Hitler had become the greatest man in German history, forgets that history never appraises a man until it can appraise all he does and all he fails to do. In the case of Herr Hitler, we may be at the moment of Austerlitz and not at the moment of Waterloo. Hitler is a vigorous individual who may still have many years in which to live and to make history.

Prime Minister Chamberlain, of course, has come to him asking for peace, but Prime Minister Chamberlain is the head of a democratic country and a democratic country makes Prime Ministers and it unmakes them. At this very moment, as you will hear in another news bulletin, France is having a Cabinet crisis.

2:43-2:51 P.M.

KALTENBORN: Indignation is running high in France and three Ministers have just threatened to resign. Now the significant thing about that particular threat is that these three Ministers represent two different groups in the French Cabinet and not any one of them belongs to the extreme Left. If Parliament were in session I'm convinced, knowing the French Parliamentary situation as I do, that the Chamber of Deputies would have voted Daladier out of power. It could be brought back, but no Government would like to bring it back. No Parliament can deal with a crisis; no Parliament can conduct negotiations. Parliament in a democratic country gives its confidence to the Ministry in power in order that what that Ministry does actually interprets the will of the country. Probably a majority of the people of France do not approve what has just been done by the Government of France. However, this does not mean that they want the alternative of war.
I think we can assume that the surrender of the Sudetenland to Germany is a fact. Whether or not it can be taken over brutally by military force is still in doubt. Whether or not the territory that Poland wants, the territory that Hungary wants will be ceded is still in doubt. In Prague, the new Government is in the process of formation. Maurice Hindus told me over the telephone this morning that it would include two Generals. As Premier President Benes very wisely has chosen General Jan Syrovy, who led the Czechs in Russia against the Germans during the World War.

3:30-4:10 P.M. — EUROPEAN ROUND-UP, LONDON, PARIS, ROME

ANNOUNCER (New York): First we cross the Atlantic to London, where Mr. Edward R. Murrow will speak. We take you now to London, England.

MURROW: This is London. Just about three or four minutes ago I spoke with the Foreign Office on the telephone concerning the rumor of Mr. Chamberlain's return to England tonight. I was told that according to one press association the discussions were to be continued tomorrow. The latest information here is that Mr. Chamberlain talked for about three and three-quarter hours this afternoon with Herr Hitler. No one was present other than Mr. Schmitt, the interpreter. Mr. Schmitt certainly will have interesting memoirs to write some day.

So far as conditions in London are concerned, it seems tonight we remain in the state of what has been called "collective insecurity" that has been maintained for the last several days. The opinion is, I think, that we're just entering the critical phase of this crisis. . . . Optimism seems to be decreasing in view of the new German demands and the news of the resignation of Premier Hodza's Government. . . . We return you now to America.

ANNOUNCER: Continuing our trek across Europe by means of radio, we turn to Mr. Kenneth Downs, well-known foreign correspondent of the International News Service, now
in Paris. America is calling Paris. We take you now to Paris, France.

Downs (Paris): Good evening. The situation is still full of danger. There are scores of tremendous problems, any one of which could have brought on a war in another day, that are yet to be solved. But men in high places here hope that the crisis in Europe's current illness is past. . . . There is universal regret in France that her standing of eighteen years must be sacrificed to the threat and ruthless demands of military Germany. . . . The people here were so drawn together by the crisis that we foreigners really felt like foreigners. We felt out of things, like a guest in a house where some tragic family problem was being resolved. But while they were ready to fight, the dominating feeling of these intelligent people has been one of the deepest repugnance and disgust at the thought of the stupidity of a long and brutal war.

Announcer: Another outstanding correspondent, Mr. Frank Gervasi, at this moment stands before a microphone in Rome, prepared to report on events there. We take you now to Rome, Italy.

Gervasi (Rome): Hello, America. This is Rome calling. Considerable confusion still exists outside as to why it is that Benito Mussolini has demanded and continues to demand what he himself called a "totalitarian solution of the Czechoslovakian crisis." Italy is not interested in engaging in the costly business called war which stultifies industry and paralyses the economic development of a nation. Not so long ago I talked with Mussolini, who made it quite clear also that he personally desires peace. . . .

Kaltenborn: Well, that was a very interesting excursion to three different European capitals, and it is certainly a new kind of world in which we are able in such quick succession to get the opinions of the leaders in three different nations, all intimately concerned with the present crisis.

Mr. Murrow brought you the news which suggests, as we've pointed out here, that we are going to get out of
Godesberg either a plan for continuing discussions or else some plan that will involve more than the immediate issue of granting Hitler's prime demand for the Sudeten area. It is beginning to look more and more as though we were at the beginning of a general European conference to settle the problems bequeathed to Europe by the World War. You will remember that the first conference in Paris nineteen years ago thought that it had settled those problems. Now the world realizes that it did not settle them. On the contrary, it emphasized some of them and created new ones.

The one good thing that may come out of this crisis is a reconsideration of these problems. I like Ed Murrow's phrase about "collective insecurity," because certainly for the moment that is what Europe has. All the more reason for us to hope that out of this collective insecurity which has now been carried to the very brink of war, there comes something that will suggest the collective security which once we thought we had through the League of Nations but which, when the test came, we found that we did not have. The initiative has been transferred from the British Prime Minister to the German Chancellor. He it is who dominates the situation at Godesberg. When Chamberlain left for Berchtesgaden a few days ago the British Prime Minister was still the dominating individual of Europe.

Winston Churchill is coming out for the opposition in England, and Winston Churchill, as I happened to hear today, has canceled his lecture tour of the United States this Fall in order that he may remain in England to lead that opposition. He said there that there was little indication of pressure on members of Parliament, and then he talked about a twenty-five-year non-aggression pact among Italy, France, Germany and Britain. That again brings up that issue of the Four-Power agreement and of a permanent settlement of the European situation.

Kenneth Downs tells us that the feeling in Paris is that war will not come, the crisis is passed, that Czechoslovakia will become a weakened minor state. Daladier has suc-
ceeded in persuading the dissident members of his Cabinet to remain. We reported to you that they had handed in their resignations. He refused to accept those resignations. However, the split in the Government remains, and if the French Parliament is convened, the split will certainly become apparent.

From Frank Gervasi in Rome you heard, as one usually hears from dictator countries, a frank expression of the dictator point of view. It is clear, he said, that Mussolini will choose his allies very carefully in the next war, but that still leaves us uncertain as to who they will be, although in view of Hitler's emergence as the dominant factor in Europe, I am willing to believe that Hitler today is the best choice. Of course, we don't need to agree with his opinion that Central Europe will remain in turmoil until the Central European powers are satisfied. Frank Gervasi referred to Hitler's Mein Kampf, as evidence that Hitler intends to stop with Czechoslovakia, but I wonder if he has read it carefully, since there is no indication in that book that the cutting up of Czechoslovakia will satisfy his ambitions or his desires. What about the Ukraine? What about his ambitions in Russia? What about the Polish Corridor? What about Danzig? What about Memel? As for Mussolini's proposed revision of all territories for all minorities, what about the 250,000 Germans who were forcibly incorporated into Italy? No, there are still problems ahead.

6:00 P.M. — News Bulletin
Announcer: Prime Minister Chamberlain appealed for calm in Czechoslovakia when he emerged from his three-hour conference with Hitler in Godesberg. . . . The conversations will be resumed tomorrow morning. . . . In Czechoslovakia, the latest report is that General Jan Syrovy will be Premier and Minister of War. . . .

8:00-8:30 P.M. — European Round-up
Announcer: . . . Calling Maurice Hindus in Prague. We take you now to Prague, Czechoslovakia.
HINDUS: Hello, America. Prague speaking. The living subject of conversation in Prague at the moment is the new Cabinet. Everybody is satisfied. There are two Generals in the Cabinet and the Prime Minister is General Syrovy. This morning in the demonstrations of the city, the crowds called for him and hailed him more loudly than any other person. . . . At the moment General Syrovy is the hero and the idol of the people and even the Communists have applauded his choice as Prime Minister. . . . To me the other exciting thing about Prague is the reappearance this evening of the frankfurter stands in the streets. Last night they had vanished. They were in the way of the marching crowds. News of the Government's capitulation to Hitler's demands had bewildered and exasperated the people and they marched almost all night. This morning the marching started again and very early. At one time it seemed that the demonstrations would get out of hand. I followed for a long distance and I wondered if anything would happen. The authorities must have become quite concerned, for they started a barrage of broadcasts, calling on the people to disperse and to go home and get to work and not lose their heads.

This evening Prague is as quiet as a village. . . . American citizens have received no word from their legation here. Instead of planning to leave, they are all buying gas masks and are staying on. . . . It's understood here that the Czechoslovakian Government is already proceeding to look after the possible new frontiers in Bohemia and to strengthen them.

The formation of the new Government strikingly enough has had its effect even on the Sudetens. The Czechs are still supposed to be in control of the territory. For a time it was feared today that there would be clashes between Sudeten Germans and Czechs. But only a short time ago the Czechs affirmed themselves in full control. "What do you suppose happened?" I asked a Czech friend. "It's the new Government," he said. . . .

ANNOUNCER: Edward R. Murrow is going to give us the lat-
est news from London. We take you now to London, England.

Murrow (London): According to a report just received from Berlin, Czech troops are reoccupying towns in the Sudeten area which had been taken over by Sudeten Germans earlier in the day. . . . Paris is of the opinion that the new Czech Government, headed by a General, will adhere to the acceptance of the Anglo-French proposals announced yesterday by President Benes.

From time to time I have tried to interpret for you the attitude of Englishmen in the state toward the day's problems. Tonight a friend of mine, Herbert Hodge, a taxi driver, is here to tell you what's in the minds of his fellow countrymen. Those of you who are acquainted with London taxi drivers know that in them you find unfailing courtesy and generally a bit of philosophy as well. Mr. Hodge is no ordinary taxi driver. He's had one book published and two plays produced. A few days ago I asked Mr. Hodge to talk with some of his associates and with the people who ride in his cab. Here is his report of what they're thinking about the present situation and the action of the British Government.

Hodge: Well, the first man I spoke to this morning was my father. When I went into the shop he was in the middle of an earnest conversation with the man whose hair he was cutting. The crisis, I thought. But, no, they were talking about the best way to grow marigolds. And that's typical. I asked my father what he thought of the situation. He said he didn't like the idea of giving way to Hitler, but then he added a little shamefacedly, "It's better to have peace at any price." And that seems to be the opinion of most people I've talked to. Sympathy seems mainly with the Czechs. But when I asked these people who denounced Chamberlain if they'd be prepared to go to war to help the Czechs, they hesitated and said, no.

It's just like Spain and China. Most people's sympathies are with the Spanish Government, but they don't feel
strongly enough about it to want to go to war. At least those of military age don't. The older people are much more warlike. But then they won't have to do the fighting. On the other hand, some people don't think there would have been a war if we had opposed Hitler. "Hitler's only bluffing," they say.

The minority who are politically conscious feel that a war between the democracies and the dictators is inevitable sooner or later in any case. They feel that this settlement, if it is a settlement, is only a temporary breathing space, a respite that will give England and France a chance to increase their armaments. We, in England at any rate, aren't ready for war. For one thing, we have little or no air-raid protection at the moment. London especially is short of all things necessary for civilian protection, and it would be madness to take the risk of a modern war, we feel, with a defenseless civilian population. At the same time we realize that every concession means that in the end we shall be up against a much more powerful enemy.

I think the most widespread feeling among ordinary people is bewilderment. ... We'd always understood that Russia was with England and France in an alliance against Germany and perhaps Italy. But now we are beginning to wonder whether Chamberlain's Government is really pro-Fascist and prefers to give way to Hitler rather than make friends with Stalin.

Then there's the United States. We're disappointed about the States and a little hurt by all the recent criticism in your press. We feel that the present situation is mainly due to the failure of the League of Nations, and the League was founded by a President of the United States. We feel a great deal of responsibility for the present situation rests on the United States.

MURROW: Mr. Hodge, in the course of your investigations, what have you heard about Mr. Eden?

HODGE: Well, you know there was a great deal of feeling against Eden some time ago but lately there's been quite an
astonishing change around. He used to be very much suspected, by left-wing liberals especially, but now opinion is coming around to his side. People feel he was right in his attitude.

MURROW: As a result of this taxicab survey that you've been carrying out, Mr. Hodge do you feel that opposition to Mr. Chamberlain's policy has increased during the past few days? Let's say during the last week?

HODGE: The general feeling seems to be that Chamberlain hasn't been as firm as he might have been with Hitler and people want to give him the benefit of the doubt until they really know the details.

MURROW: Do many people feel that Parliament should have been called before now?

HODGE: I think they feel generally they would have liked it to have been called had they not realized that when you come up against a crisis like this, it is very very difficult to have it discussed in Parliament.

MURROW: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Hodge. We return you now to America.

ANNOUNCER: And so now I call upon Mr. Kaltenborn for his analysis.

KALTENBORN: One piece of news strikes me as particularly important — something that has come to us first from Maurice Hindus in Prague and then from Edward Murrow in London, then finally from a dispatch from Berlin which has just been handed to me. That is the thing that has been happening on the Czechoslovak-German frontier. You will remember that Mr. Hindus told us just now that areas in Czechoslovakia which have been occupied by German troops yesterday were occupied by Czech troops today, and his indication was that there was no conflict in connection with that reoccupation. It was done because Czechoslovakia today once more has a strong government, headed by an extremely popular leader, General Syrovy, and such disorganization as there was yesterday has disappeared.

Ed Murrow from London also confirmed this. He told
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us too that word had just reached London that Czech troops had reoccupied the towns taken by the Sudetens. That means the two towns of Eger and Asch.

Now, here's the German dispatch. It just shows you how, unless we get the information from several sources, it's very difficult to tell exactly what is going on in those danger spots in Europe today. The official German news agency report which was handed to me just a moment ago declares that very serious trouble has developed just inside the German-Czechoslovakia frontier, and according to that news agency, Czechoslovakian troops have fired on Sudeten Germans who were celebrating their reoccupation of the town of Eger. The dispatch goes on to say that Czech soldiers, who had previously withdrawn from the area, came back and tried to reoccupy the area which Czechoslovakia had agreed to turn over to Germany. Well, the assumption there is that the Czech soldiers had no right to reoccupy that area. But they had that right. They are negotiating in Godesberg today and tomorrow as to the international commission that will be set up to supervise the transfer of that area, and consequently reentry of German troops or any troops from Germany into Sudetenland is not justified by the situation as it stands.

But naturally the Germans make it appear that it is an act of aggression on the part of the Czechs to reoccupy a part of their national territory. I assume that the first thing that the new Czech Government said was: "Maintain your position on the frontier until you get orders from Prague to withdraw."

Ed Murrow made an interesting point in quoting Lord Winterton who declares that the crisis is not over because Chamberlain will insist on a carefully supervised transfer of the territory. That is one thing, but an overrunning of Czechoslovakia by soldiers more or less out of control on three different frontiers, is a different thing. And now we're going to hear from William L. Shirer, who speaks from Godesberg, Germany.
Shirer: For the second time today, I’m talking to you from the hotel in Godesberg. Shortly after Mr. Chamberlain left Chancellor Hitler’s hotel from which I am talking at 7:15 this evening, his private secretary sent the correspondents to his own hotel on the summit of the Petersberg. The ferry wasn’t working, so we drove five miles down the river to find a bridge and arrived all breathless on the mountaintop a half hour later.

I’ll read to you from the statement from Prime Minister Chamberlain which we were given. After talking about his conversation with Herr Hitler, he said. “The Prime Minister appeals most earnestly to everybody to assist in maintaining a state of orderliness and to refrain from action of any kind that would be likely to lead to incidents.” That was Mr. Chamberlain’s appeal. Well, its 1:30 in the morning here now. I see the lights in Mr. Chamberlain’s hotel on the mountain across the Rhine are mostly out. The good folk in this town of Godesberg have all gone to bed and everyone is waiting for the decisive talk between the British and German leaders tomorrow.
Friday, September 23

6:55 A.M. — News Bulletin
Announcer: The Hitler-Chamberlain conference scheduled for 6:30 this morning, Eastern Daylight Time, has been postponed till later in the day. The Prime Minister sent a letter to Hitler, and the German leader is understood to be framing a reply.

7:45 A.M. — News Bulletin
Announcer: ... Mysterious events are under way at Godesberg.

8:45 A.M. — News Bulletin
Announcer: In Godesberg, news reached the British delegation that Germany has twenty-two army divisions on war footing in the immediate neighborhood of the Czech frontier. ... Troops total half a million men.

8:55 A.M. — News Bulletin
Announcer: Big-scale troop movements were reported throughout the French province of Alsace on the German frontier today.

9:25 A.M. — News Bulletin
Announcer: ... A serious clash between Czech troops and Sudeten Germans has been reported.
ANNOUNCER: ... In Godesberg, the conference has not yet been resumed....

KALTENBORN: The most important factor in today's situation is that for the first time a dictator is asked to compromise.

I met Adolf Hitler before he became Chancellor of Germany and I've met him since and talked with him repeatedly. The one thing that I became convinced of is that he would find it extremely difficult to compromise. His is not a compromising temperament. It's a fanatical temperament. When blocked or checked, Hitler finds it extremely difficult to remain calm. To what extent he has been asked to make concessions we do not know. We do know that he refused yesterday to join Prime Minister Chamberlain in an appeal for peace to be addressed to Czechoslovakia primarily, but to Poland and Hungary also. This might have meant that the Sudetenland might be transferred to Germany without disorder and with some decency with respect to the rights of those inhabitants who are not of Nazi persuasion. That is what Mr. Chamberlain asked. It was the least he could ask. British public opinion has been insisting that Czechoslovakia be given time to accomplish this transfer in orderly fashion. It seems that both France and England have made certain demands on Adolf Hitler. That's the reason this conference which was scheduled for this morning did not take place. That is the reason why you find an increasing tide of resentment in the German press against Czechoslovakia, which will result today in further clashes. That is the reason why once again this morning we are face to face with a fresh crisis.

The pledge that Prime Minister Chamberlain asked Adolf Hitler to give is that he would not invade Czechoslovakia while the negotiations are under way. That seems such a natural request to most of us that we wonder why Adolf Hitler wouldn't accept it. Well, the reason why he wouldn't accept it is that perhaps he can't. Remember that a dictator holds his power largely because he permits the
forces which he has created to continue to have sway. If, for example, Adolf Hitler should overnight decide that his anti-Semitic policy in Germany was injuring Germany itself and he wanted to revoke it, he would find it extremely difficult to persuade such fanatical followers as Julius Streicher to accept that. Now if he should issue an order to Konrad Henlein and the Sudetens that they must, under no circumstances, make any move to march into Sudetenland, that too would be received with grumbling. There is, of course, that tradition of complete obedience in the Nazi school of thought. Yes, it's complete obedience while the leader is asking them to do the things which they are accustomed to do and which they want to do.

The question is the Nazi leaders' readiness to do things they don't want to do. The question was raised once in Germany in 1934 when I happened to be there. What was the result then? The blood purge. The execution of every one of the leaders who dared to question Hitler's decision. That was the only time Hitler tried to do something which certain members of the Nazi force really resented.

He may try to do something now that would placate Mr. Chamberlain, but I am inclined to think that he won't go very far. Then the question is. What will Mr. Chamberlain do? The crisis of the Godesberg conference lies ahead. It was perfectly obvious to me when it began that it could not continue to be a complete surrender on the part of France and Britain to everything that Adolf Hitler asks. We have discussed the rising tide of public opinion against it. That has its effect in Godesberg.

Both Chamberlain and Hitler are in constant contact with public opinion in their countries. But in Mr. Chamberlain's case it is an opinion that he does not manufacture and that perhaps he cannot control. In Hitler's case it is an opinion that he both manufactures and, generally speaking, can control. Now he has manufactured opinion about the Czechs. There has been no disorder on the Czech frontier except that which has been wilfully created by the
Sudetens themselves. The new Czech Government, representing the Czech people in its hour of crisis, has decided that it must continue to occupy its territory until there is agreement as to how and when it is to be evacuated. That's all that the Czechs have done and that's the reason that you hear these reports from Berlin about a red rabble completely out of control, overrunning the Sudetenland and doing this, that and the other thing. Don't believe it. Czechoslovakia, once more, has a strong government and Britain and France are stronger than they were.

12:15 P.M. — 12:30 P.M.

Kaltenborn: The crisis is increasingly tense. From every capital with which we have been in touch this morning comes news that is disturbing to the lovers of peace. There is as yet no sharply accented crisis, but there are ominous premonitions. The conference between Prime Minister Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler that was to have been resumed this morning has been cancelled. Instead there was the delivery of a letter from the British Prime Minister to the German Fuehrer. That letter has now been answered. No word as to what Mr. Chamberlain's letter contained or as to what Mr. Hitler's reply contained has been permitted to reach the outside world.

That is not good news. If there had been an understanding between the two men as the result of this exchange of letters, we would at once have had the proclamation of that happy news. The fact that it has not come indicates that they are not in agreement. For the first time, the British Prime Minister has made a demand and has received from the German leader a refusal. I have no dispatch that definitely states a rejection, but the fact that the exchange has come to an end and that we have as yet had no announcement suggests a continued serious difference of opinion. I just talked with Edward Murrow in London and our conversation confirmed my impression that things are not going well. I asked him, for example, how London reacted to Hit-
ler's refusal yesterday to join with Mr. Chamberlain in an appeal for peace and he tells me that the London press this morning, obviously under Government inspiration, is extremely reserved in all its comment. It wants to do nothing or say nothing that might in any way irritate the Germans while the negotiations are under way. One would wish that the German press were similarly reticent.

From every capital I have news in front of me here which indicates the tightening of the situation. In Italy, the press insists on Mussolini's desire to make this a general dividing up of Czechoslovakia. That is something which the British and the French are apparently determined to resist. In Warsaw, the controlled press and the Government are both acting in such a way as to indicate that they are determined that Poland is to have the Teschen district at this time. Recruiting offices have been opened in Warsaw for the organization of volunteer corps similar to the Sudeten Corps. Of course that's the Government's way of covering up aggressive intentions against Czechoslovakia. It organizes those so-called corps of people supposedly native in the Teschen District who have fled because of alleged persecution and who are only going back to claim their home territory for the homeland Poland. That's the idea as it is underscored and emphasized in Poland.

That's exactly what Germany has done. She has organized these Sudetens and given them German weapons, German tanks, German artillery, and they are standing at the border waiting for the order to march. They have already taken border towns.

I can imagine the screaming headlines in today's German press announcing what has happened. They won't say that the Czechs have merely reoccupied a part of their own country. What they say is that the Czechs are a red horde of unleashed murderers acting under Moscow's instructions, terrorizing the poor inhabitants of those districts.

It is quite possible that Hitler, believing that action is the best way to get results, will, over the week-end, send
those Sudetens into certain border areas to occupy them. There is one report in London that Adolf Hitler has informed Prime Minister Chamberlain that Germany intends to march into Czechoslovakia. That, however, is only a report.

Two important news items have just come in: First, Russia has just made a move to aid its ally, Czechoslovakia, by informing Poland that Russia will denounce her non-aggression treaty with the Poles if Polish troops move into Czechoslovakia. Poland is warned that if she moves against the Teschen District, Russia will feel free to take military action. Litvinoff, we are told, is to make another speech in Geneva today *(See Appendix, Page 272)* and it is quite possible that he will announce some sort of intention on the part of his Government to take military action. The strength of feeling in the French Army about the failure of France to maintain her pledged word to Czechoslovakia is very eloquently expressed this morning by the action of the Chief of the French Military Mission of Czechoslovakia, Brigadier General Louis Eugene Faucher, who notified the French Government that he had resigned from the French Army and had placed himself at the disposal of the Czechoslovakian Army. It is quite possible that France, if not under the Daladier Government then under the successor Government, may still be faithful to its treaty obligations. The issue is not resolved. Herr Hitler has so far failed to make a single concession, and it is becoming increasingly unlikely that he will have his way without any consideration for the legitimate demands that have been made upon him.

*Kaltenborn: The news from Europe is increasingly grave. I have just talked with Ed Murrow. He tells me that there is a definite feeling in London that Hitler has made demands which Mr. Chamberlain cannot accept.*

The letter containing Hitler’s demands has been re-
laid to both London and Paris for the reaction of the Cabinets there, and upon their reply the further developments of the situation depend. Some of the Radical Socialist members of the French Chamber of Deputies had an interview with Premier Daladier on the crisis this morning and they report that Daladier has assured them definitely that France will fight to aid Czechoslovakia if Germany makes a military invasion.

According to the Deputies, the French Premier said that France will positively live up to her treaty with Czechoslovakia. Also Soviet Commissar Litvinoff has just made another speech in Geneva on the crisis, in which he declared that Russia may voluntarily go to the aid of Czechoslovakia, but that no one has a right to demand such assistance. He repeated that Russia’s treaty obligations oblige her to assist Czechoslovakia only in case France does and that Russia would meet that treaty obligation. In other words, you have an indication that Russia may fight for Czechoslovakia in case of German invasion and that she certainly will if France does. You also have the indication that France is stiffening in her point of view and that Daladier has given assurance that if Germany invades Czechoslovakia, France will fight.

There are clashes on the Czechoslovak frontier, but thus far they are only between the Sudeten volunteer corps and the Czech soldiers. Consequently Germany has not moved, and attention still focuses on Godesberg.

3:09-3:19 P.M.

KALTENBORN: The thing for us to watch is the army that is massed on the Czechoslovakian frontier on the German side. It is not a German army. It is a Sudeten army. It is an army recruited by Germany, organized by her, equipped by her, munitioned by her, supplied by her, but it is still an army of citizens of Czechoslovakia who have become traitors to their Government, particularly to the new Government which has just been created. Now that army may invade
Czechoslovakia tonight. If it does, and the Czech army fights back, there is still no certain occasion for intervention by France and consequently by Russia. That still remains a local conflict between divers groups of Czechoslovak citizens. It is not until Germany herself, with German forces, comes into Czechoslovakia that we will have the *casus belli*. That would be the definite situation which would oblige France to launch her troops against Germany and which would oblige Russia to come to the aid of Czechoslovakia in cooperation with her French allies.

Throughout the day, news has come to us with regard to French preparation for war. France has manned her troops on the Maginot Line. She has occupied the most advanced posts, placed them on a war footing. Germany, with a million and half men under arms, has also occupied frontier points. While those two armies are poised and while the Czechoslovaks, under their new military leader, occupied some of the area in Sudetenland which they had previously vacated, very delicate negotiations are bound to be made in Godesberg. There has been no meeting there today. Instead Mr. Chamberlain sent a letter to Adolf Hitler, and it's easy to guess at the contents. He probably wrote the German leader: "I must insist that you give me some guarantee that Germany will not invade Czechoslovakia while these negotiations are pending. You must give me some guarantee that you will cooperate with me in the preservation of peace in the affected Sudeten areas, during the continuance of these negotiations. If I cannot get that assurance from you, I do not feel that I can resume personal negotiations." Herr Hitler has replied; that reply has not been made public, but again I can anticipate what it contains. Herr Hitler probably says, "There is a state of revolution in Czechoslovakia. There are disorders in the frontier areas. Sudeten Germans are being killed by a ruthless, red mob. Consequently I cannot be responsible for order in a state that it is not itself able to maintain order." That is the content of Hitler's reply as we can guess it from what we hear
in the German press. For that is what the German press has been printing. We know from it that it is not an accurate picture of what is going on in those frontier districts. But Germany believes it. Hitler, as far as we know, may believe it. Therefore the present impasse. For the moment direct negotiations have ceased between Chamberlain and Hitler. They have, however, continued by an exchange of those two letters, and at this very moment, the British representatives, Sir Neville Henderson and Hugh Wilson, are conferring with von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, to see whether there is any way of working out a continuation of direct negotiations.

3:30-3:45 P.M. — Hindus, Prague; Kaltenborn, New York

HINDUS: Here in Prague we feel rather relieved. During the night a number of incidents happened on the frontier. In a number of the places the Sudetens started to take command of the Government. They even went so far as to arrest democrats and Socialists. The Czech police have rigid instructions under no circumstances to shoot except in absolute self-defense. When they happen to be on the border or so close to it that the bullets might hit someone on German territory, they are not supposed to shoot at all — no matter how great the provocation. This is the situation in Czechoslovakia at the present moment.

Last night the clashes were serious in a number of places, though not as serious as the German broadcasters have made them out to be. According to German announcements, fifty persons were killed. According to the best information we journalists in Prague have been able to obtain only nine persons were killed. That’s probably the reason why Chamberlain and Hitler are having a little difficulty at present. During the night it was obvious that a fresh mobilization was taking place. Nobody knows how many soldiers the Czechs have mobilized. The Czechs might be deserted by their friends but they say that they’re not going
to be overrun by force. They will surrender in a legal and orderly way only.

The attempts last night by Henleinists to seize certain towns and the quickness with which the Czech Government asserted control of these towns, shows clearly enough that the new Prime Minister, General Syrovy, is intent on preserving law and order under all circumstances. The Democrats, Socialists, Roman Catholics, Jews and Czechs in these lands will be defended.

For the first time I heard intellectuals speak with complete disillusionment of democracy. Until today there were eighteen districts in the Sudeten area that were under martial law. Today two new districts were added, making a total of twenty. To the Czechs this is especially good news. It shows that under General Syrovy the Government is firm. It is not allowing itself to be intimidated by Sudeten Nazis.

Another extraordinary piece of news added further to the encouragement of the Czechs. According to reliable information Potemkin, who is Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs in Moscow, called up the Polish Ambassador in Moscow at 4 o'clock this morning and told him this: "As soon as the first Polish soldiers steps over Czech territory, Russia will regard her non-aggression pact with Poland finished!"

KALTENBORN: Mr. Hindus told us several interesting things about the change in Prague (Review of Hindus' remarks) The Czechs feel more encouraged by the news of the rift in the negotiations.

A copyrighted United Press dispatch from Godesberg states that Prime Minister Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler agreed to meet again tonight after an anxious day in which their peace or war negotiations seemed in danger of being broken off. That meeting will take place tonight. After that the entire British delegation is preparing to leave for London by airplane early tomorrow. So upon that final meeting between Hitler and Chamberlain will depend, perhaps, the issue of peace or war in Europe. Notes have been ex-
changed, meetings have been held, a sharp difference of opinion has developed. Mr. Chamberlain insists on Mr. Hitler's guarantee of peace in the Sudeten areas. Hitler refuses it. They met again. For what? For peace?

5:00-5:15 P.M.

KALTENBORN: On the eve of fresh negotiations at Godesberg, we have France, Britain, and Russia acting for the first time in close communion. We have a revivified Czechoslovakia with a strong government of national union, standing fast at the old Czechoslovak border, ready to cede to Sudetenland through orderly process, but unwilling to have the Germans march in and take it over by the exercise of force. That is the situation as it stands at this moment.

Here's another bulletin from London. The British War Minister, Leslie Hore-Belisha, has been called hurriedly back to London. The Minister took an airplane and flew back to the capital. So will every other Cabinet Minister in Europe tonight.

We have reached the high point of the crisis. The next move is up to Adolf Hitler. He can have peace. He can have the Sudetenland; he can have access to the richest portion of Czechoslovakia; he can establish himself in a very powerful position in Europe by peaceful means. The question is — will he go to war under such conditions?

I've just received some information about the situation in Germany itself and it is this: In Germany there is perfect willingness on the part of the German General Staff to go to war against both France and Russia. But there is entire unwillingness to face a war in which France plus Russia plus Great Britain will be allied against Germany. That division of opinion is being expressed to Adolf Hitler at this moment and it is more than possible that he will think twice before he enters a conflict with that alliance when his own General Staff tell him, "No, under those conditions you are bound to lose."

So even though for the next few hours, it's quite likely
that the headlines will be most alarming and it’s very possible that we will have to give you bulletins that indicate the imminence of war, still remember that we have had these crises in Europe’s affairs for the past ten years. They have come again and again. Primarily they have come in more recent years since Hitler established his power. But each time, when it actually came to confronting the dictators with a Europe that stood united, they have retreated.

We had a situation on May 21st, and while it was not as critical as the one today, it was still serious. Europe stood firm; Hitler retreated. I know you share my hope that once again peace may thus be saved.

5:30-5:45 P.M. — Downs, Paris; Kaltenborn, New York

ANNOUNCER: At this time Columbia’s microphones open once more on the other side of the Atlantic, in Paris, France, to bring you the voice of Kenneth Downs, International News Service correspondent.

Downs: Good evening. The sensational and unexpected bogging down of the conversation between British Prime Minister Chamberlain and Chancellor Hitler has frightened Frenchmen of all classes. On all sides you can seem to feel a stiffening of the French attitude toward Germany tonight. Late this evening Premier Edouard Daladier received a delegation of the powerful Radical Socialist Party of which he is president, and the Minister of War. At the conclusion of the conference, Pierre Cot, former Minister of War, announced: “Premier Daladier is very firm in his declarations. He authorized me to say that in the event of a German coup d’etat against Czechoslovakia, France will go to their assistance. The Premier stated that the situation is very grave and that France has gone to the limit in the matter of concessions.”

This powerful declaration from Premier Daladier is having a sound effect, particularly in view of the fact that he up to now has met all manner of situations by making all possible concessions and cooperating 100 per cent with
the British to try to build up a settlement through conciliatory methods.

Heightening of sentiment against Germany can be seen on all sides here. . . . More than one thousand policemen and mobile guards were especially detailed to the Czech Legation, which is located near the famous Eiffel Tower, to keep large crowds from gathering around it and prevent any sort of disorder or demonstrations. . . . One group of nearly six hundred men managed to break through the police cordon and they stood cheering fiercely for Czechoslovakia in front of the Legation before they were dispersed. . . . German maneuvers are expected to reach their peak this week-end. The full might of the German Army, estimated up to two million or more, will be under arms on Sunday.

KALTENBORN: First, before I speak of Mr. Downs and comment on what he said from Paris, I want to tell you that we've just received a Press Radio flash that President Benes of Czechoslovakia has ordered full mobilization of Czechoslovakia's armed strength. That is obviously in answer to the mobilization moves which have come from the German side all day today.

If you remember the steps that preceded the World War, you will remember that it was a state of alarm first, then partial mobilization, then complete mobilization. The hostilities followed. There is nothing in complete mobilization of a small country against a large one that means that that small country is going to commit any aggressive act; it merely means that that small country very much fears that an aggressive act will be committed by the large country.

Mr. Downs called our attention to the complete change of atmosphere in Paris. And he told us that the breakdown at Godesberg came because of certain Hitler demands. One of those demands I discussed with you a few minutes ago, that is, his failure to give a guarantee that Germany would do nothing to change the status quo in Sudetenland until
negotiations had been completed for the orderly transfer of the territory from Czechoslovakia to Germany. But there is a new shift in the German position. It's a shift that came to me through listening to the German short-wave broadcast a few minutes ago as it came in from Berlin. German short-wave stations are official. I heard them announce that the creation of the new Czechoslovakian Government under General Syrovy is a Czech ruse; that it is an excuse to withdraw Czechoslovakia's cession of Sudetenland which was made by Premier Hodza. Obviously, however, from our point of view we can see no reason why Premier Hodza should have faced a revolution in his own country to make a concession, if it was only a clever scheme to get a new Government in order to withdraw it. No, I don't believe that the world will accept that particular explanation.

Notice the silence of Rome; not a word from Rome today. No sound of mobilization by Italy. Word may come, but I call your attention to the fact that on a day of violent military declarations we've had no further word from Premier Mussolini with respect to the fact that Italy has chosen her side.

But the lines are tightening and within a few hours we may be able to tell you whether it is to be peace or war.

6:30 P.M. — "Today" With Bob Trout
Trout: The news from Godesberg, now official, is that negotiations have broken off entirely and Prime Minister Chamberlain is flying back to London tomorrow, following the last-minute courtesy meeting, which is now taking place with Hitler in the Hotel Dresden.

7:15-7:30 P.M.
ANNOUNCER: We take you now to London, England....
Murrow (London): Mr. Chamberlain and Herr Hitler are still together. We are again in a whirlwind of rumors. Just before coming to the studios I heard one experienced news editor call the Godesberg dispatch an obituary of the peace.
The last message we received from Prague, before the mobilization and the cutting of communications, was that fighting was going on along the German frontier. . . . There are crowds in Whitehall, relatively small crowds and very orderly. I've just been told there are no crowds at all outside the Czechoslovakian Embassy. . . . Mr. Chamberlain's supporters are puzzled. His opponents seem tonight to be waiting. Tonight in London there is very little hope and much pessimism. One item of news not yet generally known in London is considered to be of considerable significance. That is the fact that Lord De La Warr, Lord Privy Seal, a member of the Cabinet, had a conversation with M. Litvinoff, Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, in Geneva late this afternoon.

People here believe this to be a solemn hour in British history, and I believe it to be a time for cool thinking and careful speaking.

Trout (After attempted communication with Germany): Here is a cable just received from Mr. William L. Shirer, who was to have talked from Godesberg. Mr. Shirer says: "I was not allowed to broadcast tonight anything but the official text of the communiqué. Mr. Chamberlain is going back to London tomorrow and unless the miracle happens between midnight and tomorrow, he returns without an agreement on Czechoslovakia with Hitler. That was the news that burst here in Godesberg late tonight after one of the most fantastic days modern European diplomacy has ever known.

"It looked like a deadlock until ten minutes to six this evening. At that hour, we who were watching in the lobby of the Petersberg Hotel saw Sir Horace Wilson, principal adviser to Mr. Chamberlain and Sir Neville Henderson, British Ambassador in Berlin, come rather hurriedly down the stairs from the Prime Minister's room. They both had very serious expressions on their faces. Sir Horace stopped long enough to tell us they were not off to see Hitler, but were off to see Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop at the
Hotel Dresden. The two British envoys stayed with the Foreign Minister for just two hours. Once the meeting was broken, during which time Herr Ribbentrop conveyed the nature of the conversations to Hitler. When Henderson and Wilson returned to Petersberg across the Rhine at eight o'clock tonight the latter gave us the impression that there had been a complete breakup in the negotiations. This is what he told us: 'Mr. Chamberlain's present arrangements are to leave for London tomorrow morning by airplane.' We asked Sir Horace if it was a breakdown. He said 'You will see when you look over what I have said. Mr. Chamberlain's visit to Herr Hitler tonight is merely a farewell.'

KALTENBORN: Did you catch — I'm sure you did — the little German melody that came tinkling over the air waves by short wave in Germany just before Bob Trout began reading you William L. Shirer's message? Well, sometimes a curious thing happens in a tense moment of world history. That was a quaint folk melody of Old Germany.

"Be always true and keep the faith until death comes and holds you." We could wish that all men could hold that moral to their hearts tonight, for it is a night when truth and faith and honesty and fair dealing among men are challenged. The most hopeful word was that from Ed Murrow in London, in which he told us that Chamberlain and Hitler are still together. You will remember that earlier in the afternoon we told you that this final visit was only a friendly visit, but perhaps Mr. Chamberlain employed it once more to impress upon the German Chancellor the tremendous responsibility that he assumes before the world if he launches that world into war.

Ed Murrow gave you a clear picture of the swelling tide of resentment against what seemed the humiliation of Britain and London, the growing feeling that compromise is useless. Even those who opposed Mr. Chamberlain say that they stand behind him in any serious decision he may now make. England conferring with Russia? Why? Because the crisis is near and Soviet armies are ready to act with
the British Army and Navy. This conference marks the preparation for what may be needed tomorrow. And so, if, peace fails, it will not be the fault of those who have endeavored to negotiate it on behalf of the democracies at Godesberg.

7:45 P.M.—News Bulletin

Announcer: All Europe is preparing for a threatened invasion of Czechoslovakia...

8:30-9:00 p.m.—Kwapiszewski, Warsaw, Poland

Gosling, Budapest, Hungary; Kaltenborn, New York

Announcer: ... And now for news direct from a country whose demands upon Czechoslovakia are creating new international difficulties: Poland — where, in the capital Michael Kwapiszewski is waiting to speak to us. We take you now to Warsaw, Poland.

Announcer (Poland): Hello. This is Warsaw calling. Mr. Michael Kwapiszewski, Director of the Foreign American Chamber of Commerce and former Counsellor of the Polish Ambassador to the United States, speaks of the attitude of Poland.

Kwapiszewski: The action of Germany may have surprised some people, but the claim of Poland to the Silesia robbed from her in 1919 should not surprise anybody. It is a natural consequence of Polish-Czech developments since 1919. We do not ask the Czechs to make us a gift of Teschen Silesia but we simply expect them to return what they have taken from us treacherously after the War....

Announcer (New York): And now, Robert Gosling, newspaper man in Budapest, reading the official Hungarian statement regarding its claims on Czechoslovakia.

Gosling: Normal political relations have never been possible with Czechoslovakia....

Kaltenborn: Well, the talk of the ex-counsellor of the Polish Embassy in Washington naturally presented a very definitely Polish point of view, stating that Teschen was stolen
from Poland in 1919 while Czech troops were occupied in fighting Russia and referring to the Polish-Czech convention of 1925 which from Poland's point of view Czechoslovakia has not kept. He added that Poland delayed voicing her demands in order to avoid aggravating the crisis but that now she feels that the time has come when her demands should be met. That was the presentation of the Polish point of view.

Then you have that official statement from Budapest, Hungary, that justice promised to the Hungarians minorities in other countries has not been kept. Hungary cannot swallow the insult that would be involved in settling the German issue and ignoring the Hungarian issue. There you have the Hungarian point of view and who has been in Hungary knows how strongly the Hungarian people feel about that particular thing. They did lose two-thirds of their territory and practically two-thirds of their population. The general opinion is that Hungary got one of the worst deals from the peace treaty.

TRout: More details. Military activities are now going on in Hungary. The Government denies that mobilization is under way, but the Associated Press reports that military barracks in Hungary are being rapidly filled with reservists who have received orders to report for duty at once.

KALTENBORN: That suggests direct cooperation with Germany—military action from both Poland and Hungary, working toward the Czechoslovakian frontier. A few moments ago we had news from Poland that she had rejected the warning from Russia.

Here is a new dispatch, a flash from Prague, to the effect that the Sudeten Free Corps proclaims Anschluss in Asch. Asch, as you know, is the birthplace of Konrad Henlein; Asch is the one town in Czechoslovakia that the Sudeten have continued to hold in spite of the advance of the Czechoslovak Army toward the frontier. This proclamation of Anschluss means exactly nothing from the practical point of view. It's a perfectly natural thing for them to proclaim
and no doubt has given them a great deal of satisfaction. It does not, however, affect the issue in any way. The essential thing that affects the issue is what happened between Prime Minister Chamberlain and Hitler. That we'll soon know.

ANNOUNCER: During this broadcast, we have been listening to a radio station in Prague, which brought to the citizens of Czechoslovakia no alarming news, no late news at all, in fact. Czechoslovakia, keypoint of Europe's worry, has been listening to this while we've been talking to you. ... 

10:00-10:06 P.M. — Shirer, Godesberg
Kaltenborn, New York

SHIRER (Godesberg): “Mr. Chamberlain called on the Fuehrer tonight to say good-bye. The German Minister of Foreign Affairs was present. On this occasion the Fuehrer expressed to the British Premier and to the British Government his own and the German nation's sincere thanks for their efforts to bring about a peaceful solution of the Sudeten German problem. The British Prime Minister will leave Germany early tomorrow morning to return to England.” That is the official text of the communiqué issued early this morning at Godesberg, Germany, at the conclusion of the conversations between Chancellor Hitler and Prime Minister Chamberlain.

KALTEBORN: That was the word from Godesberg. Naturally, under conditions such as this, Mr. Shirer was unable to give us his personal interpretation of this news. We know that Mr. Chamberlain made a last effort to persuade Herr Hitler to make concessions. We know that some sort of concession was made by Mr. Hitler. We know that it was not entirely satisfactory to Mr. Chamberlain. As a result, what he did was to tell Herr Hitler, “I can’t make the decision now. I must leave that decision to the people and to the Government of Czechoslovakia. What I will do is communicate your proposal to them.”

Remember also that he did not communicate it first to France. This is not the joint French-British agreement to
submit a new proposal to Czechoslovakia. This is evidently no attempt to put further pressure on the Czechs. This is merely Prime Minister Chamberlain's effort to preserve peace.

The proposal probably is what the French anticipated this afternoon it would be — namely, the occupation by Germany of a certain small area of the Sudetenland. That of course is absolutely insisted upon by Hitler in order to save his prestige. He cannot, as a dictator, appear to be making a complete concession. He must still tell his own people that he has secured the right to enter into the Sudeten territory. Perhaps that could be arranged. If, however, it involves the surrender of a large part of the Sudeten area before the three-quarter million non-Nazi inhabitants can be taken out — I am convinced that the Prague Government will not accept. It is completely mobilized and ready for war; it has proclaimed its determination to resist; the French have said that if Germany invades they will help; Russia is ready to help. So Czechoslovakia will not make a major retreat at this time.

11:00-11:30 P.M. — London-New York Interview
Murrow, London; Kaltenborn, New York
Jan Masaryk, London

ANNOUNCER: Here is Mr. Kaltenborn.
KALTENBORN: Hello, Ed Murrow, are you there? Hello, Ed.
MURROW: Hello, Hans. The Czech Minister is sitting here in London beside me. He is Jan Masaryk.

This afternoon New York telephoned me to say that Mr. Masaryk had agreed to speak tonight provided a microphone could be installed in the Czech Legation. Unfortunately there wasn't sufficient time to install that microphone, so I telephoned to Mr. Masaryk and asked rather hesistantly whether or not he would come to the studios at the hour of four in the morning in London and talk to the United States. He agreed to do so.

Ladies and gentlemen, I'm not going to say the Right
Honorable Jan Masaryk because he's told me he prefers to be known as just Jan Masaryk, Czech Minister to London.

MASARYK: It is for me quite an unexpected pleasure to visualize millions of the citizens of the great American democracy listening to me. At the same time it is an unexpected responsibility, believe me. It has been a very long day for me. It's four o'clock in the morning in London and I have not overslept myself lately.

Today my beloved little country ordered a general mobilization. We have definitely decided to resist aggression, and I can tell you that this move was not made without the knowledge of France and Great Britain. Quite the contrary. In a very few words, the history of the last few weeks and days has been about as follows:

Lord Runciman came to Prague as a mediator. We welcomed him. The Sudeten Germans welcomed him and together we gave him all the facilities to learn the real facts of the situation. Before he was quite able to finish his task, Mr. Chamberlain, in a definitely honest endeavor to save the peace of the world, went to Berchtesgaden to discuss the fate of my country with Herr Hitler. The visit of the French statesmen in London followed and my Government was suddenly, without in any way having been consulted, faced with a plan which meant, to say the least, a permanent crippling of my country.

After a terribly hard and tearful deliberation they accepted this plan in full, in toto, as they say in Latin, and in full confidence that this time France and England will not forsake us. And there the matter stands at the minute. Mr. Chamberlain is again visiting Herr Hitler, and at this moment he is being handed a memorandum containing Mr. Hitler's considered and final opinion of the Sudeten-German question. He will deliver it to us tomorrow. What the memorandum contains I have no idea. Just as I have no idea what the Anglo-French plan was till twenty-four hours after it had been decided upon. I hope and pray that it will be acceptable to us and that neighborly relations will at last be
established worthy of such proud peoples as the Germans on one side and the Czechoslovaks on the other.

My people have gone further in self-restraint, discipline, international solidarity in these last few days than anyone could have expected, and I am more proud than I ever was to be a citizen of Czechoslovakia. We shall study Mr. Hitler's proposal with good-will and that same spirit of conciliation which made us swallow many pills and bitter pills in the last few days.

But I solemnly declare that we shall not give in on the fundamental issues. We believe in democracy, humanitarianism, freedom of religion and speech and the importance of the individual. I personally insist upon reading the Bible and reading the poems by Heine. Whether Heine was a Jew or not does not interest me in the least. He's the author of *The Lorelei*, the most beautiful German poem I know.

And now I want to tell you that my country has not been perfect always. We have made mistakes. We are young and inexperienced but we are proud to be a democracy, where a mistake can be acknowledged and where it can be rectified. But please know this, and I am speaking in a very serious mood tonight. Our German minority was treated better than any other in Europe, and if it would not have been for the shocking propaganda from across the border, we and our Sudeten Germans, among whom I have hundreds of personal friends, would have settled our differences with dignity and without bloodshed.

My father was buried just a year ago. My united nation is assembled around his simple village grave, firmly resolved to safeguard the principles he laid down for us, and we are convinced that truth, decency, freedom and love will triumph in the end. We shall defend it to our last breath.

I tell you, Americans, our powder is dry. As one who has spent many years in America, who knows and loves it, who earned his first dollar in New York City when he was nineteen years old; as one whose mother was an American; and as a citizen of a small country, where St. Stanislaus and
Jan Huss are our two native heroes and patrons, I greet you, brother democrats, and may God give us peace. May He replace hatred by love and deliver us from evil.

Good night to you all. There is one more thought I had in my head. I know there are many of my countrymen who are listening in at the moment, people who perhaps fought in the last war to allow Bohemia and Slovakia to be free. Will you, majority, allow me to speak to this minority in their own tongue and tell them something?

(Mr. Marsaryk greeted his compatriots in America in Czech and said, "Truth must triumph and will triumph, I salute you, brother Democrats.")

Murrow: Thank you very much indeed, Mr. Masaryk.
Saturday, September 24

5:30-6:00 A.M. — News Bulletin
Announcer: Prime Minister Chamberlain is now in a plane flying back to London. . . . Throughout the night, reports have been piling up of heavy troop movements in Germany.

6:15 A.M. — News Bulletin
Announcer: The French Naval Minister has just announced partial mobilization of the French Navy.

6:16 A.M. — News Bulletin
Announcer: Premier Mussolini declares in a speech that Czechoslovakia has until October 1 to answer Adolf Hitler’s demands. . . . Now France orders partial mobilization of its air force. . . . Here is the text of the Mussolini statement: “Germany has forwarded proposals to Prague to which Prague has until October 1st to reply. The Prague Government has six days in which to find its way to wisdom.”

8:10 A.M. — News Bulletin
Announcer: Prime Minister Chamberlain is back in London. . . .

9:15 A.M. — News Bulletin
Announcer: Great Britain is preparing to mobilize all armed forces. . . . Air force leaves were cancelled. . . . Bombs
were distributed to all main air-force centers. . . . Barracks are being supplied with rifles and uniforms.

9:30 A.M.

KALTENBORN: October 1st has been a day fixed in the minds of all of us who have followed the European situation, for the reason that German mobilization, the calling up of her reservists, expires on that day. There has been a feeling that Adolf Hitler would have to secure some sort of settlement by that time. Otherwise demobilization of the German Army would normally take place.

That does allow some time for cool thinking. It also gives the German General Staff the opportunity to make a few things clear to Adolf Hitler. Hitler has no real comprehension of the economic and the political and the military forces that would be aligned against him. France plus Russia plus Britain would stand against Germany, even though Germany might be helped by a little army in Hungary and possibly also by Italy. The delay will give the General Staff the opportunity to impress upon him the gravity of the situation.

No one with a sense of reality could fail to appreciate the negative elements of Germany's position: natural resources, opportunity for overseas conveyance for supplies and the simple matter of food. Wars are not fought by the army alone. They are fought today by the industrial organization that lies back of the army.

England is evidently determined to stand with France. The partial mobilization about which you have heard indicates that England feels that if war comes she will be involved. I think there was a tremendous disappointment in Britain over the attitude that Mr. Chamberlain assumed at the beginning of the negotiations, and it seems to me that the old British spirit has returned. That something of that spirit has reached Mr. Chamberlain was expressed in the conferences at Godesberg yesterday and has been brought back to Britain by Chamberlain himself this morning. He
will present his experiences with Adolf Hitler to the Inner Cabinet this morning, to the full Cabinet this afternoon.

Now I know that a man like Chamberlain can't sit opposite a man like Hitler for as long as he has sat opposite to him both at Berchtesgaden and at Godesberg without realizing the limitations of that mentality and personality. He probably senses the fact that he is dealing with a fanatical individual who is very determined and very limited and with whom it is impossible to deal on the same basis as you can deal with a mature, ripened statesman.

On the other hand, Chamberlain must have sensed that there are other elements in Germany who realize the futility of war, and if he sensed that perhaps he has been able to establish contact with some part of that element. In that case it may be that he has a real hope for working out some solution and perhaps that is the reason why he was primarily concerned with gaining time.

I should add this: there is no question today but that Britain realizes that she must stand with France and I think that from now on those two countries are bound to act in the closest collaboration.

France has called several classes of reservists to the colors. The Maginot line is completely armed. France's commitments are to come to the aid of Czechoslovakia if the latter is invaded. Therefore, the General Staff may well have a definite plan for the invasion of Germany, if Germany strikes against Czechoslovakia.

France seems determined now to stand by her obligations. Daladier made that clear yesterday. His statement was absolutely unequivocal and we know that he has back of him now much more than a majority of the Chamber of Deputies. Now under what circumstances do France's obligations come into play? Suppose that the Czechoslovakian Government declares that it cannot accept the conditions which Mr. Hitler proposes?

Hitler dictates. He wants the right to march in with his own men and do the thing in his own way. So he has un-
doubted delivered an ultimatum giving the Czech troops until October 1st, to be out of Sudeten areas. If Czechoslovakia refuses to accept that, France is obliged to come to her aid.

We should know the answer very soon. It is difficult to believe that the world has gone entirely insane because of one man.

11:00-11:15 a.m. — News Bulletin

Announcer: So serious is the situation that the American Legation in Budapest, Hungary, has a train ready to leave at once for the coast to evacuate citizens of the United States. The British Legation has made similar preparations. The Hungarian-Czechoslovakian border is closed and Czechoslovakia and Hungary are rushing military preparations along the frontier. Evacuation of towns along the German frontier has begun. In Paris during the morning United States Ambassador Bullitt conferred with Foreign Minister Bonnet.

On the French side of the Rhine tanks are massed ready for instant action. The other side bristles with arms. Military movements are clothed in the greatest secrecy. Prague has isolated itself from the world. Great Britain made preparations for instant mobilization of her armed forces; forty-two warships of the home fleet put to sea today. Belgium today ordered partial mobilization.

In London registrars' offices were deluged today with the rush of couples getting married before war breaks out. Some couples went directly from being married to be fitted for gas masks.

Kaltenborn: The news sounds more warlike than it is.

I've just talked to William Shirer and learned that the dominating note is a lack of apprehension in Berlin concerning today's events or tomorrow's. There is definitely no war spirit, Shirer tells me.

He speaks of the mobilization and tells me that today Germany's mobilization has reached its peak. The Ger-
mans are so accustomed to these military movements that this one has not excited the apprehension that it would have in democratic countries.

German headlines given me by phone this morning were peaceful in tone. We know that the press is under such close control that whatever it does is suggested by the Press Department of the Propaganda Ministry. That Ministry each day gives a general order to the press telling it what to emphasize, what to play down, what particular things not to mention at all. Each editor has before him as he begins his work, detailed instructions as to how the news is to be emphasized. Consequently I think we have the right to conclude that it's the policy of the German Government at the moment not to play things up, but to hold them down.

Mr. Shirer tells me that there is very little chance of war before the expiration of a week. That is encouraging, because so frequently in these pre-war situations the gaining of time is of the essence.

The British Fleet has gone to sea. It is ready for instant action to blockade the German coast to prevent the continuance of Germany's commerce with the outside world.

I am convinced that already this morning the great German liners, which sail between New York and Bremen and Hamburg have received their orders as to what to do in case within the hour the call to war should come.

Belgium is mobilizing this morning, this time solely for the protection of their own frontier.

Rumania has mobilized. Rumania's position is not yet entirely clear. Conferences have been held concerning the passage of Russian troops through that narrow corner of Rumania which they must pass in order to reach Czechoslovakia.

Yugoslavia will hesitate before she aligns herself with Italy, if Italy should finally decide to go into the war on the side of Germany.

Mussolini's declaration is not crystal clear. He does not
say in so many words that when Germany marches, Italy marches at her side.

'12:00-12:06 P.M.
KALTENBORN: Hitler is in session this morning at Godesberg with his Generals. It must be remembered that always in the German tradition, the German General Staff has had a great deal to say when it comes to the issue of peace or war. We have had no indication that the German General Staff is anxious or even willing to undertake a war in which France plus Russia plus Britain will be aligned against Germany.

It is my understanding that the General Staff has definitely informed Hitler that while they might be willing to risk war against France and Russia, they are unwilling to risk it if Britain comes into the picture. And so the question is, has Prime Minister Chamberlain made it clear to Hitler that in case he invades Czechoslovakia, and France acts in connection with her pledge to Czechoslovakia, Britain will march with France? If that has been made clear to Hitler and to the German General Staff then I think we have an excellent chance to avoid war.

'1:15-1:30 P.M.
KALTENBORN: Ed Murrow has just told you from London that the Anglo-French proposals went far beyond what the Runciman Commission recommended. That reminds us that throughout this crisis we have not had a single official revelation as to what was actually being proposed to Czechoslovakia, what the Czechs have replied and what was said by Hitler or by Mr. Chamberlain. The first revelation will probably come when the British Parliament meets.

The fact that the Anglo-French proposals go beyond what the Runciman Commission recommended means that Adolf Hitler was very persuasive at the first meeting in Berchtesgaden. Prime Minister Chamberlain went the entire distance. Czechoslovakia accepted. Then when it came to
the discussion as to the ways and means of the surrender of the Sudetenland, Adolf Hitler proved so obdurate that another crisis arose, and that is the crisis with which we are now concerned.

The British Government will insist on a full settlement of the minorities issue, will insist that the plan now offered must prevent war and also bring a permanent settlement.

So we have the issue — Hitler wants a triumphant entry into Czechoslovakia. The Czechs insist on guarantees. France, Britain and Russia are backing the Czechs in that demand.


Announcer: The first of October is the deadline for acceptance of Hitler's plan by Czechoslovakia. Italians consider war almost inevitable. Scores of diplomats who had gathered at Geneva, Switzerland, for the League of Nations are hurrying back to their own countries, but the Soviet Foreign Commissar, Maxim Litvinoff, remained. Litvinoff spoke scornfully of talk about war and declared that the Nazis are only bluffing. One Russian spokesman commented: "When and if Germany moves, everything moves, even the League."

Kaltenborn: Why was the first of October so definitely chosen by Herr Hitler? On October 1st German mobilization normally comes to an end.

There is an interesting contrast in this dispatch in the news as it comes from Italy and as it comes from Maxim Litvinoff at Geneva. Virginio Gayda, who is often considered the mouthpiece of Mussolini, says, "It seems likely that Czechoslovakia will reject Hitler's demands. It may, therefore, be considered that events are moving toward an armed, bloody conflict." Litvinoff says, "It's foolish to talk about war, the Nazis are only bluffing."

Why the sharp difference of opinion between Italy and Russia? Well, the Italian speaks for that group which wants
to make France and Britain believe that war is coming unless they make the utmost concession. Consequently, Italy and Germany naturally give the impression that war will come unless they get what they want.

Even in Germany, one hears statements that Hitler was bluffing, even when he moved into the Rhineland; that he has succeeded in having his way merely because his bluff has never been called. The lone exception was May 21st, when Germany was reported to have mobilized. Hitler at Nuremberg denied that she had mobilized. But Czechoslovakia did mobilize and there were indications that Czechoslovakia would not be without support from France and Britain. The bluff called, that crisis disappeared.

Hungary denies that she has secretly mobilized and this means that Hungary is watching developments a little more carefully and does not desire to plunge into a situation which would drag her into war.

The British Cabinet meets again tomorrow. That indicates that they are preparing some definite proposal to submit to France and to discuss with their French allies.

For the first time, we have had an official declaration that Great Britain intends to put no pressure on Czechoslovakia to force acceptance of Hitler's terms. At the Foreign office in Britain the statement was made this afternoon that all that England did was to give a copy of Hitler's demands to the Czech Foreign Minister without comment. And that brings about a complete change in the situation, because without pressure from England and France, Czechoslovakia will not accept Hitler's ultimatum. Prague was willing to resist even before the new cabinet came into power. You remember that she yielded only when France said to her, "If you don't yield, we won't come to your aid."

Now Daladier has said, "If Germany invades Czechoslovakia we will come to Czechoslovakia's aid." In addition to that Czechoslovakia has a military cabinet headed by her military hero. The country is entirely mobilized. The whole atmosphere in Czechoslovakia has changed. It's not going
to be so easy to persuade them to accept Hitler's ultimatum. The present conference between Bonnet and the Russian Ambassador indicates that those two countries are working closely together according to the terms of their alliance.

7:00-7:30 P.M. — EUROPEAN ROUNDPUP

MURROW (London): Here is the midnight news in London. The French Premier, Daladier, and his Foreign Minister, M. Bonnet, are flying to London tomorrow for the second time in eight days. They are to hear at first hand Mr. Chamberlain's story of his Godesberg talk with Herr Hitler and the Fuehrer's final terms.

It's announced from Warsaw, Poland, tonight that Reservists, belonging to technical branches of the army, have been called up for service and have been given twenty-four hours to report. Their number is unknown.

The French press this evening, according to reports in London, is almost unanimous in urging the Government not to make further concessions.

The Czech Government closed the whole of the Hungarian-Czech frontier this afternoon. The Czech frontier with Poland has been closed on the Polish side.

It is officially announced in Warsaw that a Polish Free Corps is being formed.

Reports from Vienna state that a Czech plane flew over that city this morning, was fired on by German anti-aircraft guns and forced to return to Czechoslovakia.

It is stated that France now has a million men under arms. Germany is reported to have a million and a half.

SHIRER: This is Berlin calling. At least tonight we seem to know better where we stand. We still have six days of peace ahead of us.

Herr Hitler has demanded that Czechoslovakia, not later than next Saturday, agree to the handing over of the Sudeten territory to Germany. The very fact that Chamberlain has taken upon himself the job of communicating Herr Hitler's demands to the Prague Government is ac-
cepted here, and I believe elsewhere too, as meaning that Chamberlain backs up Hitler.

The German people still believe that there will be peace after all and that Germany will acquire 3,500,000 Sudeten Germans and the beautiful and rich territory without bloodshed. As a matter of fact, the new slogan in Berlin tonight is: “With Hitler and Chamberlain for peace.” Mr. Chamberlain has become a very popular figure in Germany.

Here in Germany we have been completely cut off from Czechoslovakia today. The telephone and telegraph service has been stopped and no trains have come through. . . .

KALTENBORN: We have one interesting piece of news by short wave from Prague. Communication with Czechoslovakia tonight is practically non-existent, since all the frontiers, except those leading to Rumania, have been closed.

There was a conference today in Prague between the British Minister and the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia. I would assume that what the British Minister did was to deliver Hitler’s proposal. It was submitted apparently without any recommendation, without any statement by Prime Minister Chamberlain as to what he thought of it.

From Berlin comes word that Germany expects peace, that Germany expects that Czechoslovakia will bow down. Why? Because Chamberlain has agreed to convey Hitler’s demand to Czechoslovakia. This is interpreted as meaning that Chamberlain backs Hitler up.

Pressure may come, but it probably won’t come until after the British Government has had a conference with Daladier and Bonnet, who are flying to London for that conference tomorrow. So after all, Berlin’s optimism is not justified.

That belief which is emphasized in the German headlines and in Berlin’s expectation of peace to my mind is the worst possible thing that could happen. The difference between Hitler risking war and not risking war is the
difference as to whether he believes that Britain will fight on the side of France or whether he thinks that Britain will stay out.

The most essential thing to prevent war is for the British Cabinet, after its session with the French Minister, to make it clear that it stands side by side with France against military aggression by Germany against Czechoslovakia. That's the lesson that I draw from the broadcasts that we've heard from overseas tonight.

There is time for negotiation. After all, Hitler says six days. If Adolf Hitler has any sense left and if his Generals who know the military situation better than he does can persuade him to use sanity and reason, then perhaps we can work out a peaceful solution. Good night.

8:23 P.M. — NEWS BULLETIN

ANNOUNCER: The Czechoslovak legation in Moscow has informed the Associated Press that there is not a chance that Czechoslovakia will accept Hitler's latest demands for settlement of the Sudeten dispute. The legation officials declare that the die is cast and that Hitler must choose between a crushing defeat in war or else demobilization of his armies now concentrating against Czechoslovakia.

KALTENBORN: Czechoslovakia says it's to be war. Germany says it's to be peace. No one knows which is right. Each is using this method of announcing expectations in order to achieve its purpose. Czechoslovakia expects Russia and France to help it to resist the ultimatum. But if Britain, France and Russia don't back up Czechoslovakia, she will certainly not reject the ultimatum. Much depends on what Britain and France decide in their Cabinet meeting tomorrow.

9:30-10:00 P.M. — NEW YORK-LONDON

KALTENBORN-SIR FREDERICK WHYTE

KALTENBORN: I wonder, Sir Frederick Whyte, are you sitting at the microphone at the other side of the Atlantic?
Does Britain have any legal or moral obligation to fight Germany if France does?

WHYTE: Moral, yes; legal, no.

KALTENBORN: Then my next question: Is British public opinion reconciled to what we understand to be the complete absence of official information in the negotiations?

WHYTE: No, British opinion is not reconciled to that. In fact, one of the difficulties here has been that the confusion, the uncertainty, the uneasiness that is obvious in British attitude today is due very largely to the fact that the major part of their information must come from foreign and not from British sources.

KALTENBORN: It is true then that most of the information you have in Britain on this whole situation has come from foreign sources rather than from anyone in Britain itself?

WHYTE: Yes, most of it, not all of it.

KALTENBORN: Where does most of it come from?

WHYTE: The majority from the other side of the Rhine. Some of it from Paris, of course.

KALTENBORN: Has there been a censorship of the British press?

WHYTE: Not a censorship in the strict sense of the word, no.

KALTENBORN: However, the British press seems to have been very discreet.

WHYTE: It has. It usually is.

KALTENBORN: Now, one more question: When will Parliament be called?

WHYTE: Almost immediately. Either Monday or Tuesday.

KALTENBORN: What did Lord Runciman report to the Cabinet from Prague?

WHYTE: Ask me another, Mr. Kaltenborn. All I can say is he's had constant meetings with the Cabinet up till . . . it's now Sunday morning in London . . . I think up till Friday . . . and then he went to his home in Northumberland, thinking that he had done his job.
HINDUS: One American journalist wrote today that mobilization was like the tolling of the Liberty Bell to the Czechs. . . . The procession of men answering the call to arms was endless. Now and then as I walked along the street I saw women accompanying the men to the railroad station, but there was little weeping. Within six hours mobilization was accomplished. It was all done with no show or pomp, no hysterics, no dramatics, no band, no singing, not even much shouting.

Last night the city was in darkness and it gave me a strange and creeping feeling when I looked down from windows and saw little blue lights moving up and down the sidewalks. . . . People were allowed to carry flashlights, provided the lights were blue. The danger of war in the judgment of a good many of us is now as great and perhaps greater than ever.

I jotted down the notes for this broadcast in the bathroom and under a very dim light. The American colony here is calm and confident. This morning we all received notice from the American Consulate, asking us to leave as soon as we can arrange it, and the sooner the better. Some Americans have already left, others are leaving tomorrow.

At the present the foreigners here are cut off from the outside world. They can't cable either to America or any other country outside of Czechoslovakia. We can't telephone outside of the country. This friends of Americans must understand. . . . This afternoon Mrs. Vincent Sheehan, the wife of the American novelist, and I, visited a Czech family. Our hostess told us that her husband had gone off to the front the night before. She appeared calm and cheerful. As we were talking, the other guests came and each one carried in a canvas sack a gas mask.

In the course of this particular visit Mrs. Sheehan and I were asked by our hostess if we would like to take a look at the bombproof cellar that she has built. It wasn't so bad.
It was long and narrow and whitewashed and it had a bath
tub and tiers of boxes on which to sit or to stretch out.
She had a table for card playing.

It is five o'clock in the morning in Prague. The city is
calm and peaceful. We have no air raids and we don’t ex-
pect any this evening. Then, we are not supposed to have
any, please remember that, at least until the first of October.
Sunday, September 25

7:00 A.M. — News Bulletin

Announcer: Czech soldiers have blown up bridges along the German border to prevent invasion while newly mobilized Czech troops stream into the Sudeten areas.

12:41-12:48 P.M.

Kaltenborn: The French Cabinet has agreed unanimously that Adolph Hitler's demands to Czechoslovakia for occupation of the Sudeten area by Germany without guarantees for new Czech frontiers are unacceptable. In other words, the proposal which Mr. Chamberlain agreed to submit to the Czechs, without recommendation, has been rejected by the French Cabinet.

At this very moment, Daladier and Bonnet are on their way to England.

There is every reason to expect that the British Cabinet will side with the French Cabinet in the decision which it has made.

Mussolini said this morning: "Up to now Italy has not taken the slightest measure of a military character, but if others continue to call reservists and mass on frontiers, and if others are concentrating their fleets, none of you will be astonished that Italy also takes measures."

Remember that there are always two stages in a pre-war situation of this kind. One is the stage which can be
most easily characterized by the word “bluff.” It isn’t all bluff. It’s partly negotiation, but bluff is an easy Anglo-Saxon word that covers the maneuverings of the different sides. No one really wants war, not even Adolf Hitler or Benito Mussolini because they both realize that if they have to face war under unfavorable conditions that they will not only lose the war but lose their positions.

The question is, how does a dictator get what he wants without war. He gets it by putting on a bold front, by making brash proclamations, by insisting that he must have this or the other thing or else the cannon will speak. And democratic nations which are much more concerned about what they say and what they do than Fascist nations, are easily intimidated. As a result democratic nations again and again respond and yield to the demand of the dictators.

1:30-1:45 P.M.

KALTENBORN: Members of the French Ministry have told correspondents that three points have received the unanimous agreement of the French Cabinet this afternoon as the final peace plan of France.

First: The French Cabinet agrees, as you will remember it had agreed once before, to the cession to Germany of certain sections of the Sudetenland where Sudeten Germans hold a strong majority.

Second: It agrees once again that the areas with mixed population are to be disposed of by an International Commission on which the Czechs, the Germans and presumably the neutrals will have representation.

Third: Britain, France, Germany and “other neighboring powers” shall guarantee the new frontiers of Czechoslovakia.

If Germany commits aggression against Czechoslovakia, then France comes into the picture. And Russia comes into the picture because she has a treaty both with France and with Czechoslovakia. And then what about Britain? I talked with Ed Murrow on the telephone a few
minutes ago and he assures me again of the English determin-
ination to make no more concessions. And within a few
hours we will have the results of the meeting that is now
to take place between Prime Minister Daladier, Foreign
Minister Bonnet, representing France, Prime Minister
Chamberlain and the British Cabinet.

It's inconceivable at this stage that Britain will turn
her back on France. As Sir Frederick Whyte expressed it
in his telephone conversation last night, "There is no legal
obligation on Britains' part but there is a moral obligation."

Czechoslovakia's reply to Adolf Hitler's latest demands
constitutes a virtual, if not a complete, rejection. It was
probably submitted to Chamberlain today by the Czech
Minister to London, Jan Masaryk, whose moving address
over this network you heard last night.

4:03-4:11 P.M.

KALTENBORN: Adolf Hitler has summoned one of his charac-
teristic meetings in the Great Sportspalast in Berlin where
on occasion I myself have heard him speak. It's a tremen-
dous auditorium that lends itself to one of those typical
Hitler meetings. This meeting brings the crisis no closer
to a head. I've said again and again just before the Nurem-
berg speech, that Hitler would not announce war in a
public address.

But troops are moving. Apprehension is growing.
Germany's controlled press, her censored radio reports have
given the average German a false picture of the situation,
a picture that certainly was altogether too optimistic yest-
day. Today Berlin is beginning to hear rumors.

Hitler did not even particularize as to just what he
meant by Sudetenland. No one knows. My own feeling is
that it would certainly include the city and the district of
Pilsen. Why Pilsen? Not on account of the beer, but on
account of the Skoda Works, the greatest munition works
in continental Europe outside of Essen. It manufactures
the finest anti-aircraft machinery, the finest machine guns.
It is tremendously important from the German point of view that Hitler get control of the Skoda ammunition works.

If Hitler has decided on war, it will come between now and the Sportspalast meeting tomorrow. It is possible that, fearing opposition from his own General Staff, and realizing that he would face growing opposition within Germany if he delays striking, he has made up his mind today to strike and to announce the fact that German troops have entered Czechoslovakia.

The British and French Ministers may concede once more up to a certain point, pointing out to Hitler that if he does not accept this proposal, France and Britain will stand with Czechoslovakia. That is the likely result of the highly important conference now in session in London. Perhaps within two or three hours we will be able to bring to you the news of the fateful decision.

5:00-5:15 P.M.—EAMON DE VALERA, GENEVA ANNOUNCER (New York): ... An address by the President of the League Assembly and Premier of Ireland, Eamon de Valera. I am addressing you from Geneva where the nineteenth Assembly of the League of Nations is in session. All delegations here at Geneva are following with anxiety the effort that is being made on Mr. Chamberlain's initiative to obtain a just and peaceful way out of the present position.

The time for something like a general European peace conference, or at least a conference between the greater powers, is overdue. If nations be called to make certain sacrifices at such a conference, these will be far less than the sacrifices they will have to make in the event of war. The game of negotiation in the throes of a crisis, with each side brandishing its armaments to enforce its demands, is a dangerous game to play for long.

Millions of human lives ought not to be staked on such a hazard. ... But are the peace-loving nations always to surrender to those who proclaim they would not be deterred by the horrors of war?
HINDUS: In the Sudeten territory, all seems quiet and peaceful.

5:30-6:00 P.M. — Shirer, Berlin; Kaltenborn, New York

SHIRER: Berlin calling. Chancellor Hitler is going to make what I am going to describe here as a historic speech tomorrow evening at 8 o'clock our time. That is 2 P.M. New York Time. Preparations will be rushed through tonight to enable every single one of the 75,000,000 Germans in this country to hear by radio the words of the Fuehrer. Among the listeners will certainly be Mr. Chamberlain in London, and M. Daladier in Paris.

Now why did Chancellor Hitler suddenly decide to make a speech tomorrow? The Chancellor, it was said, has decided to speak in order to answer a statement given out by the Prague radio station at 2:20 o'clock this afternoon (German Time) in which it is charged that Prague accused Herr Hitler and Mr. Chamberlain of going further than the original terms of the Anglo-French agreement, which was forced on Czechoslovakia last week.

I made a point of it today to go past the Czech legation. Not a soul outside, not even a policeman. There is no war fever among the people in Berlin at all.

KALTENBORN: Our Berlin correspondent goes to the Czech legation. For days now, German newspapers have been featuring atrocity stories of what the terrible Czechs have been doing to the innocent Germans along the frontier. As he suggests, you would expect with the threat of war a great crowd to gather in front of the legations. Certainly you would expect it to be protected by the police. But the peaceful Germanburghers are not paying much attention to those stories or they refuse to be excited by them.

Now those little things are significant. I was struck with a sentence from the Berliner Tageblatt that was quoted in one of the short-wave bulletins this afternoon. "It would
be madness to fight a war over the method of evacuating Czechoslovakia."

The last few hours have brought us not only an accentuation of the crisis, but from Prague and just now from Berlin a certain hope that the next six days are not going to be devoted merely to the expiration of an ultimatum, but to negotiations which will find that solution that President de Valera just a few minutes ago said was so difficult to reach in times of crisis but which could easily be negotiated in a calmer atmosphere.

6:12-6:30 P.M. — KALTENBORN
ANNOUNCER (Hitler Memorandum. See Appendix, Page 285): KALTENBORN: Remember this is the final memorandum submitted by Adolf Hitler to Prime Minister Chamberlain at Godesberg yesterday, carried by him to England, submitted by him to the Czech Government, without comment, and rejected by them; rejected by France and now made the subject of conference in London between the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of France and Britain.

Mr. Hitler says a situation of parity must be created between the Czechs and the Germans in the doubtful Sudeten areas. Then he goes on and says the area must be occupied by German troops without taking into account whether in the plebiscite particular districts may prove to be predominately Czech. Obviously, while Hitler says a situation of parity must be created, the condition he proposes —occupation by the German Army—means complete German dominance and the absolute impossibility of any fair expression of opinion by that part of the population which does not desire to go to Germany.

On the other hand, Czech territory is to be occupied by Czech troops without taking into account whether within this area there lie large German groups which in a plebiscite would no doubt give expression to German national feeling.

There are islands of Czech population in the Sudeten-
land, very close to the frontier, and islands of German population, far in the interior in an area that could not possibly be held to be included in the Sudetenland.

With a view to bringing about an immediate and final solution of the Sudeten German problem, the following proposals are submitted by the German Government.

First: Withdrawal of the whole Czech armed force, police, customs officials, and frontier guards from the area to be evacuated as designated on the map attached to the memorandum. This area is to be handed over to Germany on October 1st.

That, of course, means giving Germany the absolute and complete military and police control of that entire area and is contrary to the Franco-English proposal that an International Commission be sent in to take over the area until the final decision as to its disposition has been reached.

Second: Evacuated territory is to be handed over in its present condition. The German Government agrees that plenipotentiary representatives of the Czech Government, and of the Czech army, should be attached to headquarters of the German military forces to deal with details of evacuation.

When he states that evacuated territory is to be handed over in its present condition, he anticipates the Czechs' endeavor to take out from the area as much valuable material as possible. Czechs who have been living in this area, Jews and German Democrats who have been living and have property in this area, would naturally make every effort to evacuate from that territory the property which they own.

The Czech Government, says Hitler, is to discharge at once all Sudeten Germans serving in the military forces or police anywhere in Czech territory and permit them to return home.

That undoubtedly would be a provision of any arrangement that was arrived at as the result of conference. The Czechs in the Sudeten area will be permitted to go into
Czechoslovakia and the Sudeten Germans now in the Czech Army will naturally be permitted to return to their homes in Sudetenland.

Point four in Hitler's demands is that the Czech Government liberate all political prisoners of the German race.

Now, if the German Government will agree to reciprocate by liberating all political prisoners of the Czech race, I am sure that provision would be acceptable.

The German Government agrees to permit a plebiscite to take place in those areas more definitely defined, before November 25th at the latest.

That is a very reasonable proposal, provided between now and November 25th, the German Army and the German Nazis are not permitted to occupy that territory.

The plebiscite itself will be carried out under control of the International Commission. All persons who reside in the areas in question on October 28, 1938, or who were born in those parts prior to this date will be eligible to vote.

The plebiscite could, however, hardly be carried out under control of an International Commission if German police and German soldiers dominate the area.

A simple majority of all eligible male and female voters is to determine the desire of the population to belong either to the German Reich or the Czech state.

Yes, but what is to be done about the minorities? Suppose 51 per cent vote pro-German, and 49 per cent vote pro-Czech. How are they to be taken care of and what is to be done to safeguard their minority rights?

Both parties during the plebiscite are to withdraw their military forces out of the area to be assigned more precisely. The date and duration will be settled mutually by the German and Czech Governments.

Ah, yes, they may be withdrawn during the plebiscite but if the German military forces and the German Nazis have had control of that area between October 1st and October 28th, or the November date, why, certainly no
fair plebiscite could be held then, even if they then withdrew.

The German Government proposes that an authoritative German-Czech commission should be set up to settle all further details.

Yes, that would be satisfactory except I'm sure the Czech Government would prefer to have some international members on that committee.

The difference between Hitler's ultimatum and the Franco-British proposals to Czechoslovakia are as night and day. The one is an orderly transfer of territory peopled in a large part by an alien population under international control. The other is the brutal occupation of that area and perhaps more than that area by the army of a totalitarian government which assumes no responsibility whatever for what it is going to do after it enters upon that area.

10:00-10:30 P.M. — European Roundup:

PARIS, LONDON, KALTENBORN, NEW YORK

Downs: Troops continue to roll over the German frontier by the tens of thousands in hundreds of special troop trains. Throughout the day as throughout yesterday the station was packed with thousands of reservists leaving in an endless stream of trains. About three-fourths of the station was reserved for military trains. At each track there were signs written in chalk designating the different destinations.

There were some towns whose names will strike responsive chords in the memories of thousands of Americans who were here in 1917: Metz, Toulouse, Verdun, Strasbourg. . . . It has been unofficially reported that between one and a half and two million men were under arms and at their posts tonight.

A striking note in the railroad station was a huge mural painted on one of the walls depicting the parting scenes in 1914. Expressions, attitudes and actions in parting were strikingly similar to those I watched all around me in reality. About the only difference was in styles. The women
in the 1914 picture were wearing long voluminous dresses and sleeves at that time, and all had long hair, and many of the men bearded and dressed in spectacular red breeches and blue coats, which they wore at the start of the last war. This time the men are not yet in uniforms.

Paris is beginning to look a little empty as the reserves continue to move to the frontier. I noticed today that women are beginning to replace the men who have left such jobs as ticket takers in the stations and conductors and all sorts of inside work. The city and nation continue to remain calm in the face of the showdown that is expected to come soon.

**MURROW (London):** It's after four o'clock in the morning over here. In London tonight everything seems just a little unreal. There's no real news, no sensations, only a feeling of anxiety, of frustration. . . .

The French Embassy in London stated about two hours ago that the French Commander-in-Chief will travel to London tomorrow to join M. Daladier.

Bismarck once said, "He who is master of Bohemia is master of Europe," and that sentence will be quoted in many of tomorrow's newspapers in London. Many people here believe that Bismarck was right, and one main point in British foreign policy has been to prevent the domination of the continent by any single power. It is felt here that the terms of Herr Hitler's memorandum to Prague opened the way to domination by Germany of Middle Europe. The British Government wouldn't welcome that.

The feeling in London tonight is that the Czech refusal is final, and that public opinion in France and in Britain will not tolerate another capitulation. If that be true, the future of peace in our time can only be decided in Berlin.

**KALTENBORN:** War measures and military measures dominate Europe tonight. It's a grim Paris that makes ready for war, and it's an equally grim London that waits for morning and that final Cabinet meeting to determine whether
Britain, too, will strike once more on behalf of her balance-of-power policy in Europe.

There have been three great crises in the course of these last twelve days since this European issue reached the danger state, and tonight we're facing the fourth and perhaps the greatest.

If statesmen and diplomats have not lost all their cunning, surely there should be some way to reopen negotiations. Negotiations are carried on now by tired men working hour after hour on the most important issues, their minds clashing against one another, the nervous strain constantly increasing, until finally they throw up their hands in utter despair and let come what will. They're too tired to think, too tired to work out that easy compromise which a quick, active, fresh brain might so readily have found.

The British are convinced at last that you must enforce some concession from the dictator or else you must fight.

10:30-11:00 P.M. — "HEADLINES AND BY-LINES"
KALTENBORN: Tonight's task must be, in the poet's phrase, "to see things steadily and see them whole."

Tonight the whole world is asking: Can this crisis have a peaceful end? I think it can. I think there is an excellent chance of peace even tonight.

In Poland, Joseph Beck looking over the European situation estimating the chances pro and con, as every good statesman does, says to himself, "Perhaps we better wait, perhaps it might be just as well to use this opportunity to negotiate with Czechoslovakia." Hungary promptly denies mobilization of her not very large and not very well-equipped army. And what about Italy? Tonight across the Alps, Adolf Hitler listens anxiously and wonders what his friend is doing to get ready to stand with him against a united Europe. Does he hear any sign of Italian mobilization? Does he hear the tanks and troops rattling up toward the Brenner Pass? He does not. There is deep silence in Italy.

What of France and Britain? At last, after many a hesi-
tation, after many a difference of opinion, France and Britain tonight are engaged in a Cabinet council as friends. Britain and France are standing together against the Fascist dictators of Europe.

And so I come to Germany. What of Germany? That country I know better perhaps than any country in Europe because my ancestors lived there and I speak its language and love its people and its poetry. I know too the German General Staff, made up of intelligent men of high standing and final authority. I know that that Staff tonight is hesitating because it told Hitler long ago: War against France? Yes! Against Russia? Yes! But against France and Russia and Britain too? No! That would be too much. That would mean we fail.

You can see that the negotiations of the past two weeks have been intended by Hitler to divide England and France. Tonight we realize that Hitler has failed to do this. Consequently since Chamberlain has now seen light, since the democracies of Europe stand together, I don't believe that there will be war. Good night.
Monday, September 26

1:45-3:00 A.M. — Announcement
Announcer: . . . The Columbia Broadcasting System is remaining on the air indefinitely in the expectation of bringing you an important announcement from Washington, D. C., in connection with the European crisis. The announcement is expected at three o'clock this morning, Eastern Standard Time.

3:00-3:04 A.M. — President Roosevelt's Message to Hitler and Benes
Announcer: Now, at 3:00 A.M. this morning, Columbia brings you the first official word to come from the capital of the United States on the European crisis. From Washington the Press Radio Bureau has just released to us the news that President Roosevelt has sent a direct message to Adolf Hitler and to President Benes of Czechoslovakia appealing for peace. The same telegram was sent to Prime Minister Chamberlain and Premier Daladier through Secretary of State Hull. Here is the complete text of the President's appeal:

"The fabric of peace on the continent of Europe, if not throughout the rest of the world, is in immediate danger. The consequences of its rupture are incalculable. Should hostilities break out the lives of millions of men, women and children in every country involved will most certainly be lost under circumstances of unspeakable horror."

"The economic system of every country involved is cer-
tain to be shattered. The social structure of every country involved may well be completely wrecked.

"The United States has no political entanglements. It is caught in no mesh of hatred. Elements of all Europe have formed its civilization.

"The supreme desire of the American people is to live in peace. But in the event of a general war they face the fact that no nation can escape some measure of the consequences of such a world catastrophe.

"The traditional policy of the United States has been the furtherance of the settlement of international disputes by pacific means. It is my conviction that all people under the threat of war today pray that peace may be made before, rather than after, war.

"It is imperative that peoples everywhere recall that every civilized nation in the world voluntarily assumed the solemn obligations of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 to solve controversies only by pacific methods. In addition, most nations are parties to other binding treaties obligating them to preserve peace. Furthermore, all countries have today available for such peaceful solution of difficulties which may arise, treaties of arbitration and conciliation to which they are parties.

"Whatever may be the differences in the controversies at issue and however difficult of pacific settlement they may be, I am persuaded that there is no problem so difficult or so pressing for solution that it cannot be justly solved by the resort to reason rather than by the resort to force.

"During the present crisis the people of the United States and their Government have earnestly hoped that the negotiations for the adjustment of the controversy which has now arisen in Europe might reach a successful conclusion.

"So long as these negotiations continue, so long will there remain the hope that reason and the spirit of equity may prevail and that the world may thereby escape the madness of a new resort to war.
"On behalf of the one hundred and thirty millions of people of the United States of America and for the sake of humanity everywhere I most earnestly appeal to you not to break off negotiations looking to a peaceful, fair and constructive settlement of the questions at issue.

"I earnestly repeat that so long as negotiations continue, differences may be reconciled. Once they are broken off reason is banished and force asserts itself.

"And force produces no solution for the future good of humanity."

7:00 A.M. — News Bulletin
Announcer: Prime Minister Chamberlain has sent a special message to Adolf Hitler, following a conference with French Premier Daladier. Sir Horace Wilson of the British Foreign Office left by plane with the message just a few minutes ago. . . . The nature of the message was not disclosed.

The French Chief of Staff, General Gamelin, arrived in London by plane this morning, presumably to discuss mobilization and joint defense plans between Britain and France. . . . In Berlin, anti-aircraft guns were mounted as the nation awaits the speech by Hitler at 2 o'clock this afternoon, Eastern Standard Time.

Konrad Henlein and one hundred and fifty of his steel-helmeted Free Corps army crossed the border this morning between Germany and Czechoslovakia. . . . Shouts went up from Sudetens as Henlein was recognized: "Es geht los!" — "It's going to start!"

7:10 A.M. — News Bulletin
Announcer: Americans in France were advised by the American Embassy in Paris to leave the country at the earliest possible moment.

8:00 A.M. — News Bulletin
Announcer: Mussolini declared that if war comes, Italy will
not hesitate one moment to participate in it. . . . British Parliament has just been convoked to meet in extraordinary session tomorrow.

9:00-9:25 A.M. — Murrow, London; Kaltenborn, New York
ANNOUNCER: At this time we take you to London for last-minute news from Edward R. Murrow, Chief of Columbia's European staff.

MURROW: Everyone is clutching at straw, and therefore Mr. Roosevelt's message is welcomed in London. Certainly people, of course, have said that its force would have been immensely increased had he stated that the full moral and economic force of the United States would be brought to bear against the possible aggressor.

Just a little while ago I spoke to Berlin on the telephone and I asked a newspaper correspondent what was the reaction in Berlin to President Roosevelt's statement. He replied, "What statement?" Mr. Roosevelt's statement has not yet appeared in the German press nor has it been carried by any of the official German news agencies.

As you might expect, London is waiting to hear what Herr Hitler will say tonight. There doesn't seem to be much hope but we can only wait. . . .

KALTENBORN: Parliament has been summoned in Britain. It is obvious that the government feels at this time that the condition may arise in which it may have to recommend the declaration of war against Germany. It's not summoned just for the purpose of hearing the details of these negotiations between Mr. Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler. The British Government feel that it may have to act by the day after tomorrow.

11:00-11:15 A.M.

ANNOUNCER: The British pound sterling fell to the lowest level in three and a half years. Just before Premier Daladier took off for Paris, he replied to President Roosevelt's plea for peace.
A special bulletin just reaching this desk comes from Washington and says that President Roosevelt will hold a special cabinet meeting tomorrow to consider the European crisis. . . . In Berlin, official circles, referred angrily to President Roosevelt's message as interference and said that it should have been addressed to Prague alone.

KALTENBORN: The dominant news this morning is the appeal for peace by President Roosevelt and the continued efforts on behalf of peace by Great Britain. The fact that Prime Minister Chamberlain, at this time, after close conference with his French colleagues, once more appeals to Adolf Hitler, indicates that patience is not yet exhausted and that still further efforts are being made today to save Europe from disaster.

Sir Horace Wilson, who was as you remember, one of the companions of Prime Minister Chamberlain on his recent visit to Godesberg, has just landed in Berlin. Adolf Hitler, before he speaks this afternoon, thus gets another word of caution and counsel from the British Government and the French Government, acting at this time in unison. This is going to give Sir Horace Wilson's message even greater importance than Prime Minister Chamberlain's visit, because it will tell Adolf Hitler that this time France and Britain are acting together.

And so the world pauses for the anxious hour before hearing from Adolf Hitler.

1:30 P.M. — News Bulletin
ANNOUNCER: The New York Stock Market sagged because of the European crisis. . . . Leading shares dropped one to four dollars a share. . . .

1:55 P.M. — Adolf Hitler — Berlin Sportspalast
Translation by Kaltenborn
ANNOUNCER: At this time, just five minutes before the speech by Adolf Hitler, the Columbia Broadcasting System
takes you to the Berlin Sportspalast where William Shirer, CBS Central European representative, is stationed at a microphone.

SHIRER (From Berlin Sportspalast): ... Nazi flags. The crowd is cheering wildly. ... The cheering now is for Field Marshal Goering. He's looking jovial. ... He has on his Field Marshal's uniform. ... The crowd still yells and cheers. ... Goering now sits down on the rostrum. ... Imagine the Madison Square Garden in New York at an old-time political rally during election year and you have a picture of the Sportspalast this evening. ... 15,000 wildly cheering people. ... From the ceiling, hundreds of Nazi flags and round the platform hang great, six-feet-high posters with Nazi slogans. ... Herr Hitler has not yet arrived. ... They are yelling again for Goering. He's getting a tremendous ovation. ... Next to him on the platform I see Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop and most of the German Cabinet, the Chief of the German Navy, the Chief of the German Army, a great many generals all in uniform. ... The slogan across the back of the platform says: “The Sudeten Germans are not to be left in the lurch.” ... It is interesting to note that about half an hour ago, Prince August Wilhelm, third son of the former Kaiser, strolled alone down the aisle in uniform. ... The crowd stood and gave him a big hand. ... The crowd now is laughing very good-naturedly. ... There is no atmosphere of war here at all. ... Some have been sitting here since 11 this morning, singing and laughing. ... Now a German in the crowd gets up and cracks a joke. ... I couldn't get it. ... Hitler, we hear now, has left the Chancellery. ... A few seconds and he will be here. ... Along the main entrance, the Black Guards are standing at attention, waiting for Hitler and his party to enter. ... The crowd is yelling slogans for the Sudetens. ... “We will come to the rescue,” they shout. ... Dr. Goebbels is speaking now. ... The German people, declares Goebbels, stand behind Hitler. ... Hitler, he says, can rely on his people exactly as they rely on him. ... And
now Hitler arrives... There is tremendous applause and cheering... 

(For text of Adolf Hitler’s Sportspalast speech, see Appendix, page 288.)

KALTENBORN: Let me begin by reading to you the latest bulletin that has come to us from London, England. Great Britain will join with France and Soviet Russia in a triple front against Germany if Adolf Hitler decides to attack Czechoslovakia. This is an official statement just issued by the British Foreign Office.

The importance of that declaration is that it is the first time that we have had from London a straightforward official declaration from the Foreign Office that Britain has decided to join with France and with Russia, against Germany in case Germany attacks Czechoslovakia.

Remember, however, that this statement has no relation to the Hitler speech. It was issued while the Hitler speech was going on, and the British Foreign Office is too careful and too slow-moving to have based a statement of this kind on the basis of anything that Hitler said.

The question is, what will Hitler do when he finally digests the new memorandum which came from England today and to which he probably did not refer in his address? Hitler today was discussing his own memorandum. He reiterated that it was his last word and that unless the Czechs had evacuated the German Sudeten territory by October first he would enter Czechoslovakia and thus launch the war. You heard his statement that he felt very definitely that Germany has the strongest anti-aircraft force, the strongest anti-tank military equipment; you heard him say he felt confident of victory in war, particularly when he looked across the Alps and saw Germany and Italy marching as equals in a single bloc.

He went on, however, in discussing the details of his memorandum to indicate how reasonable he thought he had been. He said, in effect, I’ve fixed a boundary. It’s the
boundary that I fixed from the beginning. All we want is the incorporation of the Germans. Now I’m ready to make any reasonable adjustment. I was ready when Mr. Chamberlain came and I am grateful to him for his efforts on behalf of peace. Well, I proposed the German-Czech commission. Chamberlain proposed an international commission, and so I accepted.

Now during the plebiscite, Hitler said, I am even willing to withdraw the German troops. I am willing to have an international commission supervise the voting. Now, I am told, the memorandum which I handed Mr. Chamberlain creates a new situation. What is the new situation? It’s a new situation for Benes, but otherwise there is nothing new in my proposals.

That is a summary of what Hitler said. But more important than what he said is what he means. If he had really wanted to take Czechoslovakia by force and expected to do that, it seems to me that he would, before he made this address, have launched his troops and have endeavored to carry out what the Germans have been talking about for the last five years — the lightning thrust which in the opinion of German leaders is the only way in which a modern war can profitably be won. Adolf Hitler now announces that he won’t do anything until October first. He’s telling his potential enemies: Get ready. I won’t do anything for four days, and then on the fifth I’ll move.

And one other point: There was not a word in Hitler’s speech about the Hungarians or the Poles that indicated that he intended to go to war in order to press their rights. That was one of the two big problems — one concerning the way the German troops should go in; the other the way in which the other minorities of Czechoslovakia should be dealt with. Those two problems were the points of difference between Chamberlain and Hitler. Now Hitler’s failure to insist that he is going to stand up for the Poles and the Hungarians seems to me to provide a basis for further negotiation.
So, after all, while Hitler’s speech was belligerent, while it emphasized Germany’s unity, while it expressed the hope for joint action with Germany and Italy in a problematical war, still it means no immediate prospect of war, and we still have four days left for negotiation.

6:06-6:30 P.M. — Bob Trout — News of Today
Trout: In the United States, while United States Senator from Kentucky, Marvel M. Logan, was telling reporters that it looks to him as if the Hitler speech means inevitable war, the stock exchange in San Francisco was showing strength, obvious proof that some hard-headed traders interpret the Hitler speech as moving Europe at least a bit farther from war.

London and all Britain is still preparing for possible war tonight. The King has called a Privy Council meeting, now in session. Parliament has been summoned to meet Wednesday. Anti-aircraft and coastal defense forces have been called out, and every man, woman and child in the British Isles has been warned to get a gas mask as soon as possible. A system of air-raid warnings also has been worked out for further protection of the population.

Meanwhile Czechoslovakia’s reaction to Adolf Hitler’s speech was a matter of conjecture. For up to the time I started on the air tonight, 6:30 Eastern Standard Time, there was complete lack of communication with Prague.

6:45-7.02 P.M. — Hindus, Prague: Interview, Votya Benes, Kaltenborn, New York.
Announcer: Mr. H. V. Kaltenborn has with him a distinguished guest, Mr. Vojta Benes, brother of the President of Czechoslovakia.
Kaltenborn: May I ask you directly, do you believe there is going to be a war?
Benes: I do not know. Nobody knows — only Adolf Hitler.
Kaltenborn: Why only Hitler?
Benes: Because war will come only when and if he starts it.
France wants no war. Britain wants no war. Russia wants no war. Czechoslovakia certainly does not want war. It is only Hitler’s demand that may make war.

Kaltenborn: Mr. Benes, we’ve just had word that Prague, with which we have arranged a broadcast, is now coming in, and I know you won’t mind our interrupting our interview for a few minutes while we take our audience now to Prague, Czechoslovakia.

Hindus (From Prague): This evening by candlelight a group of us here in Prague listened to Hitler’s speech. Hitler gave in a general way his version of the memorandum to the Czechs. He stated clearly that he wants to occupy immediately the territory which is in question, to have it settled later under an international commission... Czechoslovakia would indeed be a head without much of a body...

Kaltenborn: We feel that the reception from Prague is so unclear because of static that we want to bring you the continuation of my interview with Vojta Benes. Just a point of information that I caught from Maurice Hindus which we did not hear over the air: that Russia is entirely mobilized and ready for action.

And now back to the interview with Mr. Vojta Benes, the brother of Czechoslovakia’s distinguished President. You will remember that we stopped at the very moment when Mr. Benes told me that it was only Hitler’s demands that may create a war. So I want to come right back at him with this question: To which of his demands do you refer, Mr. Benes?

Benes: I refer to his demands for Czechoslovakian territory.

Kaltenborn: But isn’t a certain portion of your territory peopled by Germans?

Benes: Yes. Some of the border territory is German. Some territory in Silesia is German.

Kaltenborn: Shouldn’t some of those Germans have the right to go back to Germany if they wish?
BENES: We gave them full freedom to go back, but we cannot part with our land.

KALTENBORN: Why is this particular part of the land so important?

BENES: This part of our land contains its most important natural riches. It is also our chief industrial section, but it is also important for our defense.

KALTENBORN: Why?

BENES: Because on this German-peopled frontier, there are natural mountains that form a perfect protection for our country against invasion.

KALTENBORN: But how can this minority problem be solved peacefully?

BENES: We are willing to give the Germans the same rights that we have. We have already given them most of those rights. No minorities anywhere have greater rights than the Germans in Czechoslovakia now have.

KALTENBORN: But isn't it true that in the past there was some oppression of these Germans by the Czechoslovakian authorities?

BENES: It is not true. When we created our Republic, the Germans were against it. It is because of that that we could not and did not appoint them to public office.

KALTENBORN: But didn't they cooperate with the government after a while?

BENES: Yes, they began to cooperate after 1925.

KALTENBORN: Have they stopped cooperating?

BENES: Yes, they stopped in 1937.

KALTENBORN: Why?

BENES: Because Henlein's movement was launched at that time. It was really started from Germany. It was purely a Nazi movement.

7:30-8:00 P.M. — Edgar Mowrer, Paris —
Kaltenborn, New York

ANNOUNCER: Here's a report from London that the King has already signed the general mobilization order to be
issued immediately in the event of hostilities. . . . Hundreds of laborers, many of them unpaid volunteers, are working throughout the night, digging trenches and building bomb shelters. The Labor Ministry has appealed to the public to help with the defense work.

In fact, the Ministry of Health appealed to automobile owners to send their cars to local hospitals to help remove patients in case of an air raid. The War Office has ordered a children’s hospital, located near the Battersea power station, evacuated, fearing that the power plant may become a target for bombers. In Whitehall where Government buildings are located windows are blackened and roofs of all hospitals in London are covered with sandbags.

Europeans and Americans have been crowding into steamship booking offices all day long applying for tickets to America. . . .

And here comes another late bulletin from London. A bus-load of soldiers in full war equipment began unloading boxes of machine-gun ammunition in the very heart of London tonight. Large crowds gathered, watching the operations apprehensively.

Neville Chamberlain, answering Adolf Hitler in a public statement, declared that the British Government is prepared to guarantee the execution of the original French and British plan for the surrender of the Sudeten areas to Germany. The Prime Minister said, “It is evident from Hitler’s speech that the Chancellor has no faith in the promises that have already been made. . . . I have read the speech of the German Chancellor, and I appreciate his references to the efforts I have made to save peace. I cannot abandon those efforts.”

KALTENBORN: Of course, you would agree that the most important phrase in the news is the British Prime Minister’s statement, “I cannot abandon these efforts.” He will continue to insist on an exchange of ideas and comment and proposals. . . .

TROUT: And now, Mr. Kaltenborn, while you’ve been talk-
ing we've established communication with Paris. Calling Edgar Mowrer, Chicago Daily News correspondent.

Mr. Mowrer (in Paris): Europe tonight is still tottering on the edge of a horrible abyss. Hitler has spoken...

If war comes, it will be through the will of one human being, Adolf Hitler; of one political party, the Nazis; of one people, the Germans. This war can still be averted—not, as Hitler seems to think, by falsely abusing the President of Czechoslovakia, Edouard Benes; not by further German mobilization or threats; but by Hitler's listening to the sober warnings conveyed to him this afternoon in a last message from Chamberlain by Sir Horace Wilson; by his realizing that though there is room in Europe for a great and prosperous Germany, there is no room for a vast, pirate empire that persecutes its democrats, its Catholics, its Christians and its Jews. There is no room for a country that keeps no promises, observes no forms of law and publicly educates its children in the cult of war....
Tuesday, September 27

5:50 A.M. - News Bulletin
Announcer: The world wakes this morning with three fateful words ringing in its ears. Four days more...

8:45 A.M. - News Bulletin
Announcer: It was just announced in Berlin that Adolf Hitler has replied to the President's peace appeal sent to Berlin yesterday. Hitler said he appreciates the President's intentions, but that he himself must decline responsibility if war breaks out...

9:00 A.M. - News Summary
Announcer: The world will turn to London this afternoon for Chamberlain's fateful address to be broadcast at 2:00 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, from the Cabinet Room at No. 10 Downing Street...

9:15 A.M. - Queen Elizabeth, Clydebank, Scotland
Queen Elizabeth (Christening the new Cunard liner named for her): "...By the Grace of God and by man's patience and good-will, order may yet be brought out of confusion and peace out of turmoil."

11:26-11:30 A.M.
Kaltenborn: Under certain conditions you can't avoid war. You've got unity in Britain, unity in France, unity in Russia, unity in Czechoslovakia. All those powers are stand-
shoulder to shoulder in opposition to excessive German demands. It's inconceivable that Germany can fail to realize that and can fail to respond to it. The question is: How can Hitler be permitted to save his face?

Chamberlain indicates a way in the statement of policy which he issued late yesterday, and note the skill with which he mollifies the irascible Hitler! "I have read the speech of Chancellor Hitler," he says, "and I appreciate his reference to the efforts I have made to save peace. I cannot abandon those efforts, since it seems to me incredible that the peoples of Europe who do not want war with one another should be plunged into a bloody struggle over a question on which agreement has already been largely obtained. . . ."

Thus spoke the British Prime Minister yesterday. Sir Horace Wilson is carrying Hitler's answer to 10 Downing Street in London at this very moment. I cannot believe that that answer can be anything but conciliatory. We'll know more when we've heard the Prime Minister's radio address this afternoon. . . .

1:00-1:01 P.M.

KALTENBORN: King George of Great Britain has just declared a state of emergency because of the European crisis. Everything is now ready for war.

2:00-2:17 P.M. — Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, London — Kaltenborn, New York.


ANNOUNCER (London): This is London. In a moment you will hear the Prime Minister, the Right Honorable Neville Chamberlain, speaking from No. 10 Downing Street. His speech will be heard all over the Empire, throughout the continent of America, and in a large number of foreign countries. Mr. Chamberlain. . . .
CHAMBERLAIN: Tomorrow Parliament is going to meet and I shall be making a full statement of the events which have led up to the present anxious and critical situation. An earlier statement would have been impossible when I was flying backwards and forwards across Europe and the position was changing from hour to hour.

But today there is a lull for a brief time and I want to say a few words to you men and women in Britain and the Empire, and perhaps to others as well. And first of all I must say something to those who have written to my wife or myself in these last weeks to tell us of their gratitude for my efforts and to assure us of their prayers for my success. Most of these letters have come from women, mothers or sisters of our own countrymen. There are countless others besides, from France, from Belgium, Italy, even from Germany. It has been heartbreaking to read of the growing anxiety they revealed and their intense relief when they felt too soon that the danger of war was past. And I felt my responsibility more than ever before to read such letters as made it seem almost overwhelming.

How horrible, predestined, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas masks here because of a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we need know nothing. It seems still more impossible that a quarrel which is already settled in principle should be the subject of war. I can well understand the reasons why the Czech Government have felt unable to accept the terms which have been put before them in the German memorandum.

I believed after my talks with Herr Hitler, after enough time had elapsed it ought to be possible for the arrangements for transferring the territory, that the Czech Government has agreed to give to Germany, to be settled by agreement under conditions which would insure fair treatment to the population concerned.

You know already that I have done all that one man can do to compose this forum. After my visits to Germany
I realized vividly how Herr Hitler feels that he must include other Germans and his indignation that grievances have not been met before this. He told me privately and last night he repeated publicly that after the Sudeten German question is settled, that is the end of Germany's territorial claims in Europe.

After my first visit to Berchtesgaden I did give consent to the Czech Government to proposals which gave the substance of what Herr Hitler wanted, and I was taken completely by surprise when I got back to Germany and found that he insisted that the territory should be handed over to him immediately and immediately occupied by German troops. That our previous arrangements of safeguarding the people within the territory who were not Germans or who did not want to join the German Reich—I must say that I find this attitude unreasonable. If it arises out of any doubts what Herr Hitler thinks about the intentions of the Czech Government to carry out their promises and hand over the territory, I have offered on the part of the British Government to guarantee their words and I am sure the value of our promise cannot be under-rated anywhere.

I shall not give up the hope of a peaceful solution or abandon my efforts for peace as long as any chance for peace remains. I would not hesitate to pay even a third visit to Germany if I thought it would do any good, but at this moment I see nothing further that I can usefully do in the way of mediation.

Meanwhile there are certain things that we can and should do at home. Volunteers are still wanted for air raid precautions, fire brigade and police services and for the territorial duties. I know that all of you men and women alike are ready to play your part in the defense of the country and I ask you to offer your services, if you have not already done so, to the local authorities who will tell you if you are wanted and in what capacity. Don't be alarmed if you hear of men being called up to man anti-
aircraft defenses or ships. These are only precautionary measures, such as the government must take at times like this, but they do not necessarily mean that we have determined on war, and war is imminent.

However much we may sympathize with a small nation confronted by a big powerful neighbor, we cannot, in all circumstances, undertake to involve the British Empire in war simply on her account. If we have to fight it must be on larger issues than that.

I am myself a man of peace to the depths of my soul. Armed conflict among nations is a nightmare to me; but if I were convinced that any nation had made up its mind to dominate the world by fear of its force I should feel that it must be resisted. Under such a domination life for people who believe in liberty would not be worth living. But war is a fearful thing. We must be very clear before we embark on it, that it is really the great issues that are at stake and that the call to risk everything in their defense when all the consequences are weighed is irresistible.

For the present I ask you to wait as calmly as you can for the events of the next few days. As long as war has not begun it is always hoped that it may be prevented and you know that I am going to work for peace till the last moment.

Good night.

KALTENBORN: Neville Chamberlain has completed what every one of you who has heard it will agree is a great speech, great for its moderation. . . . We can only hope that Mr. Chamberlain's appeal is heard in that country to which it was primarily addressed—for let me assure you that country was not England, but Germany.

2:37 P.M. — NEWS BULLETIN

ANNOUNCER: . . . A high official declared that Mussolini expects war within three days. . . .
KALTENBORN: Two very important press dispatches have just been received by the Press Radio Bureau.

The United Press reports from London that the British Foreign Office has received word that Adolf Hitler intends to order full mobilization tomorrow.

The Associated Press from Rome reports that Italy has begun calling several classes of reserves to the colors in preparation for a general mobilization of those classes.

Now we know that there have been approximately 1,500,000 men under arms in Germany for some time. By ordering full mobilization, Hitler calls up the full military power of Germany. It means that he stands ready to strike, and finally that he intends to strike at the expiration of his ultimatum on October 1st.

KALTENBORN: We’ve just had a very interesting contrast between several somewhat alarming bulletins that we have been receiving from Rome this afternoon, and Frank Gervase’s comment over this network.

When the Italian stock market goes up, when the theatres and cafés are all crowded, when we have received word that Mussolini has not yet issued his call to arms, when there is a lack of spectacular military preparations, when it is still considered in Rome that a pacific solution can be reached, it is obvious that the Italian capital does not take an alarmist view of the situation as it stands tonight.

However, when we come to consider the conditions under which Mr. Gervase tells us, borrowing from the official Italian point of view, that peace can be preserved we are back where we started because he declares that peace again in the Italian sense can only be preserved if the Czechoslovakian territory is surrendered to Hitler before the deadline is reached. And he adds, if the other minority
problems of Czechoslovakia are also settled. In other words, peace is possible if Hitler gets his way.

6:00 P.M. — News Bulletin
Announcer: The British Government has just announced further steps to prepare for war. The Admiralty announces mobilization of the British fleet. King George early tomorrow morning will issue another Royal Proclamation calling up the Naval Reserve.

7:30 P.M. — News Bulletin
Announcer: Czechoslovakia has agreed to a territorial revision of the Teschen border region, where large Polish majorities live. According to United Press, President Benes has notified the President of Poland that he is in agreement with a plan of territorial revision.

10:25 P.M. — Flash
Announcer: President Roosevelt again appeals to Hitler to preserve peace.

10:30-11:00 P.M. — President Roosevelt’s “Second Message”
Trout: Tonight, Europe’s news is being made in our own capital, Washington, D.C., where less than five minutes ago the State Department issued an important announcement. It is coming in at this very moment on our news tickers.

Washington. President Roosevelt has made another appeal to Adolf Hitler to preserve peace. Here is the full text of the President’s second appeal which I shall read you as it comes in. His cablegram to Berlin was filed at 10 p.m. tonight and was addressed to Adolf Hitler personally.

“I desire to acknowledge your Excellency’s reply to my telegram of September 26th. I was confident that you would coincide in the opinion I expressed regarding the unforeseeable consequences, the incalculable disaster which would result to the entire world from the outbreak of a European war.
"The question before the world today, Mr. Chancellor, is not the question of errors of judgment or of injustices committed in the past. It is the question of the fate of the world today and tomorrow. The world asks of us, who at this moment are heads of nations, the supreme capacity to achieve the destinies of nations without forcing upon them, as a price, the mutilation and death of millions of citizens.

"Resort to force in the Great War failed to bring tranquility. Victory and defeat were alike sterile. That lesson the world should have learned. For that reason, above all others, I addressed on September 26th, an appeal to your Excellency and to the President of Czechoslovakia, and to the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and of France.

"The two points I sought to emphasize were, first, that all matters of difference between the German Government and the Czechoslovak Government could and should be settled by pacific methods. And second, that the threatened alternative of the use of force on a scale likely to result in a general war is as unnecessary as it is unjustifiable. It is therefore supremely important that negotiations should continue without interruption until a fair and constructive solution is reached.

"My conviction on these two points is deepened because responsible statesmen have officially stated that an agreement in principle has already been reached between the Government of the German Reich and the Government of Czechoslovakia, although the precise time, method and detail of carrying out that agreement remain an issue.

"Whatever existing differences may be, and whatever their merits may be, and upon them I do not and need not undertake to pass, my appeal was solely that negotiations be continued until a peaceful settlement is found and that thereby a resort to force is avoided.

"Present negotiations still stand open. They can be continued if you will give the word. Should the need for supplementing them become evident, nothing stands in the
way of widening their scope into a conference of all the nations directly interested in the present controversy. Such a meeting to be held immediately in some neutral spot in Europe would offer the opportunity for this and correlated questions to be solved in a spirit of justice, of fair dealing, and, in all human probability, with greater permanence.

"In my considered judgment, and in the right of the experience of this century, continued negotiations remain the only way by which the immediate problem can be disposed of upon any lasting basis.

"Should you agree to a solution in this peaceful manner, I am convinced that hundreds of millions throughout the world would recognize your action as an outstanding historic service to all humanity.

"Allow me to state my unqualified conviction that history, and the souls of every man, woman and child whose lives will be lost in the war will hold us, and all of us, accountable should we omit any appeal for its prevention.

"The Government of the United has no political involvements in Europe, and will assume no obligations in the conduct of the present negotiations. Yet in our own right we recognize our responsibilities as a part of a world of neighbors.

"The conscience and the impelling desire of the people of my country demand that the voice of their Government be raised again and yet again to avert and to avoid war." KALTEBORN: The President's message certainly places the responsibility directly upon Hitler if he resorts to war after he has been assured by France, by Britain, by the United States, that the way to peace lies open to him.

Very rarely in world history has a single individual had as much of the world's fate in his hands as Adolf Hitler has tonight. Very rarely have statesmen of the world been as patient, as persuasive, as self-abnegating as have the leaders of the United States and of Britain been today in
the two moving appeals that they have addressed to the German Fuehrer.

Nothing could be more simple—nothing could be more straightforward than the act of the leaders of the great British Empire and of the United States joining their voices in an appeal to one man, asking him merely that instead of resorting to brute force, he should continue negotiations to solve a problem which, as the President well points out, is almost completely solved so far as the fundamentals are concerned.

It seems difficult to believe that Adolf Hitler can reject such appeals, unless he is bereft of that minimum of judgment which every statesman must have.

There is of course, no definite suggestion of American mediation here. While the President emphasizes America's independence of political involvement, yet he does indicate that if Adolf Hitler joins in that larger conference our own country will not take any part in it.

Perhaps if this crisis which has brought Europe to the very brink of disaster can be met, the world in sober reason, with its conscience once more alive to the dreadful possibilities inherent in war, will join together, and bring the world a happy solution of the problems which it faces tonight.

The President has perhaps suggested to Adolf Hitler, without directly saying so, that if he violates the conscience of mankind, he must count at least on the benevolent neutrality of the United States on behalf of those nations that have endeavored to keep the peace. That should have a very definite influence, even upon a man like Adolf Hitler.
Wednesday, September 28

7:00-7:15 A.M.
Murrow: This is London. The German official news agency has denied that Germany will mobilize at 2 this afternoon. . . . Mr. Roosevelt's second message seems to have created considerable satisfaction. . . . The early morning papers in London carried large headlines concerning the mobilization of the British fleet. It has also been announced that certain subway stations have been closed for what has been termed officially "urgent constructional work." . . . The House of Commons will meet in just about one hour and forty-five minutes. . . . A certain number of school children are leaving London today. War risk insurance rates were doubled yesterday.

8:45-10:00 A.M.
Announcer: . . . In London, England, the House of Commons is assembled for the most momentous session in twenty years. The meeting will be addressed by Prime Minister Chamberlain. We will hear from noted British observers, including Sir Frederick Whyte, Howard Marshall and Beverly Baxter. We take you now to London, England. Baxter: This is London. First of all I want to tell you something of how London looks on this grave, important day of momentous decisions. The stream of traffic is cluttered up with light tanks and various army trucks. Soldiers
are working on the parapets down below the Embankment. And a strange sight to see in a city street, an anti-aircraft gun, already pointing skywards and alongside it the ammunition covered with tarpaulins and scrawled on it in white chalk “No Smoking.” . . . In Hyde Park and other green spaces we find people digging trenches. . . . Members of Parliament this morning at dawn began taking their trains for this historic debate. Now I shall ask Sir Frederick Whyte, who was himself a member of Parliament for ten years to tell you exactly what’s going on at this moment. Whyte: . . . My mind goes back to 1914, when Sir Edward Grey told the House at 3 o’clock on August the 4th, that the die was cast. The House meets today with a tragic sense that history is about to repeat itself. . . . The members of Parliament are grave and solemn rather than excited. There is an air of tension about the house. And there comes Mr. Lloyd George, short, stocky, walking to his seat with a jaunty air of a youngster. In spite of the shaggy white hair it reminds us all that he has sat here in this House for nearly 50 years. On to his heels comes Winston Churchill with a sort of air of historic tragedy about him. He goes to his seat below the gangway on the Government side with his square-cut jewel, which seems to glint defiance to all comers. And no sooner had the House taken note of him than there appears another figure, soft, debonaire, which seemed to combine the high seriousness of state affairs with the pleasant, smiling appeal of youth, Anthony Eden. . . . The Prime Minister slips in almost unnoticed and takes his place on the front bench, but of course not really unnoticed, for his appearance is the immediate signal for that long slow crescendo, that chorus of Hear, Hear, Hear, which as some of you who have attended the House will remember, with which the House always greets a national leader. And so the scene is set. The silence that follows the actual announcement that business is about to begin, that follows the swelling chorus of cheers that greeted the Prime Minister, is almost unbearable. The Speaker rises from
his chair and calls upon the Prime Minister by his time-honored title "Our First Lord of the Treasury." Mr. Chamberlain rises to his feet. He's an older man than he was when he flew to Bavaria two weeks ago.

BAXTER: . . . The Minister now is just starting to speak.

MARSHALL: . . . I see a notice is coming in at this moment, which says that the Prime Minister began his address—I quote: (Marshall and Sir Frederick Whyte read stenographic reports of the Prime Minister's address as it is brought them by page. The entire text appears in the Appendix. See page 307.)

10:30 A.M. — FLAS

ANNOUNCER: Chancellor Hitler has just issued invitations to Prime Minister Chamberlain of Great Britain, Premier Daladier of France and Premier Mussolini of Italy to join him in a Four-Power Conference at Munich tomorrow for the purpose of settling the Sudeten problem. Further details of the reported conference will be brought to you as they become known.

11:00-11:15 A.M. — NEWS BULLETIN

ANNOUNCER: . . . Just as Chamberlain had ended a half hour of speaking before the House of Commons, he was handed a penciled note by Sir John Simon.

He read it, lifted his eyes from the paper and announced that he was invited to meet with Hitler, Daladier and Mussolini in Munich tomorrow. The Premier said, "I need not say what my answer will be. I will go to see what I can do as a last effort."

The House immediately adjourned until Monday and the gallery stood and cheered.

KALTENBORN: This news is startling and, to a considerable extent, reassuring.

The President made reference to the possibility of a general meeting on larger issues in his second cablegram
to Hitler last night. Now that meeting is going to take place.

I don’t mean to say that it is a result of the President’s message, since we don’t even know that that final message was communicated to Adolf Hitler. According to the reports from Berlin, Nazi officials were not very much impressed by it and said that Hitler would not answer it since it would mean only an exchange of meaningless words. The indication was, of course, that Germany had definitely decided on military action.

Now what’s the likelihood of that conference getting anywhere? Well, there is ever so much more likelihood of success than in any two-way conference between Hitler and Chamberlain.

... Mr. Chamberlain found it was impossible to deal with an unreasonable man, and so the bringing in of other factors is of tremendous importance. What are those other factors? Well, the prime factor, to my mind, is Benito Mussolini. Now Benito Mussolini was praised in Hitler’s last address as “that great man beyond the Alps who stands side by side with Germany.”

Now “that great man,” from Hitler’s point of view, is coming to Munich in order to cooperate in the discussion of this issue.

What kind of advice is Benito Mussolini likely to give to Adolf Hitler on this Czechoslovakian situation? Do you think he is likely to urge him to attack the Czechs, even though the Czechs have already indicated their willingness to concede the cession of Sudetenland? No, indeed.

Mussolini, whose mind is much more resilient and shrewd, and more matter-of-fact than Hitler’s, is not going to be swayed by emotion. He’s going to be swayed by his own essential unpreparedness for war and by the democratic armies and navies of the world as he sees them lined up against the totalitarian states of Europe — only two, after all. “You’ve got the prime thing that you want,” he’s going to tell Hitler. “Cooperate, and get peace while you can.”
Italy's interest is not in line with the further expansion of Germany in Central Europe, with giving Germany complete domination in the Danube Valley, where Mussolini himself has been laying his political lines. He himself has attempted to work out a Danube confederation that would be dominated by Italy. That's been the keynote of his policy in the Danube Valley for the last three years. It was a struggle between Italy and Germany for the control of Austria. Italy does not like Germany's dominance on the Brenner Pass, or the prospect of German conquest of the German-populated Tyrol, and with it Trieste, the Adriatic port that would be of such tremendous value to Germany for the exports from Austria.

Mussolini is a realist, he's intelligent and he knows history. When he comes to Munich, he will proclaim undying friendship between Germany and Italy, but behind the scenes he'll tap Adolf Hitler on the shoulder and he'll say, "Adolf, my boy, this isn't the time for us to be rash. We've got to remember that we have neither credits, nor gold, nor supplies that will last us for more than six months. As far as Italy is concerned, we haven't oil supplies to last us longer than six months."

Mr. Hitler, if he is honest, will say to Mussolini, "Well, I haven't been able to accumulate supplies to last more than six months. Let's become the little angels of peace in Europe, get what we can out of France and Britain, and then see what the future holds." That's the sense of it and unless these men have lost their reason, that's going to be the outcome of it.

The Four-Power Conference will probably work out some way of settling the Sudeten problem with a cession of considerable territory to Germany.

ANNOUNCER: Here's a special bulletin. The announcement that Adolf Hitler had agreed to a Four-Power Conference brought a wave of buying in stocks today. The British pound rallied from $4.62 to $4.75.
ANNOUNCER: Yesterday Mussolini received personal messages from Chamberlain and Roosevelt, requesting that he accept the role of mediator in the Czech situation. Rome says that after receiving Chamberlain's message, Il Duce immediately got in touch with Adolf Hitler by telephone. Then came the dramatic announcement of the Four-Power Conference.

. . . And here's a special bulletin: Washington, D. C.—The White House reveals that President Roosevelt's message to Premier Mussolini was made as another effort by President Roosevelt in the interest of preserving world peace. Stephen Early, the President's secretary, said the message was dispatched yesterday. He asserted the communication was personal and would not be made public textually.

KALTENBORN: Not since the beginning of this crisis have I approached my task of news analysis as cheerfully as I do at this particular moment. The way has been opened which must bring a solution of the crisis. So many of the world's leaders have brought pressure to bear for peace that even Adolf Hitler has not been able to stand out against it. The pressure comes not only from the President of the United States, the British Empire, France, and the United States—but it comes also from Hitler's friend and supposed ally, Benito Mussolini.

Already German mobilization has been postponed for twenty-four hours.

On the basis of what Mr. Chamberlain revealed of his conversations with Adolf Hitler in his address to the House of Commons today, I think we must conclude Hitler was ready to move. The only question is whether there might have been some power within Germany itself to stop him.

Chamberlain gave us the text this morning of his final message to Hitler on Monday. In it he asked Germany to send representatives to meet Czech representatives for transfer of the territory which it had been agreed should be
taken from Czechoslovakia and turned over to Germany. Mr. Chamberlain added, "If you wish, Britain will be glad to be represented at this meeting." Hitler replied, in effect, "I can't be confident that the Czechs will do as you want them to do."

... If Hitler's ultimatum had stood as the last word, I can't see how there could have been any answer except war.

1:00-1:15 P.M. — Kaltenborn, New York

KALtenBORN: Those of you who know French have caught Premier Daladier's statement: "I have just received an invitation from the German Government to meet with Prime Minister Chamberlain of Britain, with Benito Mussolini of Italy, and with the Reich's Chancellor at Munich tomorrow. You will understand that under the circumstances I must postpone my explanations." He added just a word of thanks to those Frenchmen who had been called to the colors and who had responded to their country's call with such enthusiasm and promptness.

Then he went on: "Throughout the difficulties that have faced us in recent days, I have worked for peace and for the vital interests of France. I shall continue to do that tomorrow and in doing that, I know that I am working in accord with the national will of France."

The speech itself indicates, as everything that has come from France has indicated, the sincere desire of the French Government and of the French people for peace. And, as we told you a little while ago, the prospects for peace have improved immeasurably as a result of this Four-Power Conference that will be held in Munich tomorrow.

A Press Radio Bulletin has just been placed before me from Berlin, Germany. It tells us that the German Government is drafting a carefully phrased official communiqué to outline the stand which has been taken by Adolf Hitler with regard to tomorrow's conference at Munich. Naturally, Hitler must explain what will seem to many people in
Germany to be a sudden change of attitude. The German Foreign Office and the German Propaganda Ministry have been besieged by questioners who want to know what's going on.

I feel convinced that that Four-Power Conference will insist upon a solution that is closer to the Franco-British solution to the last Hitler memorandum accompanied by that fateful map which was transmitted to Prime Minister Chamberlain at Godesberg. I am convinced from the turn that affairs have taken this morning that Adolf Hitler's extreme demands are no longer the dominant factor.

2:00-2:18 P.M.

**Kaltenborn:**... Just as one bulletin after another, yesterday afternoon, seemed to bring war ominously nearer and nearer, so each bulletin this morning has brought peace nearer and nearer.

And as I survey the Press Radio bulletins that are placed before me, as they come in, I can see that almost everyone promises a peaceful solution of the European conflict.

Here is the first. From Berlin — the German Propaganda Minister, Dr. Paul Joseph Goebbels told a big crowd in Berlin today that he forsees an amicable solution of the dispute between Germany and Czechoslovakia. Goebbels is usually a very fiery speaker, but today sounded only the note of peace. Curiously enough, from the democratic point of view, he did not mention tomorrow's Four-Power Conference in Munich.

He said: "As a man who knows what's going on, I can tell you that we neither can nor want to retreat, since the Fuehrer has pledged his word to support the Sudeten territory. The solution of the problem is very near." Naturally he would not have said that unless his information indicated that the German Fuehrer was now prepared to examine with much more consideration the Franco-British proposal which he rejected.
And now a word about Prime Minister Chamberlain. It turns out that when Chamberlain leaves for Munich tomorrow, it's not going to be simply the British Prime Minister with Sir Horace Wilson as adviser, but that he is going prepared for a real conference. He expects to leave for Munich from the Heston airdrome in London at 7:30 A.M. tomorrow, which is 1:30 A.M., Eastern Standard Time. The party that Mr. Chamberlain is taking with him is so large that two planes will be necessary to carry it. That indicates quite definitely that we are concerned not only with just one brief talk in which one problem will be approached, but with a more general conference on the larger problems of Europe.

... Now comes another interesting piece of news. From Rome—Mussolini has ordered all Italian volunteers withdrawn from the Spanish civil war. It's only a report. ... According to the report, the Italian dictator ordered the immediate withdrawal just before he left for tomorrow's Four-Power Conference in Munich.

That's the first indication that Mussolini has already left Rome en route to Munich. If he has, as this bulletin indicates, it would indicate to me that he probably expects to talk to Adolf Hitler before they go into the general Four-Power Conference. That would be only natural since the Rome-Berlin axis gives these two countries a joint policy.

... Here I have the text of the final message that Prime Minister Chamberlain sent to Premier Mussolini. You remember that it reached the Italian Premier at almost the same time he received President Roosevelt's message.

"I have directed today a final appeal to Herr Hitler to refrain from use of force to settle the Sudeten problem, which we are certain could be settled by means of brief discussion that would give to him essential territory and populations, and would provide for protection, both of Sudetens and Czechs, during the transfer.

"I offered to go myself at once to Berlin to discuss arrangements with German and Czech representatives, and,
if the Chancellor desired it, representatives of Italy and France as well. I trust your Excellency will be so good as to inform the German Chancellor that you are disposed to be represented there and urge him that he accept my proposal.

"This will keep our peoples out of war. I have already guaranteed the Czech promises will be fulfilled and I trust that complete agreement may be reached within the week."

Happily for the world, this and President’s Roosevelt’s messages have not been ignored and it is under the best of auspices that tomorrow comes the meeting in Munich.

2:30-3:00 P.M. — Shirer, Berlin

SHIRER (From Berlin): Ladies and Gentlemen. It really was a great relief. The naked truth is that nobody really wanted war. . . . A great mass meeting which was called tonight as a demonstration to show that Germany meant business has now been turned into a peace meeting. Undoubtedly the danger of war is not completely over, but it’s important that the people here feel and think that it is. . . . The Germans were standing absolutely on their demands. There was no talk of a compromise, the headlines proclaimed that the entire German peoples would follow the German Fuehrer to the bitter end. There really seemed no hope.

Then, shortly after noon, we who were waiting in the Wilhelmstrasse suddenly noticed a change in the wind. There was much coming and going at the Chancellery where Herr Hitler and Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop were constantly receiving callers. The German Chancellor conferred almost continually with his military advisers, chief among whom was Field Marshal Goering.

A few moments before Mr. Chamberlain stood up in the House of Commons to make his historic announcement, the big news started to leak out here in Berlin. M. Poncet, the French Ambassador, let it be known to us that following his talk with Herr Hitler, the situation was “not un-
satisfactory," as he put it. I made inquiries at the British Embassy; there they confirmed this new trend.

... We haven’t yet been told exactly where the conference will take place, but German officials tell me tonight it will probably be at the so-called Fuehrer House, Herr Hitler’s headquarters at Munich, where he has private apartments and where there is a large conference hall. The meeting probably will have to be conducted in three languages, German, English and French. Italian will not be necessary, as the Duce understands and speaks German fluently.

By a coincidence I was in the American Embassy today when an official of the North German Lloyd Company called and informed them that the liner Europa had been recalled before it reached Southampton and would probably be back at Bremerhaven tonight.

I’m going to sign off a bit early because my train for Munich leaves in just seventeen or eighteen minutes and I’ve got to dash two miles through the traffic in town to the station to make it.

KALTENBORN: William L. Shirer is now making his way through the traffic of Berlin to reach the Munich-bound train. ...

... The British Embassy notified Mr. Shirer that the situation was far from hopeless and then a little later came the news that Prime Minister Mussolini of Italy, had asked the Fuehrer to extend his time limit for marching into Czechoslovakia for twenty-four hours, and that has been done. It is perfectly obvious that one of the first things that the conferees will do is to extend the time limit for longer than twenty-four hours, for obviously they cannot work out a solution of any of their problems within that time.

The conference will be conducted in three languages, French, English and German; not Italian. Mussolini is familiar with the others. As a matter of fact, I’ve talked in all three languages with him. His English is very precise. I noted that in my interview with him he unfailingly
rejected a word that was perhaps a little too strong when I offered him that kind of word.


ANNOUNCER: Another important event in Europe at the moment is the prayer for peace by the Archbishop of Canterbury. For it, we take you now to London, England.

ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: . . . None of us can tell or measure the power of prayer. It is one of the great mysteries of this universe and the very humblest of us can know that in his prayers he is directly helping his country and the world.

Our own people have shown wonderful calmness, patience and courage in these over-pressing anxieties and so this evening be of good cheer and pray tonight and tomorrow and always that the shaft of light which has broken through the cloud may spread until the cloud itself has vanished.

I bid you, therefore, in a very special sense, Good night. God bless you all, and keep you calm and steadfast and hopeful.

6:45-7:00 P.M. — TROUT NEWS REVIEW — Maurice Hindus, Prague — Kaltenborn, New York

TROUT: This is America calling Prague and we take you now to Prague, Czechoslovakia.

HINDUS: Earlier today, a rumor spread here that Germany had sent an ultimatum to this country, giving it until yesterday afternoon to accept the conditions that Hitler had originally demanded it to fulfill by October first. . . .

Then the news reached us that tomorrow afternoon there would be a meeting in Germany of Daladier, Chamberlain, Mussolini and Hitler. . . . Soon we learned that it was Hitler himself who was calling the meeting and our first thought was, "Well, there will be no bombing over Prague until the first of October at least." I immediately asked the Czechs what they thought of this turn of events. The first
response was one of gloom. “Another sell-out.” Yet later a good many of these same people were of a different opinion.

... The news that the Sudetens were getting panicky at the thought that they would be the chief victims of the war further added to the optimism of people here. The Sudetens, incidentally, might in the event of war be subjected to the greatest havoc a people has ever known. Indeed, they might even be annihilated.

KALTENBORN: Four points from Bob Trout’s review of the news. First, Mussolini meets Hitler before Prime Ministers get together.

I ventured to predict early this afternoon that this would happen. It happens because the two dictators want to get their house in order, come to their agreements, make their plans, before they face the representatives of the world’s two great democracies in Europe.

Gayda, Mussolini’s editorial mouthpiece, says there is “no need for optimism” — a perfectly natural point of view to take because the Fascists want to preserve as much of Hitler’s claim as they can. Consequently, they don’t want Europe to feel that this is going to be an easy way to peace, but that sacrifices will have to be made, particularly by Czechoslovakia.

Then from Geneva, the Czechoslovakian Delegation declares itself satisfied with the conference. The same approval was echoed with reservations by Maurice Hindus from Prague. In Berlin, Dr. Goebbels tells Germans that the Sudetens will get what they want one way or the other — another way of saying to the Powers: “You have got to give us what we want, or we won’t continue to be peaceful.”

And finally the word from Tokio, declaring the Japanese Empire in favor of European peace. But Mr. Japan, what about Asiatic peace?

... And now, here’s a news dispatch. ... The four powers of Europe, which have been mobilizing day and night, have now agreed to suspend further mobilization
pending the outcome of the Munich talks. . . . Paris, London and Rome are in virtual agreement on the idea of having an international force occupy Sudetenland.

Once more collective security rather than armament, mobilization, war. Europe marches forward to peace!

7:45-8:00 P.M. — London-New York Interview

Kaltenborn: Hello, Stephen King-Hall.

. . . Tell me this. You know something about the general military situation in Europe and you've probably heard what Hitler said about his new army. Do you believe it's as good as he says it is?

King-Hall (from London): I should say that the weakness of the German army undoubtedly is the fact that they lack trained people in the higher command. Also, there are stories which I believe are partially true that some of the material isn't quite up to standard. They've been short of raw materials and I don't think the Siegfried Line on the German side of the Rhine is in anything like as finished condition as the Germans pretend it is. At any rate, I can tell you the French don't think it's entirely finished.

Kaltenborn: The British Navy sailed but for an unknown destination and we haven't heard a word about it since. What do you know about it?

King-Hall: If you went down to the Admiralty tonight— I've been a naval officer myself—and you said you wanted to know where the fleet is, I can tell you exactly what they'd tell you. They would say, "The fleet is at sea."

Kaltenborn: Could Germany withstand a blockade as well as she could in 1914?

King-Hall: General Goering's been talking very big about the fact that their Four-Year Plan would enable them to do it. I should say that at the present moment—and this is an estimate—they are certainly less capable of withstanding a blockade than they were, say, in 1917 when they had Central Europe under their control.
If the United States would, in a faintly neutral kind of way, assist us in a blockade of Germany in the event of war, then we'd have them. But if you insisted on putting your stuff through, Hitler could go on.

I'd like to mention one little point that I feel is important. You probably know how keen Englishmen are for their gardens. At this moment, there are hundreds and thousands of little suburban gardens in which people have had to dig trenches seven feet deep. That makes an Englishman mad, you know, to have to dig a trench seven feet deep in a garden that he's been spending a whole summer getting into order. When an English gets to that stage, he means business.
Thursday, September 29

5:09 a.m. — News Bulletin
Announcer: Adolf Hitler and Premier Mussolini have arrived at Munich for the Four-Power Conference. Earlier, Hitler went to Kufstein on the German Austrian border, forty-five miles from Munich, to meet Mussolini on his way from Rome.

5:42 a.m. — News Bulletin
Announcer: Premier Daladier of France and his aides have landed in a special plane at the Munich airport for the momentous conference to be held today. They were greeted by Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and other German officials.

7:20 a.m. — News Bulletin
Announcer: Munich, the historic old capital of Bavaria and the birthplace of the Nazi movement, is in a holiday mood. . . . There was a big crowd at the station all morning. Hitler and Mussolini received a tremendous ovation. Hitler smiled, but Mussolini looked solemn. The last of the four conferees to reach Munich was Prime Minister Chamberlain, who arrived in an airplane from London at 5:50 this morning, E. S. T. He received a tremendous ovation. . . . His face was wreathed in smiles as he stepped out of the airplane. . . . Just as he was arriving, the Czech lega-
tion in London announced that the Czech Minister to Berlin and the counsellor of the Czech Legation in London are on their way to Munich to be at the disposal of the British and French delegates if they want information. Hitler may object to the idea. . . .

8:00-8:30 A.M.—Shirer Munich—
Hindus, Prague—Kaltenborn, New York
ANNOUNCER: We now call in William Shirer to speak to us from Munich, Germany.
SHIRER: This is Munich, Germany. . . As I speak, Herr Hitler, Signor Mussolini, M. Daladier and Mr. Chamberlain are meeting in the Fuehrerhaus here in Munich. . . Mr. Chamberlain did not even bother to go to his hotel after landing. That shows you what a hurry these four statesmen have been in this morning to get down to business. Handbills and a special broadcast early this morning urged the population to turn out to greet the distinguished guests. . . . It is significant that the heads of the two totalitarian states got together this morning before either Mr. Chamberlain or M. Daladier had arrived. . . .
KALTENBORN: We take you now to Prague.
HINDUS (First few sentences unintelligible because of static.): Indeed in May, 1935, Hitler said, "Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the interior affairs of Austria, to annex Austria or to conclude an Anschluss."

On March 11th of this year General Goering assured the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin in the following words: "I give you my word of honor that we are looking only for better relations with you." Later at a banquet which Mr. Masaryk and General Goering were attending, the Field Marshal reiterated his assurances that no aggressive action would be taken by Germany against Czechoslovakia. On March 12th the same thing—assurances to Masaryk from Goering. On March 13th Mr. Masaryk was assured by the Field Marshal for the fifth time that Germany had no hostile intentions toward Czechoslovakia.
These assurances were then, with the consent of the German Government, communicated by Mr. Chamberlain to the House of Commons on March 14th. . .

Now, under the circumstances, people say here, how can we trust any assurance or promise that is made by Hitler? At the moment the Czechs are filled with doubt as to whether the meeting in Munich, in spite of the fact that there will be three Czechoslovak representatives, will answer the question satisfactorily. . . . But whatever happens, the people at the moment remain orderly, disciplined, firm.

KALTENBORN: Two such talks as we've just heard, one from William L. Shirer in Munich, where the four leaders are gathering to determine the fate of Czechoslovakia and perhaps the fate of all Europe, and that from Maurice Hindus in Prague, in which he gave us today's attitude and atmosphere in Czechoslovakia's capital, are interesting examples of what radio can do in the immediate interpretation of the situation.

Mr. Shirer quotes from today's German papers: "Impossible situation in the Sudetenland." From all unbiased reports we must conclude that Mr. Hitler is grossly exaggerating, that there is order in the Sudetenland, and that conditions are not at all impossible for anyone who is willing to obey the law of the land.

Hitler undoubtedly believes what he said and yet what he said does not correspond to the facts. . . . Therefore, you have no agreed basis of fact from which these four men can go on, and that naturally creates a tremendous difficulty, a difficulty which is bound to be emphasized.

Then there is this one-hour conference between Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler preceding their meeting with the French and British Premiers, whereas there has been no such immediate consultation between Chamberlain and Daladier.

No, there hasn't been any immediate personal consultation, but I've just received here a special Press Radio dispatch from Prague which indicates to me that those two
shrewd Prime Ministers have been in communication and have agreed on a plan which they are going to present for the settlement of the Sudeten issue. Now, why do I say that? Here is the dispatch: “The Czech Government announces that it has accepted a new plan to carry out the British-French terms for the surrender of Sudetenland to Germany.” The Czech Government tells us that the new plan has been submitted by somebody. Who submitted it? Certainly not Hitler; certainly not Mussolini. It was submitted by agreement between the French and the British, and the Czechs very promptly, and I think very wisely, accepted it. Daladier and Chamberlain are stepping into that conference this morning with an agreed plan which the Czech Government has accepted, and you can depend upon it that either Adolf Hitler will accept that particular plan or the conference is not going to proceed smoothly. That’s point number one.

Now, Mr. Shirer discusses whether or not it is going to be possible here to do something more than to just stave off an immediate war. He discusses the question as to whether they can lay the foundations for a lasting peace. I am convinced that they will do extremely well if they get the first part of the job done before they have to separate.

After all, four Prime Ministers can’t remain away from their capitals for any considerable length of time, and it is perfectly obvious that it would take more than a week, more than ten days, probably more than two or three weeks in order to settle such questions as a compact of non-aggression, air disarmament and the Mediterranean issue. If, however, the Sudeten issue can be cleared out, there will be a keen desire to go on with the work of taking up these problems one at a time and getting them out of the way.

I’ve just spent a little time this morning in going over the detailed documents that have been exchanged between the Governments in connection with the Sudeten crisis. The presentation of those documents in their complete form is
issued as a British White Paper. (For full text, see Appendix, Page 327.)

The general belief was that Mr. Chamberlain with his friendly attitude toward the dictator governments leaned toward the Hitler point of view very much more than toward the Czech point of view. Yet he, after repeated attempts to solve the problem, blames the Sudetens, acting under orders from Berlin for blocking every attempt at settlement. The White Paper explains why even a man of peace like Neville Chamberlain simply could not stomach that kind of an intransigent attitude. So let's not be over-optimistic on the problem of dealing with Adolf Hitler.

9:00-9:15 A.M. — Grandin, Paris; Darvall, London

**GRANDIN** *(from Paris)*: The horrible crisis which we are passing through has a favorable aspect. We have come to realize that there is a limit beyond which it is impossible to go without calling forth world reaction.

**ANNOUNCER**: And now to London where you will hear from Frank Darvall, British author and lecturer.

**DARVALL** *(from London)*: Good morning, America. This is the happiest morning we've had in England for several weeks. . . . I felt it particularly in my own household. Yesterday morning I was awakened very late by a terrified charwoman who had got up early in order to collect her gas mask and couldn't because the crowd had been so great at the depot. She left early last evening hoping to be able to pick up her mask before she went home. She came in this morning very confident, and I asked her if she had gotten one. She said, no, she wasn't going to worry about it any more. . . .

12:00-12:15 NOON — William L. Shirer

**SHIRER** *(from Munich)*: The big four of Europe have lost no time. . . . There was so much speed about it that Mr. Chamberlain did not even have time to go to his hotel. He drove right from the airport to the Fuehrer's headquarters
in the center of town. The first meeting was quite informal. It began at 12:30, German Time, and the first feeling-out of one another, took place while the four statesmen nibbled at a buffet lunch offered by Herr Hitler. It was what you might call a standup buffet lunch.

The four men were not alone. Foreign Ministers Ciano of Italy and Von Ribbentrop of Germany, Sir Neville Henderson, the British Ambassador, and Mr. Francois Poncet, the French Ambassador, were there, as was also Field Marshal Goering, whose role in these days must not be overlooked by any means. They all stood around in a small reception room eating a light lunch and getting acquainted. Mr. Chamberlain had never personally met the Duce before. He had written him personal letters, but had never met him face to face. They started off with a friendly little chat. Mr. Daladier had never personally met either of the leaders of the two totalitarian states, and he proceeded to get acquainted with them. Actually, I am told that during a considerable time Mr. Daladier and Herr Hitler stood in one corner and had a very long heart-to-heart talk. . . . After this standup buffet was finished, the four statesmen gathered around a table and discussed how their work should proceed. . . . Most people here tonight feel that if the Big Four can stave off war in their meeting here this afternoon and this evening, that will have been a very good day's work indeed. . . .

1:30-1:45 P.M.—Pope Pius, Castle Gondolfa Kaltenborn, New York.

Pope Pius: While millions of men are living in dread because of the imminent danger of war and because of the threat of unexampled slaughter and ruin, we gather into our paternal heart the trepidation of our children, and we invite bishops, clergy, the religious and the faithful to unite themselves with us in the most undaunted and insistent prayer for the preservation in justice and in charity of the peace.
To this unarmed but invincible power of prayer, let the people have recourse once again, that God, in whose hands rests the destinies of the world, may sustain, especially at the moment, in those who govern, confidence in the pacific ways of peaceful negotiations and of lasting agreement; and that he may find all sentiment and action used to foster peace and to establish it upon the secure basis of law and of the Gospel teachings.

Grateful beyond words for the prayers which have been and are being poured out for us by the faithful of the whole Catholic world, with all our heart we offer for the salvation and for the peace of the world, this life which in virtue of those prayers the Lord has spared and even renewed. Let the Lord of life and death, if He will, take from us the inestimable gift of an already long life; or if He so wills, let him prolong still further the laborious days of this afflicted and weary toiler.

Our offer is all the more assured of gracious acceptance because it is the marrow of the liturgical commemoration of the meek and heroic martyr, Saint Wenceslaus, and because it is the eve of the feast of the Holy Rosary, the celebrated supplication—the month of the Holy Rosary when all over the Catholic world will be multiplied, as we also earnestly recommend, the furtherance and frequency of devotion which had already on many occasions brought about the great and beneficial intervention of the blessed Virgin in the destinies of afflicted humanity.

It is with the full confidence that these recollections inspire that we give to all the great Catholic family and to all the human family our paternal benediction.

KALtenborn: The seriousness of the crisis has been brought home once more to everyone who has just listened to the message of the Pope.

We are beginning now to get some measure of information on the conference at Munich. . . . "Official German sources have informed the Associated Press [I quote textually from the dispatch] that Hitler has agreed to have the
German Army make a parade occupation of the Eger and Asch regions of Sudetenland as a symbol of German possession. . . . German troops will be permitted to occupy these border districts on October 1st and 2nd, with appropriate ceremonies of flag-waving and speeches and music. But the rest of Sudetenland is to be occupied gradually."

That represents a victory for the Anglo-French plan, for both these regions to be occupied at once are without strategic military importance for Czechoslovakia and would be abandoned immediately if war should come. . . .

3:30-3:46 P.M. — NEWS SUMMARY
ANNOUNCER: The conference in Munich during six hours of negotiations has moved so rapidly toward a solution of the Czechoslovakian question that only details remain to be straightened out. The conferees took a recess at 8:30 o'clock, Central European Time, 2:30 o'clock, New York Time, and they'll come together again at 10 o'clock, or 4 o'clock, New York Time.

At that time, according to the latest word a few remaining difficulties will be cleared away, and it may be that an agreement will be signed before the statesmen adjourn tonight. The plan which has been agreed upon in its essentials is a compromise which will permit Hitler to make a partial occupation of Sudetenland on October 1st, but will also provide for a careful settlement of the rights of Czechoslovakia in the doubtful territories.

Hitler's troops will make a sort of parade occupation of the outer borders of Sudetenland and at the same time Czech troops will retire from the sections nearest to Germany, while remaining in the portions nearer to Czechoslovakia proper.

Czechoslovakia's representatives who are not sitting in the conference itself, but keeping closely in touch with developments, have approved the compromise plan in its main essentials, but they are not yet sure that it will prove acceptable in the final test. In the meantime they have sug-
gested another way out and that is to refer the whole Sudeten problem to President Roosevelt to arbitrate in case the Munich conferences collapse. The Czechoslovakian legation in London declares that such a plan would be completely satisfactory to the Czech people and that their Government would agree in advance to accept any decision which Mr. Roosevelt might reach. The suggestion was conveyed to the White House in Washington, but the President declined to comment.

KALTENBORN: After these days of strain it is a privilege to comment on what seems like an almost official announcement that the conferees in Munich have reached agreement.

Germany will, of course, get the Sudetenland. That particular point has never been at issue in this conference. Germany was awarded the Sudetenland by the Franco-British plan, and if Hitler had been reasonable, to quote the Prime Minister of England, he would have accepted the Franco-British Plan and averted the war crisis which has convulsed the world for the past four days.

There were two things that encouraged me about that conference from the moment of its beginning. One of them was the presence of General Goering. He's the head of the army. He's the head of the air force. He is the Nazi who would undoubtedly take over in case Hitler should decide to retire or resign or in case something else should happen to him. Goering is so prominent that the very fact that he has said nothing, except that he expected a peaceable settlement, leads me to believe that he came to Munich today with the idea of cooperating with Mussolini and the French and the British Prime Ministers in case Adolf Hitler should get one of his violent attacks of fanaticism and refuse to make the necessary concessions. . . . Goering has been in contact with his Generals. He has been talking to the men of the General Staff, and I am convinced that they've told him that Adolf Hitler is courting suicide if he brings about a war under the conditions that face Germany at this moment; Russia, Britain and France, fighting against Ger-
many, and Mussolini not yet precisely declared on Hitler's side.

And now comes the suggestion that President Roosevelt arbitrate if the Munich conferences collapse. On that proposal President Roosevelt declined to comment. Well, I don't blame him for declining to comment. That gentle suggestion that we should step in where Europe's angels have failed to arrive at results recalls to my mind the suggestion of the Paris Peace Conference of unhappy memory, that we take the mandates for Armenia and for Palestine. I don't know whether you remember it, but I do. And, oh, what a nice opportunity for service Palestine would present to Uncle Sam at this particular moment. The idea that the United States take over the gentle problem of mediating between the Czechs and Adolf Hitler—well, as a suggestion, I should say that it deserves the biggest prize over all the fantastic suggestions that have been made since this fantastic crisis began.

6:30-7:00 P.M. — Shirer, Munich — Hindus, Prague

SHIRER: This is Munich calling. It took the Big Four: Mussolini, Hitler, Chamberlain and Daladier, just five hours and twenty-five minutes here in Munich today to dispel the clouds of war and come to an agreement over the partition of Czechoslovakia. There is to be no European war, after all.

There is to be peace, and the price of that peace is, roughly, the ceding by Czechoslovakia of the Sudetenland territory to Herr Hitler's Germany. The German Fuehrer gets what he wanted, only he has to wait a little longer for it. Not much longer though—only ten days. His waiting ten short days has saved Europe from a world war. To Americans it must seem a strange thing, but there it is.

I have just learned that Mussolini is preparing to leave the meeting and that the communiqué may be out soon.

The original plan of the Big Four, to go into Europe's other problems seems to have been dropped.

HINDUS (from Prague): The big question that the Czechs
are asking themselves is this: What will be the final outcome of the Munich Conference? Two dictators are facing the Premiers of the two great democracies in Europe. Who will win? Who will outwit or outfrighten whom?

This evening I asked a waitress in a restaurant, a newsstand man, the head waiter of one of the leading hotels, the peddler of lottery tickets and a bricklayer what they thought of it. It was amazing how uniform was the answer I got. All of them felt, and said, that death would be infinitely better than submission to Germany. You see, there is deep concern and gloom in Czechoslovakia at the moment.

6:45-7:02 P.M.

KALTENBORN: It's all settled.

It's just a question of minor details. Whether the delay in the occupation of further regions of Czechoslovakia is ten days or twenty days is after all an insignificant detail. The official communiqué is delayed only because the final details have not yet been settled.

7:30-8:00 P.M. — NEWS BULLETIN, New York

DeLanux, Paris; Murrow, London

ANNOUNCER: Here is a special bulletin from the Press Radio Bureau. Munich, Germany. It is announced on high authority that the four major Powers have signed an agreement on the surrender of Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland to Germany. According to the announcement, the agreement was signed shortly after midnight Central European Time.

... In Paris, Pierre DeLanux, noted French journalist, is waiting to talk to us.

DELANUX (Paris): Tonight after the first day of negotiation at Munich between the heads of the Governments of Germany, England, France and Italy, the last news indicates that a draft settlement has been reached.

MURROW (London): Hello, this is London. According to reports reaching London ten minutes ago the conference in
Munich is still sitting. Reports have been circulating in Berlin and Rome for the last two hours that agreement has been reached, and it is true that one London press association reported that agreement had been reached, but it credited the statement to an official German spokesman in Munich.

There is no official confirmation of that report in London. There was a certain amount of jubilation in the streets in London when the first report was issued. The news was greeted with an outburst of cheering. Bands struck up the national anthem. Crowds of women who were happy and relieved by this news—which as I have said is not yet officially confirmed—made Mrs. Chamberlain the center of affectionate demonstration when she left St. Michael's Church tonight.

And here is a news flash. It has just been reported that the Munich wireless has stated that Herr Hitler, Signor Musso- lini, Mr. Chamberlain and M. Daladier at 12:30 this morn- ing signed an agreement regarding the terms of the cession of the Sudeten German areas.

When Mr. Chamberlain left Heston airport this morn- ing he said he hoped when he returned to be able to say as Hotspur says in Henry IV: "Out of this nettle, danger, we pluck this flower, safety."

Mr. Chamberlain's opponents say, "We devoutly hope so, but don't forget that the nettle is still there." His opponents are still wondering how much of the nettle will remain when they have learned the terms of the agreement that has been signed in Munich tonight.

KALTENBORN: The most momentous news of all probably was given first to American listeners by Edward Murrow speaking from London when he gave us the wireless flash from Munich that the agreement had been signed some six or seven minutes ago.

The details, which we will have probably in a few minutes, will concern the occupation of the territory that is to be given up immediately and the occupation of the ter-
ritory in which there are to be plebiscites, under international supervision. . . .

10:00-10:10 P.M.

ANNOUNCER (Gives text of Four-Power Accord. See Appendix, Page 356.)

KALTENBORN: The terms which you have just heard represent a complete victory for Adolf Hitler.

One of the points that are important to note, first, is the complete exclusion of Russia, which marks the beginning of Russia's exclusion from the councils of Europe, because if this Four-Power Conference precedes others to be carried on along the same lines, it definitely means that there is now a cooperation of Fascists and Democratic Powers of France and England, for the exclusion of Russia from the councils of Europe.

Hungary and Poland will also receive concessions of territory. That is inherent in the implications of the agreement. The Czechoslovak Government will undoubtedly negotiate such cessions with Poland and with Hungary within the brief period of time that is allowed in the official agreement. Then Germany and Italy may join in the agreement to respect Czechoslovakia's remaining frontiers. It is to be noted that for the moment only France and England join in that guarantee.

The French delegation was completely broken as it left the council room and prepared to return to France. The reason is obvious. When this proposal is presented to the French Chamber of Deputies many voices will be raised to oppose it and criticize it. That same thing will be true in lesser measure in the British Parliament. But Prime Minister Chamberlain has a tremendous majority in the House of Commons and the relief at not being obliged to fight a war will offset the humiliation which the British will feel in this surrender to Hitler's demands.

Many questions of details are still to arise. The International Commission will presumably look after those. The
Commission has a good deal of authority, and it is possible that when it makes those ethnological adjustments which were referred to in the text, it will perhaps give Czechoslovakia certain concessions which do not appear on the surface of the Agreement.

Fundamentally, however, this does represent an almost complete victory for Hitler. Like most negotiators, he asked for much more than he expected to get, and I venture to say that he got much more than he really expected.

11:00-11:30 P.M. — Murrow, London; Kaltenborn

ANNOUNCER: ... And now to see what other parts of the world think about the Munich agreement, let us switch our microphone across the Atlantic to London. ...

MURROW: ... General relief is apparent. ... One taxi driver said to me just a few minutes ago, holding up a strange looking black rubber contraption: "What'll I do with this blinkin' gas mask now?" ... One of tonight's London papers, issued before news of the settlement had reached London, carried an advertisement for an all-metal dugout as an air-raid precaution. ... The price, cash with the order and subject to market fluctuations, was about forty dollars — for a dugout accommodating three people. It's not expected that the advertisement will appear in tomorrow morning's paper.

... You will have to make up your own mind in the light of subsequent developments as to whether or not permanent peace has been secured; if it hasn't, whether or not the price paid for this realization has been too great. ... At least, an armistice seems to have been arranged before the war. ... We have had only silence from Prague for the last five hours.

KALTENBORN: Military leaders, not the civilian leaders, have won. It is, of course, a victory for the dictators.

They're right in Italy and Germany to rejoice. General Goering gave a party in celebration.

Fascists have taken it as a big victory for Premier Mus-
solini. And why not? Great leaders, great Powers came to Benito Mussolini and said to him, "You are the man; only you can have some power of persuasion over Adolf Hitler. Won't you please intercede with him and ask him to preserve the world's peace?"

And Benito Mussolini graciously accepted the obligation of saying a word to the other end of the Rome-Berlin axis.

Edward Murrow tells us that in London there is rejoicing over peace; there is for the moment relief, but as he suggests, criticism may come later. I remember one phrase of comment he used in his earlier talk this evening: "Must concessions be made each time a nation threatens violence?" — for that is a question that is being asked by many millions the world over tonight.

Naturally there is a wave of gratitude that peace has been preserved but one wonders whether it is peace, or whether it just may not be the prelude to other demands and other concessions and then finally to the type of demand which no concessions can satisfy and which will end in the break that has now, happily enough, been avoided.

There is one great Power in Europe, mighty in its military force, mighty because it extends from the Baltic to the Pacific, that has been completely excluded from any contact with this conference, and yet it is a Power whose might cannot be wished out of the world, it is a Power that will become more cynical because of what has happened at Munich — Soviet Russia. Moscow tonight calls the Munich Agreement "A routine endeavor to mollycoddle an aggressor." That's typical of Soviet sarcasm, but one wonders whether to some extent it may not be justified.

As I studied out on the map the details of some of the terms, I saw how clever Hitler was in the way he has arranged his military occupation. Where do troops go in first? Not from Germany; not into that little finger of Czech territory that sticks out into Germany, where the Germans are already established over half the distance. Oh, no,
they'll march in on Saturday from Austria to signify that it was Austria first and Czechoslovakia second. Who knows what may be third?

And of course you're asking: "But will Prague accept this?" Doubt has been expressed on various points tonight. I can't share that doubt. I have in mind the Czech memorandum, so sincere, so pleading, so gracious. The Prague Government submitted this one in a last, final endeavor to secure some concessions for itself. There is one paragraph stating that at this critical juncture the Czechoslovak Government is placing the interests of civilization and world peace before the distress of its own people and is resolved to make sacrifices which never in history were asked from an undefeated state with such concentrated effort.

Yes, Prague will accept because it must.
Friday, September 30

8:16-8:26 A.M. — Hindus, Prague
ANNOUNCER: We take you now to Prague, Czechoslovakia.
HINDUS (from Prague): . . . Last night as I was on my way home from the broadcasting station, I saw a small crowd at a street corner. I walked over to see what had happened. It seems that a Czech and a German had gotten into a discussion and the German had lost his temper and had begun to speak offensively of the Czech people. He was soon surrounded by Czechs. What the Czechs said to him was this, "You shouldn't use such language about us; you ought to be ashamed of yourself to abuse us like that." That is all they said. They didn't abuse the man. They didn't abuse the German people. They didn't say derogatory words about Hitler. They didn't swear. The crowd dispersed in silence. I couldn't help thinking what might have happened to a Czech in Berlin if he, in the course of an argument with a German, had flung out a mouthful of insulting epithets at the German people. The spirit these people are displaying in these crucial times is beyond belief. Perhaps sometime today the truth will be told them and it will be a painful truth!

You who have heard the Munich agreement in full, please remember that it has not yet appeared in the Czech press.

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... One man said to me this morning: "I'm a very old man now. Two weeks ago I had a birthday. I was 50 years old. Today, I'm 70. Well, after all, 70 is not such a bad age at which to die."

11:00-11:15 A.M. — Murrow, London

Murrow: This is London. Mr. Chamberlain is expected at Heston airport some time within the course of the next half-hour. Tributes have been pouring into Downing Street all morning. Thousands of people are standing in Whitehall and lining Downing Street waiting to greet the Prime Minister upon his return from Munich. Certain afternoon papers speculate concerning the possibility of the Prime Minister receiving a knighthood while still in office, something that has happened only twice before in British history. Others say that he should be the next recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize.

International experts in London agree that Herr Hitler has scored one of the greatest diplomatic triumphs in modern history.

Prices soared on the London Stock Exchange this morning, and as I am speaking, they continue to rise.

... The Labor party's attitude has not yet been defined. But certain influential members are discussing the advisability and the possibility of urging that something be arranged to compensate Czechoslovakia for the economic sacrifices involved in the settlement.

... From Berlin it is reported that German troops will cross the frontier at midnight tonight.

When Mr. Chamberlain arrives, the bells of Westminster Abbey will ring out a welcome.

New York Announcer: Premier Daladier has just returned to Paris from the Four-Power Conference in Munich. Cheering crowds greeted him as his plane landed at Le Bourget airdrome and almost one-half million persons were along the five-mile route as he rode in an automobile from the airport to the office of the War Ministry. Many of the peo-
pie broke through the police lines and ran up to the Premier, shouting: "Peace, peace."

2:30-3:00 P.M.

ANNOUNCER: Today the world is working out the mechanics of peace. The peace that was so dramatically contrived in yesterday's conference in Munich by Chancellor Hitler, Premier Mussolini, Prime Minister Chamberlain and Premier Daladier. Columbia has returned its network operations to normal and intends from now on to interrupt the usual schedules only when the news is of exceptional importance.

The Prague Government accepted the plan of the four stronger Powers, and some time tomorrow, Czechoslovakia will begin to turn over Sudeten territory to Germany. The Czech Premier, General Jan Syrovy has broadcast an explanation to the nation, explaining that nothing else could be done. In his broadcast, Premier Syrovy said: "Superior force has compelled us to accept. My duty was to consider everything. As a soldier I had to choose the way to peace. The nation will be stronger and more united. We have chosen the only right course. Four Powers have decided to ask from us the abdication of the territories. We had to choose between a useless fight and sacrifices. We have accepted the sacrifices. We have had to choose between the death of a nation and abdication of territories. We shall accomplish the conditions imposed upon us. The main thing is that we remain ourselves. We must be united."

Prime Minister Chamberlain flew back to London from Munich and Premier Daladier to Paris. The Prime Minister said there were only two things he wanted to say: "First of all, I have received an immense number of letters during all these anxious times. So has my wife. Letters of support, approval and gratitude, and I cannot tell you what encouragement that has been to me. I want to thank the British people for what they have done."
“And next, I want to say that settlement of the Czechoslovakia problem, which now has been achieved, is in my view only a prelude to a larger settlement in which all Europe may find peace. This morning I had another talk with German Chancellor Hitler, and here is the paper which bears his name on it as well as mine. Some of you perhaps have already heard what it contains, but I would just like to read it to you.” (See Appendix, Page 359.)

Hungary is renewing in louder tones its demand that minority problems be settled and that it get the territory it wants. A Polish government spokesman said, “We are ready to occupy the territory before daylight tomorrow.”

... Here in our own country, President Roosevelt says that he is greatly pleased by the work of the State Department and our diplomats abroad during the European crisis.

KALTENBORN: My closing words at 11:30 last night were these: “Czechoslovakia will accept because she must accept.” The dispatches to which you have just listened confirm that prediction.

As General Syrovy has well said, it would have been suicidal for this little democratic state to attempt to fight Germany alone. He says that Czechoslovakia will become stronger and more united as the result of the sacrifices she is about to make.

More united, yes; but stronger, no. Czechoslovakia is giving up her richest industrial areas; she is giving up the finest military frontier of any small power in Europe. She is giving up a defense that would have stood off the Germans for much longer than a good many experts supposed.

Czechoslovakia must become, under the new conditions, a neutral state and a practically disarmed state.

Remember that she will be surrounded entirely by much more powerful neighbors. Already some of those neighbors are presenting their demands in the most aggressive form possible. Poland cries out in Czechoslovakia’s hour of agony: “We, too, must have our share and have it within twenty-four hours, or we invade.”
Czechoslovakia, staggering under the blow administered by the great Powers of Europe is perhaps in no way in a position to repel a blow from Poland, but there it would seem that decency would compel the great Powers, including Germany, to raise a staying hand and to tell Poland that even in the world in which we live today there are some standards in international relations that must be observed.

I think, however, that Poland will not invade Czechoslovakia within twenty-four hours. The agreement signed in Munich last night states that if Czechoslovakia and Poland have not agreed on territorial settlement within three months, then the Powers will meet again to force some sort of an agreement upon them. Poland has the right to believe, in view of what happened to the Sudetenland that the Teschen District, insofar as it is peopled by Poles who want to return to Poland will also be returned to Poland.

Hungary, we are told, cries out for the return of not only the piece of Slovakia that was taken from her and turned over to Czechoslovakia at the close of the war, but demands, as well, all the land that has ever been taken away from her in 1,000 years of proud Hungarian history. Jugoslavia, take notice. Rumania, take notice. Germany take notice. All three of those countries have certain territories that once belonged to Hungary.

Word comes to us from London that Mr. Chamberlain proudly held up in his right hand the signed agreement made with Adolf Hitler. It’s good to have faith in signed agreements although there is ample grounds for those who have cynically telegraphed to me, written me in hundreds of letters and telegrams since last night, that they don’t believe that this kind of a peace can endure. They tell me that in view of what has happened the last ten years, and particularly the last five years, there can be no faith, no reliance in signed agreements. All that counts is strong armament, strong nerves. But one must not lose hope. There is something magnificent in the thought that Germany and
England, two states that naturally complement one another, stem from the same race, and had a thousand years of peace, might at least unite in a pledge that forever more their differences are to be settled in peace. If such a miracle can happen, well, we should welcome it. And we should hope that such a political miracle can happen; for if we lose hope, then we lose the opportunity forever more of translating it into reality.

Without faith in agreements we can look forward to nothing but the continuation of the recent years of international lawlessness, culminating again and again in the kind of nightmare of terror that we have experienced for these past three weeks.

Finally, a word about the part played by our own country and our own President in the settlement of this problem. President Roosevelt was right in commending our State Department. We have at the head of that Department a man of great faith and of great patience and of great hope. Men like Cordell Hull, continuously and consistently pushing forward on the path of peace, may in the end win men of even lesser stamp to the belief that for humanity there is but one right way, the way of peace and agreement. Good evening.
Sunday, October 2

10:30-11:00 P.M.

KALTENBORN: As I was playing tennis out at Forest Hills this afternoon under a blue sky and shining sun, I tried to forget the things that had been happening so rapidly during the hectic weeks just past.

May I just preface my remarks tonight with a personal word? I feel very humble and very grateful in view of the response that has come to me from Columbia's vast radio audience. I am particularly sorry that all these letters and telegrams and phone calls came at once. For sixteen years I have been very proud of having answered every letter, every telegram that ever came to me, in response to my radio talks. Well, that shows you that I haven't very often had so many at one time.

At any rate, I can't do that this time. It is just impossible. There are too many. And of course there are so many because I don't suppose that ever before in the history of radio has anybody ever talked so much over so many stations, so many times in so short a time on so exciting an occasion.

I notice that many of you are grateful to me for what you call my 'expression of my opinion.' Well, now, I only hope that I didn't express my opinion too often. I didn't mean to. I tried not to because I constantly had the feeling that what one individual thinks or believes is of absolutely no importance in a crisis of this kind. The essential job of the news analyst is to keep other people's thinking as
straight as he can on the basis of the information that he has. And to do that, he must analyze the news fairly, intelligently, clearly, and — here, of course, was the difficulty for the past critical days — almost instantly. That’s a real task. Several times in the course of these weeks, I had to take a long deep breath before I attempted it, because I knew how really difficult were certain aspects of the news.

I got a good laugh out of the last issue of Variety, which, in its picturesque language, declared that I’d set myself out on a limb because I kept talking about the continued possibility of peace. Well, of course, I hope I didn’t predict peace, because I had no business to predict peace. What I tried to do was to present the reasons why some alarming dispatches were not quite so alarming when you considered where they came from, what their background was and what their implications were.

After all, that is the task of any news analyst — not so much to express what he thinks as to try to help other reasonable-minded people to keep the facts straight in their own minds.

I am already asking myself what’s next for Hitler. Germans, he says, that is all he wants — just Germans. Well, all right. There are lots of Germans in the Schleswig-Holstein part of Denmark. There are 250,000 of them in the Italian Tyrol. Danzig the Nazis have practically taken over already. Danzig is 90 per cent German. Memel in Lithuania has nothing but Germans. Poland has a million Germans. Hungary has a half million Germans and Alsace has over a million Germans. Hitler always said after each one of the six or seven conquests he has gotten away with so easily and so successfully, “Now, no more. All is well!” But there has always been more and there may be more still. On one occasion Sir Robert Walpole, who was Prime Minister of England two centuries ago, said, when the British people rejoiced because he had kept them out of war, “Today they ring the bells. Tomorrow they will wring their hands!” We can only hope that this prediction will not again come true.
September 12

Since the days when we took over the government the united front around Germany is standing against us. Today we again see plotters, from democrats down to Bolsheviks, fighting against the Nazi State. While we were struggling for power, and particularly in the decisive final struggle, they formed a united bloc against us.

We are being insulted today, but we thank God that we are in a position to prevent any attempt at plundering Germany or doing her violence. The State that existed before us was plundered for fifteen years. But for this it was praised as being a brave and democratic State.

But it becomes unbearable for us at a moment when a great German people, apparently defenseless, is delivered to shameless ill-treatment and exposed to threats. I am speaking of Czechoslovakia. This is a democratic State. It was founded on democratic lines by forcing other nationalities, without asking them, into a structure manufactured at Versailles.

As good democrats they began to oppress and mishandle the majority of the inhabitants. They tried gradually to enforce on the world their view that the Czech State had a special political and military mission to perform in the world. Former French Air Minister Cot has only recently explained this to us. According to his opinion, the task of Czechoslovakia is to perform a special political and military mission in the world.
Czechoslovakia is in case of war to bombard German towns and industrial works.

This mission, however, is in direct contrast to the vital interests, to the wishes and to the conception of life of a majority of the inhabitants of this State. But the majority of the inhabitants had to be quiet, as any protest against their treatment was regarded as an attack on the aims of this State and therefore in conflict with the Constitution. This Constitution, as it was made by democrats, was not rooted in the people but served only the political aims of those who oppressed the majority of the inhabitants. In view of these political aims, it had been found necessary to construct this Constitution in a manner giving the Czechs a predominant position in the State.

He who opposes such encroachment is an enemy of the State and, according to democratic conceptions of the State, an outlaw. The so-called nation of the Czechs has thus been selected by Providence, which in this case made use of those who once designed Versailles, to see that no one rose against this purpose of the State.

Should, however, some one belonging to the majority of the oppressed people of this nation protest against this, the nation may knock him down with force and kill him if it is necessary or desired. If this were a matter foreign to us and one that did not concern us, we would regard this case, as so many others, merely as an interesting illustration of the democratic conception of people’s rights and the right of self-determination and simply take note of it.

But it is something most natural that compels us Germans to take an interest in this problem. Among the majority of nationalities that are being suppressed in this State there are 3,500,000 Germans. That is about as many persons of our race as Denmark has inhabitants.

These Germans, too, are creatures of God. The Almighty did not create them that they should be surrendered by a State construction made at Versailles to a foreign power that is hateful to them, and He has not created 7,000,000
Czechs in order that they should supervise 3,500,000 Germans or act as guardians for them and still less to do them violence and torture.

The conditions in this nation are unbearable, as is generally known. Politically more than 3,500,000 people were robbed in the name of the right of self-determination of a certain Mr. Wilson of their self-determination and of their right to self-determination. Economically these people were deliberately ruined and afterward handed over to a slow process of extermination.

These truths cannot be abolished by phrases. They are testified to by deeds. The misery of the Sudeten Germans is without end. They want to annihilate them. They are being oppressed in an inhuman and intolerable manner and treated in an undignified way. When 3,500,000 who belong to a people of almost 80,000,000 are not allowed to sing any song that the Czechs do not like because it does not please the Czechs or are brutally struck for wearing white stockings because the Czechs do not like it, and do not want to see them, and are terrorized or maltreated because they greet with a form of salutation that is not agreeable to them, although they are greeting not Czechs but one another, and when they are pursued like wild beasts for every expression of their national life [cheers]. This may be a matter of indifference to several representatives of our democracies or they may possibly even be sympathetic because it concerns only 3,500,000 Germans. I can only say to representatives of the democracies that this is not a matter of indifference to us [Cheers].

And I say that if these tortured creatures cannot obtain rights and assistance by themselves, they can obtain both from us. An end must be made of depriving these people of their rights. I have already said this quite clearly in my speech of Feb. 22.

It was a short-sighted piece of work when the statesmen at Versailles brought the abnormal structure of Czechoslovakia into being. It was possible to violate the demands of
millions of another nationality only so long as the brother nation itself was suffering from the consequences of general maltreatment by the world.

To believe that such a regime could go on sinning without hindrance forever was possible only through a scarcely credible degree of blindness. I declared in my speech of Feb. 22 before the Reichstag that the Reich would not tolerate any further continued oppression of 3,500,000 Germans, and I hope that the foreign statesmen will be convinced that these were no mere words.

The National Socialist State has consented to very great sacrifices indeed, very great national sacrifices for the sake of European peace; not only has it not cherished so-called thoughts of revenge, but on the contrary it has banished them from all its public and private life.

In the course of the seventeenth century France took Alsace and Lorraine from the old German Reich in the midst of peace. In 1870 to 1871, after a hard war that had been forced upon her, Germany demanded these territories back and obtained them. After the World War they were lost again. The minster of Strasbourg meant a great deal to us Germans. When we decided finally to renounce it, it was for the purpose of serving the cause of European peace in the future.

Nobody could have forced us to give up these ideas of revenge of our own accord if we had not wanted to do so. We have given them up because we wanted once and for all to end this eternal dispute with France. At other frontiers also the Reich ordered that the same determined measures be taken and adopted the same attitude.

National Socialism advanced, truly supported by the spirit of responsibility. We shouldered voluntarily the greatest sacrifices in the form of claims surrendered in order to preserve peace for Europe in the future and, above all, in order to have on our part a way for a reconciliation of nations. We have acted far more than merely from loyalty.
Neither in the press nor in the films nor on the stage was propaganda carried out contrary to these decisions.

Not even in literature was an exception tolerated. In this spirit I myself made an offer for a solution of the questions at issue in order to remove tension in Europe. We ourselves voluntarily restricted our power in an important field in a hope never to have to cross swords again with the nation in question [a reference to the naval agreement with Britain].

This was not done because we could not have built more than 35 per cent of its ships, but it was done in order to make a contribution toward a final lessening of tension, and appeasement in a serious situation. They immediately accepted it and confirmed an agreement that meant for Europe's peace more than all the talk made in Geneva's League of Nations. Germany had definitely become reconciled to a large number of her frontiers. Germany is determined to accept these frontiers as unalterable and definite, and thereby give Europe a feeling of peace.

This self-restriction of Germany is obviously interpreted by many people as a sign of Germany's weakness. I wish to put this view right today. I think it would hardly serve European peace if I left any doubt about the following: Acceptance of these frontiers does not mean that Germany is disinterested in all European problems and particularly that she is indifferent to what is happening to 3,500,000 Germans and that she does not feel with them in their plight.

We quite understand that the French and British defend their interests in the whole world. I may assure the statesmen in Paris and London that there are also German interests that we are determined to defend in all circumstances.

May I remind you of my speech to the Reichstag in 1933, when for the first time I stated before the world that there may be national questions that I would take it upon me to fulfill in spite of all distress and danger that may be
connected with them. No European nation has done more for peace than Germany. No nation has made greater sacrifices.

But it must be realized that these sacrifices also have their limits and that the National Socialist State must not be confused with the Germany of Bethmann-Hollweg and Hertling. [Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg was German Chancellor during the World War up to July, 1917, and Count Georg von Hertling was a successor.]

If I make this statement here, it is done especially because in the course of this year an event took place that forced us all to subject our attitude to certain correction. In this year, as you know, after endless postponement of any kind of plebiscite had occurred, local elections, at any rate, were to take place in Czechoslovakia.

Even in Prague people were convinced of the untenable nature of the Czech situation. They were afraid of Germans joining up with other nationalities. They thought that at last measures must be taken to influence the result of the election by bringing pressure on the conduct of the elections.

The Czech Government discovered the idea that the only effective thing to do was brutal browbeating. To give effect to this they decided to make a demonstration to the Sudeten Germans of the forces of the Czechoslovak State. Above all, the brute force of the Czechs' power must be displayed to warn them against representing their national interests and to make them vote accordingly. In order to make this demonstration plausible before the election, Dr. Beneš [Czech President] and the Czech Government invented the lie that Germany had mobilized troops and was about to invade Czechoslovakia.

I have the following statement to make on this subject today: There is nothing new about making such lying statements. Last year the press of other countries published the false news that 20,000 German soldiers had landed in Morocco. The Jewish fabricators of these press lies hoped to
bring about war by this means. A statement to the French Ambassador sufficed to put an end to this lie. Also the Ambassador of another great power was immediately informed that there was not a word of truth in this Czech statement. This statement was repeated a second time and immediately brought to the notice of the Prague Government. But the Prague Government needed this lie as a pretext for their own monstrous work and terrorist oppression in influencing the elections.

I can assure you in addition that, first, at that time not a single German soldier more was called up and, second, not a regiment marched to the frontier. At this time there was not one soldier who was not in his peacetime garrison. On the contrary, an order was given that anything that might appear like pressure on the Czechs on our side was to be avoided. Despite this, this base campaign took place in which the whole Europe was mobilized with the object of holding elections under military pressure, browbeating citizens and thus depriving them of their right to vote.

For this purpose moral justification was needed so that no one should shrink from the unscrupulousness of plunging a great State and Europe into a great war. As Germany had no such intention, and, indeed on the contrary, was convinced that local elections would confirm the rights of the Sudeten Germans, nothing was done by the Reich Government.

That, however, was made the occasion for saying, after nothing had happened, that Germany had drawn back in consequence of the agitation of the Czechs and the intervention of Great Britain and France.

You all understand that a great power cannot suddenly submit a second time to such a base attack. In consequence I took the necessary precautions. I am a National Socialist and as such I am parrying every attack. I know exactly that by yielding to such an irreconcilable enemy as Czechoslovakia that this enemy could never be reconciled but only incited to a still higher opinion of itself.
The old German Reich is a warning for us. In its love for peace it went as far as self-sacrifice without thereby being able to prevent war. Conscious of this, I took very serious measures on May 28.

First, the strengthening of the army and air force was, on my order, considerably increased forthwith and immediately carried out.

Second, I ordered an immediate extension of our fortifications in the West.

I may assure you that since May 28 the most gigantic fortifications that ever existed are under construction there. With the same aim in view, I have entrusted the Inspector General of German Road Constructions, Dr. Todt, with a new task. He has accomplished one of the greatest works of organization of all time. On the construction of the defenses in the West there are now 278,000 workmen in Dr. Todt's army. In addition, there are, further, 84,000 workmen and 100,000 men of the labor service as well as numerous engineer and infantry battalions.

The German railways are taking to these districts daily 8,000 cars of material apart from the materials transported by motor vehicles.

The daily consumption of gravel is more than 100,000 tons. Before the beginning of Winter Germany's fortifications in the West will be finished. Their power of defense is already in existence to its full extent. After completion it will comprise 17,000 armored and concrete fortifications. Behind this front of steel and concrete, which is laid out in three and partly in four lines, of a total depth up to fifty kilometers, there stands a German people in arms.

These most gigantic efforts of all time have been made at my request in the interest of peace. In no circumstances shall I be willing any more to regard with endless tranquility a continuation of the oppression of German compatriots in Czechoslovakia.

Herr Benes indulges in tactics and speeches. He is trying to organize negotiations to clear up questions of pro-
procedure on the lines of Geneva and to make small concessions. This cannot go on forever. This is not a matter of phrases; it is of right—that is, of violated right.

What the Germans demand is the right of self-determination, which every other nation also possesses. It is not up to Herr Benes to give the Sudeten Germans gifts. They have the right to claim a life of their own just as much as any other people.

If the democracies, however, should be convinced that they must in this case protect with all their means the oppressors of Germans, then this will have grave consequences. I believe I am serving peace the more if I do not leave any doubts about this. I did not raise the claim that Germany may oppress 3,500,000 French or then that 3,500,000 English shall be surrendered to Germany for oppression. But I demand that the oppression of 3,500,000 Germans in Czechoslovakia shall cease and be replaced by the free right of self-determination.

We would regret it if thereby our relations with other European nations should suffer harm. However, we are not to be blamed. Moreover, it is up to the Czechoslovak Government to discuss matters with the authorized representatives of the Sudeten Germans and bring about an understanding in this or that way.

My business and the business of us all, however, my comrades, is to see today that right does not become injustice in this case, for German comrades are concerned. Moreover, I am not willing to allow a second Palestine to be created here in the heart of Germany by actions of other statesmen.

The poor Arabs are defenseless and perhaps deserted. The Germans of Czechoslovakia, however, are neither defenseless nor deserted. I believe I must state this especially at this party convention at which for the first time representatives of our German Austrian legion take part. They know best how much pain it causes to be separated from a mother country. They, too, will first understand the mean-
ing of my statements today. They will also agree with me most enthusiastically if I state before the entire nation that we would not deserve to be Germans if we were not willing to adopt such an attitude and bear the consequences in this or that way arising from it.

If we remember the exacting demands that in past years even small nations believed they could address to Germany, the only explanation that we can find is that there is scant willingness to see the German Reich as a State that is more than a temporary upstart.

Standing in Rome in the Spring of this year I realized how the history of mankind is viewed and judged in intervals that are too short and therefore inadequate. The history of a millennium comprised only a few successions of generations. What becomes exhausted in the present can rise up again in the same time. The Italy and Germany of today are proof of this. They are rejuvenated nations that one may describe as new in this sense.

But this youth does not rest on new soil, but on old historic soil. The Roman Empire begins to breathe again; however, though historically and infinitely younger, it is likewise no new creation in its national new form.

I had the insignia of the old Reich brought to Nuremberg in order to induce not only my own nation but also the whole world to consider that more than a thousand years before the discovery of a new world a mighty Germanic Deutsches Reich existed. Dynasties came and disappeared. Outer forms have changed. The people today have been rejuvenated, but substantially they always remained the same. The German Reich has slumbered a long time and the German people have now awakened and taken their thousand-year-old crown to themselves.

For us, the whole historical witnesses of this revival, there is proud joy and a humble sense of gratitude to the Almighty. For the rest of the world it should equally be a suggestion and a lesson that they should study history again
from a higher vantage point and a lesson not to fall into their old mistakes again.

The new Italian Roman Empire and the German Empire are in all truth very old creations. People do not need to love them, but no power in the world can any more remove them.

Comrades and National Socialists, in this hour the first party day of Greater Germany comes to a close. We are all filled with powerful historical impressions of these days. Your national pride and your confidence have been strengthened in the face of this demonstration of strength, resolution and determination of our nation.

Go now again into those little districts that you for almost two decades have borne in your hearts as Germans and National Socialists. You have the right to be able to carry your German heads raised once again in pride. We all have a duty never to bow them again to a foreign will. May this be our pledge, so help us God!
A plenary meeting at Eger of the executive committee of the Sudeten German party examined the political situation created by the events of yesterday and today and the subsequent government measures.

The committee points out the fact that since February of this year the Czech Premier has repeatedly declared that the government would take no measures of any importance without previously consulting the Sudeten party. Although our delegation was in Prague yesterday and this morning and was even in constant telephonic communication with different Ministries, the government took far-reaching and disquieting measures without getting into contact with leaders of the Sudeten party.

Reinforcements of gendarmes and military were sent to Sudeten districts and martial law was proclaimed by radio.

After consultation with Herr Henlein [Sudeten German leader], Herr Frank [aide of Herr Henlein] sent the following demand to Premier Hodza:

"A great number of Sudeten Germans have been killed or wounded by orders of the State in the frontier areas. In this state of affairs the leadership of the Sudeten party requests the government to take the following steps:

"First, martial law shall be rescinded immediately.

"Second, the State police shall be withdrawn from all..."
THE SUDETEN ULTIMATUM

districts containing a German majority. The exercise of police duties shall be handed over to Mayors, who are also to be responsible for the establishment of corresponding substitute organizations to maintain peace and order.

"Third, gendarmes and other security organizations shall be limited to their normal number and restricted to their normal posts.

"Fourth, all military formations shall be confined to barracks and be used for military purposes only to avoid bloodshed.

"If within six hours of the delivery of these requests the government has not accepted and published them, particularly by radio, the leadership of the Sudeten German party refuses all responsibility for further disorders."
September 21

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen: We are discussing now the annual report of the Secretary General, of the League's work during the past twelve months. Quite naturally and rightly, however, the speakers so far have dealt not with what the League has done during this year but what it has not done this year or in previous years. Evidently everyone recognizes that the League of Nations was not set up for the activities recorded in the report presented by the Secretary General of the League.

One does not forget that the League was created as a reaction to the World War. Its object was to make that the last war, to safeguard all nations against aggression and to replace the system of military alliances by the collective organizations of assistance to the victims of aggression. In this field the League has done nothing.

Two States, Ethiopia and Austria, have lost their independent existence in consequence of violent aggression. A third State, China, is now a victim of aggression and foreign invasion for the second time in seven years; and a fourth State, Spain, is in the third year of a sanguinary war owing to the armed intervention of two aggressors in its internal affairs. The League of Nations has not carried out its obligations to these States.

By courtesy of the New York Times.
At the present time, a fifth State, Czechoslovakia, is suffering interference in its internal affairs at the hands of a neighboring State and is publicly and loudly menaced with attack. One of the oldest, most cultured, most hard-working of European peoples, which acquired its independence as a State after centuries of oppression, today or tomorrow may decide to take up arms in defense of that independence.

I am sure, ladies and gentlemen, that the sympathies, if not of all governments, at any rate of all the peoples represented in this Assembly, go out to the Czechoslovak people in this, its terrible hour of trial.

We all remember the most active part played by Czechoslovakia and its present President, M. Benes, in the organization of the League of Nations, and all our thoughts are so occupied with the events in Czechoslovakia and around it that we delegates find it difficult to give necessary attention to the Assembly's agenda, in which Czechoslovakia is not mentioned.

There is nothing surprising therefore in the fact that the general discussion has centered on what the League of Nations ought to have done but did not do. Unfortunately, it has not been limited to the recording and explanation of the League's blunders and mistakes, but has included attempts to justify them and even legalize them for the future.

Various arguments have been used, among them the most favored being a reference to the absence of universality. The fallacy of this argument has been pointed out more than once. The League of Nations has never been more universal during the first twelve years of its existence. From the outset it lacked three of the largest powers and a multitude of smaller States. Furthermore, some States left it, others joined it, and after the first case of aggression it never crossed any one's mind, at all events no one expressed such views in the League, that the League could not fulfill its principal functions and therefore that its constitution should be altered, and those functions, the functions of guardianship of peace, be eliminated.
Moreover, no one has yet proved and no one can prove that the League of Nations refused to apply sanctions to the aggressor in this or that case because some countries were absent from its ranks and that this was the reason why sanctions applied in one case were prematurely brought to an end.

Even today the League of Nations is still strong enough by its collective action to avert or arrest aggression. All that is necessary is that the obligatory character of such actions be confirmed and that the machinery of the League of Nations be at least once brought into action in conformity with its Covenant. This would require only the good-will of the States that are members. For there are no objective reasons of such a character as to prevent the normal functioning of the League; at any rate, no such reason as could not be foreseen by the founders of the League and by those States which later joined it. If the complaints of lack of universality be carefully examined they will be found to reveal considerations of quite a different nature.

One may reason this way: When the League was being set up or when it was receiving new adherents, no one seriously anticipated that any State would defy Articles X and XVI and undertake aggression and that there would arise the necessity of applying those articles in practice, thereby disturbing one's own tranquillity as a State and sacrificing one's immediate interest.

But now that aggression has become a reality, it is apparently necessary to eliminate collective methods of combating aggression, in order to avert it from one's self. A fire brigade was set up in the innocent hope that by some lucky chance there would be no fire. Things turned out rather differently. Fires have broken out in defiance of our hopes.

The case presented by the opponents of sanctions will reveal yet another argument. Aggression has raised its head too high. Its forces have been multiplied and are growing daily. The exponents of aggression today are several and fairly powerful. Moreover, they have joined forces in mu-
tual defense, or rather for mutual attack, and they have gone far, principally with the help of printer's ink and the radio.

These facts cannot be contested. The aggressor States have grown immensely during the last three years. They have formed a bloc in order to defend the principle of aggression and will defend and justify one another even when one of them is infringing upon the rights and interests of another. There are cases, too, of joint aggression.

The responsibility, ladies and gentlemen, for these regrettable facts lies with those States who restrained the League from resistance to the aggressors when they were still weak and divided. They have since attempted to break the peace, and, thanks to the impunity with which they have allowed to break one international treaty after another, to the propaganda for aggression and thanks to the policy of concession, negotiation and back-stage intrigue with them, they have since grown strong.

There is no room for bargaining or compromising. They can be restrained from carrying their evil designs into effect if at the least attempt to carry out aggression in practice there will be an appropriate measure of retaliation, according to the capacity of each member of the League for collective action provided by Article XVI.

In order words, the aggressor should be met with the program laid down by the League covenant, resolutely, persistently and without hesitation. Then the aggressor himself will not be led into temptation.

There is, however, another conception, which recommends as the height of human wisdom, under the cover of "pacifism," that the aggressor be treated with consideration and his vanity be not wounded. It recommends conversations and negotiations to be carried on with him, that he be assured that no collective action will ever be taken against him, and, even though he enters into collusion with other aggressors, that compromise agreements be concluded with him and his breaches of former agreements be overlooked
and that his demands, even the most illegal, be fulfilled. And that one State after another be sacrificed to him and that, if possible, no question of his activity be raised at the League of Nations because the aggressor does not like it, he takes offense and sulks.

Unfortunately, this is just the policy that has been pursued toward the aggressor. Three wars have threatened to bring down on us a fourth. Four nations have already been sacrificed and a fifth is next on the list.

In view of such lamentable results of this policy, we have the right to expect that there should be recognition of the mistaken character of this policy and of the necessity of replacing it by some other policy. Instead we hear proposals here to make the old policy permanent.

The aggressor previously reckoned with the possible reaction of the League of Nations. He showed a certain hesitation in preparing his aggressions, carrying them out gradually and in proportion to his growing certainty that there would be no reaction at all. But now we are asked to reassure him beforehand that he need not fear anything under the League and that the League henceforth will not apply to him military or economic or financial sanctions. At the very worst, he is threatened with moral condemnation, and that, in all probability, will be couched in appropriately cultured diplomatic forms.

I have already had occasion in another place to point out that Articles X and XVI, with the latent threat of international sanctions contained in the latter, constitute a powerful potential for peace. It is now suggested that we destroy that potential because, in spite of the paralyzing of the League, in spite of its failure to carry out its obligations in many cases, the aggressor still might fear that the moment would come when the League would nevertheless do its duty. The aggressor nations, therefore, carry on a tireless campaign against Article XVI through their friends inside the League. They need fear no obstacle as far as Geneva is concerned.
If any one should wish to realize the importance to aggressor countries of the proposed nullification of Article XVI, let him study the comments of the press of a certain country on the speeches made in this Assembly on the subject and the praise lavished on the speakers.

Furthermore, we know that certain small countries have been subjected to direct pressure by one aggressive State, which by threats and promises was endeavoring to persuade them to join the movement for the abolition of Article XVI.

I shall probably hear the reply that no one has any designs on Article XVI or even on sanctions, and that all that is proposed is to eliminate their obligatory and automatic character. I hope my colleagues will forgive me if I tell them that such a reply can only be taken seriously by very naïve people.

Is it not obvious that the whole value of Article XVI lies in its obligatory character, that is, in the objective character of sanctions which enable every member of the League to rely on universal aid if he is attacked? But if such aid is to depend on a separate decision in each individual case, if assistance is to be granted to some States and not to others, there can be no question of a feeling of security. Who will agree to make sacrifices and to grant altruistic aid to another State if the latter declares beforehand that it is under no obligation of reciprocity?

Will any one pay premiums to an insurance company if he is not guaranteed the automatic payment of benefits in cases provided for and if that payment depends on the quite arbitrary decision of the management of that company? Yet we are flatly told that every member of the League is to judge for himself whether his participation in the sanctions coincides with his own interests.

But to grant aid to another State in one's own interests requires no League of Nations. It was the practice long before the League existed. Did not twenty-five States combat the Central Powers during the World War because their interests coincided? Did not private alliances serve the same
end of the joint defense of their common interests by groups of States? But we were told the League of Nations was to put an end to the system of private alliances and agreements and to replace them by the principles of collective security based on the common interests of all people in the maintenance of peace.

We are also put off with assurances that the measures proposed will be of a purely temporary character, that in some indeterminate future it will be possible once again to return to the obligatory and automatic character of sanctions. No indication is given of what conditions will be necessary for such a change.

If the reason for the modus operandi now proposed is the absence of universality, why must we think that the League of Nations, completely withered away as to its contents and retaining a mere shell outside, will present any attraction to new members or that those States which remain outside the League on account of the compulsory character of sanctions will enter it in order to restore that compulsory character once it has been abolished?

If, on the other hand, the obligatory application of sanctions is considered impossible because aggression has appeared on the political horizon, what grounds have we for believing that the phenomenon will disappear? If it does disappear there will be no need of sanctions. Is it true that the present masters of world destiny cannot yet rise to the heights of international solidarity, but that in the future they themselves or their successors will reach that elevated level?

We know, however, that those heights were reached by founders and first leaders of the League of Nations, and that the people who have replaced them are trying to bring about a revision of the original intentions of those who founded the League. Here, too, consequently, it is rather a case of retrogression. I fear we must draw the conclusion that it is not a question of a moratorium for the League but of a logical change in its character.
The bitter taste of the remedy we are offered seems to be realized by the doctors themselves, since they propose to dilute it with syrup in the shape of a suggestion that the unanimity rule be abolished in respect of the paragraph of Article XI dealing with what the League must do in the event of war or threat of war. Such a suggestion might have been welcomed if Article XVI were maintained with its list of practical measures which the League can take. Now when we are asked to nullify Article XVI, the aggressor will not be frightened by Article XI, which makes it possible only morally to condemn him.

One of those who spoke here against Article XVI had the courage to tell us that his statement applied equally to Article X. That position seems to me perfectly logical. After all, if we are to renounce collective measures for combating aggressors, Article X, which speaks of the undertaking to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League, is therefore deprived of all practical significance.

Supporters of what amounts to the abolition of Article XVI, in various speeches from this tribunal, assured us of their loyalty and continued devotion to League principles. I may be permitted to ask: If the principles of collective security and joint struggle against attacks on the territorial integrity and political independence of the League members are eliminated from the League, to what other principle is the League pledging its loyalty?

Is it possible for the League to exist just to make decisions regarding the drug traffic, assistance to refugees, establishing an international system of signaling at railroad crossings, or the results of statistical and other researches of various commissions? But what have all these questions, important as they are in themselves, in common with the maintenance of peace; with that main object for which the League was set up?

Could not these be considered by some organization of
more modest and less pretentious title? Is it for these things that the taxpayers of various countries have to spend large sums totaling 30,000,000 Swiss francs a year? Now, if we are to be realists and declare the League of Nations to be ready for dissolution, then there is no need to create new illusions because that will deceive nobody.

Ladies and gentlemen: I am not saying this at all because I am trying to convince those governments and statesmen who have adopted decisions reflected in some of the speeches we have listened to in this assembly. The mistakenness and harmfulness of those decisions for the whole of humanity, and, first and foremost, for those States which have attempted to defend them, will be shown by history.

But at the moment when mines are being laid to blow up the organization in which were fixed the great hopes of our generation and which stamps a definite character on the international relations of our epoch—at the moment when, by no accidental coincidence, decisions are being taken outside the League which recall to us the international transactions of pre-war days which are bound to overturn all present conceptions of international morality and treaty obligations—at the moment when there is being drawn up a further list of sacrifices to the god of aggression and the line is being drawn under the annals of all post-war international history with the sole conclusion that nothing succeeds like aggression—at such a moment, every State must define its moral responsibility before its contemporaries and before history.

That is why I must plainly declare here that the Soviet Government bears no responsibility whatsoever for the events now taking place and for the fatal consequences which may inevitably ensue.

After long doubts and hesitations, the Soviet Union joined the League in order to add the strength of its 170,- 000,000 people to the forces of peace. In the present hour of bitter disillusionment, the Soviet Union is far from regretting this decision, if only because there would undoubtedly
have otherwise been attempts to attribute the alleged impotence and collapse of the League to its absence.

But having entered the League, it has been unfailingly loyal to the League obligations which it undertook and has faithfully performed and will endeavor to continue to carry out all the decisions and recommendations of the League directed to preserving peace and combating aggression, irrespective of whether those decisions coincided with its immediate interests as a State.

That was its attitude during the attack on Ethiopia.

The Soviet nation invariably insisted that the League should do its duty to Spain, and it is not the fault of the Soviet Government that the Spanish problem was withdrawn from the League of Nations and transferred to the so-called London Non-intervention Committee, which has, we all know, considered its object to be to avoid intervening in the intervention of the aggressor countries in Spanish affairs. The activity of the Soviet Government in relation to the Spanish events, both in the London committee and outside it, has been penetrated with the spirit of the League of Nations, its principles, and the established standard of international law.

The same can be said likewise of the Chinese question. The Soviet delegation always insisted that the League of Nations should afford the maximum support to the victim of Japanese aggression, and those modest recommendations which the League of Nations adopted are being fulfilled more than loyally by the Soviet Government.

Such an event as the disappearance of Austria passed unnoticed by the League of Nations. Realizing the significance of this event for the fate of the whole of Europe and particularly Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Government, immediately after the "Anschluss," officially approached the other European great powers with a proposal for an immediate collective deliberation on the possible consequences of that event in order to adopt collective preventive measures.

To our regret, this proposal which, if carried out, could
have saved us from the alarm which all the world now fears for the fate of Czechoslovakia, did not receive its just appreciation.

Bound to Czechoslovakia by a pact of mutual assistance, the Soviet Union abstained from any intervention in the negotiations of the Czechoslovakia Government with the Sudeten Germans, considering this to be the internal business of the Czechoslovak State.

We have refrained from all advice to the Czechoslovak Government, considering it quite inadmissible that it should be asked to make concessions to the Germans, to the detriment of its interests as a State, in order that we should be set free from the necessity of fulfilling our obligations under the treaty bearing our signature. Neither did we offer any advice in the contrary direction.

We value very highly the fact that the Czechoslovak Government up to the last few days did not even inquire of us whether we would fulfill our obligations on the pact, since obviously it had no doubt of this. It had no grounds for doubt. But when, a few days before I left for Geneva, the French Government for the first time inquired of my government as to its attitude in the event of an attack on Czechoslovakia, I gave the French representative in Moscow, in the name of my government, the following perfectly clear and unambiguous reply:

"We intend to fulfill our obligations under the pact, together with France, to afford assistance to Czechoslovakia by the way open to us; our War Department is ready immediately to participate in a conference with representatives of the French and Czechoslovak War Departments in order to discuss measures appropriate to the moment. In an event like this, we shall consider desirable that the question be raised in the League of Nations, if only as yet under Article XI, with the object, first, of mobilizing public opinion, and, secondly, ascertaining the position of certain other States whose passive aid might be extremely valuable."

We said further that it was necessary to exert all means
of avoiding an armed conflict and we considered one such method to be immediate consultation between the great powers of Europe and other interested States, in order, if possible, to decide on the terms for a collective démarche. This is how our reply was framed.

It was only two days ago that the Czechoslovak Government for the first time addressed a formal inquiry to my government, whether the U. S. S. R. is prepared, in accordance with the Soviet-Czech pact, to render to Czechoslovakia immediate and effective aid if France remains loyal to her obligation and renders similar assistance, and to this inquiry my government gave a clear answer in the affirmative. I believe it will be admitted by you ladies and gentlemen that that was both the reply of a loyal signatory to an international agreement and of a faithful servant of the League.

It is not our fault if no effect was given to our proposal, which I am convinced could have produced the desired results. It was in the interest of Czechoslovakia and the interests of all Europe and general peace.

Unfortunately, other steps were taken which have led, and which could not but lead, to such a capitulation as is bound sooner or later to have quite incalculable and disastrous consequences. To avoid a problematic war today and make certain one of tomorrow is the price which the insatiable aggressors ask.

To allow the destruction or mutilation of several States is certainly not to act in accordance with the Covenant of the League of Nations. To grant bonuses for saber-rattling and resort to arms for the solution of national problems, in other words, to reward and encourage aggressive superimperialism, is not to act in the spirit of the Briand-Kellogg Pact.

Ladies and gentlemen, the Soviet Government takes pride in the fact that it has not acceded to such a policy and has invariably pursued the principles set forth by the League of Nations, which were approved by almost every nation in the world; nor has it any intention of abandoning
them for the future, being convinced that in the present conditions it is impossible otherwise to safeguard a genuine peace and genuine international justice. It calls upon other governments likewise to return to this policy.
September 25

Reports increasing in number from hour to hour regarding incidents in the Sudetenland show that the situation has become completely intolerable for the Sudeten German people and, in consequence, dangerous to the peace of Europe.

It is, therefore, essential that the separation of the Sudetenland, agreed to by Czechoslovakia, should be effected without any further delay.

On the attached map the Sudeten German area which is to be ceded is shaded in red. Areas in which a plebiscite also is to be held, over and above the areas to be occupied, are drawn in and shaded in green.

Final delimitation of the frontier must correspond to the wishes of those concerned. In order to determine these wishes a certain period is necessary for the preparation of a plebiscite during which disturbances must in all circumstances be prevented.

A situation of parity must be created. The area designated on the attached map as German is to be occupied by German troops without taking into account whether in a plebiscite it may prove to be in this or that part of an area with a Czech majority.

On the other hand, Czech territory is to be occupied by Czech troops without taking into account whether in this

With a view to bringing about an immediate and final

By courtesy of the New York Times.
area there lie large German language islands in which in a plebiscite a majority will without doubt give expression to its German national feeling.

solution of the Sudeten German problem the following proposals are submitted by the German Government:

I
Withdrawal of the whole Czech armed forces, police, gendarmerie, customs officials and frontier guards from the area to be evacuated as designated on the attached map, this area to be handed over to Germany on Oct. 1.

II
Evacuated territory is to be handed over in its present condition (see further details in Appendix). The German Government agrees that plenipotentiary representatives of the Czech Government and of the Czech Army should be attached to headquarters of the German military forces to deal with details of modalities (methods of making effective) of the evacuation.

III
The Czech Government to discharge at once all Sudeten Germans serving in the military forces or police anywhere in Czech State territory and permit them to return home.

IV
The Czech Government to liberate all political prisoners of the German race.

V
The German Government agrees to permit a plebiscite to take place in those areas — to be more definitely defined — before Nov. 25 at the latest.

The plebiscite itself will be carried out under control of an international commission. All persons who resided in the areas in question on Oct. 28, 1918, or who were born in those parts prior to this date will be eligible to vote.

A simple majority of all eligible male and female voters will determine the desire of the population to belong either to the German Reich or the Czech State.
During the plebiscite both parties will withdraw their military forces out of the area to be defined more precisely. The date and duration will be settled mutually by the German and Czech Governments.

VI

The German Government proposes that an authoritative German-Czech commission should be set up to settle all further details.

APPENDIX

The evacuated Sudeten German area is to be handed over without destroying or rendering unusable in any way the military, economic or traffic establishment (plants). These include ground organization of air service and all wireless stations.

All economic and traffic materials especially rolling stock of the railway system in the designated areas are to be handed over undamaged. The same applies to all utility services (gas works, power stations, etc.).

Finally, no foodstuffs, goods, cattle, raw materials, etc., are to be moved.
ADOLF HITLER'S SPEECH IN BERLIN

September 26

On February 22 I made before the Reichstag deputies a fundamental demand concerning which there could be no bargaining.

The nation heard it and understood what I meant.

One statesman (meaning former Chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg, of the then independent Austria) failed to understand — he has been removed, and my promise of that time has been fulfilled.

[Herr Hitler said he spoke February 22, but apparently meant February 20. On that date, he called for return of German minorities in two other countries adjoining Germany and colonies lost in the World War. Of Austria, which he was to take over March 13, he said merely that an “appeasement” with her had been achieved.]

For the second time, I spoke on this same demand before the Reich’s party convention in Nuremberg and again the nation heard.

Today I once more stand before you speaking to the people itself as in the days of our struggles and you know what that means.

Today there must remain no vestige of doubt in the world — today it is not a Fuehrer or a man who speaks, but the whole German people.

And if I am now spokesman of this German people,

By courtesy of the New York Times.
I know at this hour that all the listening millions of this people are at one, that they endorse these words and make them their own testimony.

Let other statesmen search themselves and see if it is the same with them.

The question that has been agitating us most deeply for the past months and weeks is well known to them.

Its name is not so much Czechoslovakia; its name is rather Herr Benes (Edouard Benes, President of Czechoslovakia).

This name unites all that is agitating millions today, what either drives them to despair or fills them with fanatic determination.

How came this question to reach such importance?

I will here briefly repeat, as I have done before, the essence and purposes of Germany's foreign policy.

German foreign policy, as distinct from (that of) many democratic States, is fixed in our philosophy of life.

This philosophy of our people of the new Third Reich is based on the maintenance and safeguarding of the existence of our German people.

We are not interested in oppressing other peoples.

We do not wish at all to have other nationalities among us. We want to live after our own patterns and let others live after theirs.

This, in a manner, is our philosophy — I may well say a racially bound conception leads to limitation of our foreign policy; that is, our foreign political aims are not limitless or random ones nor are they aims determined by occasional happenings.

They are laid down by determination to serve the German people alone, to maintain it in this world and to preserve its existence.

What is the situation today?

You know that at one time the German people, too, were imbued, under the slogan "Self-determination of Peoples," with belief in super-national assistance and that it
thereby renounced utilizing its own strength to the very end.

You know that this weak German trust of those days was shamefully betrayed.

You know the result was the Versailles treaty, and you all remember what frightful consequences this treaty had. You remember how our people were robbed of their weapons and how the unarmed people were later mistreated. You know the terrible fate that befell us, that persecuted us for a decade and a half.

And you know, too, that if Germany today has despite all become once more great, free, strong, it owes all to its own strength. Others contributed nothing to it. They tried as long as possible to blackmail and oppress us.

Out of our own people grew this power to end this humiliating situation and to show the people a way to go, worthy of a free, great people.

Although we have become today free and strong through our own power, we nourish no ill feeling against other nations.

We know that peoples cannot be made responsible for what an unprincipled clique of international profiteers and jobbers is to blame for.

These profiteers do not recoil from pressing entire nations into the service of their mean interests.

We bear no hatred in us against the surrounding world and we have proved it. German love for peace has been proved by these facts:

First, we had hardly begun restoration of German equality when I proposed to the entire world, as a visible sign of renunciation of any so-called revenge, quite a number of agreements. They were in the line of limitation of armaments.

My first proposal: Germany demands equality under all circumstances, yet it is willing generally to renounce arma-
ments and weapons, if necessary to the last machine-gun, and disarm completely if other nations do the same.

This was not even taken as an occasion for discussion.

Then came the second proposal: Germany is willing to limit her army, like other States, to 200,000 men with the same arms as the others. This, too, was rejected.

Germany—another proposal—is ready if others do likewise to renounce heavy armament, the so-called aggressive weapons, namely, tanks, bombers, heavy and super-heavy artillery.

It was rejected.

I now proposed an international regulation with a 300,000-man army, the same to apply to all European countries.

Again this was rejected.

I then offered further suggestions: At least, the elimination of air fleets, elimination of bombing, absolute outlawing of poison gas in war, the safeguarding of the homeland and of lands not lying in the line of attack, the elimination at least of the heaviest artillery and elimination of the heaviest tanks.

That, too, was declined. It was all in vain.

After I had thus for two years made offer after offer and received nothing but rejection after rejection, I now issued a command to put the German defense force in the best position that could possibly be achieved by us. I can now admit that openly.

We have now, to be sure, completed a rearmament the like of which the world has not seen.

First, I offered disarmament as long as that was possible.

After it was rejected I certainly made no more halfway decisions. In that I am a National Socialist and an old front fighter.

If they do not want an unarmed world, then, German people, bear arms that are stronger than others.
I have armed up these five years. I have spent billions on arms. The German people know it.

I have said: Let a new army be raised with the most modern arms possible. I have asked my friend (Field Marshal Hermann) Goering to provide me with an air force that will protect the German people against all attack.

So we have built up a defense force that the German people today may be proud of and which the world will respect whenever it makes its appearance.

We have created the best anti-aircraft equipment and the best anti-tank equipment that there is in the whole world.

Work has gone on day and night on them these five years.

On one single point I have succeeded in coming to an understanding, to which I shall refer later.

[This was taken to be in reference to the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1936 by which Germany agreed to limit its navy to 35 per cent of Great Britain’s.]

Nevertheless, I have carried on, politically, my erstwhile thoughts of armaments limitation or a disarmament policy.

In those years I have really conducted a practical peace policy.

I have attacked all seemingly impossible problems with a firm will to solve them peaceably if at all feasible even at the risk of more or less important German sacrifices.

I am a front soldier myself and I know how terrible war is.

I wanted to spare the German nation this experience and therefore I took up problem after problem with a firm resolve to attempt everything to make an amicable solution possible.

The hardest problem I found, my fellow citizens, was Polish-German relations. We faced the danger here of steering ourselves into, let us say, fanatical hysteria. The danger existed that in this case a conception like inherited enmity
would gain possession of our peoples as well as the Polish people.

This I wanted to forestall. I know perfectly well that I would not have succeeded alone if at that time there had been a democracy of western construction in Poland.

For these democracies running over with peace phrases are the most bloodthirsty war instigators.

There was no democracy in Poland but there was a man. With him we succeeded in less than a year in arriving at an agreement which for the duration of ten years basically removes the danger of any clash.

We all are determined, and also convinced, that this agreement will bring about lasting and continuous pacification, because problems in eight years are no different from those today.

We do not have to expect anything from each other. We recognize this. We are two peoples. They shall live. One cannot annihilate the other. I recognize this and we must see it: A State of 33,000,000 people will always strive for an outlet to the sea.

Here the road to understanding had to be found, and it was found. And it is being widened and expanded. Of course, down there realities are often grim. Nationalities and little racial groups often fight with each other.

But the decisive thing is: The two administrations and all sensible and reasonable people in both countries have a firm will and a firm resolve continually to improve relations.

That was a great deed of mine, and a real act of peace which weighs more than all the jabbering in the Geneva League of Nations palace.

Now I have tried during this time also gradually to bring about good and enduring relations with other nations.

We have given guarantees for the States in the West. We have guaranteed to all contiguous neighbors the inviolability of their territory so far as Germany is concerned.

That is not a phrase — that is our sacred will.
We are not interested in breaking peace. We do not want anything from these peoples. It is a fact that these our offers were meeting with increasing acceptance and also growing understanding.

Slowly, more and more nations are departing from the idiotic delusion of Geneva; I should like to say, departing not from collective peace obligations but from collective war obligations.

They are withdrawing from them and they begin to see problems soberly and are ready for understanding and peace.

I have gone farther.

I extended a hand to England. I renounced voluntarily ever again joining any naval conference so as to give the British Empire a feeling of security, not because I could not build more — and there should be no illusion about that — but exclusively for this reason: to safeguard permanent peace between both nations.

[This was the reference to the Anglo-German naval pact promised earlier in Hitler's speech.]

To be sure, there is here one pre-condition — it cannot be admitted that one party should say: I do not want to fight you any more and therefore I offer to cut my armaments down to 35 per cent, and that the other party should say from time to time: We will fight again when it suits us.

That won’t do. Such an agreement is morally justified only when both peoples shake hands on an honest promise never to wage war upon each other again.

Germany has this will. We all hope that among the English people those will prevail who are of the same mind. I have gone further. Immediately after the Saar had been returned to the Reich by plebiscite, I told France there were no more differences between France and us.

I said: Alsace-Lorraine does not exist any more for us.

These people really have not been asked their opinion in the last few decades. We believe that the inhabitants of
those parts are happiest when they are not being fought over.

And we all do not want any more war with France. We want nothing of France, absolutely nothing.

And when the Saar territory was returned to the Reich, thanks to — I will say so right here — thanks to France’s loyal execution of the treaties, I immediately gave this frank assurance: Now all the territorial differences between France and Germany are settled.

I no longer see any differences at all. There are two nations. They can live best if they work together.

After this renunciation, irrevocable once and forever, I turned to another problem, solvable more easily than others because a mutual philosophic basis served as a prerequisite for an easier mutual understanding: Germany’s relations to Italy.

Certainly the solution of this problem is my work only partially. The other part is due to the rare great man (Premier Mussolini) whom the Italian people is fortunate to possess as its leader.

This relation has long left a sphere of clear economic and political expediency and over treaties and alliances has turned into a real strong union of hearts.

Here an axis was formed represented by two peoples, both of whom in their philosophical and political ideas found themselves in close indissoluble friendship.

Here, too, I cut the cloth finally and definitely, convinced of my responsibility toward my countrymen.

I have relieved the world of a problem that from now on no longer exists for us.

Bitter as it may be for a few, in the last analysis the interest of the German nation stands above all.

This interest, however, is: To be able to work in peace.

This whole activity, my fellow-citizens, is not a phrase that cannot be proved, but instead this activity is demonstrated by facts which no political liar can remove.

Two problems remained.
Here I had to make a reservation.

Ten million Germans found themselves outside the Reich's confines in two large contiguous regions — Germans who desired to come back into their homeland. This number of 10,000,000 is not a trifle. It is a question of one-fourth of the number of inhabitants France has.

And if France during forty years did not renounce its claim to a few million French in Alsace-Lorraine, certainly we have a right before God and man to keep up our claim to these 10,000,000 Germans.

Somewhere, my fellow countrymen, there is a limit — a limit where yielding must cease, because it would otherwise become a harmful weakness and I would have no right to maintain a place in German history if I were simply to renounce 10,000,000 without caring about them. I would then have no moral right to be Fuehrer of the German people.

I have taken upon myself sufficient sacrifices in the way of renunciations. Here was a limit beyond which I could not go. How right this was has been proven, first by the plebiscite in Austria; in fact, by the entire history of the reunion of Austria with the Reich. A glowing confession of faith was pronounced at that time — a confession such as others certainly had not hoped for.

A flaming testimony was given at that time, a declaration such as others surely had not hoped would be given.

It was then we saw that for democracies a plebiscite becomes superfluous or even obnoxious as soon as it does not produce results democracies hoped for.

Nevertheless this problem was solved to the happiness of the great German people, and now we confront the last problem that must and shall be solved.

This is the last territorial demand I have to make in Europe, but it is a demand on which I will not yield.

Its history is as follows: In 1918 Central Europe was torn up and reshaped by some foolish or crazy so-called statesmen under the slogan "self-determination and the right of nations."
Without regard to history, origin of peoples, their national wishes, their economic necessities, they smashed up Europe and arbitrarily set up new States.

To this, Czechoslovakia owed its existence.

This Czech State began with one big lie and its father's name was Benes. [Cries of hang him.]

This Herr Benes at that time turned up at Versailles and told them that there was the Czechoslovak nation. [Loud laughter.]

He had to invent this lie to bolster up an insignificant number of his own nationals so as to make them seem more important.

And Anglo-Saxon statesmen who are not so good at geographical and national questions did not think it necessary to put Herr Benes's assertions to a test or else they would have disclosed pretty quick that there is no Czechoslovak nation, but that there are Czechs and Slovaks and that the Slovaks prefer to have nothing to do with the Czechs.

At last the Czechs through Herr Benes annexed Slovakia. As this State did not seem to be able to live on, it simply took 3,500,000 Germans against their right of self-determination and their will to self-determination.

Yet this did not suffice. Hence, 1,000,000 Magyars had to be added, then the Carpatho-Russians and at last several hundred thousand Poles.

Thus this State was created which later called itself Czechoslovakia in contradiction to the right of the self-determination of nations and in contradiction to the clear wish and will of the raped nations.

As I here talk to you now I feel sympathy for the fate of all these oppressed, I feel for the fate of Hungarians, Slovaks, Poles, Ukranians—naturally I am speaking only for the fate of my Germans.

When Herr Benes lied his State together at that time he solemnly promised to divide the State into cantons ac-
ccording to the Swiss system because there were some among the democratic statesmen who had qualms of conscience.

We all know how Herr Benes solved cantonization. Now he began his system of terror. Then when Germans attempted to protest against this arbitrariness and rape they were blown to bits and a war of annihilation has raged ever since.

In those years of Czechoslovakia's peaceful progress nearly 600,000 Germans had to leave Czechoslovakia for a very simple reason— they would have perished of hunger had they remained.

The whole picture from 1918 to 1938 showed one thing quite clearly: That Herr Benes was resolved simply to root out Germandom slowly and gradually and in this he succeeded up to a certain point.

He has plunged countless people into deepest misery.
He has managed to keep millions of people in fear and trembling and with continuous application of terror he succeeded slowly in gagging those millions.

It was then that the true reasons for existence of this State, seen from an international viewpoint, were revealed.
It was no longer a secret that this State was destined to be used as a German baiter when the opportunity offered.

The French Air Minister Pierre Cot a few weeks ago said blandly "we need this State because from its territory German economic and industrial life can be most easily destroyed."

So this State was used by bolshevism as its point of entry.
It was not we who sought a contact with bolshevism, but bolshevism used this State to dig a channel into Central Europe.

And now comes this scandalous situation: This State, which is ruled by a minority only, forces its nationalities to a policy that one day makes them shoot their own brothers.

Herr Benes rises and demands from Sudeten Germans: If I conduct war against Germany you must shoot Germans.
If you do not want to you are traitors and I will have you shot.

And he demands the same from Hungarians, Poles and Slovaks, that they defend aims that are indifferent to the Slovak people.

The Slovak people want peace and no adventures.

Herr Benes, however, dares to stamp all these human beings either as traitors to the people or traitors to the nation. Either they betray their people and are ready to shoot, or Herr Benes says: You are traitors to the nation and therefore will be shot.

This is the greatest impudence thinkable—to force alien people under certain conditions to shoot their own fellow-citizens because the bad, rotten, criminal State regime wants it.

I can assure you right here: When we occupied Austria my first order was: No Czech needs or may serve in the German army.

I never want to cause him qualms of conscience. I do not want him to do it, he shall never do it.

Who, however, opposes Herr Benes’s total aims is being persecuted, terror breaks over him, he can be sure of jail and he will simply be killed economically.

Democratic world apostles cannot remove this from the world. The results have been dreadful in this State of Herr Benes. Here again I speak for Germans.

Mortality is greatest there among all German tribes. Their death of children is the greatest, unemployment is the most terrible there.

Suicides are more frequent. It is only a question of how long this is to endure.

For twenty years Germans in Czechoslovakia and German people in the Reich looked on. Perhaps they had to look on, not because they were ever willing to take it but because they were defenseless and could not help themselves from their tormentors and the world—these world democracies.
Yes, when anywhere a traitor is locked in or if a man, if you please, who has been inciting against his race from the pulpit is merely taken into custody, then there is excitement in England and indignation in America.

But when hundreds of thousands of humans are driven out, when tens of thousands are delivered into jails, when thousands are massacred — then these fine democracies are not moved in the least.

We have learned in these years thoroughly to despise them.

During all this time and even today — this I must state — we find but one State, one great power in Europe and at its head, above all, one man who has a full understanding for this ardent need of our people.

This is my great friend, Benito Mussolini.

We shall never forget what we did during this time and what attitude the Italian people took.

If a similar hour of need should come to Italy, I will go before the German people and urge it to take a similar stand. Then there will not be two States defending themselves, but one solid bloc.

I said in the Reichstag on Feb. 22 (Feb. 20) that this [meaning the Czechoslovak situation] must be changed. Only Herr Benes changed it differently. He started a more radical system of oppression, greater terror, a period of dissolutions, bans, confiscations, etc.

This went on until May 21, and you cannot deny, my friends, that it was truly endless German patience that we practised.

This May 21 was unbearable enough. I have told the story of this month already at the Reich's party convention. There at last were to be elections in Czechoslovakia. They could no longer be postponed.

So Herr Benes thinks out a way to intimidate Germans there — military occupation of those sections. [Shouts of bloodhound.]
He still keeps up this military occupation in the expectation that so long as his hirelings are there nobody will dare raise a hand against him.

It was an impudent lie that Germany had mobilized. That had to be used in order to cloak the Czech mobilization, excuse it and explain it.

What happened then, you know. The infamous international world set at Germany. Germany had not called upon one man. It never thought of solving this problem militarily.

I still had hopes that the Czechs would recognize at the last minute that this tyrannic regime could not keep up.

But Herr Benes believed Germany was fair game. Of course, he thought he was covered by France and England and nothing could possibly happen to him.

And if everything failed there still was Soviet Russia to fall back on.

Thus the answer of that man was: No, more than ever, shoot down, arrest and incarcerate all those whom he did not like for some reason. Then, finally, my demands came from Nuremberg.

The demands now were quite clear. Now, for the first time, I said, that at last nearly twenty years after Mr. Wilson's right of self-determination for the 3,500,000 must be enforced and we shall not just look on any longer.

And again Herr Benes replied: New victims, new incarcerations, new arrests. The German element gradually began to flee.

Then came England. I informed Mr. Chamberlain unequivocally of what we regard as the only possibility of solution.

It is the most natural solution possible.

I know that all these nationalities no longer want to remain with this Herr Benes.

In the first place, however, I speak of Germans. For these Germans I have now spoken and now given assurances that I am no longer willing to look on quietly and passively
ADOLF HITLER'S SPEECH IN BERLIN

as this lunatic believes he can simply mishandle 3,500,000 human beings.

I left no doubt that German patience at last was exhausted. I left no doubt it was the way of our German mentality to take things long and patiently, that, however, the moment comes once when this must be ended.

And now, in fact, England and France agreed to dispatch the only possible demand to Czechoslovakia, namely to free the German region and cede it to the Reich.

We have full knowledge today of the conversations which Herr Benes then conducted.

He reached the decision in view of England's and France's threat no longer to sponsor Czechoslovakia unless the fate of the peoples therein were shaped differently and the regions liberated.

In the face of these declarations Herr Benes found a way out.

He admitted that yes, these sections must be lopped off. That is what he declared.

And what did he do? He did not lop off the territory—he drove out the Germans. Now that is something where the game is up.

Hardly had Herr Benes said this when his military subjugation began anew and in sharper measure.

And now look at the figures: 10,000 one day, the next day 20,000, the next day 37,000, two days later 42,000, then 78,000, then it is 90,000, 137,000 and today 214,000. Whole stretches of land are depopulated. Villages are burned to the ground. An attempt is made to smoke Germans there out with grenades and gas.

But Herr Benes sits in Prague and is convinced "nothing can happen to me. Behind me stand England and France."

And now, my fellow-countrymen, I believe the moment has come for talking business.

When anybody suffers such disgrace and such humilia-
tion for twenty long years, there certainly can be no doubt about his being peace-loving.

If any one develops patience such as we developed, it certainly cannot be claimed that we lust for war.

And finally: Herr Benes has 7,000,000 behind him while here stands a people of 75,000,000.

I now have addressed a memorandum to the British Government with a last and final German proposal.

This proposal is nothing else but the realization of what Herr Benes already has promised.

The content of the proposal is very simple: Territory that is nationally German and wants to join Germany is to go to Germany.

Not when Herr Benes has succeeded in driving out one or two million Germans, but right now, instantly.

I have selected a frontier that is fair to Czechoslovakia on the basis of material compiled some decades past on ethnographic and language divisions.

I am a more just man than Herr Benes and I do not want to use the power I possess.

I have therefore adopted this rule: this and this territory comes under German sovereignty because it is essentially inhabited by Germans.

The final boundaries, however, I leave to a vote of the people there, meaning a local vote will be taken.

And so that no one can say that this would not be fair enough, I have decided to adopt the Saar plebiscite statute as a basis for this vote.

I was and am willing to have a plebiscite in the whole Czechoslovak territory.

But Herr Benes objects to this and so do his friends, that this is to be only in certain sections.

Very well, I have yielded there. I said, "Mr. Chamberlain, if you insist on the principle that it is to be only in certain disputed sections — all right with me."
And so that no one can say this plebiscite would not be fair enough, I was ready to give a vote supervised by an international control commission.

Then I want farther. I was ready now to leave defining of the new borders to German and Czech commissions.

Mr. Chamberlain asked whether this could not be an international commission. I even agreed to this.

All right; an international commission should do it.

Furthermore, I was ready even to withdraw troops during the plebiscite and today gave consent to invite the British Legion which offered during this time to go into this region to maintain peace and order.

And then I was ready for such an international commission to draw a definite border.

And I was ready to hand over all modalities (methods) to a commission consisting of Germans and Czechs.

What exactly is the content of this memorandum?

It is nothing else than a practical execution of what Herr Benes already agreed to and that, too, under the greatest international guarantees.

There is, however, something that is unacceptable for Herr Benes. Herr Benes says the memorandum created a new situation. What does the new situation consist of?

Because I demand that now, as an exception, Herr Benes this time keep his promise. That is the new situation for Herr Benes.

What hasn’t this man promised during his lifetime? He has kept nothing. And now for the first time he should stick to a promise.

Herr Benes says: “Yes, we can not withdraw from this territory.” Then Herr Benes understood in ceding these regions that a region would be credited to the German Reich as a legal title which will be raped by the Czechs.

That is past history. I have now demanded that Herr Benes be forced to stick to the truth. He will have to hand the territory to us on Oct. 1.
Herr Benes now pins his hopes to the world. Neither he nor his diplomats conceal this.

They declare: It is our hope that Chamberlain will fall, that Daladier will be removed, that revolutions happen everywhere. And our hope is Soviet Russia.

He still believes he can escape fulfillment of his duty. And there I can now say one thing: Two men are on the scene against each other. There is Herr Benes and here am I.

We are two such different persons that when Herr Benes sneaked through the world during the great wrestling of nations, I then fulfilled my duty as an honest soldier.

Today, however, I face this man again as a soldier of my people. I have little to say: I am thankful to Mr. Chamberlain for all his trouble and I assured him that the German people wants nothing but peace, but I also declared that I cannot go beyond the limits of our patience.

I further assured him and I repeat here that if this problem is solved, there will be no further territorial problems in Europe for Germany.

And I further assured him that at the moment that Cechoslovakia has solved her other problems, that is, when the Czechs have reconciled themselves with their other minorities, the Czech State no longer interests me and that, if you please, I give him the guarantee: We do not want any Czechs.

But equally I want now to declare before the German people that as regards the Sudeten German problem, my patience is now exhausted.

I have made an offer to Herr Benes. It is nothing else than realization of what he himself has already conceded. He now holds in his hand peace or war.

Either he will now accept this offer and at last give the Germans their freedom, or we will take this freedom for ourselves.

And there is one thing of which the world may have taken cognizance: Throughout four and one-half years of
my political life nobody has been able to charge me with having been cowardly.

I now head the procession of my people as first soldier and behind me—may the world know this—there now marches a people and a different one than that of 1918.

Errant mentors of those times succeeded in infiltrating the poison of democratic phrases into our people, but the German people of today is not the German people of 1918.

Such phrases act like wasp's stings on us, but now we are immune.

In this hour the whole German people will be united to me, my will they shall feel as their will, just as I regard its future and fate as director of my actions.

And we will strengthen this common will as we did in the time of our struggles, the time when I went out as a lone unknown soldier to conquer a reich.

Never did I doubt success and final victory. A body of brave men and brave women gathered around me and they went with me.

And so I ask my German people: fall in behind me man for man, woman for woman.

In these hours we will take one holy common resolve. It shall be stronger than any pressure, any peril. And when this will is stronger than pressure and peril, it will break the pressure and peril.

We are resolved!

Let Herr Benes choose!
PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN'S
ADDRESS TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

September 28

Shortly before the House adjourned at the end of July, some questions were addressed to me as to the possibility of summoning the House before the time arranged and during the recess in certain eventualities.

Those eventualities referred to possible developments in Spain, but the matter which has brought us together today was one which at that time was already threatening but which we all hoped would find a peaceful solution before we met again.

Unhappily these hopes have not been fulfilled.

Today we are faced with a situation which has had no parallel since 1914. To find the origins of the present controversy it would be necessary to go back to the constitution of the state of Czechoslovakia with all its heterogeneous population. No doubt at the time when it was constituted it seemed to those then responsible that it was the best arrangement that could be made in the light of conditions as they then supposed them to exist.

One cannot help reflecting that if Article XIX of the (League of Nations) Covenants providing for revision of treaties by agreement had been put into operation, as was contemplated by friends of the Covenant, instead of waiting until passions became so exasperated that revision by

By courtesy of the New York Times.

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agreement became impossible, we should have avoided the crisis.

Therefore, for that omission all members of the League must bear their responsibility. I am not here to apportion blame among them. The position we had to face in July was a deadlock. Negotiations had been going on between the Czechoslovak Government and the Sudeten Germans and there were fears that if the deadlock were not speedily broken the German Government might presently interfere.

Before His Majesty's Government there were three alternative courses we might have adopted:

Either we could have threatened to go to war with Germany if she attacked Czechoslovakia; or we could have stood aside and allowed matters to take their course; or, finally, we could attempt to find a peaceful settlement by way of mediation.

The first of these courses was rejected. We had no treaty liabilities to Czechoslovakia. We had always refused to accept any such obligations and indeed this country, which does not readily resort to war, would not have followed us if we had tried to lead it into war to prevent a minority from obtaining autonomy or even from choosing to pass under some other government.

The second alternative was also repugnant. However far this territory may be from Europe, a spark there might give rise to a general conflagration. We felt it our duty to do everything in our power to help the contending parties come to an agreement.

We addressed ourselves to the third course—the task of mediation. We felt that the object was good enough to justify the risk.

And when Lord Runciman had expressed his willingness to undertake our mission, we were happy to think we had secured a mediator of long experience of well known qualities of firmness, tact and sympathy and one that gave us the best hopes of success. That Lord Runciman did not succeed is no fault of his.
We, and indeed all Europe, must ever be grateful to him and his staff for their long and exhausting efforts on the behalf of peace, in course of which they gained the esteem and confidence of both sides.

On the twenty-first of September, Lord Runciman addressed to me a letter reporting the result of his mission. That letter is printed in the White Paper, but I may conveniently mention some of the salient points of the story.

On the seventh of June, the Sudeten German party had put forward certain proposals which embodied eight points of Herr Henlein's speech at Carlsbad on the twenty-fourth of April. The Czechoslovakian Government, on their side, had embodied their proposals in their draft of a nationality statute, language bill, and administrative reform bill. At the middle of August, it had become clear to Lord Runciman that the gap between these two proposals was too wide to permit of negotiations between the parties on that basis.

In his capacity as mediator he was successful in preventing the Sudeten German party from closing the door to further negotiations, and he was largely instrumental in inducing Dr. Benes, president of Czechoslovakia, to accept new proposals on the twenty-first of August, which appear to have been regarded by Sudeten party leaders as a suitable basis for the continuance of negotiations. Prospects for the negotiations being carried to a successful conclusion were, however, handicapped by a recurrence of incidents in Czechoslovakia involving casualties both on the Czech and Sudeten German sides.

On the first or second of September Herr Henlein went to Berchtesgaden to consult Herr Hitler on the situation. He was the bearer of a message from Lord Runciman to Herr Hitler expressing the hope that he would give his approval and support to the continuance of negotiations going on in Prague. No direct reply was communicated to Lord Runciman by Herr Henlein, but the latter returned convinced of Herr Hitler's desire for a peaceful solution.

It was after he returned that the Sudeten Germans'
leaders insisted on the complete satisfaction of the eight Carlsbad points in any solution that might be reached.

The House will see that during August Lord Runciman's efforts had been directed with a considerable degree of success toward bringing the Sudetens and Czechoslovakians closer together. In the meantime, however, developments in Germany itself had been causing considerable anxiety to His Majesty's Government.

On July 28, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs had written a personal letter to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Ribbentrop, expressing his regret on the latter's statement to Sir Neville Henderson, our Ambassador in Berlin, that the German Government must reserve its attitude toward Lord Runciman's mission, regarding the matter as one of purely British concern.

The Secretary of State had expressed the hope the German Government would collaborate with His Majesty's Government in facilitating a peaceful solution of the Sudeten question and so prepare the way to establishing relations on a basis of mutual confidence and cooperation.

Early in August we received reports of military preparations in Germany on an extensive scale. They included the calling up of reserves, service for the second year of recruits beyond the beginning of October when they would ordinarily have been released, the conscription of labor for the completion of German fortifications on her western frontiers, and measures which empowered the military authorities to conscript civilian goods and services.

These measures, which involved a widespread dislocation of civilian life, could not fail to be regarded abroad as equivalent to partial mobilization and they suggested the German Government was determined to find a settlement of the Sudeten question by Autumn.

In these circumstances, His Majesty's Ambassador to Berlin was instructed by the middle of August to point out to the German Government that these abnormal measures could not fail to be interpreted abroad as a threatening ges-
ture towards Czechoslovakia. They must therefore increase the feeling of tension throughout Europe and they might compel the Czechoslovak Government to take precautionary measures on their side.

An almost certain consequence would be to destroy all chance of successful mediation by Lord Runciman's mission, perhaps endanger the peace of every one of the great powers of Europe.

This, the Ambassador said, might also destroy the prospects for the resumption of the Anglo-German conversations. In these circumstances it was hoped that the German Government might be able to modify their military measures in order to avoid these dangers.

To these representations, Herr von Ribbentrop replied in a letter in which he refused to discuss military measures and referred to the expressed opinion that the British efforts in Prague had only served to increase Czech intransigence.

In the face of this attitude, His Majesty's Government, through the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who happened to be speaking at Lanark August 22, drew attention again to some words I had used March 24 on this subject when he declared there was nothing he had to add or vary in the statement which I had made.

[Mr. Chamberlain then quoted part of his statement of March 24.]

Toward the end of August, however, events occurred which marked the increasing seriousness of the situation. The French Government, in consequence of information which had reached them about the moving of several German divisions toward their frontier, took certain precautionary measures, including the calling up of reserves to man the Maginot Line.

On the twenty-eighth of August, Sir Neville Henderson had been recalled to London for consultations and a meeting of Ministers held Aug. 30 to consider his report on the general situation.

On Aug. 31 he returned to Berlin and gave Herr von
Kreitzer, the State Secretary, a strong personal warning regarding the probable attitude of His Majesty's Government in the event of German aggression against Czechoslovakia, particularly if France were compelled to intervene. On Sept. 1 our Ambassador saw Herr von Ribbentrop and repeated to him as a personal but most urgent message the warning he had already given the previous day to the State Secretary.

His Majesty's Government desired to impress the seriousness of the situation upon the German Government without the risk of further aggravating the situation by any formal representations which might have been interpreted by the German Government as a public rebuff, as had been the case in regard to our representations of May 21.

His Majesty's Government had also to bear in mind the approach of the Nazi Party Congress. It was to be anticipated that the Chancellor would not fail to make some public statement and, therefore, it appeared necessary, in addition to warning the German Government of the attitude of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, to make every effort in Prague to secure the resumption of negotiations between the Czechoslovak Government and the Sudeten representatives on a basis which would offer a rapid and satisfactory settlement.

Accordingly, His Majesty's Minister in Prague saw Dr. ests of Czechoslovakia to offer immediately and without Benes and emphasized to him that it was vital in the inter-reservation those concessions without which the Sudeten question could not be considered settled. His Majesty's Government were not in a position to say whether anything less than the full program would suffice.

In Lord Runciman's opinion, what was known as the Fourth Plan embodied almost all the requirements of the eight Carlsbad points and formed a basis for negotiations.

The publication of the Fourth Plan, unfortunately, was followed by the serious incident at Moravska-Ostrava [Maehrisch-Ostrau].

It would appear from investigations of the British ob-
server that the importance of this incident was very much exaggerated.

The immediate result was a decision on the part of the Sudeten leader not to resume negotiations until the incident had been liquidated.

Immediately measures were taken by the Czechoslovak Government to liquidate it. Further incidents took place Sept. 11 near Eger, and in spite of Lord Runciman's efforts to bring both parties together negotiations could not be resumed.

In view of the unsatisfactory development of the situation in Czechoslovakia, His Majesty's Government made further efforts to exercise a restraining influence upon the German Government.

The French Government had shown itself particularly insistent that nothing should be left undone to make the attitude of His Majesty's Government clear to the Chancellor himself.

Sir Neville Henderson was at Nuremberg Sept. 9 and 12 and took every opportunity to impress upon the leading German personalities the attitude of His Majesty's Government as set forth in my speech of March 24 and repeated by Sir John Simon Aug. 27.

It was decided to make personal representations to the Chancellor himself. The French Government were informed of the warning which had been conveyed by Sir Neville Henderson at Nuremberg.

On Sept. 9 the Cabinet met to consider the situation and decided to take certain precautionary naval measures including the commissioning of mine layers and mine sweepers, and on Sept. 11, I made a statement to the press which received widespread publicity, stressing in particular, the close tie uniting Great Britain and France in the probability in certain eventualities of this country going to the assistance of France.

On the morning of Sept. 12 the Cabinet met again. They decided no further action could usefully be taken before
Herr Hitler's speech at Nuremberg that evening. In that speech Herr Hitler laid great stress on the defensive military measures taken on the German western frontier. In his references to Czchoslovakia he reminded the world that on Feb. 22 he had said the Reich would no longer tolerate further oppression and persecution of the Sudeten Germans.

"They demanded the right of self-determination," he said, "and were supported in their demand by the Reich."

Therefore, for the first time, this speech promised the support of the Reich to the Sudeten Germans if they could not obtain satisfaction themselves, and for the first time it publicly raised the issue of self-determination.

It did not, however, close the door on further negotiations in Prague nor demand a plebiscite. The speech also was accompanied by specific references to Germany's frontiers with Poland and France, and the general effect was to leave the situation unchanged, with a slight diminution of tension.

The speech, however, and in particular Herr Hitler's references to support for the cause of the Sudeten Germans, had an immediate and unfortunate effect among these people. Demonstrations took place throughout Sudetenland, resulting in an immediate extension of the incidents which had already begun Sept. 11.

Serious rioting occurred, accompanied by attacks upon Czech police and officials, and by Sept. 14, according to official Czchoslovak figures, there had been twenty-one killed and seventy-five wounded, the majority of whom were Czechs.

An attempt made by Lord Runciman to bring the Sudeten leaders into a discussion with the Czchoslovak Cabinet failed. On Sept. 14 Herr Henlein issued a statement that the Carlsbad points no longer were enough and that the situation called for self-determination.

Thereupon Herr Henlein fled to Germany, where it is understood he has since occupied himself with the formation
of a Sudeten legionary organization reported to number 40,000 men.

In these circumstances, Lord Runciman felt no useful purpose could be served by his publishing a plan of his own. The House will recall that by the evening of Sept. 14 a highly critical situation had developed in which there was an immediate danger of German troops, now concentrated on the frontier, entering Czechoslovakia to prevent further incidents occurring in Sudeteland of fighting between Czech forces and Sudeten Germans, although reliable reports indicated order had been completely restored in those districts by Sept. 14.

On the other hand, the Czechoslovak Government might have felt compelled to mobilize at once and so risk provoking a German invasion. In any event, a German invasion might be expected to bring into operation the French obligation to come to the assistance of Czechoslovakia and so lead to a European war in which this country might well have been involved in support of France.

In these circumstances I decided the time had come to put into operation a plan which I had had in mind for a considerable period as a last resort.

One of the principal difficulties in dealing with a totalitarian government is the lack of any means of establishing contact with the personalities in whose hands lie the final decision.

I, therefore, resolved to go to Germany myself and interview Herr Hitler and find out in a personal conversation whether there was any hope yet of saving peace.

I knew very well that in taking such an unprecedented course I was laying myself open to criticism on the ground that I was detracting from the dignity of the British Prime Minister, and to disappointment, even to resentment, if I failed to bring back a satisfactory agreement.

I felt that in such a crisis where the issues at stake were so vital for a million human beings, considerations of that kind could not be allowed to prevail. Herr Hitler responded
to my suggestion with cordiality and on Sept. 15 I made my first flight to Munich, and from there I traveled by train to Herr Hitler's mountain home at Berchtesgaden.

I confess I was astonished at the warmth of approval with which this adventure was everywhere received, but the relief which it brought for the moment was indication of the gravity with which the situation had been viewed.

At this first conversation, which lasted three hours and at which only an interpreter was present, besides Herr Hitler and myself, I very soon became aware the situation was much more acute and much more urgent than I had realized.

In courteous but perfectly definite terms, Herr Hitler made it plain he had made up his mind the Sudeten Germans must have the right of self-determination and of returning, if they wished, to the Reich. If they could not achieve this by their own efforts, he said, he would assist them to do so and he declared categorically that, rather than wait, he would be prepared to risk a world war.

At one point, he complained of British threats against Germany, to which I replied he must distinguish between a threat and a warning and that he might have just cause for complaint if I allowed him to think that in no circumstances would this country go to war with Germany when, in fact, there were conditions in which such a contingency might arise.

So strongly did I get the impression that the Chancellor was contemplating an immediate invasion of Czechoslovakia that I asked him why he had allowed me to travel all that way, since I evidently was wasting my time.

He said if I could give him there and then the assurance the British Government accepted the principle of self-determination, he was quite ready to discuss ways and means of carrying it out.

If, on the contrary, I told him such a principle could not be considered by the British Government, then he agreed it was no use to continue our conversations.
I was, of course, in no position to give there and then such assurance, but I undertook to return at once to consult my colleagues if he would refrain from active hostilities until I had had time to obtain their reply.

That assurance he gave, provided, he said, nothing happened in Czechoslovakia of such a nature as to force his hand and that assurance has remained binding ever since.

I have no doubt now, looking back, that my visit alone prevented an invasion, for which everything had been prepared, and it was clear to me that with German troops in the positions they then occupied, nothing anybody could do would prevent an invasion unless the right of self-determination was granted, and that quickly, to the Sudeten Germans.

And that was the sole hope of a peaceful solution.

I came back to London the next day. That evening the Cabinet met and it was attended also by Lord Runciman who, at my request, had traveled from Prague. Lord Runciman informed us that although in his view responsibility for the final breach in the negotiations at Prague rested upon the Sudeten extremists, nevertheless, in view of recent developments on the frontier, the districts between Czechoslovakia and Germany where the Sudeten population was in the majority should be given the full right of self-determination at once.

He considered the cession of the territories to be inevitable and thought it should be done promptly. Measures for peaceful transfer could be arranged between the two governments. The Germans and Czechs, however, would still have to live side by side in many other parts of Czechoslovakia. In those areas, Lord Runciman thought the basis ought to be sought for local autonomy on the lines of the fourth plan published by the Czechoslovak Government on July 10.

He considered that the dignity and security of Czechoslovakia could only be maintained if her policy, internal and external, were directed to enabling her to live in peace with all her neighbors. For this purpose, in his opinion, her pol-
icy should be entirely neutral, as in the case of Switzerland.

His Majesty's Government felt it necessary to consult the French Government before replying to Herr Hitler and, accordingly, M. Daladier and M. Bonnet were invited to London Sept. 18.

[The Prime Minister then quoted the text of the communiqué issued Sept. 19.]

During these conversations the representatives of the two governments were actuated by the desire to find a solution that would not bring about a European war and therefore a solution which would not automatically compel France to take action in accordance with her obligations. It was agreed the only means of achieving this object was to accept the principle of self-determination.

Accordingly, the British and French Ministers at Prague were instructed to inform the Czechoslovak Government that continuance within Czechoslovakia of districts mainly inhabited by Sudeten Germans would imperil the interests of Czechoslovakia herself and all hopes of peace.

The Czechoslovak Government was asked to agree immediately to direct the transfer to the Reich of areas inhabited by a population more than 50 per cent German.

The Czechoslovak Government were informed that to meet their natural desire for their security in the future, His Majesty's Government would be prepared as a contribution to the pacification of Europe to join in an international guarantee in regard to new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression.

Such a guarantee would safeguard the independence of Czechoslovakia by substituting a general guarantee against unprovoked aggression in place of the existing treaties with France and Russia which involved reciprocal obligations of a military character.

In agreeing to that guarantee, His Majesty's Government were accepting a completely new commitment. We were not previously bound by any obligations toward
Czechoslovakia other than those involved by the Covenant of the League.

[The Prime Minister then reviewed the further progress of negotiations, pointing out that the British and French Ministers in Prague were instructed to tell the Czechoslovak Government there was no hope of new proposals.]

This they did immediately and unconditionally Sept. 21. Our Minister in Prague was instructed to inform the Czechoslovak Government Sept. 22 that His Majesty's Government were profoundly conscious of the immense sacrifice which the Czechoslovak Government had agreed to and the immense public spirit which they had shown.

These proposals had been put forward in the hope of averting general disaster and saving Czechoslovakia from invasion.

Her willingness to undertake them won a measure of sympathy which nothing else could have aroused.

The Czechoslovak Government resigned and a government of national concentration under General Syrovy was constituted, but it was emphasized that this government was not a military dictatorship and that it had accepted the Anglo-French proposals.

We had hoped that the immediate problem would not be complicated at this juncture by the claims pressed by Poland and Hungary. They had, however, demanded similar treatment of their minorities as were accorded German minorities.

The Governments of Poland and Hungary have made representations to His Majesty's Government, and we have replied that we take note of those representations but that we are at present concentrating our efforts on the Sudeten problem, on the solution of which the issue of war or peace in Europe depends. While appreciating their position, His Majesty's Government hoped these two governments would do nothing to add to the present delicate situation.

The Polish Government had expressed considerable dis-
satisfaction and troop movements had taken place in the direction of Teschen.

The Hungarian Government had been encouraged by conversations of the Regent with Field Marshal Goering and conversations of the Hungarian Prime Minister and Chief of Staff at Berchtesgaden, and mobilization measures had been taken by the Hungarian Army.

On Sept. 22 I went back to Germany to Bad-Godesberg-on-Rhine, where the Chancellor had appointed a meeting place as being more convenient for me.

Once again I had a warm welcome in the streets of villages through which I passed, which demonstrated to me the desire of the German people for peace, and on the afternoon of my arrival I had a second meeting with the Chancellor.

During my stay in London the government had worked out with the French Government arrangements for effecting the transfer of territory proposed, also for the delimitation of the final frontier.

I explained these to Herr Hitler, who was not previously aware of them, and I also told him about the proposed guarantee against unprovoked aggression.

On that point of guarantee he made no objection, but he said he could not enter into any guarantee unless other powers, including Italy, were also guarantors.

I said I had not asked them to enter into a guarantee but that I had intended to ask him if he were willing to enter into a pact of non-aggression with a new Czechoslovakia. He said he could not enter into such a compact while the other minorities of Czechoslovakia were not satisfied, but that when they were satisfied he would then be prepared to join an international guarantee.

He said he could not accept other proposals which I described to him, on grounds they were too dilatory and offered too many opportunities for evasion. He insisted a solution was essential on account of the terrorism and oppression with which the Sudeten Germans were faced.

[Mr. Chamberlain said Herr Hitler then gave him an
outline of the proposals subsequently embodied in the famous memorandum, "except he did not in this conversation actually name any time limit."

The honorable members will realize the perplexity in which I found myself in being faced with this totally unexpected situation. I had been told at Berchtesgaden that, if principles of self-determination were accepted, Herr Hitler would discuss with me ways and means of carrying it out.

He told me afterward he never for one moment supposed I should be able to come back and say that the principle was accepted.

[The Prime Minister added he did not think Herr Hitler deliberately deceived him.]

When I got back to Godesberg, I thought I had only to discuss quietly with him the various proposals already submitted. I was shocked when, at the beginning of the conversations, he [Herr Hitler] said these proposals were not acceptable and that there were other proposals which I had not contemplated at all.

I felt I had to consider what I had to do. Consequently, I withdrew with my mind full of foreboding as to the success of my mission. I have seen speculative accounts of what happened the next day which suggested that long hours passed whilst I remained on one side of the Rhine and Herr Hitler on the other because I had difficulty in obtaining assurances from him about the removal of his troops.

I want to say at once that that is purely imaginary. There was no such difficulty. We had arranged to resume our conversation at 11:30 the next morning, but in view of the difficulty of talking with a man through an interpreter and the fact I could not feel sure that what I had been saying had always been understood and appreciated by him, I thought it would be wise to put down on paper some comments upon these new proposals of his and let him have it some time before the talks began.

Accordingly, I wrote a letter [which is Number IV in the White Paper] which I sent him. I sent that soon after
breakfast and in it I declared my readiness to convey the proposals to the Czechoslovak Government, but I pointed out what I thought to be grave difficulties in the way of their acceptance.

On receipt of this letter the Chancellor intimated he would like to say something in reply.

The reply was not received until Wednesday afternoon and contained no more proposals than those which had been described to me the night before. Accordingly, I replied, asking for a memorandum of the proposals and a copy of the map for transmission to Prague, and intimating my intention of returning to England.

The memorandum and map were handed me at my final interview with the Chancellor, which began at 10:30 that night and lasted into the small hours of the morning, and at which the German Foreign Secretary was present as well as Sir Nevile Henderson and Sir Horace Wilson.

For the first time, I found in the memoranda new proposals and I spoke very frankly. I dwelt with all the emphasis at my command upon the risks which would be incurred by insisting on such terms.

I declared the language and manner of the document, which I described as an ultimatum rather than memorandum, would profoundly shock public opinion in neutral countries and I bitterly reproached the Chancellor on his failure to respond in any way to the efforts which I had made to secure peace.

In spite of those frank words, this conversation was carried on on more friendly terms than that which preceded it.

I think I should add that, before saying farewell to Herr Hitler, I had a few words with him in private which I do not think are without importance.

In the first place, he repeated to me with great earnestness what he had already said at Berchtesgaden—namely, that this was his last territorial ambition in Europe; that he
had no wish to have in the Reich people of other races than German.

The next day we received from the Czech Ministers the reply of the Czech Government, which stated they considered Herr Hitler's demands, in their present form, to be absolutely and unconditionally unacceptable.

This reply was communicated to the French Ministers. Conversations were resumed next morning with the French Ministers, and they informed us that if Czechoslovakia were attacked France would fulfill her treaty obligations.

In reply we said if, as a result of these negotiations, the French forces became actively engaged, we should be pledged to support them.

Meanwhile, as a last effort to preserve peace, I sent Sir Horace Wilson to Berlin Sept. 26 with a personal message to Herr Hitler, to be delivered before his speech to be made in Berlin at 8 o'clock that evening; the French Ministers entirely approved of this initiative and we issued a communiqué to that effect.

Sir Horace Wilson took with him a letter from me pointing out that the reception of the German memorandum by Czechoslovakia had confirmed the expectations which I had expressed to him at Godesberg.

I therefore made a further proposal with a view to arriving at a settlement by negotiation rather than by military force — namely, that there should be an immediate discussion between German and Czechoslovak representatives in the presence of British representatives.

Sir Horace Wilson arrived at Berlin on the afternoon of the 26th and presented this letter to Herr Hitler, who listened to it but expressed the view he could not depart from the procedure of the memorandum since he felt a conference would lead to further intolerable procrastination.

I should tell the House how deeply it was impressed on my mind in my conversations with Herr Hitler, and I see it again in every speech he makes, that he has deep-rooted distrust and disbelief in the sincerity of the Czechoslovak
Government. That has been one of the factors in all this difficult story of events.

In the meantime, after reading Herr Hitler's speech in Berlin in which, as I say, he expressed his disbelief in the intentions of the Czech Government to carry out their promises, I offered on behalf of the British Government to guarantee that the promises which they had made to us and the French Government would be carried out.

Yesterday morning Sir Horace resumed his conversations with Herr Hitler but, finding his views unchanged, he, upon my instructions, repeated to him in precise terms what I said a few moments ago, that France would fulfill her obligations to Czechoslovakia and should France become engaged in hostilities with Germany, the British Government would feel obliged to support her.

Now the story which I have told the House brings us up to last night. About 12:30 I received from Herr Hitler the reply to my letter sent by Sir Horace Wilson which is printed in the White Paper. A careful perusal indicates certain indications of his intention. There is a definite statement that troops will not be moved beyond the red line [beyond the Sudeten areas into Czechoslovakia]. They are only to preserve order and that a plebiscite will be carried out with a free vote.

It was added he would abide by the results and, finally, he would join in an international guarantee for the remainder of Czechoslovakia, once minority questions were settled.

This was rather a reassuring statement, and I have no hesitation in saying—from the personal contacts I had with him—I believe he means what he says.

But the thing which was uppermost in my mind was that once more the difficulties and obscurities had been narrowed down to points, and it was inconceivable they could not be settled by negotiations. So strongly did I feel this that I felt compelled to send a last appeal.

I sent the following personal message:
“After reading your letter, I feel certain that you can get all the essentials without war and without delay, and I will arrange to go to Berlin myself, at once, to discuss the arrangements with you and the representatives of the Czech Government, together with representatives of France and Italy if you desire it.

“I cannot believe you will take the responsibility of starting a World War, which might end civilization, for the sake of a few days’ delay in settling this long standing problem.”

At the same time, I sent the following personal message to Premier Mussolini:

“I have today addressed a last appeal to Herr Hitler to refrain from force in the Sudeten problem which I feel sure can be settled by further discussion.

“I offered myself to go at once to Berlin to discuss arrangements with the German and Czech representatives—also Italy and France. I trust Your Excellency will inform the German Chancellor you are willing to be represented and urge him to agree to my proposal which will keep all our peoples out of war.

“I have already promised that the Czech promises should be carried out and feel confident a full agreement can be reached in a week.”

In reply to the message to Signor Mussolini, we were informed that instructions had been sent to the Italian Ambassador in Berlin to see Herr von Ribbentrop at once and to say that, while Italy would fulfill completely her pledges to stand by Germany, in view of the great importance of the request made by His Majesty’s Government Signor Mussolini hoped Herr Hitler would see his way to postpone the action which the Chancellor had told Sir Horace Wilson was to be taken at 2 P.M. today, for at least twenty-four hours to allow him (Premier Mussolini) to examine the situation and find a peaceful settlement.

In response, Herr Hitler agreed to postpone mobilization for twenty-four hours.
Whatever views we may have had about Premier Mussolini in the past, I believe every one will welcome his gesture. He has been willing to work with us— but that is not all!

I have something further to say to the House yet!

I have been informed by Herr Hitler that he invites me to meet him in Munich tomorrow morning.

He has also invited Signor Mussolini and M. Daladier. Signor Mussolini has accepted and no doubt M. Daladier will also accept.

I need not say what my answer will be!

There can be no member in this House who did not feel his heart leap when he heard the crisis had been once more postponed. And now there is to be one more opportunity to try by reason of good-will and discussion to find a solution of the problem which already is within sight of settlement.

I cannot say any more. I hope the House will release me now to go and see what I can make of this last effort, and perhaps, in view of this new development, this debate might be adjourned for a few days.

Then, perhaps, we may meet in happier circumstances.
TEXT OF BRITISH WHITE PAPER
CONTAINING DOCUMENTS ON
THE CZECH - GERMAN CRISIS

September 28

DOCUMENT I
Lord Runciman to Prime Minister
WESTMINSTER, Sept. 21, 1938.

My Dear Prime Minister:
When I undertook the task of mediation in the controversy between the Czechoslovak Government and the Sudeten German Government party I was, of course, left perfectly free to obtain my own information and draw my own conclusions. I was under no obligation to issue any kind of report. In the present circumstances, however, it may be of assistance to you to have the final views which I have formed as the results of my mission and certain suggestions which I believe should be taken into consideration if anything like a permanent solution is to be found.

The problem of the political, social and economic relations between the Teuton and Slav races in the area which is now called Czechoslovakia is one which has existed for many centuries with periods of acute struggle and periods of comparative peace. It is not a new problem and in its present stage there are at the same time new factors and

By courtesy of the New York Times.

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also old factors which would have to be considered in any detailed review.

When I arrived in Prague at the beginning of August the questions which immediately confronted me were, firstly, constitutional; secondly, political, and thirdly, economic. The constitutional question was that with which I was immediately and directly concerned. At that time it implied the provision of some degree of home rule for the Sudeten Germans within the Czechoslovak Republic; the question of self-determination had not yet arisen in an acute form. My task was to make myself acquainted with the history of the question, with the principal persons concerned and with the suggestions for the solution proposed by the two sides, viz., by the Sudeten German party in a “sketch” submitted to the Czechoslovak Government on the 7th of June (which was by way of embodying the eight points of Henlein’s speech at Karlsbad) and by the Czechoslovak Government in their draft of the nationality State, language bill and administrative reform bill.

It became clear that neither of these sets of proposals was sufficiently acceptable to the other side to permit further negotiations on this basis and the negotiations were suspended on Aug. 17. After a series of private discussions between the Sudeten leaders and Czech authorities a new basis for negotiation was adopted by the Czechoslovak Government and communicated to me on Sept. 5 and to the Sudeten leaders on Sept. 6. This was the so-called fourth plan. In my opinion—and, I believe, in the opinion of the more responsible Sudeten leaders—this plan embodied almost all the requirements of the Karlsbad eight points and with a little clarification and extension could have been made to cover them in their entirety.

Negotiations should at once have been resumed on this favorable and hopeful basis; but little doubt remains in my mind that the very fact that they were so favorably operated against their chances with the more extreme members of the Sudeten German party. It is my belief that the incidents
arising out of the visit of certain Sudeten German deputies to investigate the case of persons arrested for arms smuggling at Maehrisch-Ostrau was used in order to provide the excuse for the suspension if not the breaking off of negotiations. The Czech Government, however, once more gave way to the demands of the Sudeten German party in this matter and preliminary discussions on the fourth plan were resumed Sept. 10. Again I am convinced that this did not suit the policy of the Sudeten extremists and incidents were provoked and instigated on Sept. 11 and with greater effect after Hitler's speech on Sept. 12.

As a result of the bloodshed and disturbance thus caused the Sudeten delegation refused to meet the Czech authorities as had been arranged on Sept. 13. Henlein and Frank presented a new series of demands — the withdrawal of State police, the limitation of troops to their military duties, etc., which the Czechoslovak Government again prepared to accept on the sole condition that a representative of the party come to Prague to discuss how they should be maintained. On the night of Sept. 13 this condition was refused by Henlein and all negotiations were completely broken off.

It is quite clear that we cannot now go backward to the point where we stood two weeks ago and we have to consider the situation as it now faces us.

With the rejection of the Czechoslovak Government's offer on Sept. 13 and with the breaking off of negotiations by Henlein my functions as mediator were in fact at an end. Directly and indirectly connected between the chief of the Sudeten leaders and the government, the Reich had become the dominant factor in the situation; the dispute was no longer an internal one. It was not part of my function to attempt mediation between Czechoslovakia and Germany.

Responsibility for the final break must, in my opinion, rest upon Henlein, Frank and upon those of their supporters inside and outside the country who were urging them to extreme unconstitutional action.
I have much sympathy, however, with the Sudeten race. It is a hard thing to be ruled by an alien race; and I have been left with the impression that Czechoslovak rule in the Sudeten areas for the last twenty years, although not actually oppressive and certainly not "terroristic," has been marked by tactlessness, lack of understanding, petty intolerance and discrimination to the point where the resentment of the German population was inevitably moving to the direction of revolt. The Sudeten Germans felt, too, that in the past they had been given many promises by the Czechoslovak Government, but little or no action followed these promises.

This experience induced an attitude of unveiled distrust of leading Czech statesmen. I cannot say how far this mistrust was merited or unmerited, but it certainly exists, with the result that, however conciliatory their statements, they inspire no confidence in the minds of the Sudeten population. Moreover, in the last elections in 1936 the Sudeten German party polled more votes than any other single party and they actually formed the second largest party in the State in Parliament. They then commanded some forty-four votes in a total Parliament of 300.

With subsequent accessions they are now the largest party. But they can always be outvoted, and consequently some of them feel constitutional action is useless for them.

Local irritations were added to these major grievances. Czech officials and Czech police speaking little or no German were appointed in large numbers to purely German districts; Czech agricultural colonists were encouraged to settle on land transferred under the land reform in the middle of German populations; for the children of these Czech invaders Czech schools were built on a large scale; there was a very general belief that Czech firms were favored as against German firms in the allocation of State contracts and that the State provided work relief for Czechs more readily than for Germans. I believe these complaints to be in the main justified. Even as late as the time of my mission I
could find no readiness on the part of the Czechoslovak Government to remedy them on anything like an adequate scale.

All these and other grievances were intensified by the reactions of the economic crisis on Sudeten industries, which form so important a part of the life of the people. Not unnaturally the government was blamed for the resulting impoverishment.

For many reasons, therefore, including the above, the feeling among the Sudeten Germans until about three or four years ago was one of hopelessness. But the rise of Nazi Germany gave them new hope. I regard their turning for help toward their kinsmen and their eventual desire to join the Reich as a natural development in the circumstances.

At the time of my arrival the more moderate Sudeten leaders still desired a settlement within the frontiers of the Czechoslovak State. They realized what war would mean in the Sudeten area which would itself be the main battlefield. Both nationally and internationally such a settlement would have been an easier solution than a territorial transfer. I did my best to promote it and up to a point with some success but even so not without misgiving as to whether when the agreement was reached it could ever be carried out without giving rise to a new crop of suspicious, controversies, accusations and counter-accusations. I felt that any such an arrangement would be temporary and not lasting.

This solution in the form of what is known as the "fourth plan" broke down in the circumstances narrated above; the whole situation internal and external had changed and I felt that with this change my mission had come to an end.

When I left Prague on Sept. 16 the riots and disturbances in the Sudeten areas, which never have been more than sporadic, died down. A considerable number of districts had been placed under a regime called "Standrecht," amounting to martial law. The Sudeten leaders, at any rate the more extreme among them, fled to Germany and were issuing proclamations defying the Czechoslovak Govern-
ment. I have been credibly informed that at the time of my leaving the number killed on both sides was not more than seventy.

Unless, therefore, Henlein’s “Freikorps” are deliberately encouraged to cross the frontier I have no reason to expect any notable renewal of incidents and disturbances. In these circumstances the necessity for the presence of State police in these districts would no longer exist. As the State police are extremely unpopular among the German inhabitants and constituted one of their chief grievances for the last three years I consider that they should be withdrawn as soon as possible. I believe their withdrawal would reduce the cause of wrangles and riots.

Further, it has become self-evident to me that those frontier districts between Czechoslovakia and Germany where the Sudeten population is in an important majority should be given the full right of self-determination at once. If some cession is inevitable, as I believe it to be, it is as well it should be done promptly and without procrastination. There is real danger, even the danger of civil war, in the continuance of this state of uncertainty. Consequently there are very real reasons for a policy of immediate drastic action. Any kind of plebiscite or referendum would, I believe, be a sheer formality in respect to these predominantly German areas. A very large majority of their inhabitants desire amalgamation with Germany. The inevitable delay involved in taking a plebiscite vote would only serve to excite popular feeling, with perhaps the most dangerous results.

I consider, therefore, that these frontier districts should at once be transferred from Czechoslovakia to Germany and further that measures for their peaceful transfer, including provision of safeguards for the population during the transfer period, should be arranged forthwith by agreement between the two governments.

The transfer of these frontier districts does not, however, dispose finally of the question of how Germany and
Czechs are to live together peacefully in the future. Even if all the areas where Germans have a majority were transferred to Germany there would still remain in Czechoslovakia a large number of Germans and in the area transferred to Germany there would still be a certain number of Czechs. Economic connections are so close that absolute separation is not only undesirable but inconceivable; and I repeat my conviction that history has proved that in times of peace two peoples can live together on friendly terms. I believe it is in the interests of all Czechs and all Germans alike that these friendly relations should be encouraged to re-establish themselves and I am convinced that this is the real desire of the average Czech and German. They are alike in being honest, peaceable, hardworking and frugal folk. When political friction has been removed on both sides I believe they can settle down quietly.

For those portions of the territory, therefore, where the German majority is not so important, I recommend that an effort be made to find a basis for local autonomy within the frontiers of the Czechoslovak Republic on the lines of the “fourth plan” modified so as to meet the circumstances created by the transfer of preponderantly German areas. As I have already said, there is always the danger that an agreement reached in principle may lead to further divergencies in practice. But I think that in the more peaceful future this risk can be minimized.

This brings me to the political side of the problem which is concerned with the question of the integrity and security of the Czechoslovak Republic, especially in relation to her immediate neighbors. I believe here that the problem is one of removing the center of intense political friction from Middle Europe. For this purpose it is necessary permanently to provide that the Czechoslovak State should live in peace with all her neighbors and that her policy, internal and external, should be directed to that end. Just as it is essential for the international position of Switzerland that her policy should be entirely neutral, so an analogous pol-
i

cy is necessary for Czechoslovakia—not only for her own future existence but for the peace of Europe.

In order to achieve this I recommend:

Firstly, that those parties and persons in Czechoslovakia who have been deliberately encouraging a policy antagonistic to Czechoslovakia’s neighbors should be forbidden by the Czechoslovak Government to continue their agitation; and if necessary legal measures should be taken to bring such agitation to an end.

Secondly, that Czechoslovak Government should so remodel her foreign relations as to give assurances to her neighbors that she will under no circumstances attack them or enter any aggressive action against them arising from obligations to other States.

Thirdly, that the principal powers acting in the interest of the peace of Europe should give Czechoslovakia guarantees of assistance in case of unprovoked aggression against her.

Fourthly, that a commercial treaty on preferential terms should be negotiated between Germany and Czechoslovakia if this seems advantageous to the economic interests of the two countries.

This leads me on to a third question which lay within the scope of my inquiry, viz., the economy problem. This problem centers on the distress and unemployment in the Sudeten German areas, distress which has persisted since 1930 and due to various causes. It constitutes a suitable background for political discontent. It is a problem which exists, but to say that the Sudeten German question is entirely, or even in the main, an economic one is misleading. If the transfer of territory takes place it is a problem which will for the most part fall to the German Government to solve.

If the policy which I have outlined recommends itself to those immediately concerned in the present situation I would further suggest:

A—That a representative of the Sudeten German people
should have a permanent seat in the Czechoslovak Cabinet.

B—That a commission under a neutral chairman should be appointed to deal with the question of delimitation of the area to be transferred to Germany and also with the controversial points immediately arising from the carrying out of any agreement which may be reached.

C—That an international force be organized to keep order in the districts which are to be transferred pending the actual transfer, so that the Czechoslovak state police, as I have said above, and also Czechoslovak troops may be withdrawn from this area. I wish to close this letter by recording my appreciation of the personal courtesy, hospitality and assistance which I and my staff received from government authorities, especially Dr. Benes, Dr. Hodza, from the representatives of the Sudeten German party with whom we came in contact and from the very large number of other people in all ranks of life whom we met during our stay in Czechoslovakia.

Yours very sincerely,

RUNCIMAN OF DOXFORD.

DOCUMENT II
Anglo-French Proposals


Representatives of the French and British Governments have been in consultation today on the general situation and have considered the British Prime Minister’s report on his conversation with Hitler. The British Ministers also placed before their French colleagues their conclusions derived from the account furnished to them of the work of his mission by Lord Runciman. We are both convinced that after recent events the point has now been reached where further maintenance within the boundaries of the Czechoslovak State of the districts mainly inhabited by Sudeten Deutsch cannot in fact continue any longer without imperiling the interests of Czechoslovakia herself and European peace.
In the light of these considerations both governments have been compelled to the concessions that the maintenance of peace and the safety of Czechoslovakia's vital interests cannot effectively be assured unless these areas are now transferred to the Reich.

Secondly, this could be done either by direct transfer or as the result of a plebiscite. We realize the difficulties involved in a plebiscite and we are aware of your objections already expressed to this course, particularly the possibility of far-reaching repercussions if the matter were treated on the basis of so wide a principle. For this reason we anticipate in the absence of an indication to the contrary that you may prefer to deal with the Sudeten Deutsch problem by the method of direct transfer and as a case by itself.

Thirdly, the area for transfer would probably have to include areas with over 50 per cent German inhabitants but we should hope to arrange by negotiation provisions for adjustments of frontiers, where circumstances render it necessary, by some international body including a Czech representative. We are satisfied that a transfer of smaller areas based on a higher percentage would not meet the case.

Fourthly, the international body referred to might also be charged with questions of the possible exchange of populations on the basis of the right to opt within some specified time limit.

Fifthly, we recognize that if the Czechoslovak Government is prepared to concur in the measures proposed involving a material change in the conditions of the State they are entitled to ask for some assurance of their future security.

Sixthly, accordingly His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be prepared as a contribution to the pacification of Europe to join in an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression. One of the principal conditions of such a guarantee would be the safeguarding of the independence of Czechoslovakia by the substitution of a general guarantee against unprovoked aggression in place of
the existing treaties which involve reciprocal obligations of a military character.

Seventhly, both the French and British Governments recognize how great is the sacrifice thus required of the Czechoslovak Government in the cause of peace. But because of that cause common to both Europe in general and in particular Czechoslovakia herself they have felt it their duty jointly to set forth frankly the conditions essential to secure it.

Eighthly, the Prime Minister must resume conversations with Hitler no later than Wednesday and earlier if possible. We, therefore, feel we must ask your reply at the earliest possible moment.

DOCUMENT III
Prime Minister to Reich Chancellor
GODESBERG, SEPT. 23, 1938.

My Dear Reich Chancellor:

I think it may clarify the situation and accelerate our conversation if I send you this note before we meet this morning.

I am ready to put to the Czech Government your proposal as to the areas so that they may examine the suggested provisional boundary. So far as I can see there is no need to hold a plebiscite for the bulk of the areas, i.e., for those areas which [according to statistics upon which both sides seem to agree] are predominantly Sudeten German areas. I have no doubt, however, that the Czech Government would be willing to accept your proposal for a plebiscite to determine how far if at all the proposed new frontier need be adjusted.

The difficulty I see about the proposal you put to me yesterday afternoon arises from the suggestion that the areas should in the immediate future be occupied by German troops. I recognize the difficulty of conducting a lengthy investigation under existing conditions and doubtless the plan you propose would if acceptable provide an immediate eas-
ing of tension. But I do not think you have realized the impossibility of my agreeing to put forward any plan unless I have reason to suppose it will be considered by public opinion in my country, in France and, indeed, in the world generally as carrying out the principles already agreed in an orderly fashion and free from the threat of force. I am sure an attempt to occupy forthwith by German troops the areas which will become part of the Reich at once in principle and very shortly afterwards by formal delimitation would be condemned as an unnecessary display of force.

Even if I felt it right to put this proposal to the Czech Government, I am convinced that they would not regard it as being in the spirit of the arrangement which we and the French Government urged them to accept and which they have accepted. In the event of German troops moving into the areas as you propose there is no doubt that the Czech Government would have no option but order their forces to resist, and this would mean the destruction of the basis upon which you and I a week ago agreed to work together — namely, an orderly settlement of this question rather than a settlement by the use of force.

It being agreed in principle that the Sudeten German areas are to join the Reich, the immediate question before us now is how to maintain law and order pending the final settlement of arrangements for transfer. There must surely be alternatives to your proposal which would not be open to the objections I have pointed out. For instance, I could ask the Czech Government whether they think there could be an arrangement under which the maintenance of law and order in certain agreed Sudeten German areas would be entrusted to Sudeten Germans themselves — by the creation of a suitable force or by the use of forces already in existence possibly acting under the supervision of neutral observers.

As you know, I did last night, in accordance with my understanding with you, urge the Czech Government to do all in their power to maintain order in the meantime.

The Czech Government cannot, of course, withdraw
their forces nor can they be expected to withdraw the State police as long as they are faced with the prospect of forcible invasion; but I should be ready at once to ascertain their views on the alternative suggestion I have made and if the plan is proved acceptable I would urge them to withdraw their forces and State police from the areas where the Sudeten Germans are in a position to maintain order.

Further steps that need to be taken to complete the transfer could be worked out quite rapidly.

I am faithfully,

NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN.

DOCUMENT IV

Reich Chancellor to Prime Minister

GODESBERG, SEPT. 23, 1938.

YOUR EXCELLENCY:

A thorough examination of your letter, which reached me today, as well as the necessity for clearing up the situation definitely lead me to make the following recommendations:

For nearly two decades Germans as well as the other various nationalities in Czechoslovakia have been maltreated in the unworthiest manner, tortured, economically destroyed and, above all, prevented from realizing for themselves also the right of nations to self-determination. All the attempts of the oppressed to change their lot failed in the face of the brutal will to destruction of the Czechs. The latter were in possession of the power of the State and did not hesitate to employ it ruthlessly and barbarically. England and France never made an endeavor to alter this situation. In my speech before the Reichstag on Feb. 22 I declared that the German Reich would take the initiative in putting an end to any further oppression of these Germans. I have in a further declaration during the Reich party congress given a clear and unmistakable expression of this decision. I recognize gratefully that at last after twenty years the British Government, represented by Your Excellency, has now decided
for its part also to undertake steps to put an end to a situation which from day to day and, indeed, from hour to hour, is becoming more unbearable.

For if formerly the behavior of the Czechoslovak Government was brutal, it can only be described during recent weeks and days as madness. The victims of this madness are innumerable Germans. In a few weeks the number of refugees who have been driven out has risen to over 120,000. This situation as stated above is unbearable and will now be terminated by me.

Your Excellency assures me now that the principle of the transfer of the Sudeten territory to the Reich has in principle already been accepted. I regret to have to reply to Your Excellency that as regards this point the theoretical recognition of principles also has been formerly granted to us Germans. In the year 1918 the armistice was concluded on the basis of the Fourteen Points of President Wilson, which in principle were recognized by all. They, however, in practice were broken in the most shameful way. What interests me, Your Excellency, is not the recognition of the principle that this territory is to go to Germany but solely the realization of this principle and the realization which both puts an end in the shortest time to the sufferings of the unhappy victims of Czech tyranny and at the same time corresponds to the dignity of a great power.

I can only emphasize to Your Excellency that the Sudeten Germans are not coming back to the German Reich in virtue of the gracious or benevolent sympathy of other nations but on the ground of their own will based on the right of self-determination of nations and of the irrevocable decision of the German Reich to give effect to this will. It is, however, for the nation an unworthy demand to have this recognition made dependent on conditions which are not provided for in treaties nor are practical in view of the shortness of time.

I have, with the best intention and in order to give the Czech nation no justifiable cause for complaint, proposed
— in the event of a peaceful solution — as the future frontier that nationalities frontier which I am convinced represents a fair adjustment between the two racial groups, taking also into account the continued existence of the large language islands. I am, in addition, ready to allow plebiscites to be taken in the whole territory which will enable subsequent corrections to be made in order — so far as possible — to meet the real will of the peoples concerned. I have, moreover, declared myself ready to allow this plebiscite to take place under the control of either international commissions or a mixed German-Czech commission. I am finally ready during the days of the plebiscite to withdraw our troops from most of the disputed frontier area subject to the condition that the Czechs do the same. I am, however, not prepared to allow a territory which must be considered as belonging to Germany on the ground of the will of people and of the recognition granted even by the Czechs to be left without the protection of the Reich. There is here no international power of agreement which would have the right to take precedence over the German right.

The idea of being able to entrust to Sudeten Germans alone the maintenance of order is practically impossible, in consequence of the obstacles put in the way of their political organization in the course of the last decade and particularly in recent times. As much in the interests of the tortured, because it is defenseless, population as well as with regard to the duties and prestige of the Reich, it is impossible for me to refrain from giving immediate protection to this territory.

Your Excellency assures me that it is now impossible for you to propose such a plan to your own government. May I assure you for my part that it is impossible for me to justify any other attitude to the German people. Since for England it is a question at most of political imponderables, whereas for Germany it is a question of the primitive right of the security of more than 3,000,000 human beings and the national honor of a great people.
I fail to understand the observation of Your Excellency that it would not be possible for the Czech Government to withdraw their forces as long as they were obliged to reckon with possible invasion, since precisely by means of this solution the grounds for any forcible action are to be removed. Moreover, I cannot conceal from Your Excellency that the great mistrust with which I am inspired leads me to believe that the acceptance of the principle of the transfer of the Sudeten Germans to the Reich by the Czech government only was given in the hope thereby to win time so as by one means or another to bring about a change in contradiction of this principle.

For if the proposal that these territories are to belong to Germany is sincerely accepted there is no ground to postpone the practical resolution of this principle.

My knowledge of Czech practice in such matters over a period of long years compel me to assume the insincerity of the Czech assurance so long as they are not implemented by practical proof.

The German Reich, however, is determined by one means or another to terminate these attempts, which have lasted for decades, to deny by dilatory methods the legal claims of oppressed peoples.

Moreover, the same attitude applies to other nationalities in this State. They are also victims of long oppression and violence. In their case also every assurance given hitherto has been broken. In their case also attempts have been made by dilatory dealing with their complaints or wishes to win time in order to be able to oppress them still more subsequently. These nations, if they are to achieve their rights, will sooner or later have no alternative but to secure them for themselves. In any event, Germany—as it now appears to be the case—if she should find it impossible to have the clear rights of Germans in Czechoslovakia accepted by the way of negotiation, is determined to exhaust the other possibilities which then alone remain open to her.

Adolf Hitler.
From Prime Minister to Reich Chancellor
Second Letter Sept. 23, 1938

GODESBERG, SEPT. 23, 1938.

MY DEAR REICH CHANCELLOR:

I have received Your Excellency's communication in reply to my letter of this morning and have taken note of its contents.

In my capacity as intermediary it is evidently now my duty — since Your Excellency maintains entirely the position you took last night — to put your proposals before the Czech Government.

Accordingly, I request Your Excellency to be good enough to let me have the memorandum which sets out these proposals together with the map showing the area proposed to be transferred subject to the result of the proposed plebiscite.

On receiving this memorandum I will at once forward it to Prague and request the reply of the Czechoslovak Government at the soonest possible moment. In the meantime, until I receive their reply, I should be glad to have Your Excellency's assurance that you will continue to abide by the understanding which we reached at our meeting of Sept. 14 and again last night that no action should be taken, particularly in Sudeten territory, by the forces of the Reich to prejudice any further mediation which may be found possible.

Since the acceptance or refusal of Your Excellency's proposal is now a matter for the Czechoslovak Government to decide, I do not see how I can perform any further service here, whilst on the other hand, it has become necessary that I should at once report the present situation to my colleagues and the French Government. I propose, therefore, to return to England.

Yours faithfully,

NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN.
tive German-Czech commission should be set up to settle all further details.

Appendix

The evacuated Sudeten German area is to be handed over without destroying or rendering unusable in any way the military, economic or traffic establishments (plants). These include ground organization of air service and all wireless stations.

All economic and traffic materials especially rolling stock of the railway system in the designated areas are to be handed over undamaged. The same applies to all utility services (gas works, power stations, etc.).

Finally, no foodstuffs, goods, cattle, raw materials, etc., are to be moved.

DOCUMENT VII

The Czech Reply

My government has instructed me just now, in view of the fact that the French statesmen are not arriving in London today [the French arrived later in the day], to bring to His Majesty's Government's notice the following message without any delay:

The Czechoslovak people have shown a unique discipline and self-restraint in the last few weeks, regardless of the unbelievably coarse and vulgar campaign of the controlled German press and radio against Czechoslovakia and its leaders, especially President Benes.

His Majesty's and the French Governments are very well aware we agreed under most severe pressure to the so-called Anglo-French plan for ceding parts of Czechoslovakia. We accepted this plan under extreme duress. We had not even time to make any representations about its many unworkable features.

Nevertheless, we accepted it because we understood it was the end of demands to be made upon us and because it followed from Anglo-French pressure that these two powers
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Yours faithfully,

Neville Chamberlain.
The Hitler Memorandum

Reports increasing in number from hour to hour regarding incidents in the Sudetenland show that the situation has become completely intolerable for the Sudeten German people and, in consequence, dangerous to the peace of Europe.

It is, therefore, essential that the separation of the Sudetenland, agreed to by Czechoslovakia, should be effected without any further delay.

On the attached map the Sudeten German area which is to be ceded is shaded in red. Areas in which a plebiscite also is to be held, over and above the areas to be occupied, are drawn in and shaded in green.

Final delimitation of the frontier must correspond to the wishes of those concerned. In order to determine these wishes a certain period is necessary for the preparation of a plebiscite during which disturbances must in all circumstances be prevented.

A situation of parity must be created. The area designated on the attached map as German is to be occupied by German troops without taking into account whether in a plebiscite it may prove to be in this or that part of an area with a Czech majority.

On the other hand, Czech territory is to be occupied by Czech troops without taking into account whether in this area there lie large German-language islands in which in a plebiscite a majority will without doubt give expression to its German national feeling.

With a view to bringing about an immediate and final solution of the Sudeten German problem the following proposals are submitted by the German Government:

I

Withdrawal of the whole Czech armed forces, police, gendarmerie, customs officials and frontier guards from the
area to be evacuated as designated on the attached map, this area to be handed over to Germany on Oct. 1.

II

Evacuated territory is to be handed over in its present condition (see further details in Appendix). The German Government agrees that plenipotentiary representatives of the Czech Government and of the Czech army should be attached to headquarters of the German military forces to deal with details of modalities (methods of making effective) of the evacuation.

III

The Czech Government to discharge at once all Sude- ten Germans serving in the military forces or police anywhere in Czech State territory and permit them to return home.

IV

The Czech Government to liberate all political prisoners of the German race.

V

The German Government agrees to permit a plebiscite to take place in those areas— to be more definitely defined— before Nov. 25 at the latest.

The plebiscite itself will be carried out under control of an international commission. All persons who resided in the areas in question on Oct. 28, 1918, or who were born in those parts prior to this date, will be eligible to vote.

A simple majority of all eligible male and female voters will determine the desire of the population to belong either to the German Reich or the Czech State.

During the plebiscite both parties will withdraw their military forces out of the area to be defined more precisely. The date and duration will be settled mutually by the German and Czech Governments.

VI

The German Government proposes that an authorita-
tive German-Czech commission should be set up to settle all further details.

Appendix

The evacuated Sudeten German area is to be handed over without destroying or rendering unusable in any way the military, economic or traffic establishments (plants). These include ground organization of air service and all wireless stations.

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His Majesty’s and the French Governments are very well aware we agreed under most severe pressure to the so-called Anglo-French plan for ceding parts of Czechoslovakia. We accepted this plan under extreme duress. We had not even time to make any representations about its many unworkable features.

Nevertheless, we accepted it because we understood it was the end of demands to be made upon us and because it followed from Anglo-French pressure that these two powers
would accept responsibility for our reduced frontiers, and would guarantee us their support in the event of our being feloniously attacked.

The vulgar German campaign continued.

While Mr. Chamberlain was at Godesberg, the following message was received by my government from His Majesty's and French representatives at Prague:

"We have agreed with the French Government that the Czechoslovak Government be informed that the French and British Governments cannot continue to take responsibility of advising them not to mobilize."

My new government headed by General Syrovy declared they accept full responsibility for their predecessor's decision to accept stern terms of the so-called Anglo-French plan.

Yesterday [last Saturday] after the return of Mr. Chamberlain from Godesberg, a new proposition was handed by His Majesty's Minister in Prague to my government with the additional information that His Majesty's Government is acting solely as an intermediary and is neither advising nor pressing my government in any way.

Mr. Krofta [the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister] in receiving the plan from the hands of His Majesty's Minister in Prague, assured him the Czechoslovak Government will study it in the same spirit in which they have cooperated with Britain and France hitherto.

My government now has studied the document and map. It is a de facto ultimatum of the sort usually presented to a vanquished nation and not a proposition to a sovereign State which has shown the greatest possible readiness to make sacrifices for appeasement of Europe. Not the smallest trace of such readiness for sacrifices has yet been manifested by Hitler's government.

My government is amazed at the contents of the memorandum.

The proposals go far beyond what we agreed to in the so-called Anglo-French plan. They deprive us of every safe-
guard for our national existence. We are to yield up large proportions of our carefully prepared defenses and admit German armies deep into our country before we have been able to organize it on a new basis or make any preparations for its defense.

Our national and economic independence would automatically disappear with acceptance of Herr Hitler’s plan.

The whole process of moving the population is to be reduced to panic and flight on the part of those who will not accept the German Nazi regime. They have to leave their homes without even the right to take their personal belongings or even, in the case of peasants, their cows.

My government wished me to declare in all solemnity that Hitler’s demands in their present form are absolutely and unconditionally unacceptable to my government.

Against these new cruel demands, my government feels bound to make their utmost resistance and we shall do so, God helping us.

We rely upon the two greatest Western democracies, whose wishes we have followed, much against our own judgment, to stand by us in our hour of trial.

DOCUMENT VIII

Czechoslovak Minister in London to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs


Sir: I have communicated to my government the Prime Minister’s question which he sent to me yesterday afternoon and for which he wished an answer. This question of the Prime Minister’s as I understood it I transmitted to Prague as follows:

“Although Hitler did say that the memorandum handed the Czechoslovak Government by His Majesty’s Government was his last word and although Chamberlain doubts very much that he could induce Hitler to change his mind at this late hour the Prime Minister may, under the circum-
stances, make one last effort to persuade Hitler to consider another method of settling peacefully the Sudeten German question, namely by means of an international conference attended by Germany, Czechoslovakia and other powers which would consider the Anglo-French plan and the best method of bringing it into operation. He asked whether the Czechoslovak government would be prepared to take part in this new effort for saving peace."

To this question I now have received the following answer of my government:

"The Czechoslovak Government will be ready to take part in an international conference where Germany and Czechoslovakia, among other nations, would be represented, to find a different method of settling the Sudeten German question from that expounded in Hitler's proposals, keeping in mind the possible reverting to the so-called Anglo-French plan. In the note which Masaryk delivered yesterday afternoon mention was made of the fact that the Czechoslovak Government, having accepted the Anglo-French note under the severest pressure and extreme duress, had no time to make any representations about its many unworkable features. The Czechoslovak Government presumes that if a conference were to take place, this fact would not be overlooked by those participating."

My government, after the experience of the last few weeks would consider it more than fully justifiable to ask definite binding guarantees, in effect that no unexpected action of an aggressive nature would take place during the negotiations and that the Czechoslovak defense system would remain intact during that period.

DOCUMENT IX
Prime Minister to Reich Chancellor
LONDON, Sept. 26, 1938.

My Dear Reich Chancellor:
In my capacity as intermediary I have transmitted to the Czech Government the memorandum which Your Excel-
lency gave me on the occasion of our last conversation.

The Czech Government now informs me that while they adhere to their acceptance proposals for the transfer of Sudeten German areas on the lines discussed by my government and the French Government and explained by me to you on Thursday last they regard as wholly unacceptable the proposal in your memorandum for the immediate evacuation of the areas and their immediate occupation by German troops, these processes to take place before the terms of cession have been negotiated or even discussed.

Your Excellency will remember in my letter to you of Friday last that I said an attempt to occupy forthwith by German troops areas which will become part of the Reich at once in principle and very shortly afterward, by delimitation, any normal demilitarization would be condemned as an unnecessary display of force, and that, in my opinion, if German troops moved into areas that you had proposed, I felt sure the Czech Government would resist and that this would mean the destruction of the basis upon which you and I a week ago agreed to work together—namely, an orderly settlement of this question, rather than a settlement by use of force. I referred also to the effect likely to be produced upon public opinion in my country and in France, and, indeed, in the world generally.

The development of opinion since my return confirms me in the views I expressed to you in my letter and in our subsequent conversation.

In a communication with me about your proposals the Government of Czechoslovakia point out that they go far beyond what was agreed to in the so-called Anglo-French plan. Czechoslovakia would be deprived of every safeguard for her national existence. She would have to yield up large proportions of her carefully prepared defenses and admit German armies deep into her country before it had been organized on a new basis or any preparations had been made for its defense. Her national and economic independence would automatically disappear with the acceptance of
the German plan. The whole process of moving populations is to be reduced to a panic flight.

I learn that the German Ambassador in Paris has issued a communiqué which begins by stating that as the result of our conversations at Godesberg Your Excellency and I are in complete agreement as to the imperative necessity to maintain peace in Europe. In this spirit I address my present communication to you.

In the first place, I would remind Your Excellency that the Czech Government adhere to their acceptance of proposals for the transfer of Sudeten German areas and there can be no question of Germany “finding it impossible to have their clear rights of Germans in Czechoslovakia accepted by way of negotiation.”

I am quoting the words at the end of Your Excellency's letter to me of Friday last (Document Four).

On the contrary, a settlement by negotiation remains possible and, with a clear recollection of the conversations which you and I have had and with an equally clear appreciation of the consequences which must follow the abandonment of negotiations and the substitution of force, I ask Your Excellency to agree that representatives of Germany shall meet the representatives of the Czech Government to discuss immediately the solution by which we are confronted with a view to settling by agreement the way in which the territory is to be handed over. I am convinced that these discussions can be completed in a very short time, and if you and the Czech Government desire it I am willing to arrange for the representation of the British Government at the discussions.

In our conversation, as in the official communiqué issued in Germany, you said that the only differences between us lay in the method of carrying out an agreed principle. If this is so, then surely the tragic consequences of a conflict ought not be incurred over difference in method.

A conference such as I suggest would give the confidence that the cession of territory would be carried into
effect, but that it would be done in an orderly manner with suitable safeguards.

Convinced that your passionate wish to see the Sudeten German question promptly and satisfactorily settled can be fulfilled without incurring human misery and suffering that would inevitably follow on a conflict, I most earnestly urge you to accept my proposal.

I am yours faithfully,

NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN.

DOCUMENT X

Reich Chancellor to Prime Minister
BERLIN, Sept. 27, 1938.

Dear Mr. Chamberlain:

I have in the course of the conversations once more informed Sir Horace Wilson, who brought me your letter of Sept. 26, of my final attitude. I should like, however, to make the following written reply to certain details in your letter:

The government in Prague feels justified in maintaining that the proposals in my memorandum of Sept. 23 went far beyond the concessions which it made to the British and French Governments and that acceptance of the memorandum would rob Czechoslovakia of every guarantee for its national existence. This statement is based on the argument that Czechoslovakia is to give up a great part of her prepared defense system before she can take steps elsewhere for her military protection. Thereby the political and economic independence of the country is automatically abolished. Moreover, the exchange of population proposed by me would turn out in practice to be a panic-stricken flight.

I must openly declare that I cannot bring myself to understand these arguments or even admit that they can be regarded as seriously put forward.

The government in Prague simply passes over the fact that the actual arrangement for the final settlement of the Sudeten German problem in accordance with my proposals
will be made dependent not on a unilateral German petition [translator's note: or decision] or on German measures of force but rather on the one hand on a free vote under no outside influence and on the other hand to a very wide degree on a German-Czech agreement on matters of detail to be reached subsequently.

Not only the exact definition of territories in which a plebiscite is to take place, but the execution of the plebiscite and the delimitation of the frontier to be made on the basis of its result, are in accordance with my proposals to be met independently of any unilateral decision by Germany. Moreover all other details are to be reserved for agreement on the part of a German-Czech commission.

In the light of this interpretation of my proposals and in the light of the cession of Sudeten population areas, in fact agreed to by Czechoslovakia, the immediate occupation by German contingents demanded by me represents no more than a security measure which is intended to guarantee a quick and smooth achievement of the final settlement.

This security measure is indispensable. If the German Government renounced it and left the whole further treatment of the problem simply to normal negotiations with Czechoslovakia the present unbearable circumstances in the Sudeten German territories, which I described in my speech yesterday, would continue to exist for a period, the length of which cannot be foreseen. The Czech Government would be completely in a position to drag out the negotiations on any point they liked and thus to delay the final settlement.

You will understand, after everything that has passed, that I cannot place such confidence in assurances received from the Prague Government. The British Government also would surely not be in a position to dispose of this danger by any use of diplomatic pressure.

That Czechoslovakia should lose part of her fortifications is naturally unavoidable in consequence of the cession of the Sudeten German territory, agreed to by the Prague Government itself. If one were to wait for the entry into
force of the final settlement, in which Czechoslovakia completed new fortifications in the territory which remained to her, it would doubtless last for months or years. But this is the only object of all Czech objections.

Above all, it is completely incorrect to maintain that Czechoslovakia in this manner would be crippled in her national existence or in her political and economic independence. It is clear from my memorandum that the German occupation would only extend to a given line and that the final delimitation of the frontier would take place in accordance with the procedure I have already described.

The Prague Government has no right to doubt the German military measures would stop within these limits. If, nevertheless, it desires that such doubt be taken into account the British and, if necessary, also the French Government can guarantee quick fulfillment of any proposal.

I can, moreover, only refer to my speech of yesterday, in which I clearly declared that I regret the idea of any attack on Czechoslovakia’s territory and that under the condition I laid down to them was even ready to give a formal guarantee for the remainder of Czechoslovakia. There can, therefore, be not the slightest question whatsoever of a check to the independence of Czechoslovakia.

It is equally erroneous to talk of an economic rift. It is on the contrary a well-known fact that Czechoslovakia after the cession of the Sudeten German territory would constitute a healthier, more unified economic organism than before.

If the government at Prague, finally, evinces anxiety also in regard to the state of the Czech population in the territories to be occupied I can only regard this with surprise. It can be sure that on the German side nothing whatever will occur which will preserve for those Czechs the similar fate that has befallen Sudeten Germans consequent on Czech measures.

Under these circumstances, I must assume that the Government of Prague is only using the proposal for the oc-
cupation by German troops in order, by distorting the meaning and object of my proposal, to mobilize those forces in other countries, particularly England and France, from which they hope to receive unreserved support of their aim and thus achieve the possibility of a general warlike conflagration. I must leave it to your judgment whether in view of these facts you consider you should continue your effort — for which I would like to take this opportunity once more of thanking you — to spoil such manoeuvres and bring the Government of Prague to reason at the very last hour.

ADOLF HITLER.
TEXT OF FOUR-POWER ACCORD

September 29

Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, taking into consideration the agreement which has already been reached in principle for cession to Germany of the Sudeten German territory, have agreed on the following terms and conditions governing the said cession and the measures consequent thereon and by this agreement they each hold themselves responsible for the steps necessary to secure its fulfillment:

I

The evacuation will begin on Oct. 1.

II

The United Kingdom, France and Italy agree that the evacuation of the territory shall be completed by Oct. 10 without any existing installations having been destroyed and that the Czechoslovak Government will be held responsible for carrying out the evacuation without damage to the said installations.

III

The conditions governing the evacuation will be laid down in detail by an international commission composed of representatives of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Czechoslovakia.

Occupation by stages of the predominantly German territories by German troops will begin on Oct. 1. The four

By courtesy of the New York Times.

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TEXT OF FOUR-POWER ACCORD

territories marked on the attached map will be occupied by German troops in the following order:

Territory marked No. 1 on the 1st and 2d of October; territory marked No. 2 on the 2d and 3d of October; territory marked No. 3 on the 3d, 4th and 5th of October; territory marked No. 4 on the 6th and 7th of October.

The remaining territory of preponderantly German character will be ascertained by the aforesaid international commission forthwith and be occupied by German troops by the 10th of October.

The international commission referred to in Paragraph III will determine the territories in which a plebiscite is to be held. These territories will be occupied by international bodies until the plebiscite has been completed. The same commission will fix the conditions in which the plebiscite is to be held, taking as a basis the conditions of the Saar plebiscite. The commission will also fix a date, not later than the end of November, on which the plebiscite will be held.

There will be a right of option into and out of the transferred territories, the option to be exercised within six months from the date of this agreement.

A German-Czechoslovak commission shall determine details of the option, consider ways for facilitating the transfer of population and settle questions of principle arising out of the said transfer.

The final determination of the frontiers will be carried out by the international commission. This commission will also be entitled to recommend to the four powers, Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, in certain exceptional cases minor modifications in strictly ethnographical determination of the zones which are to be transferred without plebiscite.

The Czechoslovak Government will within a period of four weeks from the date of this agreement release from their military and police forces any Sudeten Germans who may wish to be released and the Czechoslovak Government
TEXT OF FOUR-POWER ACCORD

will within the same period release Sudeten German prisoners who are serving terms of imprisonment for political offences.

ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government have entered into the above agreement on the basis that they stand by the offer contained in Paragraph VI of the Anglo-French proposals of Sept. 19 relating to an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression.

[The paragraph referred to reads: "Accordingly His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be prepared as a contribution to the pacification of Europe to join in an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression. One of the principal conditions of such a guarantee would be the safeguarding of the independence of Czechoslovakia by the substitution of a general guarantee against unprovoked aggression in place of the existing treaties which involve reciprocal obligations of a military character.

When the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia has been settled, Germany and Italy, for their part, will give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia.

The heads of the governments of the four powers declare that the problems of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia if not settled within three months by agreement between the respective governments shall form the subject of another meeting of the heads of governments of the four powers here present.

SUPPLEMENTARY DECLARATION

All questions which may arise out of the transfer of territory shall be considered as coming within the terms of reference to the international commission.

Munich.
THE ANGLO-GERMAN PEACE PACT

October 1

We, the German Fuehrer and Chancellor and the British Prime Minister, have had a further meeting today and are agreed in recognizing that the question of Anglo-German relations is of the first importance for the two countries and for Europe.

We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again.

We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries, and we are determined to continue our efforts to remove possible sources of differences and thus to contribute to assure the peace of Europe.

(Signed) ADOLF HITLER
(Signed) NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN

By courtesy of the New York Times.