

THE AXIS ON THE AIR

by

HAROLD ETTLINGER



THE BOBBS-MERRILL COMPANY

Publishers

Indianapolis

New York

COPYRIGHT, 1943, BY THE BOBBS-MERRILL COMPANY
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES

First Edition

D810
P7G++2

THE CORNWALL PRESS, INC., CORNWALL, N. Y.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. The Battle of Words	11
II. The Biggest Liar in the World	21
III. The Traitors	38
IV. Those Who Fell	61
V. Divide and Conquer	68
VI. To Bore from Within	94
VII. The Freedom Stations	107
VIII. The Satellites	120
IX. The Voice of Japan	131
X. The Bottomless Pit	148
XI. Pursuit of the Fox	165
XII. We Call Him Meyer	188
XIII. Slave Peoples, Free Spirits	197
XIV. Trouble on the Home Front	207
XV. The Soft Underbelly	221
XVI. Germany's Nightmare	232
XVII. The End of Il Duce	252
XVIII. Propaganda and Peace	257
XIX. Propaganda Gems	267
XX. The Voice of Moscow	274
XXI. The Voice of America	280
XXII. London Calling	295
XXIII. Shades of Victory	309

THE AXIS ON THE AIR

My thanks to the *Chicago Sun* for permission to use the name of my column, *The Axis on the Air*, as the title of this book, and for the use of quotations from its files.

I would like also to express my appreciation to the Foreign Service Division of the Office of War Information for its co-operation in providing material from its monitoring records.

H. E.

CHAPTER ONE

THE BATTLE OF WORDS

IT IS SPRING, 1943. An American soldier at a camp somewhere behind the lines in North Africa idly turns the dial of a portable radio. He is tired and a little homesick. Suddenly he perks up, for out of the loudspeaker come the strains of "Home, Sweet Home." He listens and nudges his buddy to see if he recognizes the music. Together they listen until the song is ended. They wait, wondering where it has come from.

Then a soft voice is heard, a woman's voice, soothing and ingratiating. She is speaking English.

"Well, boys," she says familiarly, "my poor American boys, things don't look so good for you, do they? Here you are, thousands of miles from home, in a foreign land that means nothing to you, while your home, sweet home, is in danger. And what are you fighting for? For the English, who mock you and scoff at you at every opportunity. Don't do it, boys! Don't get yourselves killed or maimed for life for the English, or for the Bolsheviks!"

The boy at the radio switches the dial. Who was that woman? She was the Axis on the air—an agent of the German propaganda ministry speaking from Berlin, trying with soothing words and nostalgic music to bore into the morale of American fighting men. Does she succeed? That depends on how quickly she is recognized for what she is.

The time is a few minutes after the American soldier has turned off the voice of the woman in Berlin. A wealthy Arab sits in his house behind a high wall in the native quarter of Algiers. He sips his thick coffee and listens to his radio. The voice he hears speaks Arabic.

"Arab leaders have protested to the authorities against the insulting of native women by the American troops in North Africa," says the voice. "The barbarians from across the Atlantic respect nothing but their stomachs. That is why they requisitioned all the foodstuffs in one town yesterday, and when all they wanted was not forthcoming they arrested all the male inhabitants. The American general announced that every thirty minutes one Arab hostage would be shot until the food demanded was delivered."

The Arab turns off the radio and glances uneasily toward the apartments of the women members of his household. Does he believe what he has heard? Perhaps, for he has heard it often now. Where does it come from? From Berlin, where a special propaganda service devotes its entire time to trying to turn the native populations of Africa, from Cairo to Casablanca, against the British and American forces.

It is the winter of 1942. A monitor at the shortwave listening post of a great American news service sits at his receiver recording a Morse code transmission from Stockholm.

"Where is Hitler?" the dots and dashes ask. "Why has he made no public appearance since last November? Why have all his recent public statements been read for him by others? Reliable reports reaching here from anti-Nazi sources in Germany say the reason is that Hitler has suffered an acute mental collapse and has been confined to a sanatorium. It is believed not unlikely that he may even be dead by now."

The foreign editor gets the dispatch. It is highly sensational, but is it true? There is no way of knowing. Shall he pass it up, then? It is a tough decision to make, for he knows that it will get headlines in many cities. He decides finally to send it out on the cross-country trunk wire, thoroughly qualified and fully identified as a rumor from Stockholm for which it is impossible to obtain confirmation.

But by the time the item gets into print in some cities the qualifying phrases that he so carefully inserted are modified or even dropped, at least in the headlines. And the purpose for which the story was designed has been fulfilled. What was that purpose? It was to slow down our war effort by making newspaper readers think that the war may be over soon. How was it that the radio of a neutral country like Sweden played this Nazi game? There was nothing difficult about that. Nazi agents plant rumors of that kind in neutral countries every day of the week.

It is the fall of 1942. Two men are conversing in a Boston streetcar, loudly enough to be overheard by the people around them.

"It's a scandal, that's what it is!" one of them is saying. "Why, I heard on the radio last night that we have sent so much artillery to the Russians and the British that we haven't got more than fifty anti-aircraft guns left to protect the whole Atlantic coast!"

What the man said about having heard that on the radio was true, but he neglected to mention that it was the Axis radio, by shortwave. He also neglected to mention that by speaking of it in a streetcar he was knowingly spreading a vicious and groundless rumor. Why? Because he was a fifth columnist, a Nazi sympathizer, just a little one to whom Berlin had given

a little job—the job of listening to the German shortwave transmissions and picking up rumors to spread, rumors that would make the people along the Atlantic coast uneasy for their safety and resentful of our Allies and our government.

It is spring, 1942. A family in San Francisco is listening to a shortwave broadcast from Tokyo.

“Your government is lying to you!” says the speaker in clipped English. “You have been led to think that you are safe, when actually your government knows that we are ready to land on your coast whenever we wish. You have not been told that Santa Barbara is already in ruins as a result of just one of our bombardments from the sea. We can reach your coasts at will, because your government has sent your navy eight thousand miles away to guard the empires of others—the Dutch and the British.”

Thus from the far end of the Axis comes a propaganda double play. None too subtle, you say? The Axis does not deal in subtleties. It deals in hammer blows and drives them home by repeating them often enough. In that broadcast Tokyo did not worry about the fact that the people in Santa Barbara could laugh at them, knowing that the bombardment referred to had been carried out by a single surfaced submarine and had ruined nothing but a couple of wooden beach houses. Tokyo knew that the people of San Francisco or Portland would carry in their minds a kernel of doubt. Maybe there was something to it after all. Wartime censorship being what it is, maybe there really had been severe damage at Santa Barbara. And maybe we *have* sent our naval strength so far away that our coasts are unprotected. Those doubts were what Tokyo wanted to sow to create uneasiness and to make people bring pressure on the government to recall the Navy from the

far western Pacific, where it was interfering all too effectively with the plans of the Japanese.

It is the fall of 1940. England has won the battle of Britain, thanks to reserves of fortitude and courage people never dreamed they had, and thanks to a magnificent group of men, the Royal Air Force. Thousands are dead, tens of thousands of homes lie in ruins. There is no one in England who has not made some sacrifice. Germany is furiously bitter at the fact that these stubborn English dogs do not know when they are beaten. Hitler has peered across the narrow English Channel just as Napoleon had. He has seen the cliffs of Dover and has gone back to Berlin, frustrated. The air blitz has failed. Something must be done to soften up those English. Propaganda might help. An English family gathered about the radio in their blacked-out home get what Germany considers the proper treatment.

“You are losing everything by your resistance,” says Berlin, in English. “And for what? So that the plutocrats across the Atlantic, the dollar imperialists in Wall Street, working hand in hand with the Bolsheviks, can dismember your empire while you are too weak to resist. The help Churchill tells you America is sending is a myth! You can save yourselves if you make peace now! But if you fight the hopeless fight against the greatest military machine the world has ever known you are doomed. And when you are lost everything you had will be in the hands of Washington!”

It is early June, 1940. The battered and bewildered French armies are being pushed back toward Paris. The Stukas, the tanks and the sheer weight of numbers are winning for the Germans. Refugees clog the roads and the French military

machine is completely disorganized. Yet at some places French units hold out. To them the Berlin propagandists speak, in Jovian voices over powerful loudspeakers on the very field of battle.

“You are alone!” the speakers roar. “You are doomed! You have been deserted by your so-called allies, the English! Where are they? Do you see them anywhere? Did we not tell you time and again that England would fight to the last Frenchman?”

The speakers are switched off. The attack comes, and from the hearts of the more gullible Frenchmen the will to fight is gone.

That is Nazi propaganda. It neglects nothing. No item is too insignificant to use if it has a purpose. No lie is too blatant, no distortion too grotesque, no means too devious, no contradiction too striking, for Hitler has said that the memory of the common man is short and that his forgetfulness is great.

The Axis took to the air to fight its battle long before the beginning of the actual military war. The political war had been on for many years—since 1931, at least, in Japan, and since 1933 in Europe. Propaganda over the air has played a tremendous role.

Some of us have the idea that propaganda is the business of winning a people or an individual over to a cause or a doctrine like Fascism by hammering away at its good points and attacking other doctrines like democracy or Communism. That is really only the smallest, least important part of it. In none of the propaganda cases I have given was Berlin or Tokyo trying to sell us any of their ideas. The only people they have ever sought to win over to their side have been those among us whom they thought they could use in getting at our own politi-

cal structures in the United States, Britain and Russia. Their ambitions in regard to the rest of us, whom they know they cannot use, have been to soften us, to frighten us, to bewilder us, to destroy our will to fight. If painting Hitler as a maniac confined to a sanatorium serves that purpose, the Nazis do it. If painting the Japanese as a people who would disregard all the codes of civilization helps, they do that too.

Propaganda may be likened to artillery in a battle. Just as the heavy guns are training on the enemy to prepare for an attack by the infantry, so propaganda is trained on us to prepare the way for a direct military assault.

Just what does the Axis expect its propaganda to accomplish? In general its aims are to do these things:

1. Convince us that our cause is a lost cause even before we fight, because the German military machine is invincible. That is a little harder to do now than it used to be, before Germany suffered defeats in Russia and Africa, but that does not prevent the persistent Nazis from trying, especially since it worked so well in western Europe even before an attack was made—during the Munich crisis, for instance.

2. Convince us that Germany has no aggressive aims toward us. That too is getting a little harder as the aggressions have succeeded one another and have been directed against peoples whose safety had been guaranteed by the Germans. But the Axis radio still works on it and not without success. It has convinced all too many of us that we are thoroughly safe on our sea-protected continent, that we could get along with a Nazified Europe, that we could do business with Hitler, and that a negotiated peace could restore normal commercial and political affairs and normal profits provided a few incorrigible democrats like President Roosevelt and Wendell Willkie were got out of the way.

3. Make us think that the real threat to us comes not from Nazism but from something else, Communism for example. Work on the Red menace theme, which found such fertile ground before the war and which still finds plenty of it every time the political sprinkling can is tilted, even after the dissolution of the Communist International. Try to convince us, particularly the middle class, that the defeat of Germany would bring Communism everywhere, with the result that our bank accounts would disappear.

This involves hiding the fact that the Nazis have wiped out their own middle class with much more speed and ruthlessness than it was ever made to disappear in Russia, but the Axis does not mind contradictions. Communism, moreover, is not the only menace held up to enemies of the Axis as the real foe. Some countries are given a steady diet of "the menace of Americanism," which is something a little difficult to explain. It is therefore usually left unexplained but it sounds impressive and apparently the Axis radio propagandists think it works.

4. Destroy our will to fight. This propaganda job has many facets. One of the more obvious is to try to turn us against our government and our Allies, but there are more devious ones as well. For example, the effort is made to convince us that we have already practically won the war and that there is no use of our continuing to exert ourselves or make further sacrifices. For this campaign the idea that Germany is invincible is forgotten, or rather is put into reverse. German propagandists, hoping we will not remember their previous admonitions about the undefeatable Nazi military machine, tell us that Germany is really a pushover. Her production has fallen off, they tell us in broadcasts routed through so-called neutrals, her effective manpower is stretched to the breaking point, her armies are

decimated and she is incapable of launching another offensive. So let us just sit back and win the inevitable victory.

5. Create confusion among us by spreading false rumors and misinformation. The aim is to get us as bewildered as possible, to pull us mentally and emotionally from all sides, to sap our energy and our resolution.

These are the general aims. To achieve them the Axis on the air works on a varied list of specific ones. Recently government monitors compiled a list of Hitler's propaganda objectives with regard to us. Hitler, they found, wants us to believe the following:

Democracy is dying.

Our armed forces are weak.

The New Order is inevitable.

We are lost in the Pacific.

Our west coast is in such grave danger that there is no point in fighting on.

The British are decadent and have sold us a bill of goods.

The cost of the war will bankrupt the nation.

Civilian sacrifices will be more than we can bear.

Stalin is getting too strong, and Bolshevism will sweep over Europe.

Our leaders are incompetent, our government is incapable of waging war.

Aid to our Allies must stop.

Our real peril is the Japanese, and we must join Germany to stamp out the yellow peril.

We must bring all of our troops and weapons back to the United States and defend only our own shores.

The Chinese and the British will make a separate peace with Japan and Germany.

American democracy will be lost during the war.

Some of these things that Hitler wants us to believe, you will notice, are the same things at which a section of our own press hammers in its obscurantist opposition to the administration and to the way the war is being conducted. Hitler is very grateful for this help—which bears no relation to legitimate constructive criticism to be expected in a democracy—just as he was for the isolationist America First movement which was so useful to him before the war. The Axis radio has demonstrated this gratitude many times, as we shall see.

CHAPTER TWO

THE BIGGEST LIAR IN THE WORLD

A HATCHET-FACED little man with a club foot walks through the pages of this ~~book~~. He is Dr. Paul Joseph Goebbels, an ambitious and unscrupulous Rhinelander who became the propaganda genius of the Nazi party and then of the Third Reich.

It is with his unquestioned cleverness that we deal when we look into the matter and the method of Axis radio propaganda, for the whole machine is his creation, built on principles laid down by himself and Hitler long ago. One of the first things Hitler had the senile Hindenburg do when the Nazi chief was named chancellor in 1933 was to sign a decree creating the first propaganda ministry in German history for Goebbels, and the latter went right to work. He had two jobs, first to sell Nazism to the German people, and second to prepare the world for German conquest.

Goebbels was born in Rheydt in the Rhineland in 1897, the son of a factory foreman. There have been stories that he was actually the illegitimate son of a banker who saw to it that he was given a good education, but these stories have never had factual support. Because of his deformity Goebbels was exempt from military service during the First World War, and he spent the war years attending various German universities and acquiring learning which made him without doubt the best educated of the Nazis when he later joined the party. His

intelligence stood out strikingly among the boorish and brutal followers of Hitler, such as Roehm and Streicher, and it was not long before he reached the top in party circles.

Goebbels went from one university to another, as was often the custom among German students. Between 1917 and 1921 he attended Heidelberg, Bonn, Freiburg, Berlin and other famous centers of learning, which he later repaid for his education by reducing them to Nazi rubber stamps. At Heidelberg he is said to have owed much to Professor Frederick Gundolf, a Jew and a famous Shakespearian scholar. For what he gave Goebbels Professor Gundolf has now been repaid—in the Nazi manner.

It was in Munich in the early twenties that Goebbels first made his acquaintance with the Nazi movement—in the Munich of discontent and poverty, of a rebellious German spirit which could not reconcile defeat with the idea of a super race, of a plotting Reichswehr which had been casting about for something that would lead it back to power and had hit upon Hitler. The latter had done small services for the army as a petty stooge, but he had made some speeches and his gifts as a rabble-rouser had been noted.

Goebbels was not yet ready for Nazism, however. In fact he was writing for Catholic papers which castigated it. His attacks were so telling that Gregor Strasser, one of Hitler's lieutenants whom he later had murdered in the *putsch* of 1934, admired Goebbels and invited him to join the party and edit one of its papers. Since Goebbels' Catholicism went no deeper than the nib of his facile pen, his conscience was not troubled when he turned against it. In 1924 he became co-editor with Strasser of a small Nazi paper in Elberfeld. He distinguished himself mainly in that period by getting himself expelled from the Rhineland by the French occupation authorities for preach-

ing Nazism and revenge under the noses of the inept victors.

Two years later, when the party was beginning to have some real financial backing and take on the character of a national force, Hitler named the clever Goebbels *gauleiter* of Berlin. There he really put his talents as propagandist to work on a big scale, founding a newspaper, *Der Angriff*, and making it the most blatant Nazi mouthpiece in Germany.

In 1928 Goebbels was elected to the Reichstag, where his skill as a speaker came to national attention. To him went much of the credit for swinging the successes of the Nazis in the elections of 1930. It is interesting to note what an American observer said of Goebbels' oratory at that time, for it throws light on his propaganda methods and on the manner which all other Axis propagandists have followed in imitation of him.

Frederick T. Birchall of the *New York Times* wrote:

"It is notable that throughout his delivery he does not argue, merely affirms; never questions, merely commands; never admits, only denounces. The most astonishing statements are emitted, the most unassailable facts are perverted and thus presented, all in a thunder of fervid confidence that leaves one gasping."

Birchall wrote also of Goebbels' methods in his first really important propaganda vehicle.

"In the *Angriff* he evolves into a German type of Léon Daudet [the famous French royalist polemist noted for his violent invective], somewhat less literary but quite as poisoning and with an inexhaustible supply of invectives against liberals, democrats, the Weimar republic, and the Jews. The very shallowness of his appeal, compared with that of the Frenchman, gave him an incomparably more effective range."

Shallowness—that is one of the great secrets of Axis propaganda. Forget the intellectuals, Hitler said. Aim for the big-

gest, lowest audience. Goebbels knew how to do that better than anyone else. He knew how to do it so well that he boasted to an American interviewer in 1940 that if he wanted to get Germany steamed up he could do it in twenty-four hours. That was no idle boast, for he had already done it more than once. He had done it when Germany marched into Austria. He had done it when the Munich meeting was used to wring Czechoslovakia from the frightened and indecisive leaders of France and England. He had done it when all of Czechoslovakia was devoured the following spring. And he had done it when the army wanted the semblance of an excuse for marching into Poland at the outset of the war in 1939.

To go back to the assumption of power by the Nazis in 1933, Goebbels' immediate job was to lay his hands on every organ of public opinion, every channel of propaganda. The first thing he did was to put the well-developed German radio setup directly and thoroughly at the service of the Nazi state, not forgetting the shortwave system, which was yet small but which he was to mold quickly into a world-wide propaganda machine. He took over the press, that is he took over the papers he wanted and saw to it that the others went out of business. Never in history has there been such a casualty list of newspapers as there was in Germany in the months after the Nazis took power.

He formed the *Reichskulturkammer*—the Culture Chamber of the Empire—with himself at the head. This agency was to become the teacher and guardian of the new totalitarian culture. He organized seven subchambers—for music, literature, sculpture and the graphic arts, painting, the stage, the movies and radio. All musicians, artists, journalists, actors and writers were forced to belong to one of these chambers if they wanted to work, and in order to be eligible for membership

they had to meet with Goebbels' approval. They had either to be good Nazis, to show the prospect of being easily won over, or to be an outstanding figure in the intellectual world which the Nazis would like to keep for window dressing to show the world that culture still lived in Germany under the New Order. Goebbels thus acquired a firm grip on all means of expression and entertainment, free to use it for his propaganda purposes and to see that it was not employed as a vehicle by any opposition to the regime.

At one time Goebbels apparently felt that things might get a little dull if he banished criticism altogether, and he announced that he would allow it. However, one Berlin paper took him at his word and criticized his propaganda setup. That was the end of criticism, for Goebbels became furious, suspended the paper for three months and fired the editor.

When Goebbels set out to create his foreign propaganda machine he had two kinds of directives from which to work. The first was the ideas Hitler had expressed in *Mein Kampf* on how propaganda ought to be presented, at whom it ought to be aimed, and what could be expected from it. The second was a document drawn up by Goebbels' ministry shortly after its creation called "General Instructions for German Agents in North and South America." That document, unfortunately, got all too little publicity when it was first brought to light in France and England. We shall return to it in a moment.

Hitler had two governing ideas about propaganda which he expressed in *Mein Kampf*. The first was that you must appeal to the lowest common mentality. The second was that if your appeal was properly made you could sell anybody anything.

"Propaganda must appeal forever and only to the masses," he said. "By propaganda, with clever and permanent applica-

For note
line

tion, even heaven can be palmed off on a people as hell, and vice versa."

He elaborated frankly: "All propaganda should be popular and adapt its intellectual level to the perception of the least intelligent of those toward whom it is directed. The receptive ability of the great masses is very limited, their understanding is small. On the other hand their forgetfulness is great. All effective propaganda should be limited to very few points. It has to confine itself to little and repeat this eternally."

Emotion and not reason should be appealed to, Hitler said. "People in the overwhelming majority are so feminine in nature and attitude that their activities and thoughts are motivated less by sober consideration than by feeling and sentiment."

And on the matter of truth in propaganda, Hitler's instructions were these: "In the size of the lie there is always contained a certain factor of credibility, since the great masses of people may be more corrupt in the bottom of their hearts than consciously or intentionally bad. Therefore, with the primitive simplicity of their minds they will more easily fall victim to a great lie than to a small one, since they themselves lie sometimes in little things but would certainly be too ashamed of very great lies.

"As soon as one's propaganda admits even a glimpse of right on the other side, the ground for doubting one's own cause is laid."

In this connection Hitler added that in the last war British and American propaganda in regard to the Germans was psychologically correct, at least insofar as it helped harden the British and American people to war.

"By displaying the Germans to their own people as barbarians and Huns," he said, "they prepared the individual soldier

for the horrors of war and guarded him against disappointments."

German propaganda in the First World War, on the other hand, was wrong, in his view, because it merely painted the enemy as ridiculous, rather than formidable. When the German soldier met these enemies in the battlefield he got anything but a ridiculous impression of them, with the result that he was unnerved.

Hitler, you will note from the above, does not have a very high opinion of people.

Goebbels' general instructions to his agents in this hemisphere created a great sensation when they were published in *Le Petit Parisien*, a leading morning newspaper in Paris, in November 1933. I say they created a sensation, but they unfortunately did no permanent good, for neither the government nor the press did much about them or even remembered them when in later years they were put to such effective use by the Nazis. The American correspondents in Paris cabled the story of them to this country, but here too they were not given nearly enough prominence. Indeed, in many papers they got less prominence than the indignant German denials of their authenticity. Those who were so anxious to give publicity to the German denials overlooked the fact that the German ambassador in Paris had failed to make a written protest to the foreign ministry because he knew that the document was authentic, and he knew that the French government knew it too.

I was in Paris at the time the instructions were published, but I cannot quote from the original articles about them because, for obvious reasons, the files of *Le Petit Parisien* are not available. However, Ernst Kris wrote a comprehensive discussion of them in February 1942, in the magazine *Social Research*, and I shall quote from his translation.

Our main interest in those instructions here is that they ordered the creation of a system of German radio propaganda to be used for the western hemisphere. Germany was not yet ready to come out into the open with her propaganda appeals to us, and for that reason the instructions were such a close secret. Germany was not yet ready for war and wanted to make her preparations in the ensuing years behind a mask of innocence.

The instructions, Mr. Kris pointed out, began from the assumption that public opinion in this hemisphere was hostile to the Nazi government. It was considered necessary to sway this opinion so that when the moment arose pressure might be brought to bear on the governments which depended on it. For instance, if isolationism could be encouraged and fostered—secretly—then pressure against American intervention in Europe might successfully keep the government from taking action to help the victims of German aggression.

The campaign, said the instructions, was to be carried out through the following channels:

“An extended German wireless news service; the same in a thoroughly neutral guise; a skillful wireless broadcast propaganda which will also be organized for overseas listeners; direct attempts to influence the foreign press in the ways to be described in greater detail; the publication of German propaganda articles in this foreign press in a form not recognizable as propaganda; the cultivation of personal relations with leading foreign newspaper representatives and newspaper owners, with a view to possible influence by personal favors; a cultural and tourist-travel propaganda which henceforth must also to some extent be skillfully employed for purposes of political propaganda; furthermore, any sort of organization adapted to influencing opinion in favor of Germany—including occasional exhibitions, above all in the field of the graphic arts, which

would include in particular all propagandist works concerning the new Germany; finally there is the question of translating these and other German books and writings into the native language of the States in question; that is to say, in the present case, into English, Spanish and Portuguese."

The document went on to explain that the radio was to be used chiefly for the organization and expansion of "German broadcasting hours." Without "violating the legal regulations of the particular country," it said, these hours were to serve the purposes of German foreign policy. It was specified that the programs were to include broadcasts in the language of the country for which they were intended, but shortwave programs direct from Germany were not discussed, since they were still in the process of being built up to the point where they would be important other than for direct news transmission.

Getting down to the matter of just what we were to be brought to believe, the instructions said that in this country and Canada the propagandists were going to have a difficult time, because "the war feeling is still strong and the German-American population has not by any means recovered full consciousness of its German origin and character." It advocated a careful procedure, in view of the rapid assimilation of German immigrants in this country.

In general, the document went on, an isolationist policy was to be supported and appeals to American business were to be emphasized. It recommended that everything be done to stir up anti-French feeling, based on France's failure to pay the war debt. It urged that American businessmen be convinced that they stood to make more money if they supported German foreign policy.

It urged, particularly in South America, that newspapers with Fascist leanings "no matter what their importance" be

treated with deference and that every consideration be shown Fascistlike organizations.

Special efforts were to be made to cultivate men of prominence, to whom collaboration was to be made attractive by "financial sacrifices."

As for the substance of the propaganda Goebbels wanted to foster in direct relation to German foreign policy, the central theme was to be the alienation of potential allies from France and the fostering of anything that might gain support for German aims to regain the losses of World War I. England was regarded as France's most dangerous and most powerful ally and "therefore all the foreign political efforts of the Reich government must be directed towards disturbing the relations between these two countries."

The document announced to German agents that the Nazi government did not intend to tolerate the Versailles Treaty much longer:

"No stone must be left unturned in order to secure a revision of this dictate [*diktät*] by way of negotiation. At the same time, however, nothing must be left undone which might be of service in the event of Germany being compelled to take what is her due by other means."

Item number one in those days was the Saar, it was explained, "while the inalienable German claims to Alsace-Lorraine should not at present be insisted upon to a degree correspondent with the wishes and the feelings of the German people."

Anything that might cause trouble with Poland was to be avoided, but only for the moment, because "naturally these claims have by no means been relinquished, any more than the demand for the restoration of, at any rate, a portion of the former German overseas colonies."

Besides colonies, the instructions continued, "the ultimate

aim of the National Socialist foreign policy must be the recovery of all portions of territory around Germany which contain a German minority," and the obtaining of equality in armaments, "without any international control."

It was made plain that Germany did not yet feel herself ready for conquest.

"It is clear that it will be extraordinarily difficult to secure satisfaction of all these demands by way of negotiation. It is, however, equally clear that Germany is not yet prepared to obtain satisfaction of these claims in another way."

That, briefly, was the way Germany intended to organize her propaganda and what she sought to gain by it. It merely remained for Goebbels to get busy and put the scheme into practice, and that he did, with remarkable thoroughness and with the use of a propaganda budget which called for no economies.

Parenthetically, Goebbels used his position as German culture boss for purposes no more honorable than his propaganda work but in a different field. As Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda—that was his flamboyant title—he found that there were many women who needed to curry his favor, movie stars for instance, and he proceeded to enlighten them, privately. The fact that he was married and the father of four children did not stand in his way, nor did the fact that he looked so much like a rat that he was the delight of caricaturists. Actresses who wanted to get ahead, who wanted the stamp of approval of the Reichskulturkammer, had to lavish their favors on Dr. Goebbels, or else.

One escapade of that variety got Goebbels world-wide publicity and a dressing down from Hitler that would have spelled the doom of a more dispensable party man. It was in December 1938 when the story was carried throughout the world

(outside of Germany, of course) that he had nearly been murdered for his attentions to the German film star Lida Barova. The story was that the Barova's husband, a well-known actor named Gustave Froelich, had been sent to a concentration camp for threatening Goebbels and challenging him to a duel. Froelich's friends then ambushed Goebbels in Froelich's apartment and administered a terrific beating before the little man got away. He spent a month in the hospital thereafter and displayed two black eyes and a missing front tooth. Hitler was not amused, but the story goes that Goering, who had always hated Goebbels, was delighted.

Goebbels spent the years before the war industriously building up the greatest system of shortwave broadcasts in the world and perfecting the radio propaganda setup for Germany itself and for the European countries which could be reached by ordinary long-wave and medium-wave transmissions. He did not have to start from scratch, for Radio Zeesen, a shortwave transmitter located near Berlin, already existed when the Nazis came to power.

The records show that Radio Zeesen was already getting fan mail from abroad in response to its broadcasts before the advent of the Nazis in 1933. It had listeners in distant parts of the world, particularly in South America, where the business of trying to alienate the Latin Americans from the United States by playing on the theme of Yankee imperialism and "the colossus of the north" was already under way. By 1936 Goebbels had built up the Zeesen shortwave transmissions to the point where he was able to boast of the receipt of 45,000 letters a year.

Year by year other transmitters were added—Breslau, Stuttgart, Deutschlandsender and so on—until by 1943 the Germans were going on the air with well over two hundred broadcasts a

day for foreign consumption. They were on the air for a total of nearly a hundred hours a day, broadcasting in more than thirty languages, beaming programs from India to Argentina.

The first thing the Germans did every time they entered a country in their conquest of Europe was to take over the radio stations. Radio squadrons went with the troops and got right to work, so that the system Goebbels had at his disposal grew tremendously as the years passed. Until recently our own propaganda broadcasts to the European continent and to the rest of the world were only a feeble trickle compared with the torrent of words Goebbels was pouring out against us everywhere. We are still far behind, but we and the British are catching up slowly, and in some fields are able to compete on something like even terms.

Although he had the press and all other means of expression at his disposal for propaganda purposes inside Germany, Goebbels always gave the radio first place in his attention. Before the war it was chiefly used, of course, to broadcast the speeches of Hitler, Goebbels himself and other party leaders—so thoroughly used that it became a crime in Germany for an individual even to look as though he might not be giving rapt attention to the words coming out of the loudspeaker.

After the war began it was used for communiqués and commentaries as well as speeches, and during the days when Germany was piling up victory after victory Goebbels saw to it that the people were put in the proper frame of mind to hear the great triumphal announcements. There was martial music, there were special fanfares for special triumphs, orders for people to stand at attention in public places while the official announcements were being made, and generally all the trimmings that a showman handling the puppet that was German public opinion would think of.

An idea of how the German public behaved before the loud-speaker even before the war may be gathered from the story told by Dr. Eric W. Stoetzner, former advertising manager of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, in a recent speech in Philadelphia.

"Radio is now established as a political force," he said. "An experience I had as president of an advertising club in southern Germany may illustrate radio's great power. The club members were invited for a Friday twelve-o'clock luncheon meeting, to which they came from all parts of the country. We were just about to gather when, totally unexpectedly, an announcement came out of the ether. The omnipresent Hitler was to speak over the radio at twelve o'clock.

"The effect was that of an earthquake. All means of communications were stopped. All labor ceased. Printing presses, big and small, halted, for after the speech—who knew?—the world might look entirely different. The plant workers and employees had to gather in an assembly hall and listen in as the 'folk's community.'

"The speech began to roar over all heads, the faces became masks, everybody put on an interested smile. After the speech was finished the obligatory exclamations followed: 'How inspiring! How wonderful!'

"The crowd poured out of the assembly hall. The important meeting of the visitors from far out of town gathered two hours later without the slightest consideration for their other business engagements."

Goebbels' radio stunts usually come off the way he plans them, but once in a great while they miss fire. It was my pleasure in the summer of 1938 to be a witness to what was probably the doctor's most embarrassing moment. Max Schmeling was fighting Joe Louis. The representative of the German master race was going to administer a beating to the Negro representa-

tive of decadent America. Schmeling had already beaten Louis once, when Joe had had an inattentive moment. Goebbels saw tremendous propaganda possibilities in the return fight. In the first place he was sure of a victory by Schmeling—at least all his advisers had promised him one. Goebbels had not yet learned that one of the drawbacks of power is that you are surrounded by yes-men, who say yes for reasons of self-preservation when the answer should be no.

All Europe was to hear the fight broadcast by the German radio as relayed from New York. All Europe was to hear the blow-by-blow account of Aryan superiority asserting itself. I was in Paris at the time, and I heard the arrogant, boastful introduction to the fight which came over the air from Germany. The European radio audience was told all about how Schmeling was going to uphold the fact of German might in all fields. It was told, further, that Goebbels was going to take time off from his arduous duties as a pillar of the state to listen to the broadcast of the fight. He was going to do it in Schmeling's own house, by the side of Schmeling's own pretty wife, the German movie star Annie Ondra. That would make fine propaganda—the picture of Goebbels sitting by the radio with Annie Ondra—so the newsreel men were all there to see that posterity lost none of it.

Then the fight began—and it ended. Almost before the German announcer could draw a breath it was over. Joe Louis had administered to Schmeling the beating of his life, and the Nazi superman was hanging in agony from the ropes. The German radio went abruptly off the air with no explanation beyond some confused mumbling. Soon there was recorded music. Goebbels stalked out of the house of the tearful and benumbed Annie Ondra.

As Schmeling's manager, the late Joe Jacobs, would have said, on that day Goebbels should have stood in bed.

I remember another occasion, earlier in Nazi history, when Goebbels' radio got its signals badly mixed and ruined Germany's chances to play innocent of one of the most ruthless crimes ever organized by a government. That was the assassination of the Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss in Vienna during the abortive Nazi *putsch* of 1934.

As the plans had been laid in Berlin the chancellery was to be invaded at the zero hour by Nazi strong-arm men in the uniforms of Austrian police. Dollfuss was to be shot, and then the Austrian minister to Rome, Rintelen, was to take over the chancellery under Nazi protection and set up a National Socialist state. A very careful timetable for all this had been worked out—and incidentally the main job of the Nazis besides taking the chancellery was to gain immediate control of the Vienna radio station.

The timetable for the murder of Dollfuss at his desk was followed to the letter, but the intermediary who was to fetch Rintelen lost his nerve at the last moment. Rintelen, the man who was slated to become the first of the quislings in Europe, waited nervously at a café in the heart of Vienna, but nobody came to get him.

While he was still sitting there, wondering what had gone wrong, the Berlin radio, assuming that the timetable had been followed, issued the flash announcement that Dollfuss had been killed, that the Austrian Nazis had taken power and that Rintelen was at that very moment installed as chancellor.

When the *putsch* failed Germany did her best to make the world think that she had had nothing to do with it, but the words of Goebbels' own radio were too clear an indictment for

anybody to believe her innocence, if anybody had been so inclined.

Rintelen, if you recall, instead of becoming chancellor, shot himself in the head. His attempt at suicide failed, and at this writing he still lives as a paralytic monument to Nazi treachery.

CHAPTER THREE

THE TRAITORS

BEFORE GOING FURTHER into the substance of Axis propaganda itself let us meet some more of the charming people connected with it. Let us get acquainted with the traitors, Dr. Goebbels' roster of able assistants who speak to us in our own language and who seek to undermine our unity and our morale in terms they think we understand.

It is hard for most of us to believe that there are Americans who will sit at a microphone in Berlin and work feverishly for the defeat of their country. It is harder still to conceive what kind of people they might be. Even knowing them personally does not always help to understand them. I myself knew one of them well. He did not seem like a potential traitor in those days, yet now, of all the Americans broadcasting from Berlin, he is the most violent in his attacks upon us, the most servile in obeying the spirit of Goebbels' anti-American line.

No doubt these traitors are to be pitied as well as despised. They cannot possibly have any self-respect, no matter how cocky they may sound over the air—and some of them are very flip indeed. Their nights must be long and cold. Some of the American traitors have already been indicted, and their view of the future must be black, for they know that when Germany is defeated they are finished, if not before. If somehow they elude the plans which the Department of Justice has already made for

them, they know that their treason will be punished in some other way, and I do not mean in an afterlife. Meanwhile—what is just as bad from their point of view—they know that the Germans who are using them cannot regard them with anything but contempt. Hitler and Goebbels may buy the sorry commodity they have to sell, but even to a Nazi a traitor is a traitor. The man at the cashier's window in the Berlin broadcasting studio must curl his lip just a little every month when he pushes their dirty marks under the bars.

We cannot say just what makes a traitor, but we can note at least one thing which many of them have in common. They never seem to stem from the left or moderate or even conservative side in politics but always from the extreme right. There seems to be a thin line between violent, extreme nationalism and treason. It seems that a man is a Fascist before he is an American or a Frenchman or a Norwegian, and that he will betray his country in the interests of Fascism. One moment, being a Fascist, he is violently nationalistic, working for a political creed which involves exalting his own country above others. The next moment, having been frustrated in his aims, he turns against his country and fights for its downfall, or sees to it, if it has already fallen, that it does not rise again. That is true of men like Vidkun Quisling in Norway, Pierre Laval in France, Léon Degrelle in Belgium, Anton Mussert in Holland, and it is true of the smaller fry who work for Dr. Goebbels' Axis radio, for example the most famous of the traitor-broadcasters, Lord Haw Haw.

Lord Haw Haw is Britain's Number One traitor. He had the questionable distinction of being the first of all the traitor broadcasters in the field, and he set the style for many who came after him. He fled to Berlin with his wife in August

1939, and began broadcasting for Goebbels shortly after the war broke out. He was no stranger to Germany, however, for he had frequently visited there before the war and had done a number of odd jobs for the Nazis in Britain. Among other things he had served the Gestapo by providing them with information on the activities of German refugees in England.

Let us look into his background. Lord Haw Haw is William Joyce, born in Ireland in 1906. He got his degree at London University and decided to break into politics after the last war. He had difficulty getting along with people, however, and cast about trying one thing and another until he found just what he was looking for in the British Fascist party. That was back in 1923. Those Britishers, aping Mussolini's tactics, sought to stir up as much trouble as possible, and were fiercely and violently anti-Catholic and anti-Jewish. They got into many street brawls in London, and in one of those Joyce acquired a scar and the nickname Scarface.

However, in spite of their engaging in occasional brawls and otherwise seeking to put their imprint on English life, the original British Fascists were not militant enough for Joyce's tastes. When Sir Oswald Mosley formed the British Fascist Union, Haw Haw dropped the original organization and went in with Mosley. He rose rapidly in the party and by 1936 was Mosley's director of propaganda. That was a good job, as jobs in the party went, and it no doubt gave him valuable experience for his more ambitious work later with Goebbels. But it was not the job that Joyce wanted. He wanted Mosley's job. He wanted to be the fuehrer. Mosley found out about it, and in 1937 Joyce was expelled from the party.

That by no means ended his career as a militant Fascist. On the contrary, it gave him the opportunity to embark on a line that was the direct copy of the German Nazi party—Mosley

always held Mussolini up as his model—and he accordingly formed the National Socialist League with the frank aim of propagating Nazi doctrines in England. It was then that his period of intimacy with the Gestapo began and that the ground was laid for his becoming a traitor when war broke out.

People who knew Joyce in the old days say they would not be surprised at anything he did. Blond and ruddy-faced, he had a disagreeable personality and a violent, unbalanced nature, they recall. They had him down as conceited, mean and unfaithful, completely devoid of moral standards. Add to that the fact that he was a pretty good speaker and you have exactly what Goebbels was looking for.

One of the curious angles to Haw Haw's career on the Berlin radio is that it might never have been so successful had it not been for the British sense of humor. A few people listened to his broadcasts at the outset of the war with mild interest, wondering who he might be, for his name had not been announced by Berlin. The papers gave casual mention to the fact that somebody in Berlin was sniping at British morale in nightly broadcasts in English. The British government never attempted to jam his broadcasts, since it felt certain that only a fringe of public opinion would be swayed by anything he might say.

Then a writer for the *Daily Express* in a feature story about the traitor in Berlin referred to him as Lord Haw Haw. The aim, of course, was to ridicule him by drawing him as the kind of caricature Englishman we see in the movies. Everybody did, in fact, get a good laugh at his expense, but at the same time his broadcasts were called to public attention more strikingly than they had ever been before. The *Daily Express* sold some two million copies a day, and the publicity was just what Lord Haw Haw needed. Thus the story, instead of getting him

laughed off the air, caused him to be laughed into a position of prominence that he could never have achieved by his own efforts. We must give both Goebbels and Joyce credit, moreover, for catching on quickly. Joyce immediately accepted the name of Lord Haw Haw and used it regularly. He did everything he could to capitalize on it and to encourage speculation as to who he might be. In short, anything that got him talked about was all right with him, for it made people listen to his programs, and that was his one and only aim.

The writer of that story has probably regretted it many times, but it is certainly no fault of his that it had the results it did. It was just one of those things that often happens when publicity works the wrong way.

In any case, Lord Haw Haw played up to the full the laugh at his expense and the mystery about his identity. He used it for a year and a half. He finally admitted in April 1941 that he was William Joyce, but clung to Lord Haw Haw as his *nom de guerre* until September 1942. Since then he has officially taken the German name of Froelich by deed poll—Froelich meaning joyous and intended as a translation of Joyce.

Americans never got to hear Lord Haw Haw except in occasional shortwave broadcasts, but it was not because the Nazis did not try to sell him to us. It is to the credit of the American broadcasting companies that long before we entered the war, and were officially if not spiritually neutral, they rejected Nazi efforts to get them to relay Lord Haw Haw's anti-British broadcasts to this country. In fact Goebbels used that rejection for one of his periodic attempts to jack up Lord Haw Haw's publicity and make sure that interest in him did not wane.

In early October 1941 Berlin gave the American correspondents there the story that Lord Haw Haw had been banned from the air. It looked like a good story, and enough of the

men fell for it to give it world-wide currency. Then, when everybody was tuned in at his regular broadcast time to see who would replace him, Lord Haw Haw appeared himself as if nothing had happened. Berlin had simply misrepresented. It had given the world the impression that he had been banned from the Berlin radio, when actually he had been banned by the American networks.

In announcing the affair at the time, Paul White of CBS said pointedly: "Only a Lord Haw Haw would expect us to broadcast a Haw Haw."

As for the substance of Lord Haw Haw's broadcasts, they follow the general German line, with the occasional use of English localisms and with a choice of subject matter, where possible, that he thinks would appeal to his hearers. He has done his utmost for three years to undermine British morale, but thanks to the fortitude of the people, he has been a colossal failure. He has tried to divide the British from ourselves and from the Russians and to play up the Red menace bogey, with his eye on the British middle class. But there too he has had little success.

Following is an example of the way he works, taken from a broadcast in January 1943, the aim of which was to try to make propaganda capital out of the Russian victories on the eastern front:

"Despite fantastic losses in men, guns, planes and tanks, Stalin still has others which he hurls into the fray. Four-fifths of the material used by Russia is her own. Anglo-American help has scarcely reached twenty percent. England and the United States are faced with a tragic dilemma. On the one hand they are pleased to see the Russians fighting for them and are helping them get through the winter so successfully. On

the other hand they must be terribly worried by this practical demonstration of Bolshevist military might.

“Stalin is rendering Anglo-Saxon capitalists priceless service today. But tomorrow? Tomorrow must loom threateningly. Either they must be conquered by the tripartite powers or be swallowed by the Russian imperialistic Bolshevism.”

If you hear an American voice from Berlin some night that speaks in a familiar yet sneering tone and seems to pat his listeners on the head as though they were backward children, you may be sure it is Fred Kaltenbach, the closest thing we have to Lord Haw Haw. As a matter of fact Kaltenbach was once dubbed Lord Hee Haw, which pleased him immensely, but it failed to stick.

Kaltenbach's specialty is trying to alienate us from the British, although he is ready and willing to talk on any subject Dr. Goebbels assigns to him. All Kaltenbach seems to ask is that his scripts give him the opportunity to exercise a dusty sense of humor which he nourishes on bad puns and flippant little phrases like “my pretties,” or “my dear deluded children.” From time to time he comes out with what he obviously considers a killer-diller, and when he does he works it until the last sickly smile has been wrung from it. For example during the debate in Congress over Lend-Lease in 1940 Kaltenbach began his broadcasts to America with the words, “Lend or lease me your ears!” Or when he was still trying to hang onto the name Lord Hee Haw he used to sign off his broadcasts with the line: “This is England's Lord Hee Haw, who will live up to his title by giving British pretensions in this war the merry merry hee haw!” A perfect scream, as you can see.

The son of a German immigrant, Kaltenbach was born in Dubuque, Iowa, forty-five years ago. His father, who spent

most of his life as a butcher although he once made his living selling Bibles from door to door, gave him and his brother a good education. The brother, incidentally, is now a respected chaplain in the U.S. Army. Fred went to Grinnell College and Iowa State Teachers College and took a master's degree at the University of Chicago. He enlisted in the Army in the First World War and became a lieutenant in the Coast Artillery before the Armistice but never saw active service. After the war he became a member of the American Legion post at Waterloo, Iowa, and it was as a legionnaire that he first began to expound Nazi ideas which brought him under the sharp suspicion of his associates. His career as an unofficial Nazi propaganda agent in Iowa lasted until 1936, when he was discharged from a teaching post he had held at Dubuque Senior High School since 1931.

Kaltenbach's exit from the lives of the people of Dubuque, whom he thought were considerably more gullible than they were, created not a little sensation. His students had brought home stories that he was trying to indoctrinate them with Nazi theories and that he had actually tried to organize them into a brown-shirt organization without their being aware of it. They reported that Kaltenbach had organized a hiking club and that after it had made several field trips he had ordered the boys to appear next time in brown shirts. That was the proper shirt for hiking, he explained.

Indignant parents protested to the school board and to the local Legion post. The Legion wanted to be as fair as possible to Kaltenbach, and they invited him to appear before them to explain his ideas. He did so, with typical arrogance and with no effort to disguise his open admiration for Hitler and Nazism. As he stepped from the platform one legionnaire floored him with a blow to the jaw, others piled on him and he was given

a severe beating before he escaped. He was dismissed by the school board, and shortly afterward he turned up in Germany. At the outbreak of war he began to broadcast for Goebbels, first over the German English-language station Debunk and later on the regular Berlin shortwave broadcasts to this country as well.

Edwin Hartrich, who was with CBS in Berlin after the fall of France, reports that Kaltenbach's Middle-Western accent and alleged knowledge of American psychology pays him about forty dollars a week, plus extra food rations and a reduction in his rent.

Kaltenbach's first assignment was naturally to keep us out of the war. His method was to try to stir up as much hatred of the British among us as possible and at the same time to soothe us into believing that Germany never would attack us, had no designs on anything we possessed and was, in fact, willing to see us grab up just about everything in this hemisphere for our very own empire. All she wanted was for us to keep out of Europe. The traitor's technique for a time was to write his scripts in the form of a chat with "my old friend Harry out in Iowa" and all his other friends. Investigation has failed to uncover any friends of Kaltenbach in all Iowa, although there is such a man as Harry, who is a respectable lawyer and has been much embarrassed by the whole business.

When Kaltenbach failed to keep us out of the war he did his best to try to influence us against waging an active campaign. What we ought to do, he said, was just keep our troops at home where they wouldn't get hurt. About two months after Pearl Harbor Kaltenbach made the following typical appeal to "reason" in a broadcast from Berlin:

"Keep your troops at home for American defense and nothing can happen to you. Neither Japan nor Germany have any

interest in attacking any part of the western hemisphere directly. Japan and Germany can no more attack you than you can attack them on your own territory.

“It isn’t too late to force Roosevelt to revise his policy, even if you are officially at war with Japan and Germany.

“Japan’s aims are toward the southwest Pacific and toward India. There are, of course, the Philippines, but Japan regarded these, in view of Roosevelt’s threats and provocations, as a military threat to her. If Roosevelt were to keep his troops and Navy at home, Japan would doubtless go ahead with her plans in the Far East without so much as casting a side glance at the western hemisphere.”

Now that the incorrigible Roosevelt has refused to listen or be influenced and won’t keep our troops at home, Kaltenbach has turned to other jobs. One of his favorite propaganda targets is the American housewife.

“Stock up on all the canned and other foods you can lay your hands on,” he told her last December, before rationing of canned goods went into effect. And he used his chatty technique for all it was worth. “Before the war is over your cute little left hand will be sufficient to count all the goods that will be unrationed,” he said cheerfully. “So you had better be wise. Stock up in larder and cellar before it is too late.”

Like other Nazi commentators Kaltenbach has run into trouble because he could not resist making predictions but, just as typically, he has hoped we would forget about them and just go on with the business of hating the British and hoarding food. He made one of those unfortunate predictions in April 1942 when he said, “Believe me, folks, as far as the Russian front is concerned, there isn’t going to be any in 1943 or 1944.”

William L. Shirer, who as CBS correspondent in Berlin saw Kaltenbach often, says that he actually believes the Nazi non-

sense he tries to sell us. Shirer recalls seeing Kaltenbach at Compiègne during the armistice negotiations. He was not supposed to be there, and the military was taking him into custody for gate-crashing. A few hours later, Shirer reports, he saw him again. He had escaped and was leaning against a tree gazing with glassy eyes at the railway carriage where the Germans were laying down their armistice terms to the French.

Hardest of the traitors to understand is Robert H. Best, a native South Carolinian, whose violence of language in his broadcasts for Berlin is unequalled. The scripts he writes for himself are such that few of them can be printed unabridged. Most newspapermen who have worked in Europe know Best well, for he was a correspondent for the United Press in Vienna for nearly twenty years. He wore a ten-gallon hat, had a rather unorthodox private life and was generally regarded as a trifle on the queer side, but he gave little evidence before the war that he would turn traitor. He did have ultraconservative political ideas and discussion of the New Deal was to him like the waving of a red flag, but it is still, with most people at least, a far cry from opposition to President Roosevelt to out-and-out treason. I knew Best in Vienna in 1934, when the Nazis attempted the *putsch* in which they assassinated Chancellor Dollfuss but failed to win power, and there was nothing that I could see in Best's coverage of the story that showed particular sympathy for the Nazis. I suppose that in the seven intervening years between then and 1941, when he was interned with the other American correspondents upon Germany's declaration of war on us, he went a long way to the right.

Somebody seems to have worked on Best's prejudices so thoroughly and cleverly that by the time the moment for repatriation came in exchange for German newspapermen and

diplomats in this country he was easily won over to treason. He had swallowed so completely the Nazi line about Roosevelt and the Jews that he couldn't see what he was doing in its true light. His violent, even insane prejudice appears all the stranger in the light of one of the things he did after the Nazis took Austria in 1938. In the United Press Vienna bureau at the time was a German-Jewish refugee newspaperman who had fled from Germany in 1933 and who was so highly placed on the Nazi blacklist that he would certainly have been put to death had he fallen into German hands. He had gone first to the Saar, then to Paris, then the Riviera and finally Vienna. I knew him well, because I had found him in the Saar when I went there to write a series of stories in 1934 before the plebiscite, and it was I who got him his first job as a string correspondent with the United Press.

This man was unable to get out of Austria when the Nazis marched in, and he was naturally terror-stricken. Best, as temporary head of the bureau (he had always been bitter about the fact that the United Press would never name him permanent bureau chief despite his years in Vienna), knew the spot the man was in. Accordingly, he hid him in one of the back rooms of the office, allowed him to sleep there and saw to it that no Gestapo searching parties penetrated to his hideout. Meanwhile, with the aid of the American embassy, he worked out an elaborate scheme for getting him safely across the Hungarian border. Execution of the plan was really a thriller. As I recall it, the man was taken by Best and some embassy officials to a spot close to the border in an official embassy car, then given instructions on how to walk across the line and elude the Nazi border guards over a little-known path in the hills. The embassy car, meanwhile, went through the frontier barricade, picked him up safely on the other side and took him to Buda-

pest. Later the man got back to France and, still just a jump ahead of the Nazis, reached safety in this country.

In view of that story and his general behavior in the prewar years, men who know Best can only conclude that he has become insane. There are evidences of insanity in his broadcasts, particularly the fact that he has been seriously campaigning for people to write his name on the presidential ballots in 1944. He has dreamed up a political party which he calls Christocracy, and has been seriously trying to sell it to the American people while frankly in the pay of Goebbels. One of Best's broadcasts, made in January 1943, gives a better idea of the almost incredible depths to which he has descended than any description could give. Here is how he introduced himself:

"Mr. and Mrs. America and the oncoming generation of young Americans, generation of Americans whose precious Gentile blood is now being poured out in streams by Roosevelt and his Jewish politicians on a foreign battlefield for a foreign cause and for anti-American issues:

"Friends, fellow crusaders and fence-straddlers, and likewise any Judah upstarts, growing suckers or any others who may care to listen in: Here is a year-end message from Robert H. Best, your self-appointed correspondent for the new order of social and economic justice. Robert H. Best, the alarm clock of America's sleeping conscience. Robert H. Best, a native-born South Carolinian of pioneer stock. Robert H. Best, the Christocrat whose goal is to put more of the real spirit of Jesus into the Christian life of both America and Britain.

"Robert H. Best, the candidate of all real true-blue, dyed-in-the-wool Americans for the presidency of the United States of America in November 1944. And in case this is not introduction enough, then you may also call me the leader of that

ever larger majority of Americans who are determined to twist the tail of the Talmud triplets until these triplets are no longer in a position even to try to wring our necks.”

That was one of the more printable samples, and I think it illustrates the grotesque shape the mind of the traitor Best must be in.

Next most important American traitor in the pay of Goebbels is Douglas Chandler, an early convert to Nazism who was given a great propaganda build-up early in 1941 as Paul Revere. Chandler, a former Chicagoan and a writer on a Baltimore newspaper, began toying with Nazism in the late twenties. According to his own story, the outbreak of the war found him in Yugoslavia with his wife, but he has never explained what he was doing there, although he has devoted many broadcast hours to trying to justify his treason. Chandler says that when he wanted to go to Germany from Yugoslavia in the summer of 1940 the American consulate in Belgrade and the State Department in Washington would validate his passport only for travel home. That was the fixed policy at the time, but Chandler says it was a plot against him, especially since his wife was too ill to travel so far. Finally he eluded American authority by “escaping” to Italy.

“Five months of recuperation and medical care in beautiful Florence served to restore my wife’s health to normal,” he recounted in one of his broadcasts. “Then we came to Berlin in order that I might undertake the role of your devoted messenger.”

As Paul Revere, Chandler was an outstanding flop, and he has not been used nearly so much in recent months as Best and Kaltenbach.

Then there is Otto Koischwitz, a former professor at Hunter College, who broadcasts from Berlin under the pseudonym of Professor Okay. Koischwitz, who left this country several years ago just a couple of jumps ahead of the FBI, represents about the lowest thing in propaganda. Most of his broadcasts are examples of the depths to which it can fall. A broadcast he made to our troops in North Africa in February 1943 gives a graphic if slightly nauseating illustration.

He began by telling a story, which he admitted he was not sure was true, about how mediocre the BBC broadcasts had become and how, as a result, somebody had suggested to the British radio authorities that they ought to look for new talent among the wounded war veterans—men, for instance, who had lost a leg or an arm. The British, he said, turned down the suggestion because men with one leg would not be able to walk up the stairs to the broadcasting studios.

After chuckling at this very funny joke, Koischwitz asked: "If they feel that way now, when there is a shortage of labor everywhere, how will they feel after the war?" And with that he got down to the point of his broadcast.

"When you get back home," he warned the men in Africa, "you'll have a tough time finding a job. And if you get home without a leg or an arm you will have an even tougher time. Your heroism and patriotism won't count for a thing. As a matter of fact it doesn't count for much even now."

After dwelling for a few moments on the point, he concluded significantly: "So think before you risk the loss of a leg or an arm. Better be a coward for a few minutes than a cripple the rest of your life."

Two women traitors in Berlin must not be overlooked. They are Jane Anderson, a woman whose anti-Red phobia appears to

have warped her mind, and Constance Drexel, whom the Germans billed as a Philadelphia socialite but who seems to be more in the nature of a female journalistic beachcomber who will do anything for something to eat.

Jane Anderson was once a reputable newspaperwoman and was married to an important figure in Amercian life and a convinced anti-fascist, Deems Taylor. She was born in Atlanta in 1890, was given a good education and became a correspondent in the First World War for two English papers. She first broke into prominence in recent years when she turned up in Spain at the outbreak of the civil war. According to her story she was arrested by the loyalists for her ardent pro-Franco leanings and barely escaped execution. She was ultimately rescued by the United States authorities, she says, after spending forty-three days in a Spanish dungeon.

Despite her alleged sufferings, when she got back to the States she was in good enough shape to make an extensive lecture tour in which she sought to sell Franco to this country and in which she played on the theme of the holy crusade against Bolshevism. She went back to Germany in 1941 and began working for Goebbels, who billed her as a world-famous Catholic, twice condemned to death by a firing squad in Spain, and whose lectures in the United States were indorsed by the Archbishop of Washington.

She would be more effective on the air if she did not get so hysterical.

An idea of the tone of her broadcasts can be gathered from her description of the Fuehrer: "Hitler is an immortal crusader, a great lover of God, who has struck back against the universal enemies of mankind."

As for Constance Drexel, Shirer, to whom she came for a job when he was in Berlin, describes her as "an insignificant,

mixed-up and ailing woman of about fifty who always had a bad cold." He says that she used to harp on her need of money. The Nazis saw that they could buy her cheaply and did so.

E. D. Ward, alias Edward Leopold Delaney, a one-time ham actor from Glenview, Illinois, completes the list of American traitors in Berlin, although there are other English-speaking voices, like that of Walter Boehmer. Ward, who is a man of about sixty, was a stock-company actor and author of light fiction. The Nazis made considerable use of him early in the war for describing the triumphal entry of the Germans into the conquered countries, but since then he has been more or less eclipsed by the traitors described above.

In Rome we have the red-bearded expatriate intellectual gone Fascist, Ezra Pound. What makes him a tool of our enemies is hard to say. Probably his intellectualism has run thin and lost its blood. Probably, too, he likes his home in Rapallo, where he has lived for twenty years, and is willing to buy it from the Italians in whatever currency they demand, including treason.

Pound was born at Hailey, Idaho, in 1885, a relative on his mother's side of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow. He was graduated from Hamilton College in 1905 and got his master's degree at Pennsylvania the following year. After winning a traveling scholarship to Europe, he returned to teach Romance languages at Wabash College, Crawfordsville, Indiana, but he lasted there only four months. The local authorities said he was "the Latin-Quarter type, hardly attuned to the moral or intellectual life of Crawfordsville." He then went back to Europe and has lived there ever since, except for infrequent visits to the States, the last of which was in 1939.

In some ways Ezra Pound is the most interesting of the traitor-broadcasters. Certainly the best educated, he embroiders his causeries on political and social problems beamed to this country and to England in a fabric of historical references and dates intended to show his erudition and impress the listener. Whether they succeed in putting his specious arguments across is questionable. In fact I am inclined to doubt whether Pound's Italian employers are getting their money's worth from him, because he talks over the head of the average man much of the time.

For all his display of education, Pound's blows at all things American and British, his subservience to his Fascist masters, his rather cheap invective, are on no higher a plane than those of his fellow traitors. Much of what he has to say is nothing more than rhetoric, an empty script gilded with expensive words which, whatever they achieve among his listeners, must surely make the Italian censor perspire over his dictionary.

Pound scrupulously avoids discussing developments in the war and limits himself almost entirely to diatribes against the enemies of Italy and academic discussions of political and social problems. Typical of Pound's style was a broadcast beamed at England on June 13, 1943: "You do not yet officially know what the war is about," he said. "You have failed to listen to the voice of reason. I don't mean my voice. I mean you have been such dull thundering asses that you have not, not for forty years, listened to any Englishman or alien critic who could tell you anything sensible. I don't want to claim that I possessed more judgment or perception when I left England in 1920 than I actually had at the time. Liberty is not a right but a duty. That is an Italian saying. I don't claim that I had anything more than a strong personal taste for personal autarchy. American anarchy and Italian Fascism are in perfect accord

about the desirability of personal autarchy. Not a right but a duty. That idea may be exotic. I mean that it may be alien to British bullheadedness. You were better off than the school-boys who recited Macaulay and meant it. Your sense of values was probably better in those days. But so recently as 1931 there were still voices. In fact right up till the war broke loose there were still voices and audible voices among them. . . .”

Here are excerpts from other broadcasts, which also begin as though they were going to remain close to the ground and then float away like the example above:

From a broadcast on April 6, 1943: “The weak and cowardly nations invoke the aid of savages to crush a rising war on their power. England invited red Indians against the English colonists in America. France in the grip of her usuries brought black troops to Europe. London and New York have invited the aid of the Muscovites. And no man knows better than Churchill the meaning of Stalin. No literate man in Europe or America is ignorant of what Judah’s domination has meant and means . . . the governments of London and Washington betrayed civilization and know it. They fight for monopoly. And the American people have been betrayed by gold.”

Pound then really let himself go: “Throughout the ages it has been the favorite device of the creditor class first to work a contradiction of currency which bankrupted the debtors and then cause inflation which created a rise, during which they stole the property they had laid on. And this alternate shifting and debasing of the value of money is not accidental. When Kipton met Bryan, Bryan already knew that the silver propaganda was an implement of a camouflage over a major issue, that is, namely, the control of a national credit, of the national power to buy. . . . Samuel Lloyd understood the use of a single standard. After Waterloo no effective power withstood the usurers

until by 1914 the complete usurocracy had been constructed. For fifty years, or for seventy years, it had been almost impossible to get any large-scale propaganda against the fetish value of gold except by ballyhoo about silver. By 1878 [name undistinguishable] said that silver ballyhoo was already necessary to get in a motion in Congress to keep at least some of the non-interest-bearing national debt in circulation as currency."

I think that will give you an idea of how Pound carries on when he gets onto a technical subject.

Here is another sample, from a broadcast of April 24, 1943: "There are probably no Americans in North Africa with a clear conscience and there may be some with no conscience whatever. . . . The American people have decency enough to see that they should not be attacking Europe from the west while Russia attacks from the east. And in the name of what? Of stealing French territory and British trade."

Here is Pound's way of pleasing his bosses, taken from a broadcast of May 30, 1943:

"I shall repeat two sentences several times if I continue to speak over this radio. First, every social gain that has gone into effect in Italy should be defended. England and the American New Deal follow stumbling in the wake of Fascist invention, in the wake of Italian practice. An old order dies, and a new order rises. That new order is the hope of all people, on whichever side of the battle line."

Occasionally a new voice is heard on the air that sounds as if it might be that of another traitor, newly drafted by Goebbels from among the Americans interned in France and elsewhere. Such was the voice early in 1943 which called itself Mr. Whiteoak. Those of us who had worked abroad thought we

recognized Mr. Whiteoak as a former Paris newspaperman, but so far he has not identified himself conclusively enough for me to give the name I suspect.

Of all the traitors from European countries, not counting the ones who broadcast at stations taken over by the Nazis in their native lands, like Max Blokzijl in Holland, the best-known is probably Paul Ferdonnet, the Frenchman who as the "Traitor of Stuttgart" made such a contribution to the fall of France in the first days of the war. It was Ferdonnet who sniped at French morale so effectively with broadcasts warning that "England will fight to the last Frenchman," and playing on the Joan of Arc theme ceaselessly to remind the French that Britain is the traditional enemy.

Ferdonnet, before becoming a traitor, was a newspaperman of extreme rightist stamp. The French like to minimize his importance, but actually he was once quite a figure on the extreme right. He began working for Germany long before the outbreak of war—as did many other rightist journalists in Paris—but unlike most he set up shop in Berlin itself, as correspondent for a small French publishing house which the Nazis gladly subsidized. He dealt in pro-German political articles and pamphlets and even wrote a couple of books taking the German view in foreign affairs before the war gave him the chance to go on the air in Stuttgart. I don't know where Ferdonnet is now, but it is safe to assume that he has a good job in Paris or Vichy.

It took the Germans nearly two years to come up with a Russian traitor, or a man billed as such. The Russian, who went on the air for the first time in March 1943, is described as Andrey Andreyevitch Vlasov, a former lieutenant general in the Soviet army. So far there is no proof that he is not a phony.

His job, following the orthodox Nazi propaganda line, is first to alienate the Russians from their government and second to try to alienate the Russian government from the other United Nations.

Goebbels wants to make sure that we, as well as the Russians, hear all about Vlasov, for his broadcasts have been transmitted to this country in Morse code for those who cannot pick up the originals. In these Morse-code transmissions Vlasov has been described as the man who disclosed that "Stalin linked the fate of the Russian people with that of England," a charge which Goebbels apparently thinks we would consider serious, although I cannot see why.

On the other side of the world Tokyo has a couple of traitors too, or at least men who might loosely be described as such. One of them is Charles Yoshii, an American-born Japanese who was once a free-lance announcer in Los Angeles. He went to Japan in the early thirties, renounced his American citizenship and became one of Tokyo's leading radio propagandists. Another is a Filipino, Ricardo Perez, who talked to the islands from Japan in their native Tagalog before the fall of Bataan and is now probably installed in Manila.

That is the roster of men and women who have sold out their countries for Dr. Goebbels. The more we know about them the less damage they can do to us, for the weight we give to what we hear on the air depends, in part at least, on what opinion we have of the source. All of these people will be dealt with by our government and the others in time. Eight Americans—Kaltenbach, Best, Pound, Chandler, Delaney, Koischwitz, Miss Anderson and Miss Drexel—were indicted on July 26, 1943 by a federal grand jury on charges of treason. It is the intention of the Department of Justice to bring these people,

when they are apprehended, to trial "before a jury of their fellow citizens, whom they are charged with betraying." Meanwhile, let us remember who they are and why they tell us what they do.

CHAPTER FOUR

THOSE WHO FELL

THE PART that the Nazi radio played in the fall of Poland, France, Belgium and Holland cannot be overestimated. It was used with amazing effectiveness both behind the lines and on the actual field of battle. The way had been prepared for bringing it into full play by years of hammering away at the morale of those countries with all the means of propaganda combined. The groundwork had been laid by vast networks of spies and secret agents, by the buying of traitorous newspapermen, politicians, bankers, manufacturers, generals and even labor leaders and men of the left. Careful execution of the propaganda line described in Chapter II, as laid down in 1933, had ripened Europe for conquest, had permitted to go unpunished and unhindered the rape of Ethiopia, the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the tearing up of the Locarno Pact, the rebuilding of the German army, the occupation of Austria, the Fascist conquest of Spain, and finally Munich and the over-running of Czechoslovakia.

Those of us who were in France in the years before the war could see clearly how propaganda was softening the country for the kill. We saw the outright purchase of large sections of the press by the Japanese in 1931 for the purpose of spreading pro-Japanese propaganda about Manchuria and giving French opinion the Japanese viewpoint. We saw the same thing again

in regard to Ethiopia, when newspapermen who had been bought and paid for by the Italians practically in broad daylight, like Henri Beraud, began to pour out anti-British venom in deadly doses. We saw it in regard to Spain, when a weak French government allowed itself to be paralyzed by financial and political interests which, with German and Italian money and encouragement, painted the Red menace as the main thing to be feared, and which covered up the fact that Spain was being given to the Axis powers. We saw it at the time of Munich when the Nazi propagandists played so successfully on the "fear-of-war" theme that the peace-at-any-price forces won the day and labeled the anti-Munich advocates warmongers.

At that time too we saw the strategy of confusion worked so effectively on the French. We saw them subjected to what they called "a Scottish shower," alternately hot and cold, until people did not know what to think or believe, and until the majority reaction after Munich was a kind of benumbed relief. There was such gratitude at the release of tension—much of it artificially built up—that the people did not realize the price they were paying for Mr. Chamberlain's peace in our time. And finally, we saw an ostensible man of the left like Marcel Déat, now the leading collaborationist in France after Laval, come out with an editorial demanding to know why Frenchmen should die for Danzig. That was the tip-off of how thoroughly German propaganda had penetrated, and it should have been the tip-off of what to expect when war broke out.

But the remarkable thing was that with all this material in our hands, none of us, to my knowledge, drew the right conclusions—namely, that France was lost. We saw all the elements of a collapse, but faith in the myth of the great French army and in the fighting spirit of the French prevented us from drawing the obvious inference. Perhaps some of us did draw

that inference in the back of our minds, but we never admitted it, even to ourselves. True, we had some very uneasy moments during the months of the so-called phony war in late 1939 and early 1940, when things looked very rotten indeed—when, after Poland fell, the French made no attempt to penetrate the Siegfried Line, which was still built in good part of soft, new concrete. We were disturbed by the strange confusion we saw at the censorship office in Paris, by the peculiar way the foreign ministry behaved, by the fact that a few communists had been arrested by the dangerous defeatists of the right were not only at liberty but hard at work.

Only when the blitz actually began and the confusion in France still stood out so sharply did the realization come that it was all over, that our faith in France's ability to pull herself together disappeared. It became clear then that propaganda and corruption had done their work and that the job Germany did on the battlefields themselves was just the finishing touch.

There were three main themes of the radio propaganda as used to support the German armored divisions in their invasion of France: first, the political theme, aimed at dividing France from England; second, the military theme, aimed at confusing the troops; and third, the morale theme, aimed at breaking down resistance both at the front and behind the lines.

All during the winter of 1939 the German radio, using its regular Berlin broadcasts and the traitor of Stuttgart, repeated the anti-British line.

“Where are the English?” the Berlin radio demanded day after day. “England will give the machines; the French must give their lives! England will fight to the last Frenchman!”

Night after night Ferdonnet and others hammered away at the line that England was the historic enemy of France. Satanic Britain, France was reminded, had burned Joan of Arc at the

stake. "Perfidious Albion," the name the anti-British propagandists always used to describe Britain, would never fight herself but would always see to it that French blood was spilled in the defense of England. As for America, it was a money-grabbing plutocracy which wanted only dollar profits, which had dunned France mercilessly for payment of the war debt after 1918 and which, in any case, was too far away to help even if it were so inclined.

"Mental confusion, indecisiveness, panic—these are the weapons of Hitler." The words are from an illuminating pamphlet called *Divide and Conquer*, put out by our Office of War Information, and they describe accurately the German technique in late 1939 and early 1940. The ways in which it was accomplished were innumerable. No trick was too low.

Nazi agents sent home by shortwave descriptions of French families with men at the front, picked for their susceptibility. To these postcards were sent by other agents in towns near the battle lines announcing the death or illness of their fighting sons. Female Nazi agents donned mourning and paraded ostentatiously in public for the purpose of giving people behind the lines the idea that heavy casualties were already being piled up in the early days of the war. Men at the front received anonymous notes announcing that their wives and sweethearts had been unfaithful or had run off with British soldiers. These notes were devilishly clever and included just enough authentic description of the men's homes to cause them to be believed.

Rumors were spread in café talk by agents who got their instructions by following the radio propaganda line. I heard plenty of these myself in the months after war began. Almost any kind of rumor that would attack morale was used. A favorite was the German secret weapon. It was used vaguely at first, but after the fall of Fort Eben Emael in Belgium it was specifi-

cally credited with having brought that feat about. Correspondents in Berlin for foreign neutral radios and newspapers were encouraged to speak of it. The Germans occasionally would drop a hint as to what it might be, or issue a denial of what they pretended had been a specific story about its nature, getting into the denial enough description to set people to speculating.

The theme of German military might and of certain defeat was played upon constantly by the Berlin radio and the traitor broadcasters.

“Get your coffins ready!” loudspeakers would blast across the front lines at Siegfried fortifications.

“Where are the Tommies?” the Germans would demand. They knew that the Tommies were in Flanders a quarter of a million strong, but they also knew that the average French soldier was not aware of it and could not investigate for himself the insinuations that the British were not there. It is remarkable how little French propaganda did to counteract the charge that Britain was letting France down—or, on second thought, in view of the high places reached by the tentacles of Nazi agents, perhaps it is not so remarkable after all.

The idea of certain death for the French soldiers was alternated with one quite the opposite which was extremely effective as part of the war of nerves—the idea that the front lines were really a safe place. German propagandists went to all lengths to put that one across, including the turning of spotlights on French labor crews building fixed emplacements at night in order, as the loudspeakers announced, that they might see better.

The French were given an idea of the omnipresence of the German agents in many ways. One was by having the German radio announce the names of every man in a French company

a few minutes after it had been moved into the front line. The unnerving stunt was accomplished by having agents who had obtained the list transmit it by ultra-shortwave to Nazi scouting planes flying overhead. In the same way the Nazi radio was able to announce the full menu of a luncheon given for Churchill on a visit to the lines at the very moment he and his party were sitting down to eat it.

The radio was used with tremendous effect when the French retreat began at the outset of the blitz. False warnings were sent out over the air for the purpose of causing the inhabitants of villages behind the lines to flee and clog the roads so that French reinforcements and supplies could not be moved up. German agents, working directly by telephone, impersonated French municipal officials on at least one occasion and caused local authorities to order a mass evacuation at a time and place when it would do the Germans the most good.

During the Polish campaign German stations pretending to be Polish contributed to the rout of the Polish armies by giving out fake panic reports, describing wholesale disaster and destruction. Radio Breslau, for example, broadcast in the Polish language on the wavelength of the Warsaw radio, giving prematurely the impression that Warsaw had fallen and trying to establish the authenticity of its broadcasts in the minds of the Polish people by playing Polish music for hours at a time.

The Nazi radio beamed at Holland carried fantastic tales of Nazi parachutists disguised as nuns or Dutch soldiers working behind the lines. At one point during the brief Dutch campaign Berlin had a field day with a story about poisoned chocolate being distributed in Holland. The story originated in Berlin, of course. The German radio, with a show of moral indignation, accused the British of spreading this atrocity story, but meanwhile was careful to give it in full. C. J. Rolo, an

expert on radio propaganda, vouches for the effectiveness of that kind of campaign in support of an already overpowering blitzkrieg.

German propagandists did very thorough groundwork in Belgium before the actual blitz began, spreading stories of Nazi troop concentrations, blowing hot and cold on the subject of whether Belgium was in danger or not, originating whispering campaigns on the weakness of Belgian defenses. They went to the length of having a German plane come down on Belgian territory, having as passengers some high German army officers who just happened to have a copy of detailed general staff plans for the invasion in their pockets.

That was how radio and other propaganda means were used in the actual blitz and in preparation for it. The occupied countries of Europe are monuments to its success, but there is also a monument to its failure—England.

After the fall of France all the guns of the Nazi propaganda artillery were turned on Britain. Every effort was made to crack British morale just as morale had been cracked in France, Belgium and Holland. There were alternating prophecies of doom and assurances that peace would be profitable, threats of disaster and appeals to the appeasers to throw Churchill out and make terms. There are indications that Hitler developed quite a case of frustration when Britain failed to fall for his propaganda appeal and then just as stubbornly failed to collapse during the Battle of Britain.

So sure was he that England was his that after Berlin's triumphal celebration of the fall of France all the street decorations and even the grandstands were allowed to remain for several weeks, in the obvious expectation that they would be used again. Finally they were taken down quietly one night and no mention was ever made of them again.

CHAPTER FIVE

DIVIDE AND CONQUER

DIVIDE AMERICA from Britain, stir up in the western world the fear of a Red menace, destroy the admiration of the nations of Europe and of the Germans themselves for the United States—those are the constant aims of Dr. Goebbels' political warfare. He does not merely plant propaganda seeds of that kind among us and hope that they will grow. He nurses them tenderly, cultivates them year in and year out. He is not discouraged by the fact that they may fail to sprout in one place, but immediately plants them in another. Nor does he depend on the false but reasonable-sounding burden of a single argument to obtain his result for him. In fact he does not trouble much about our reason at all.

His method is to hammer away constantly, night after night, on the radio with the idea that some among us will begin to take his lies for truth merely because we hear them so often. By force of constant repetition—not just ten or a hundred repetitions but tens of thousands—he hopes that the slogans he seeks to implant in us will become part of our thought patterns no matter how we fight against them. The mere fact of the constant hammering away at the words "Bolshevik menace" will, in his opinion, make even the most rational among us think, first subconsciously then openly, the moment there is the slightest provocation, that the threat of Communism is

worse than being submerged in a Nazi world. He sees to it, moreover, that no matter how the war is going on the battlefield his propagandists find some material in it for their campaigns.

For example when Germany was winning sweeping victories in Russia he sought persistently to get us to relax our preparations for total war against Germany, arguing that the Nazis were doing the world a service by repelling "the Asiatic hordes" from western Europe. That failed, fortunately, and just as fortunately the tide of battle turned in Russia. But Goebbels was not discouraged. He began to work on a new theme—the theme that we had better do something quickly to prevent Russia's regaining too much ground. Not directly but by devious means, through neutrals and through tried and trusted anti-Reds among us, he gave forth the idea that continued Russian victory would put the Kremlin in Berlin, would lead to the Bolshevization of Europe and would, specifically, wipe out the investments of those of us who had them.

The same was true of his propaganda effort in regard to us and the British. In stirring up anti-British feeling against us he played first on the tune that we would never send any troops to help them, that we were going to be merely silent partners who would sit back and let them win the war for us, then step in and reap the benefits. When the numbers of our troops and planes and Lend-Lease items became too great for even the most unobservant Britisher to overlook he changed the theme. He began to warn England that we were going to reduce her to a dependency, that we were practically taking over even before the war was won, that the only way for her to maintain her independence was to do it in a Nazi-dominated world where England—with a few colonies subtracted, of course—would be allowed to go her own way.

His job with us has been to try to discourage as much as possible the sending of men and supplies to Europe. Before the war began the Nazi line fitted in perfectly with that of our own isolationists, who argued that we should keep everything we had at home and protect our own shores, because nobody would attack us unless we sent our armed forces abroad. Night after night the Berlin radio sent back to this country quotations from the speeches of isolationists and professional anti-Britishers among us with the idea of spreading even further arguments which already had ample currency in our press. Goebbels retransmitted the ideas to us in such form that listeners got the impression they represented the majority opinion. He never once let it leak out over his radio that anybody at all except President Roosevelt and a few Communists and Jews recognized a sufficient Nazi menace to go to meet it before it reached our shores, when the time would be too late.

We were attacked, of course, and with that the isolationist argument that we needed to fear no attack crashed to the ground. Goebbels was forced to find new arguments, and he did readily enough. They were not arguments so much as insinuations, for the most part—the spreading of stories of how the British were taking advantage of us, how they were using Lend-Lease goods to win our South American markets from us, how they were building the kind of ships that would secure postwar shipping monopolies (he told England exactly the same story about us) and how Britain was sitting back, snug in her island, and waiting for us to send our boys over to get killed while her own troops merely carried out home-guard patrols.

Turning continental Europe against us was perhaps his hardest task of all. Goebbels knew that the people of Europe recalled all too vividly for his purposes the fact that victory in

the First World War had followed American intervention. How great a part we actually had in that victory on the field of battle might continue as a subject for controversy among military experts, but he was not interested in the opinions of military experts. He was interested in the ordinary little man who believed, and did not need to reason, that the word America spelled victory, for that is the way it had been once before. He knew, too, that his own people, pessimistic by nature and carrying deep in their hearts the thought of defeat even in the days of the greatest victories, connected the name of our country with the German disaster of 1918. His job, then, was to try to make Europe believe that it was not the same this time, that we would never get enough military strength in the field to win a victory, that Germany would have it well won before we, in our slow, lumbering way, got moving. Failing that, he sought to paint us as barbarians whose arrival in Europe was to be dreaded rather than welcomed.

Goebbels' belief that he could successfully help Germany's conquest of the western world by playing up the Red-menace theme was not merely a theory. It was based on actual experience gained before the war, particularly in France. The Red-menace theme was an extremely important part of softening the French. Indeed, it is not too much to say that the fear of Bolshevism and of social revolution in their own countries was the underlying factor in the behavior of French and British statesmen during the entire period between the two world wars. First the socialistic German republic was allowed to be sabotaged because of the fear that its ideas, which politicians in France and England thought were similar to those of Russia, might spread to the rest of Europe. Second, the Fascism of Mussolini in Italy was given every help and encouragement by France and England's conservative politicians because they had

been convinced, by carefully built-up propaganda which the Nazis later merely took up and carried forward, that the alternative was a left revolution in Italy. Then everything that could be done to undermine the Popular Front government in France was done by conservative political and financial interests under the direct influence of the German industrialists and their colleagues elsewhere in Europe, who were always closely linked in their undercover activities. And finally the Spanish Republican government was allowed to fall to a Fascist army, directly aided by Germany and Italy, because the Axis powers had convinced men like Chamberlain that the alternative was Red revolution which would seep from Spain into the rest of western Europe.

Those of us who followed the French press in the days when the farce of nonintervention was being played during the Spanish War know now that the papers which most ardently campaigned against intervention and which most carefully nurtured the Nazi propaganda line of the Red menace as applied to Spain are the very ones which are most subservient to the Nazis now. We know that in occupied France the men who ran the pro-German, anti-Loyalist, anti-British papers like the daily *Le Matin* and the weekly *Gringoire* are the most slavish collaborators. The tragedy is that in the days before the war we allowed them to parade behind masks of patriotism when actually they were even then committing treason by playing a game which led to the weakening of France to the point where its conquest on the actual battlefield was easy.

Those among us who are ardently opposed to Communism might ask if there really is not a Red menace, even if the Nazis do play it up for their own purposes. The answer, for anybody who cares to look for it, is on the battlefields of Russia, where as many German troops were put out of action as we had in

all of our armed forces by the summer of 1943. The answer lies in the tremendous devastation wrought by the battle, of the gigantic task awaiting Russia when the war is over, when clearly the Kremlin will have much more important things to do restoring normal life in the Soviet Union than trying to stir up revolutions among the rest of us.

In a given week in January 1943, shortwave monitors in this country calculated that the thirty percent of the Nazis' broadcasting to Britain and the United States was devoted to the Red-menace bogey. Incidentally, during the same week Tokyo, which was still at peace with Russia, spent much of its broadcast time directed at Russia to stirring up Russian distrust of the Anglo-Saxon countries. It must not be forgotten that, since the Red-menace campaign is only designed to separate us from our most active ally, it would naturally follow that nothing must be left undone in the effort to turn Russia against us.

In this connection Axis propagandists have not let the Russians forget that after the last war it was American and other allied troops who were occupying Russian soil, and not Germans.

The Axis does not always come out clearly and tell us what it hopes to achieve by its hammering away at the Red scare, but in January 1943 the Hungarian radio admitted the following:

"As a result of the latest Russian successes it is clearly apparent today that the interests of the Axis powers and the Allies are to a certain extent identical. This does not mean at all that the Allies will sue for peace. But the Allies would do well to take into account the realities and not establish a second front in Europe."

It is all very simple: we were not to establish a second front to make Germany fight on two fronts. If we obligingly re-

frained she would use all her available power to defeat the Russians and then turn against us, with no eastern front to worry about.

To the Russians at the same time Tokyo broadcast a commentary entitled "Anglo-Saxon Machinations Against Russia," in which liberal misquotations from a *New York Times* story were used to make the desired point.

"The reason the United States wants an army of 11,000,000 men," the Japanese commentator told the Russians, "is not that they need it to defeat the Axis but that they want to have it in order to neutralize Soviet power after the war."

Tokyo then warned the Soviets that the United States and Britain had a very poor record of dealing with weaker nations, "such as India, France, Latin America and Chungking," a record which, the speaker said, made the sensitive Japanese shudder at the brutal conduct involved.

That record ought to serve as a warning to the Russians, he continued, as should the alleged fact that the Allies drove the Soviets to fight the Germans "with the sinister intention of ruining both powers." The fact that Germany made an unprovoked attack on Russia in June 1941 did not cramp the commentator's style.

Berlin has used the same kind of argument, employing a Russian speaker whom it called Lenin's Old Guard and who pretended to be the voice of an underground anti-Stalin movement inside Russia. A typical broadcast by that voice was the following:

"Don't let us be fooled by the tyrants in the Kremlin. The British and the Americans are not going to open a second front. Not now, not tomorrow, not ever. They don't care what happens to Mother Russia. They only want us Russians to sacri-

“... sacrifice our blood to save the British Empire and to protect the warmongering, Jewish-dominated American government.”

Sometimes the Nazis can combine the Red-menace theme with its anti-British line to this country and thus accomplish a double purpose—and sometimes they get the help of our own press in so doing.

For example in the summer of 1942 the Nazis broadcast repeated allegations that the Soviet-British treaty signed at that time contained secret clauses in which they plotted to divide up the world without letting the United States in on the deal. The Nazis not only broadcast the story but saw to it that it was planted in the neutral press, or the press that we thought was neutral. Thus the story was printed in a pro-Nazi Swedish paper. It was planted there, of course, for the purpose of having some American correspondent pick it up and cable it to this country, and Donald Day, then correspondent for the *Chicago Tribune*, promptly complied. Day, who had been stationed in Riga for years and had taken on himself the special job of sending anti-Russian dispatches to this country, was an old hand at helping to keep the Red-menace theme alive. Press dispatches from Finland reported late in 1942 that he had finally resigned his post, which was then in Helsinki, and joined the Finnish army.

Day's dispatch quoted the Swedish paper to the effect that the Soviet government had demanded the creation of an enlarged Russian “sphere” in the Scandinavian peninsula, and had also demanded the Baltic states, central Europe and the Balkans. Besides that they were to be given military and political control over Finland, Germany, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria and military garrisons and bases throughout Europe in order to secure free access to the North Sea and the Mediterranean.

Most American correspondents abroad can be trusted not to pick up Nazi-inspired stories which have been planted for the express purpose of spreading anti-Russian and anti-British feeling among us. But every once in a while there is a slip, sometimes inadvertent and sometimes committed by a man whose anti-Red bias is such that he will give rein to it even if he knows it might help the enemy.

In April 1943 fuel for Goebbels' anti-Bolshevik campaign was provided by the Polish government in exile, which could hardly claim to have done it inadvertently, because the material which it used had been openly furnished by the Nazis. The German government announced in the spring of 1943 that the graves of some 10,000 Polish officers and men had been discovered at Katyn on the Smolensk front and that the men had been massacred by the Russians before they evacuated that region. The fact that the Nazis had occupied the territory for two years before the "discovery" was made should have tipped everyone off to the nature of the charge and should have forestalled its use as a political issue. But the Polish government fell for it. The apparent reason was that the Poles wanted to use the charge as a striking issue with which to get their real quarrel with the Soviets out in the open and put Moscow on the defensive. That issue was the matter of postwar frontiers. Premier Sikorski's government wanted assurance from Russia and guarantees from the United States and Britain that Poland would be restored to her 1939 borders. The Soviet government had already served notice that it intended to retain the 1941 borders, which were also the frontiers left to Russia after the First World War. These had only been altered in Poland's favor as a result of a victorious campaign against the young Red army in the early twenties. Russia claimed that the population of those regions was not Polish but White Russian and

Ukrainian and that they rightfully belonged inside the Soviet frontiers. Both Britain and the United States had tacitly indicated that they would not bring pressure on Russia to withdraw that claim.

Accordingly, Poland decided to make an issue of the alleged massacre. The Soviet government dismissed the charge as an obvious plant designed to create a rift among the United Nations and said that the men in question had been killed on the Smolensk front by the Germans. Instead of accepting this explanation Sikorski accepted the Nazi suggestion that the International Red Cross be asked to investigate and appealed directly to the Red Cross, against the urgent advice of the British government. Moscow felt there was nothing left to do but break off relations with the Polish government, and the Axis had accomplished its purpose.

Then, of course, Goebbels went to work making propaganda capital of the affair.

“Moscow has become the executioner of Poland and the Poles while London stands idly by!” a Berlin commentator said gleefully. “In undertaking this step Moscow has made an open attempt to free herself from the terrible crimes with which she is charged.”

Berlin played incessantly on the theme that the Allies had as much to fear from Russia as the Axis powers and that the break with Poland was only the beginning. “It will disturb if not destroy relations between Moscow, London and Washington,” a German commentator predicted.

“Moscow has rid itself of the annoying Poles, which is proof of what would happen to a Europe at the mercy of Soviet Russia,” Berlin said, while Goebbels’ underlings in other Axis countries were ordered to join in the chorus.

A Finnish commentator predicted the end of the “unnatural

alliance" between Britain and Russia and declared that "Bolshevism is obviously losing its balance and exposing itself."

Rome announced with satisfaction that the rift was "the first actual break in the artificial structure of the so-called United Nations" and claimed that Moscow's action in suspending relations with the Poles was an admission of guilt.

A Paris radio commentator said that Stalin had found himself "on the eve of being denounced by the International Red Cross as author of the Katyn crime" and had had to take action "to compel the Anglo-Saxon Allies to make a choice."

Sikorski's government withdrew the appeal to the Red Cross a few days later, but by that time the damage had already been done. The above are only a few samples of the use made of the affair by the Axis radio. Subsequent broadcasts returned many times to the charge, for Goebbels was never one to let a good thing go as long as he might find some additional use for it by distortion or suppression of some of the facts.

A damaging blow was delivered to the Nazi propaganda machine in late May 1943 which threatened not only to deprive the Axis of the Red-menace theme but even to knock the props out from under the original political structure on which the Axis was based. Moscow dissolved the Communist International, that is, the organization of various national Communist parties which had its headquarters in the Soviet capital. It had been charged many times by those opposed to Communism that while Russia maintained friendly relations with various countries, the Communist International sought to stir up revolution through the medium of the party branches. That was not only the basis of Nazi propaganda in regard to Bolshevism but also the excuse for the formation of the anti-Comintern pact by the Axis countries in 1936, into which some of the

satellite nations were later forced. In dissolving the Comintern Moscow gave formal assurance that it had no revolutionary ambitions in any foreign country and that its sole aim was to win the war. It did, in effect, deprive itself voluntarily of the only organization in existence through which revolution could possibly be fomented.

The fury with which Axis radio propagandists reacted to the dissolution of the Comintern gave a good indication of the seriousness of the blow to their favorite theme. Berlin quoted Dr. Paul Schmidt, press spokesman of the Wilhelmstrasse, as calling the action "the most fantastic propaganda trick of modern politics." Rome said the dissolution was "Stalin's trick to appease the Americans," and the Nazi-controlled Rennes radio in France urged Frenchmen to "remember La Fontaine's fable of the wolf which became a sheep and to ponder over it at length."

"This is a new camouflage and a perfidious maneuver for deceiving the world," said the Rennes commentator. "The Third International disappears before the astonished world, only to rise again very soon under a new name and form."

The best Axis propagandists could do besides denouncing the action as a trick was to urge listeners not to attach any importance to it, because even if it were genuine "Russia's word has never been binding."

Let us look now into the German method of trying to destroy British confidence in us. A series of Nazi broadcasts to Great Britain over a single period in the winter of 1942 will give us ample illustration. The series began with a talk by a woman speaker, who told the British that they should never have allowed American troops to celebrate Thanksgiving Day in Westminster Abbey because Americans don't know how to be-

have in places like that. Two hours later there was a broadcast the theme of which was that "Britain is obliged to play the part of an onlooker while the United States gains more and more influence over her empire."

A few minutes later still another Berlin speaker warned Britain that the United States was "calmly absorbing Australian sovereignty," and added: "There must be many people in Britain who think that America would be far less expensive as an enemy than as an ally."

Shortly afterward Berlin put its star, Lord Haw Haw, on the air to accuse President Roosevelt of "openly snubbing the British government" and to warn of "the binding force of Roosevelt's decrees upon England."

The next item was a broadcast which said: "Washington's economic missions are now being constituted to insure that the financiers of Wall Street reap economic advantages at the expense of British lives, British trade and British tonnage."

Next came an announcement that the United States was making an alliance with Russia the purpose of which was "to eliminate Britain as a world power and deprive her of any post-war influence." Note the remarkable similarity of that idea and the one broadcast to America a few months earlier to the effect that it was Britain who was making the secret alliance with the Soviets.

London was then told for a second time that Roosevelt had "cynically resumed his policy of dollar aggrandizement at the expense of British lives, British ships and British war material."

One of the more fanciful efforts to turn the British against us was a broadcast reporting that American school children learn geography from maps on which Europe, including England, "is completely wiped off the face of the world." The ac-

count of these mysterious maps explained that America was "ready to liquidate the British empire," and added:

"One can already see completely falsified maps of the world in the schools. There are no oceans on these maps. The isolationism which is disappearing cedes its place to a new map of the world on which the United States is the center. As far as Europe is concerned the states are completely wiped off the face of the world.

"Every moment one hears it said that Soviet Russia will have a great role to play. But, and that is what worries the British, England too has been wiped off this map. The United States are not at all in favor of Anglo-American co-operation in the future. China and Russia are considered more precious partners than the crumbling British Empire."

That might strike you as a little childish and not likely to convince many people. But Hitler thinks the mental level of most people is low, and Goebbels drops his aim accordingly.

Following are some examples of how the Nazis use the divide-and-conquer theme to Britain and America at the very same time over different transmitters. These examples were taken from a series of broadcasts monitored during January 1943.

On the subject of shipping the Axis radio told the United States: "The English are glad that the Americans are building Liberty ships, because Liberty ships will not be able to compete with British ships after the war. Britannia always ruled the waves and intends to do so after the war."

On American war aims, Berlin told England: "The Yankees have achieved victory after victory at the expense of Britain under the guise of friendship. But their success has gone to their head. They have stopped taking the precaution with which they might have fooled the British public at least a little.

Every day brings more evidence that the Americans are as much the enemies of Britain as the Nazis are."

Regarding Africa Berlin told the English: "The Americans are reserving for themselves the job of occupying French Morocco. The Yanks have taken the soft job for themselves, and once again it is the British soldier who is going to have to do the fighting. The British First Army is in front and the Americans are in the rear."

But to the United States at the same time Germany broadcast: "Cordell Hull did not want to turn French North Africa over to the English but he had no chance whatever of winning this diplomatic battle because he is not a match for the English."

On the subject of Lend-Lease the Axis radio told America: "In the beginning it was only cash and carry. Now it is Lend-Lease and throw-away, namely lend the money, lend the ships and throw away hundreds of thousands of American lives as well as money and ships."

And to Britain, on the same day: "America's aid under Lend-Lease has not materialized."

What the Axis likes to call "the beautiful fiction of Lend-Lease" has served repeatedly as propaganda material. Radio Rome, for example, last March made great propaganda capital out of the discussion brought up in Congress in regard to post-war "freedom of the air," which had to do with the question of who was going to control the world's airlines when the victory was won. Rome explained in an English-language broadcast to this country that the freedom-of-the-air controversy was just "part of the mutual suspicion between America and Britain." The speaker then told us that we were an innocent, naïve lot who always managed to get taken in by the wily British, "although the Americans had more illusions in the last war than they have now."

“The Americans are willing to believe that the English love them for themselves alone,” the commentator said. “They cannot learn that the British may bow to circumstance but not too low to keep an eye on the future.”

He then cited alleged statistics to show how Lend-Lease had benefited England in the field of air transport, about which Congress was then talking. He said, while U.S. airlines were forced at the outset of the war to give up more than one hundred transport planes and to curtail service, the trans-Canadian line actually extended its service with the use of twenty-two new Lockheed planes which Canada got from the United States. Needless to say, he failed to mention the fact that Canada was already at war at that time and that the transports were being used for war purposes.

Finally, he warned us that Lord Londonderry had drawn up a four-point program for developing Britain's commercial air services after the war, and that it was up to us to see that we weren't cheated out of our fair share in the field.

Axis propagandists are ever on the alert for occasions to quote or misquote the American press or American personalities in matters that can serve their divide-and-conquer line. Their assumption is that we are likely to believe something that appears in print in our own country, even if most of us first hear about it via the English-language broadcasts from the Axis country.

On July 8, 1942, Rome broadcast the following to this country:

“An idea of what a great part of American public opinion thinks about the British is given by an article in the *New York Daily News*. The American paper wants to know what the British are waiting for before sending to the front at least one million and a half of their soldiers who are having a good time

at home. Could the British be waiting for the arrival of Americans? They [the Americans] are asked not to forget that sending aid to Great Britain is a very different affair indeed on account of the increasing submarine danger and the scarcity of shipping tonnage. Great Britain is only twenty to fifty miles away from the continent, the New York *Daily News* continues, whereas America is 3,000 miles away across an ocean fraught with danger."

In October 1942 the German radio made considerable propaganda capital out of an open letter to Britain published in *Life* which attacked British imperialism and urged that the British cease fighting a war to hold their empire. Reporting the matter, Berlin said:

"Britain is played out and the United States is taking advantage of this state of affairs. This disagreement of the two allied nations is becoming more and more obvious, and the letter in *Life* shows the attitude of the Americans toward their Allies."

Some of the best material our press has ever furnished the Nazis, however, was contained in the proposal by Colonel Robert R. McCormick, publisher of the *Chicago Tribune*, in April 1943, that the members of the British Empire be admitted into our union as states. The suggestion was certainly not designed to help Hitler, but the *Tribune* has habitually attacked Soviet Russia and Britain without seeming to trouble itself about whom it was helping. Anybody following Axis propaganda knows that habitual attacks on United Nations unity help the Nazis, as do some of the attacks on the administration. It is one thing to voice constructive criticism on the conduct of the war but quite another to endanger the morale of the nation by habitually giving the impression that it is being irretrievably bungled. It is one thing to criticize administration policies but quite another to give the impression that the main enemy is not

Hitler but Roosevelt. We shall look further into that subject in the next chapter. For the present let us see what the Axis radio did with Colonel McCormick's proposal to accept New Zealand, Australia and the other British dominions into the United States if they wanted to join.

Rome on April 25 had this to say: "We are not going to have the bad taste to ask Mr. Churchill, a descendant of the Duke of Marlborough, whether he desires to place the British Empire, the defense of which is his principal object, in the position which Texas holds in the United States confederation. But we would like to tell him that McCormick's proposal is not a joke. Perhaps the American colonel has never had a regiment under his orders, but that is no reason to think that he is not in dead earnest when he ventilates political ideas which are an echo of what the majority of Americans think about the same argument.

"The mistake is not to be imputed to the Americans. The mistake is being made by the British themselves. The British became traitors to European civilization when they called the Americans to be umpire in the European countries. The British have given the men from over the ocean the possibility to speak the way they do about institutions and ideals which are typically European. The logical consequence was that the Americans thought themselves entitled to discuss and decide these problems. In doing so they reveal, of course, their usual ignorance and presumption concerning European matters."

Another Rome broadcast said: "The White House is rather cautious in making declarations concerning their (the American) program for future domination of the world. The American papers which are not directly influenced by the White House show absolutely no delicacy when speaking of their British allies. The Chicago *Tribune*, for instance, pub-

lishes an article by Colonel McCormick who thinks that it would be opportune to incorporate the countries of the British Empire into the United States of America.”

The Tokyo radio in an English-language broadcast on May 17, 1943, gave strong support to the McCormick proposal.

“Just as you and I, Colonel McCormick, owner of the Chicago *Tribune*, has both friends and enemies,” Tokyo said. “His enemies brand him as a British-hating arch-isolationist, a publicity-thirsty megalomaniac. To his friends, however, Colonel McCormick is a man of independent will, a man of action, a fearless foe, ready to express himself regardless of consequences. I also assume there must be a group of neutrals who have no definite likes or dislikes about the colonel.

“At any rate there is no doubt that Robert McCormick is an extremely charming character. I think America today needs many more characters like this Chicago veteran. You will recall that a little more than three weeks ago the fighting Chicago newspaper publisher declared that he would start a nationwide editorial campaign for the absorption by the United States of all the British countries. Not a few American observers warned time and again of the great danger inherent in Mr. Roosevelt’s foreign policy. Sure enough, the American people were forced to pay a most fantastic price for this fantastic foreign policy of the New Deal chieftain.

“It is quite apparent that the Chicago veteran is conducting a one-man crusade for the defense of true Americanism and for the salvation of the United States from the hands of the radical internationalists led by Mr. Roosevelt. He is out to prevent the establishment of a dictatorship at home, and to guarantee the British countries a republican form of government by means of incorporating them into the American Empire. In fact this seems to be too heavy for one man.

“But remember that Colonel McCormick’s *Chicago Tribune* has no less than 1,000,000 circulation. Moreover there is the possibility that other influential newspapers such as the *New York Daily News* and the *Washington Times Herald* also may join the colonel’s annexation campaign. They will have tremendous influence over the reading public.

“Mr. McCormick’s plan for the absorption by America of all the British countries may perhaps be the best plan to safeguard American interests. After all, McCormick’s proposal seems to be somewhat too late. It nevertheless might be worth attempting on the part of Uncle Sam. In fact indications are not entirely lacking that Mr. Roosevelt unconsciously is putting into practice what Colonel McCormick is preaching. It is quite conceivable that the colonel’s annexation movement may become very popular with the American people and, I am afraid, it is also conceivable that when the movement becomes popular Mr. Roosevelt in a fit of indignation might indict the fighting Chicago veteran on the ground that the colonel has been waging the campaign by Japanese instigation.”

Proposals like that of Colonel McCormick not only give the Axis a field day in its perennial campaign to turn the British against us, but also furnish material for the anti-American theme which is constantly fed continental Europeans and the Germans themselves. Goebbels has specific reasons for the anti-American campaign.

It is not just because we are the enemies of the Germans that we are described to them in the most unfavorable light; it is not just because, if they think themselves good, we must naturally be painted as bad. The reason is, specifically, to create a hearty fear of us in the minds of the Germans, to picture possible defeat by us as a great disaster from which no German

would escape. Nazi leaders need to create this fear because any concerted effort to throw them out of power in a mass movement brought on by defeat would be impossible if every German felt that he himself would escape comparatively lightly, and that only the leaders would be punished.

In the case of some of Germany's enemies the fear comes naturally, but in the case of the Americans and the British it does not. The Germans are afraid of the Russians, for example, especially after the attack on Russia. The thought of an invasion by the Soviets holds plenty of terror for the Germans without any propaganda campaign being needed to stimulate it. Likewise it is beginning to dawn on the Germans what may happen to them if the people they have conquered get the upper hand. They know, having pieced the details together little by little over many months, what their troops and their Gestapo agents have done in Poland, Holland, Norway, the Baltic countries, the Balkans and France. Clearly a campaign to stimulate fear is not needed in that direction.

But the Germans have neither an instinctive nor a synthetic fear of us. Unfortunately for present Nazi propagandists, it was their predecessors before the war who painted us as softhearted and sentimental, and hence, to the Germans, soft-headed. That impression of us did more good than harm to Germany in the days which led to Munich, but it no longer helps now. Now the Nazis need to paint us as bloodthirsty and brutal, ruthless and grasping. That is why the Nazi radio makes so much of tales to the effect that we plan to seize all German orphans and bring them up abroad and that, if we win, we intend to conduct ourselves generally in such a way that no German's life would be worth living.

As for the attitude of the rest of Europe toward us, I have already pointed out that we are regarded as a synonym for

victory, and the Nazis must do what they can to change that. We are considered tremendously rich and powerful. The Nazis must either show that we are not rich and powerful or that we got that way by exploiting other countries and intend to continue doing so. Then the Nazis must appeal to European pride by describing us as ignorant and lacking in culture and not fitted to have a leading place in the world.

The best material the Axis radio has had to date for its job of depicting us as barbarians who would punish every individual German for his part in the war was, like some of the propaganda fuel we have already noted, furnished by someone on our side. In the summer of 1942 a free Dutch weekly in London published a letter from a contributor suggesting that the way to get rid of the scourge of Nazi indoctrination in Germany after the war was to bring German children abroad to be educated. The letter, as published, appeared innocent enough and was couched in very mild language. But the Nazis got hold of it, and before they were through quoting it on the radio it had the appearance of a bloodthirsty proposal to sweep postwar Germany clean of her entire population of children. The Axis radio sent the story in its own distorted version all over the world, never once mentioning its origin in the obscure letter column of an unimportant Dutch paper but attributing the entire idea to Roosevelt and to Churchill and making it out to be an official part of our postwar policy.

The underground reporter of *The Nation* told of a similar affair last November. Three years ago an American named Kaufmann, an obscure businessman, wrote a pamphlet called *Germany Must Perish*, in which he suggested, among other things, that Germans should be sterilized so that the German nation would die out and the world would be left in peace. The idea never was given much currency in this country, but

Goebbels got hold of it and made very good use of it for his purposes. He had the book translated into German, printed thousands of copies and saw to it that as many Germans as possible got to read it. A free copy of it was given away with food-ration cards.

Very few people in this country have ever heard of Kaufmann, but as a result of Goebbels' stunt he is very well known indeed in Germany. Moreover, Germans do not know that he is an obscure individual but have been told that he is one of Roosevelt's most intimate friends and is high in the President's councils. Since the publication of the pamphlet in Germany Goebbels has repeatedly spoken of Roosevelt and his friend Kaufmann and has written in *Das Reich* that "thanks to the Jew Kaufmann we Germans know only too well what to expect in case of defeat."

The Nation's underground reporter, who knows Europe well, urges that people refrain from making fantastic proposals, because even if no one here takes them seriously they can be of tremendous service to Goebbels in building up war spirit among his tired people by arousing in them fears of what defeat will bring.

From time to time Goebbels devotes his weekly article in the Berlin paper *Das Reich* to our shortcomings. In one such article in August 1942 he described us thus: "The country possesses no language of its own, no culture of its own, no education of its own. Everything has been borrowed. If the Americans possessed no money they would probably be the most despised people in the world. Arrogance is never so irritating as in their case."

Germany, on the other hand, is right there when it comes to culture, especially art. Last year the German radio was particularly boastful about German artists and might have had the

rest of the world believing that there was a real artistic renaissance afoot had it not told too much of the story. The boasts about art were based on the Greater German Art Exhibition in Munich.

“Our painters,” said Goebbels in discussing the show, “have again learned to paint.”

Instead of letting it go at that he made the mistake of telling the world what they were painting. Outstanding exhibits of the show, he revealed, were: 1. A portrait of Hitler. 2. A procession of storm troopers. 3. The sentinel of Europe (another painting of Hitler). 4. Ammunition column in motion. 5. A U-boat crew standing on deck.

Striking evidence of how the German propaganda ministry has gone about the business of collecting material for its campaign to discredit America in the eyes of Europeans was contained in an FBI announcement on July 17, 1943.

The announcement was of the arrest of ten German aliens in New York, including a woman who admitted that her special job in this country was to keep Goebbels supplied with stories of “the high-jinks of high society,” of “American women who marry barons,” of “millionairesses marrying boxers,” and news of the “dominance of American women.”

Goebbels was particularly fond of material which would illustrate how the women run this country and keep the men under their thumbs. For that reason the woman agent was instructed that there was a special need for such photographic material as pictures of men over kitchen stoves or of men pushing baby carriages.

The “menace of Americanism” theme, as we have noted, is always left a little vague, but it too seems to tie up more or less with our alleged lack of culture. In a broadcast in February 1943 the Nazi radio said that the European continent was

"darkly overshadowed, not only by Bolshevism but equally by Americanism." Both sprang from the same root, he said. "We are threatened by both. Our horizon is black."

Attacking American "lack of cultural values," the speaker said that "it is but one step from the schoolboyish lack of breeding of the American, who in his naïve superciliousness thinks he knows everything best" to what he described as the destructiveness of Bolshevism.

To Europeans who thought this was a capitalistic country the speaker explained that "in principle the policy of Wall Street is identical with that of the Kremlin." That was a paraphrase of a speech by Hitler in which he said: "The conspiracy of international capitalism and Bolshevism is in no sense paradoxical but a natural phenomenon, as the driving force in both is international Jewry."

About the same time that Europe was being fed this line a Vichy broadcaster, as often happens, injected a sour note when, in discussing "friction among the United Nations," he rounded off his argument by exclaiming: "As if the men of the City [London's financial district] and Wall Street could have anything in common with Moscow." But occasional slips like that do not seem to trouble the Nazis.

Great care is taken by the Axis radio to see to it that none of the broadcasts attacking us as a people is heard in this country. For American consumption Berlin carefully avoids slurs on our culture or lack of it. To us they say we are an innocent and deluded people in the hands of a sinister government which is the enemy of Americans and Germans alike.

That is the picture of the divide-and-conquer radio war. We can take a little comfort, perhaps, from the glaring inconsistencies it contains and from the obvious silliness of some of the stories it uses, but not too much comfort, for the Nazis have

clearly proved that they do not need consistency and that they do not care about being reasonable. They think they have found that they can sow sufficient dissension and discontent for their purposes without being consistent or appealing to reason.

CHAPTER SIX

TO BORE FROM WITHIN

AXIS RADIO PROPAGANDISTS with the special job of creating disension and uneasiness inside the United States have many and varied assignments. One day they will concentrate on denouncing President Roosevelt as a dictator, the next they will devote their efforts to trying to restore life to the vestiges of prewar isolationism. Then they will turn their guns on our war production in an effort to convince us that it is being hopelessly bungled and that the real facts are being kept from us by a rigid and undemocratic censorship. It is ironic how often the spokesmen of Nazi and Fascist repression set themselves up as the champions of democracy and expect us to swallow their words without considering the source.

Hitler long ago recognized Roosevelt as the natural leader of the democratic world who could not be appeased or blinded to the aims of Germany, and for that reason every possible means was used before the war, and continues to be used, to discredit him in the eyes of the American electorate. The Nazi campaign against Roosevelt has had many disappointments, not the least of which was the fact that in the elections of 1940 the opposition candidate Wendell Willkie turned out to be as little of an isolationist as Roosevelt. Hitler has never forgiven Willkie for that or for the fact that his German ancestry did not make him even the least bit sympathetic to the Nazi New

Order. The fact that Willkie failed to see the blessings which Hitler wanted to confer on the world, and the fact that isolationist leaders like Lindbergh retired from the limelight with the outbreak of war increased the job of Axis propagandists considerably and forced them to scatter their efforts over a dozen fields rather than concentrate them in one consistent anti-Roosevelt line. So badly had the Nazi radio spokesmen been burned before we entered the war that they began to display caution in interpreting American election returns.

Time was when every election of a Republican to Congress was hailed as the beginning of the end for Roosevelt, but in the November 1942 elections Axis commentators were hard put to find anything really favorable to sink their teeth into. They had discovered that Republicans were just as anxious to win the war as Democrats, and in any case the Democratic majority in Congress was maintained, if depleted. So they took up the somewhat labored line that the election was a rebuke to Roosevelt but that it did not mean very much because the President did not allow Congress to have much power anyway.

The elections "obviously indicate criticism of Roosevelt," said Paul Schmidt, German Foreign Office spokesman, on the Berlin radio. "It is not astonishing that certain parts of the American population should have their eyes opened to Roosevelt's policies," he continued. "But Germany does not harbor the illusion that the Republican victories will lead to a change of Roosevelt's policies. He and his Jewish counselors have the helm of state in hand. The American nation and its representatives in Congress are practically without influence."

Rome took up a similar line, reporting that Americans were dissatisfied "with the false promises of Roosevelt who in the course of his presidential campaign had promised to keep the country out of war."

Axis efforts to revive isolationism are usually made in times when we have suffered some kind of defeat or in times when action on the war fronts is at a minimum. An American setback gives them the opportunity to tell us that we should have let well enough alone; the semblance of a stalemate is used to tell us that there ought to be some way of patching this thing up, giving us some compensation—such as British possessions in this hemisphere and hegemony over South America—and giving Germany Europe. The object, of course, is to spread disunity among us by reviving the prewar political feuds and to weaken our announced resolution to fight on to unconditional surrender.

At the lowest ebb of our fortunes in the Pacific in the spring of 1942 Tokyo opened a radio program beamed at this country entitled *America First*, with the not very subtle purpose of capitalizing on the isolationist connotation of those words, in more or less the same way that Japan used to steal American commercial patents. Just as a shipment of canned goods arrived from Japan in the early days of the New Deal with the blue eagle emblem printed on the wrappers, so Tokyo sought to give a made-in-the-U. S. A. flavor to its political propaganda.

“The isolationists were right,” said the speaker on one of Tokyo’s *America First* programs. “I have no idea what the American isolationists are saying about the Roosevelt administration at this moment, but whatever their stand may be, they have the whole world standing behind them in full sympathy and admiration. It was some credit to the United States that President Roosevelt’s fantastic ideas did not pass unchallenged by sober, thinking elements in that country, largely represented by the isolationists.”

Another speaker said that “practically all the leaders of the various parties in the United States” were denouncing Roose-

velt's policies, including "various newspapers of the Hearst chain."

As for the proposal to call the whole thing off, Tokyo informed us that "Japan would be a charming partner to any nation which would understand Japan's ideals correctly," and it promised that the newly won raw materials in Asia would be shared with the United States if only Americans would "get rid of Roosevelt."

To this suggestion Berlin at the same time added the following over a station that Goebbels called American Freedom and which pretended to broadcast from inside the United States: "Join us in our endeavor to save our boys from foreign battlefields! You can compel the government to act! The elections are coming again, and our people will have a last opportunity to reassert themselves. Organize as free Americans to fight the dictatorship being set up in Washington. The only real enemies sit right within the ranks of our government today."

An example of how Berlin rushes to the support of anybody who fostered policies which were to its liking before the war was given in April 1942 when Father Coughlin's paper *Social Justice* was barred from the mails. Berlin accused Roosevelt of using "gangster methods" in "suppressing" the paper.

Said the Nazi commentator: "Father Coughlin, well known in America for his undaunted struggle against Bolshevism and Jewry, has once again been given a taste of the methods of oppression so common in the world's freest democracy against those who possess different political ideas from the mighty of the land. It is quite easy to understand that a man who has the talent to enlighten the people of the United States with regard to their president's Jewish and Bolshevik cronies cannot expect to be in Roosevelt's good books."

Axis efforts to make political propaganda out of our war

production follow three lines: 1. We are badly bungling the job and falling far behind our schedules. 2. Donald Nelson has set up what practically amounts to a Red dictatorship. 3. The production program is ruining the country. The aim is to lay the foundations for rumors which can be bruited about the country either by careless individuals who do not realize the damage they are doing or by Nazi agents whose job it is to spread rumors.

Events like the coal strike by members of John L. Lewis' United Mine Workers in the spring of 1943 give the Nazi radio just the type of material it wants. Axis radios in Europe and Japan capitalized heavily on the strike while it was in progress, both in propaganda broadcasts and Morse-code transmissions directed at the United States and other foreign audiences. The Japanese, for example, hammered away at "falling" American production and carried two separate propaganda arguments, one for labor and one for other Americans. To labor the Japanese said that it was being exploited by "soaring living costs," and to elements other than labor Tokyo played on the theme that labor was unpatriotic. All three Axis countries used the strike as an argument that the democratic system was weak and inferior to the totalitarian system.

The Japanese-controlled Batavia radio in an English-language broadcast said: "The Axis nations are watching this with amusement. Can a whole nation be thrown out of gear just because Lewis does not like the President? Apparently."

Rome in a broadcast to Spain boasted of the superior German and Italian social system where "the collective work contract is the basis of labor legislation and the main concern of the state is that no employer evades it."

Berlin supplemented its discussion of the strike with a story to the effect that the Germans had discovered a new device for

saving time and preventing overexertion of coal miners, thus increasing output and, by implication, making their lot much better than that of miners in this country.

In 1942 Berlin devoted considerable broadcast time to Nelson, whom it labeled "Dictator Nelson." Axis speakers accused him of trying to "Bolshevize American industry" and announced that he had introduced the Stakhanoff Russian speed-up system in our war factories.

In July 1942 Rome broadcast quite a story about how badly things were going at the war plant in Manitowoc, Wisconsin, and elsewhere, claiming to reveal secret information which Washington was keeping from the American public. In a broadcast entitled "The Great Disillusionment" Rome said:

"Let us look for example at how it (the shortage of essential war materials in the United States) works in one particular town, such as Manitowoc, Wisconsin. Manitowoc lives principally on the manufacture of aluminum utensils. Defense has rationed aluminum. Meanwhile all existing aluminum production is funneled into defense. The biggest firm in Manitowoc has already laid off half its factory force of 2,600 and many of its office workers. Thereupon local stores need fewer clerks. Thereupon goods bought on the installment plan are being returned to dealers because the purchaser cannot keep up payments. Presently almost all of Manitowoc's aluminum employees may be penniless. It is sad to sit in the Office of Production Management and read the same news coming in from other aluminum towns in Wisconsin, Ohio, Pennsylvania and West Virginia. Here there is actual distress and more, much more, is coming. Our shortages are not only in aluminum but also in every other material and metal.

"In Adamsville, Indiana, two big firms make 575,000 electrical refrigerators a year. When we were cut off from alumi-

num for ice trays we substituted copper. When copper got scarce they substituted steel. But what about steel? The OPM estimated that this year we shall have an eleven-million-ton deficit."

The speaker, still using the first-person pronoun "we" in order to make listeners think the talk was coming from within the United States, then went on to tell us more about our alleged troubles. Wholesale layoffs were about to be made in Sandusky, Ohio, he said, in Belleville, Illinois, Attleboro, Massachusetts, Jamestown, New York, and other points where suffering was supposed to be acute, and he concluded:

"Several thousand small communities in this country concentrate on specialized products, requiring one or more of those critical materials. Every such community is in for a sort of social and economic revolution, which will turn it into a ghost town. This then is all that America has got out of the war so far. Ghost towns, humiliation before the world, defeat on the field of battle, chagrin at the decline of her raw materials, greater unemployment than ever, and an economic life disrupted and torn to pieces."

All in all, it was a pretty distressing picture, but it did not happen to be true. Investigation at the time showed, for example, that at Manitowoc there was peak employment of 8,200 workers, and local people described the town as the busiest in the Middle West.

For rumor-spreading of this kind Nazi propagandists have not hesitated to manufacture quotations from American magazines and newspapers if they could not find any authentic ones that suited their purposes. For example in October 1942 Berlin quoted *Time* on the subject of production in Detroit as follows:

"The situation in Detroit is unimaginable. The lack of raw materials and the tension between workers and management

have led to a considerable diminution of production. The morale in Detroit is said to be the worst in the whole country. The workers now are retaliating for the bad treatment they endured before the war."

The paragraph was an out-and-out fabrication. No such statements appeared in the issue of *Time* quoted. There was an article entitled "Production in Detroit," but its tone was diametrically opposed to the tone of the Nazi broadcast. *Time* said that at the Packard plant, for instance, production was seventeen percent above the May quota, fourteen percent up in June and fifteen percent up in July, and added that "there have been no strikes, no slowdowns, not even a minor labor fracas."

In June 1943, however, an outbreak of race riots in Detroit provided both ends of the Axis with authentic material which their propagandists could easily distort and magnify but for which they could still claim a solid basis in fact. Tokyo, for example, used the affair in two ways—first in its campaign to turn the Asiatics against the white race, which we will examine a little later, and second to create uneasiness among the Australians and New Zealanders about our ability to carry on the war. In a broadcast to Australia, Tokyo faked a Reuter's dispatch from Washington as reporting that "the domestic situation in the United States is turning from bad to worse," and added: "The troubles, including coal-mining strikes, price questions, food problems and degeneration of social morals, are now steadily driving the United States into a deep-rooted turmoil." The race riots were cited with obvious satisfaction as an example of this turmoil.

The Berlin radio dwelt on the idea that we were a mongrel race which easily fell prey to elements seeking to cause dissension and that in this particular case it was the Communists who created the trouble.

"The ex-Comintern is busy at work in the United States," said one Berlin broadcast. "A proof is the big riot in Detroit. Unlike Germany and Italy, the United States is not composed of a uniform race. Fourteen million Negroes, for instance, are the permanent problem of a country where all labor must be utilized in the service of production. The white workers, however, consider these Negroes to be a sort of dirty competition because they are forced to work for the lowest wages."

Another Nazi broadcast explained to Europe that the riot was the result of the lack of race unity in the United States, "a problem greatly affected by the Bolshevization of the American Negroes through the overwhelming influence of American Jewry."

The Rome radio in a sarcastic broadcast to France said that the riots showed how free of race prejudice and what a "model country" America was and added that "lynch law exists in the land of Christopher Columbus." It sought to make the point that the riots showed internal American weakness and proved that we were not invincible.

"Wars are won with arms and not the internal disorder of the enemy," Rome said, "but we hope that this people which has been spoiled by fate will begin to have a better comprehension of the fact that its faculties are limited, and that it will begin to doubt the myth of American superiority."

We have noted the Nazi sniping at our President, our resolution to continue fighting the war until final victory, and our production program. These are the major objects of attack in the campaign to bore from within, but there are other purposes including the effort to discredit our army. The most obvious and most frequent attempt of the Axis radio in regard to the army is to make us believe that it doesn't know how to fight. Berlin used that line all through the African campaign, and

Tokyo used it until a change was forced by the reverses at Guadalcanal, which had to be explained to the Japanese public somehow. But for a time Berlin made much of scurrilous charges that our army was riddled with corruption. That job was given to a minor English-speaking voice on the German radio named Joe Scanlon in the spring of 1942.

Scanlon used the station called Debunk, which was invented by Goebbels to give American listeners the impression that they were hearing an outlaw station operated in the Middle West whose purpose was to "tell the real truth about the war and the Roosevelt administration." Berlin is still using the station, but it is to be hoped that people in this country who tune in to Nazi shortwave broadcasts are aware of its real origin by now.

He accused a General X, spelling out the name carefully, of being a thief and embezzler, adding: "He is in the U.S. Army. It is a shame and a disgrace to our country that the professional officers of our army should be thieves and candidates for the Leavenworth penitentiary. Yes, that is where they belong."

That was only part of Scanlon's low-level attack. From the officers themselves he went on to their wives. "The professional officers of the army have applied drastic measures to prevent prostitutes from hanging about army camps, but how about the wives of the army officers, many of whom lead an immoral life?" And he cited the name of a regiment, gave the name of the commanding officer, and continued: "Tonight I will give you the name of one officer whose wife is a prostitute. The officer's name is Major P. I can give you the names of two men who practiced the business with the major's wife, but both men are otherwise okay and there is no necessity of getting them mixed up in this filthy affair." That, as you can see, was very generous of Joe Scanlon, and the officers in question were no doubt very grateful.

You may wonder where Scanlon got the names he used, but actually the matter is quite simple. All he did was get a copy of a prewar issue of the *Army and Navy Register of Officers* and select names at random. The fact that his entire script was a scandalous fabrication was but a detail. You can't talk back on the radio, and even if the officers named had stooped to Scanlon's level and sought to defend themselves, his point was already made, the grain of a rumor already started and the purpose of the broadcast accomplished.

In the way that we have seen Berlin and Tokyo take up our production program, our policies and our army, dozens of other minor stories, many of them quite as damaging as the major efforts of the Axis radio, are set going across the country. David G. Wittels in an article in the *Saturday Evening Post* in November 1942 listed some of these. You have probably heard some of them at one time or another without realizing that they were directly traceable to Nazi agents in this country and to the Axis radio. They come right off the assembly line of what Mr. Wittels called Hitler's shortwave rumor factory. If they are not picked up by innocent but careless listeners and spread by them, they are put into circulation by Nazi agents who know that they are designed as grist for their mill and who act accordingly. Some of them are:

1. The Red Cross doesn't need any more human blood because animal blood will do just as well.
2. Jewish doctors mix Negro and white blood in the Red Cross blood banks.
3. We will feed England and Russia even if our own babies at home starve.
4. England is underselling us in South America with goods acquired through Lend-Lease.

5. Our government has no intention of paying off the war bonds.

6. The British battleship *Warspite* ran away from the battle of the Coral Sea and left our naval units to take a beating from the Japanese.

7. A disastrous U.S. convoy sinking in which 1,500 American troops lost their lives has been kept from the American public.

8. Prostitutes live right inside our army camps.

From time to time the Nazis come up with a new technique in their constant search for means of getting at our morale. One of their more recent innovations has been the chatty dialogue, and they have been using it weekly in the place of a political commentary. I recently recorded one of these, which was in the form of a conversation between one George O'Neill and his pal Jack, "the old Chicago bartender."

The theme was how swell things were in Chicago in the good old days before Roosevelt and the Communists sent so many of Jack's friends off to war in a foreign land. Neither George nor Jack explained how they happened to be in Berlin, or how Jack had acquired such a thick German accent, but then even Nazi propaganda can't be perfect.

The chat began by Jack telling George (a little haltingly as he labored over his script) how great it was to be there at the microphone. George agreed that it was great, and asked Jack what he had been hearing lately from his old friends in Chicago.

Jack turned sad at that point. "My friends?" he asked. "I'm afraid there aren't many of them there any more, the way they've been sent off to war. And I bet a lot of them won't come back either."

"Yeah," said George. "Do you remember those fellows in

the American Legion and that newspaperman on the Chicago *Tribune* that you used to know?"

"I sure do," Jack replied, warming to his subject. "They sure used to have some splashes about isolationism in the *Tribune*, didn't they?" Jack sighed. "That Colonel McCormick sure was a die-hard isolationist, wasn't he? And he had a big following too. The people back there didn't want to get mixed up in this war, did they?"

George agreed that they didn't.

"In the good old days," Jack continued, "you didn't dare even mention the word Communist back in Chicago. Anybody who dared breathe it was ostracized. [The word ostracized in the script got Jack down for a moment, but he soon recovered.] Why, I remember the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars campaigning against Communism, and to think that now they're a link in the Communist chain! Why, I even understand that it's got so bad that there are signs in the bars in Chicago that say, 'Joe for President.'"

"That's because the Jews are so powerful," George explained.

"Funny, isn't it," said Jack, "how people can't see that the Jews are behind the Red menace?"

"Yeah," George agreed, "and it's so sad, too, the way youth is being sacrificed for the world revolution. There'll sure be plenty of gold-star mothers over there when it's over—thousands of them."

Leaving us with that cheerful thought, George and Jack retired from the microphone, assuring us that they would be back again soon.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE FREEDOM STATIONS

ONE OF THE MOST interesting sidelights of the radio war has been the rise and fall of the freedom stations—their rise as a heartening voice of resistance in the blacked-out countries dominated by the Axis, and their fall to the position of just another propaganda device.

A freedom station is a clandestine transmitter broadcasting, ostensibly under the noses of the Gestapo, words of courage and resistance to peoples under the Fascist yoke. From time to time, since the early days of the Nazi rise in Europe, one of these transmitters has gone on the air and sought to make some message heard by the peoples who were otherwise allowed to listen to nothing but the words Dr. Goebbels wanted them to hear. These stations never could gain much importance as anti-Nazi propaganda organs, because their existence was too precarious. They were a great source of annoyance to the Gestapo and to Nazi propagandists but only rarely were they more than that. They could not be counted on to carry on a sustained campaign before an assured audience, because modern methods of detection made it necessary for them to change their location with almost every broadcast and change their wavelength as well to prevent jamming.

It became evident to the propaganda authorities of both sides soon after the first freedom stations came into existence that if

authentic ones could do little more than stir up the imagination, fake ones could accomplish much more. Accordingly phony freedom stations began to spring up, and still continue to spring up in both Europe and Asia. It is giving away no military secret to say that we have used the device as well as the Nazis, but we have never employed it to anything like the extent that the enemy has. The reason is that we can rely on direct transmissions for everything we have to say and do not need the subterfuge of a fake freedom station to get a message across.

The use of such stations began before the war, but it did not grow to important proportions until 1940 when, for example, the Germans made considerable use of a French-language station called Radio Humanité (named after the suppressed French Communist daily) in order to promote pacifist sentiment in France and interfere, all too successfully, with the French prosecution of the war. On the other hand the French had a station which was supposed to originate in Austria but which no doubt was located in eastern France, and had remarkable success for a time with its technique of imitating Hitler's own brand of German.

The idea behind the use of the clandestine station is that anybody who falls for the deception will think he is listening to broadcasters who are on his side and are risking their lives to get their messages across. If Germany says, "This is Berlin speaking; you had better make peace now," the average American or Englishman rightly infers that the Nazis recommend peace because it would be a good thing for Germany. But if he hears the same thing from a speaker whom he believes to be broadcasting secretly in defiance of the German authorities, he may assume that the speaker says it because he thinks it would be a good thing for England or America.

The Germans do not confine themselves to a single freedom station for each of their enemies. England receives broadcasts from at least four, each of them broadcasting frequently, and there are others for the dominions. Those beamed at England are the New British Broadcasting Station, the Workers' Challenge, Radio Caledonia and the Christian Peace Movement. Among those aimed at the Empire are Free India, Free Egypt and Anzac Tattoo.

One of the stations aimed at England is keyed to a middle-class audience and another to factory workers. Each plays up what the Germans imagine to be the prejudices of the class they are addressing. As they appeal to different audiences, they have to differ not only in their method of going after their objectives but even in the objectives themselves. For example, on the second-front issue in 1942 and early 1943 the middle-class freedom station for Britain exploited what the Nazis believed to be British middle-class fear of Communism. The station followed the line that it was the Communists who wanted the second front in order to save Communism, no matter how many lives it cost.

The station aimed at British workers actually appeared to favor a second front, but it used the issue to try to hinder British production. "Russia wants the second front in western Europe," it said, "but she won't get it from the capitalists. Workers of Britain, strike for a second front!"

The station Debunk mentioned in the previous chapter is a typical fake clandestine station. When it first began broadcasting Debunk went to elaborate lengths to make us believe it originated in the Middle West. Its speakers made their accents as twangy as they could, announced the time as Central Standard, opened with a few bars of the "Star-Spangled Banner," and generally sought to create a cracker-barrel atmosphere.

Joe Scanlon, the principal Debunk speaker, is probably Otto Koischwitz, who has persuaded Goebbels that he is the very man to put a fake Midwestern radio station across with us yokels out here.

Among the more recent efforts of the Nazis to exploit the freedom-station technique was the creation shortly after the Anglo-American landing in North Africa of three ostensibly clandestine transmitters which had the special job of trying to cause dissension and interfere with our plans. These stations were Brazzaville Two, which was supposed to be a Fighting French outlet in North Africa, the Voice of Truth and Radio Patrie, all of them broadcasting from France or Italy. Brazzaville Two was designed to be confused with the authentic Fighting French station broadcasting from Brazzaville in Equatorial Africa and used the latter's wavelength. It issued contradictory orders in order to cause confusion, appealed to French soldiers in the name of the Fighting French and interlarded its news broadcasts with attacks on the United States and items which it believed would increase the rivalry between General Giraud and General de Gaulle.

In one broadcast Brazzaville Two sought to create panic by announcing the spread of a plague of typhus in the zones occupied by American troops. The speaker, purporting to be a De Gaullist, said: "We are dumfounded at the administration's inability to check this scourge. But alas, this administration remains what it has always been—the same boasting incompetent chiefs, with the same unconcern and the same blindness."

The so-called Voice of Truth went on the air to Africa with a strong anti-Semitic line, announcing in one of its first broadcasts that "all Jewish officers who were in the French army and had been dismissed by the Vichy administration have been

called up [in North Africa] and made high officers and advisers, but were never sent to the front."

For purposes of creating animosity between Arabs and Jews and creating enmity against the occupation forces among the native population, Vichy Arab-language transmitters, parading as authentic Arab mouthpieces, went on the air with broadcasts like this: "The Allied nations and the French traitors are delivering you to the Jews. Your fathers were masters of the Jews. The Allied nations are now making the Jews your masters. Will you stand for this?"

One invention of those transmitters was the statement that the American minister in Syria had told the press that the Atlantic Charter did not apply to the Arab peoples. As quoted by an Arab-language station, the minister said: "The Arab people will have to buy their future by complete submission to North America's will." Needless to say the minister never made any such statement.

Fake freedom stations have been used with increasing frequency throughout Asia in recent months. Afghanistan has been a favorite nesting spot for them, as Axis secret agents and even diplomatic missions have been able to work there with comparative freedom, broadcasting irresponsible, false news items and diatribes against Britain and the United States in the form of news commentaries. These transmitters are usually not very powerful and are not designed to carry very far. Their principal job is to influence the more uncivilized natives of northwest India, Persia, Iraq and Arabia rather than the city populations of Asia. For the latter the Axis has powerful transmitters located in its own capitals which parade as freedom stations. Radio Himalaya, which is supposed to operate from New Delhi, actually originates in Rome; India Independence broadcasts from Tokyo; Free India originates in Berlin.

Probably the best known of all the fake freedom stations operating today is the one called Gustave Siegfried Eins, which broadcasts in German, ostensibly from Berlin. While it is clear that the Gustave Seigfried Eins station is not what it pretends to be, I cannot say what it actually is. It purports to be operated by high officers of the German army who are opposed to the Nazis but want to win the war. It is patriotically German, never says anything favorable to our side but consistently picks at Nazi party officials for their inefficiency, corruption and general mishandling of the war. The fact that the station has remained in existence for many months and has made frequent broadcasts shows that either the Nazi government does not want to suppress it, or cannot get at it. If the former be true, it means that the Nazis are willing to take a little personal abuse to allow the Allied countries to believe there exist in Germany men powerful enough to operate a secret radio station under the very nose of the regime, who seem "reasonable" and the type of people with whom one might negotiate a peace. If the latter be true, it means that the station originates somewhere in Europe outside of Germany, probably England.

Whatever the case may be the Gustave Siegfried Eins station is worth our attention for the work it does. Last December it carried a violently anti-Nazi broadcast attacking the German labor setup as out-and-out slavery and relating one of the most gruesome stories of the war. It reported that the Nazi labor czar Fritz Sauckel was ruthlessly exploiting German war wounded.

"Men with one arm, blind men, men whose legs have been amputated," it said, "these are only objects to be exploited for the industrialists, worth anything as long as they slave for them. For Herr Sauckel the war cripple exists only to produce still more war tools with which to maim still more war vic-

tims. . . . The blind, those whose hands, arms or legs have been amputated, those whose limbs were frozen off, are sent directly from hospitals to re-education camps. Technicians decide how far this human wreckage can be remade into something capable of working. Then artificial limbs are measured to it. It receives new hands, arms, feet and legs, or sometimes only a wheel chair or an apparatus to enable it to hear something. Then the re-education starts. During this process the cripple is drilled spiritually in order that he shall enjoy being made into a working machine."

Later the same month it made a violent attack on the Nazis in Hitler's immediate entourage, charging them with gross incompetence. A third broadcast, in December 1942, urged Germany not to waste men and material helping "the weak-sister Italians" on the African front and warning that the only vital front was Russia. In this connection, the station made frequent attacks on Rommel for his unsuccessful African campaign.

Only a few weeks before the final defeat of the Axis in Africa the Gustave Siegfried Eins station was still harping on the line that the effort there was wasted. Referring to Africa in March 1943 as the "macaroni front," the station's commentator, known as The Chief, said: "Despite the fact that all military experts in authority agree that Tunis is a lost proposition, the strategists of the party send huge quantities of our best troops, planes and tanks there. Panzers and fighter planes of the latest types, our best elite troops, all that we need so terribly in the east and do not get, are sent now, at ten minutes before the zero hour, to Tunisia. Material for an entire panzer division has already been sunk in the Mediterranean."

The line which the Eins station has always maintained, to the effect that Germany could win with her generals but not her Nazi leaders, brought a curious development in February

1943. Another ostensible freedom station went on the air—with only one broadcast so far as I can determine—to answer that argument. That station declared that Germany had irretrievably lost the war and that “we the workers” would not permit either the capitalists or the generals to try to save themselves at the expense of the Nazis. Broadcasting in German, the speaker said in part:

“Hitler is the tool of the capitalists. Now that the war is lost beyond repair they try to save their positions by declaring the failure of Nazism. Maybe they will put another tool in the place of Hitler, a Neurath or a Schacht, or even someone a little more to the left. But we don’t want this.

“This time the generals will not be allowed to conclude the peace. We have enough of peace which is but a lull. We have enough of 1918. We will not permit the exchange of Hitler domination for domination by the big capitalists. We will not allow the exchange of Himmler for the field marshals, or Sauckel for capitalist exploitation.”

A new freedom station which called itself the Station of French Resistance and which contributed substantially to the war of nerves against the Germans appeared in the summer of 1943. Although we cannot say for sure, the chances are that it was not a freedom station in the original sense but a transmitter set up either in French North Africa or England with the special mission of fostering action against the Nazis in occupied France. One of the jobs it assumed was that of supplementing the BBC and the official Algiers stations in sending out instructions to French patriots. Another job was to think up ways of annoying the Germans. A highly successful effort along the latter line was a burlesque of a Nazi celebration in early July on the third anniversary of Hitler’s triumphant demonstration in Berlin following the fall of France.

According to Columbia Broadcasting System monitors, the broadcast, pretending to transmit a series of news flashes, went like this:

“Nobody is on the streets but everybody is happy. The Gestapo keeps the crowds moving. The station master was shot as a precaution [against sabotage at the railroad station where Hitler was due to arrive]. Goebbels and Goering are in hiding while waiting.”

The second flash said: “Our Berlin correspondents report that the Gestapo is checking everybody’s identification papers. General Rommel arrived in an armored car. In another car we see General von Paulus, the Russians having lent him to the Germans so he could greet Hitler personally.”

Next came another news flash reporting: “A later dispatch from our correspondents reveals that Hitler has still not arrived. But there was an R.A.F. raid and Goering got so frightened that the doctor had to give him a morphine injection to revive him. Von Arnim and Hess have also arrived in an armored car. The British lent them for the occasion, and they have been locked up in a kiosk.”

A few minutes later came the following: “A dispatch which has just come in reveals that Laval, Jean Luchaire (French traitor-editor) and Fernand de Brinon (Vichy delegate in Paris) are attending the ceremony, but De Brinon, alas, was shot by the Gestapo. They apparently made a mistake.”

Finally came the closing item: “A last flash from our Berlin correspondents reports that Hitler’s train was derailed by saboteurs. Great enthusiasm reigns in Berlin, and the Gestapo is shooting everyone in sight.”

From time to time a freedom station does appear which has an unmistakably authentic ring, but it rarely is heard from more than a few times. Such a station appeared in Belgium in

June 1942 and called itself the Flemish Freedom Station. The best recommendation for its authenticity was the fact that the Germans tried so hard to jam its broadcasts, and usually succeeded after the first minute or two. It was rarely able to get more than a few sentences across before the jammer cut it out.

"This is the free transmitter of oppressed Belgium!" it would say. "Hang all the traitors! Tear down all the swastikas!" And that is about as far as it could get before the interference became too great for it to be heard.

In August 1942 a secret Socialist broadcaster which called itself the Station of European Revolution made a few broadcasts. Its apparent aim was to keep alive whatever opposition to the Nazi regime existed inside Germany, particularly among the workers. In one of its broadcasts it made the following appeal:

"The eyes of the workers of the world are today fastened on the workers of Germany. The signal for the revolt of the peoples must come from our country. The regime feels that its downfall is approaching. The terror revels in blood, but it cannot hold back the growing opposition.

"Hitler doesn't promise final victory for this year. He promises only partial success. But we tell you today, this year will bring the decision. In this year Hitler will fail. And that is why in the coming months each one of us will carry an enormous responsibility. We can do more than we ever had a chance to do before because the anti-Fascist movement is stronger and the Nazi regime weaker than ever before."

I conclude the discussion of freedom stations with a story of real heroism connected with an unquestionably authentic one, operated in Holland—an exploit which could well serve as an example to enemies of the Axis powers everywhere in the countries they have overrun.

Early in 1942 a Dutch Nazi was killed in Utrecht. That night an underground broadcasting station in the Netherlands gave a description of the murder, complete in every detail, even to the license number of the murdered Nazi's car.

After that broadcast the station was silent for a time, while the Gestapo scoured Holland in search of it. Then, obligingly, it came on the air again. This time it taunted the Nazis by giving a circumstantial report of a visit to Gestapo headquarters in Amsterdam. The speaker described fully the interior of the building, mentioning the pictures on the wall, the dirt spots on the tile floors and other striking details.

Next the broadcaster gave a word-for-word account of conferences between a prominent resident of Amsterdam and his family regarding the acceptance of an important post which had been offered to him by the Nazis occupation authorities. The announcer warned the man that he would be hanged from a tree in front of his house if he dared take the job.

Weeks went by, but the Germans were unable to find the station. The programs never came from the same source twice. Jamming the transmitter proved impossible, because its wavelength was always being changed. That, of course, made it difficult for listeners to pick it up, but the men who ran the station realized that it was better to have a small, haphazard audience than to be shot.

Finally the Nazis resorted to an elaborate ruse to discredit all underground broadcasting in the Netherlands. On the night of June 24, 1942, almost immediately after the signing-off of the official Hilversum radio, a tremulous voice was heard:

"This is the secret Dutch freedom station *De Notenkraker* [the nutcracker]. We draw your attention to our daily transmissions on the ultra-shortwave. We do not like Goebbels. That is why we play this dangerous game with a secret sender.

We do not like the Dutch Nazis. We like the programs of Radio Orange in London, but we have information which they do not possess.

“The war will probably end in a stalemate, and Holland will have to know where it stands. To make this clear is the purpose of our underground station.”

The announcer continued in that vein, interlarding mild criticism of the Nazis with attacks on the United Nations. The Dutch were suspicious of the station from the beginning, and they knew it was a phony when it appeared night after night at exactly the same time and frequency, broadcasting for twenty minutes. The methodical instincts of the Germans were their own undoing. No illegal station hunted by the Gestapo could broadcast with such regularity.

Radio Orange, the station of the Dutch government in London, beamed a message to its Dutch listeners warning them against the Nutcracker station. For a while it continued, however, putting out commentaries which always led to the conclusion that, although the Dutch did not like the Nazis, they ought to keep their opposition in hand because England was not going to win the war. At times it gave mild warnings to the Dutch government in London not to be so “hateful” in its propaganda.

Finally the Germans changed the frequency of the Nutcracker station, putting it on the same wavelength as that of the Hilversum station. That was the last blunder the Nutcracker made. It soon disappeared from the air as unceremoniously as it had come, having failed in its effort to be taken for the real clandestine transmitter.

The authentic freedom station continued. It came on the air at irregular intervals, once every two or three weeks. It broad-

cast crisply for five minutes or so, giving hot and provocative items, and then it vanished again.

Reliable reports from the Netherlands say that the Dutch people stay glued to their radios listening for it, knowing that it will not broadcast very often, but that long waits for it will always be well rewarded, and knowing too that the Nazi effort to discredit it was a clumsy failure.

•

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE SATELLITES

IN THE RADIO WAR against us Goebbels neglects not a single weapon. If there are targets which his shortwave guns in Berlin cannot reach he fires from the capitals of the satellite nations, using ostensible neutrals as well as those which are frankly in the Nazi camp. Because a country like Spain is not a member of the Axis with troops in the field against us does not mean that Goebbels cannot recruit its propaganda machinery on his side. On the contrary, Spanish radio stations and newspapers have been ready and willing since the war began to do everything in their power to help Berlin, as we shall see presently. The reasons are not difficult to trace.

The Franco regime was brought into power with the open aid of Germany and Italy. Its victories were won with German tanks, German guns and German planes, and some of its defeats were sustained by the Italians—the battle of Guadalajara, for example. In the early days of the war in 1936, while the French and British were playing the game of nonintervention, claiming that the war in Spain was a purely civil affair in which the other nations of Europe should not take sides, we who were covering the war saw Italian Caproni bombers drop their explosives on Spanish cities in loyalist hands. We saw German agents come and go across the French frontier. The men who covered the war from Franco's own capital at Burgos

saw thousands of Germans and Italians in the rebel armies, who laughed at the nonintervention farce, helped Franco win the war and, incidentally, tested out their latest weapons and tactics for use in this war.

The point of recalling these things is to make it clear that Franco had a debt to the Axis countries which he has been discharging ever since. Moreover, he knows that his very existence depends on an Axis victory, for without the support he can get from outside his own country he cannot remain in power. Rigorous repression and the keeping of literally hundreds of thousands of Spaniards in prisons since the end of the Spanish War have not wiped out the sources of resistance to Franco's artificially nourished regime, and he knows it. At this writing he has not yet gone so far as to attack Gibraltar in the interests of the Axis or to allow the Nazi armies to cross his soil and attack it themselves, but the reasons have nothing to do with where his sentiments lie. The reasons are that Spain would again become a center of guerrilla warfare if foreign armies crossed her soil, that economically the situation has been so bad that an army would have the utmost difficulty sustaining itself, and that a military venture by Italy and Germany in Spain might be more trouble than it was worth. But short of military action Franco and his propaganda machine have been very obliging.

The major effort of the Generalissimo and his government has been directed toward trying to get us to make peace with the Axis powers—an effort which was begun when it became clear to Hitler that he faced ultimate defeat but might save something if he could persuade us to stop short of complete victory and negotiate a peace. Twice in early 1943 direct peace feelers came from Spain. First Franco's foreign minister, Gomez de Jordana, urged peace and told the world that he

was speaking in the name of the Vatican as well as Spain. His point was that Communism would result from continued war and that something could be worked out so that all the erstwhile belligerents in the west could get together to fight the Red menace. The Communist-threat theme has been the major political thought in Franco foreign policy, because his government was born of it. All the legalistic trimmings of Axis intervention during the Spanish war and of Franco's own announced purposes in domestic affairs arose from the idea that Communism was the real enemy and that by overthrowing the legitimately elected government of Spain Franco was saving Europe from the Red hordes.

A few weeks later Hitler again called on Franco urgently. The Axis armies in Africa had just been subjected to a resounding defeat, the Allies were in complete possession of the southern shore of the Mediterranean, other Allied armies were poised in England, and the Russians were still occupying hundreds of thousands of Axis troops. The threat of Allied invasion was acute, and Hitler knew it. So he asked Franco once again to try to get him a peace, and Franco readily complied. In a speech at Almeria (which German warships had shelled as part of their "nonintervention" stand during the Spanish war) Franco urged again that everybody turn to the Communist menace and claimed, with little attention to the military facts, that the war in the west had reached a stalemate anyway. He too brought in the Vatican and tried to give the impression that he spoke in the name of the Pope as well as his own. It is highly important to note that neither after Jordana's speech nor after Franco's did the Vatican give any support whatever to the peace suggestions. While the Pope clearly wanted peace he just as clearly did not want to associate himself with Franco's bid for it and with Franco's reasons for making that bid.

In the matter of radio propaganda itself Spain has been highly useful to the Axis, particularly in seeking to stir up feeling against the United States in South America, where there is naturally a large audience for the Spanish radio. In reading the following excerpts from Spanish radio broadcasts it should be borne in mind that we are on ostensibly friendly terms with Spain, that we have followed a policy of appeasing the Franco regime wherever possible, that we have sent oil and other vital commodities to Spain, and that we have in Madrid an ambassador noted for his friendliness to the regime.

Our gestures toward Spain have thus far brought us nothing but abuse from the Spanish radio and the Spanish press. For example, on the anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor last year Radio Nacional of Barcelona followed a purely Axis line in attacking "American imperialism" and glorifying the Japanese.

"Japan has been crowned with success," the Spanish commentator said. "Japan's military power has been more than proved."

Commenting on an address by Sumner Welles on the subject of democracy, Radio Coruna broadcast the following:

"Sumner Welles tells us that the main freedoms of this world are freedom of speech and religion. Freedom of religion means in Europe that the Jews will come back to their positions again, followed by a train of misery, exploitation and crime. Freedom of speech is not unknown to us. We Spaniards know that democracy is known by the name of republic, and republic means atheism, robbery, murder by the roadside, rape, terror and anguish. We are not interested in the paradise which Sumner Welles offers to the world."

Returning to the theme of American imperialism on Decem-

ber 11, 1942, Radio Burgos broadcast the following on our war aims:

“American expansion seems to aim at making the Atlantic an American sea. To achieve this Americans are sending forces step by step into the African continent. At the same time they hope to establish in the Far East a sort of federation of Asiatic states which they would perhaps dominate economically as they dominate South America today.”

On the Atlantic Charter last November the station of Franco's Falange at Valladolid broadcast: “Wars have never been won by speeches and letters. Let them write as many letters as they please. In the meantime, a strong and united side is ending the enslavement of Stalin's people.”

A few days later the Valladolid radio made the following comment on a manifesto published in Vichy demanding that war be declared on the United States and Britain as a result of the Allied occupation of French North Africa:

“We will say only that the differences between the Americans and the British in North Africa, and between the different brands of French traitors, are growing. On the other hand, each day the unity between all Frenchmen worthy of the name is becoming more marked. They are uniting behind Pétain, who in these critical hours has adopted the only attitude which will save his country.”

This highly favorable comment on the attitude of the traitors of Vichy was far from an isolated instance. On the contrary, it was part of a consistent line which to date Spain shows no sign of abandoning.

Following are a few samples of Spanish broadcasts made early this year, some of them almost at the same moment that our ambassador was making a speech in Barcelona in which he

discussed our large-scale oil shipments to Spain and our friendly attitude toward the country.

On February 2, 1943 Valladolid broadcast: "The Jewish banks of New York and London in concert with Bolshevism unleashed this war. And therefore their demands for a part in the peacemaking are understandable. They will then be able to disorganize the world at will and engrave on the future constitutions of the nations the indelible stigma of their hatred and vengeance.

"Should it really be their hour, it would go down as the end of Europe. But like a brilliant ray of hope Hitler's voice assures us that this fight will not finish as the Jews wish, with the extermination of the Aryan race, but with the destruction of European Jewry."

Later the same month the Spanish radio heaped ridicule on our troops in Tunisia—ridicule at which we may well smile now that the Axis armies there have been routed.

"A reconnoitering operation by Rommel's vanguard was enough to put a whole American army to flight. The Germans have verified that in the future one German soldier confronting four or five Americans can provide reasonable hope of victory."

On March second the Spanish radio had this to say about our war aims: "The Anglo-American-Russian coalition is aimed at destroying all human forces sustained by the spirit, and they have reached an agreement on this goal through international Jewry and the Free Masons. We must do our utmost to prevent European culture from disappearing, which is exactly the opposite of what the British and their friends are after."

So much for Spain, supposedly a neutral. Let us take a brief glance now at the Finns, who have done their utmost to try to convince us that they are not really playing the Axis game but

are merely fighting Russia. The fact that both we and the Russians are fighting Germany is just a coincidence, they say, and is no reason for our not continuing friendly relations with them. Many of us fell for that line, in spite of the evidence. We were encouraged to do so by the fact that the Finns were sometimes openly critical of their Axis partners and that they did not seem to swallow Hitler's new order so completely as some other Axis satellites. We were encouraged also by recurrent rumors that Finland was trying her best to arrange a separate peace with Russia and to pull out of the war. Finally, we were encouraged by the fact that since the winter of 1941 there had been little action on the Russo-Finnish front.

But the true colors of the Finnish government came to light too clearly for any of us to ignore in April 1943, when it openly took a stand in favor of the Japanese after the latter had barbarously executed some of the American aviators who had taken part in the raid on Tokyo the previous year. Although couched in legalistic language, the Finnish position was unmistakable and should have served to clarify things for a lot of us. On April twenty-seventh the Finnish radio broadcast the following, which it said had been published in the newspaper *Ajan Suunta*:

"The United States has stated that executions of American airmen have taken place and that the United States will reserve for herself the right to take reprisals after the war, if circumstances allow.

"Japan has now replied, explaining why the death sentences were carried out. The American airmen who had raided Tokyo directed their attack particularly against civilian targets to such an extent that they, for instance, machine-gunned children playing in the grounds at a school, killing and wounding many

of them. The airmen themselves have admitted this. Afterward the culprits were sentenced to death and executed."

Note the complete swallowing of the Japanese propaganda line, without the slightest indication that it might have been a fabrication.

The broadcast continued: "We must remember that international law forbids the murdering of unarmed noncombatant civilians in general. With regard to the death sentences and executions carried out in Japan, it is true that an international agreement concerning the treatment of prisoners of war binds the captor to protect prisoners of war against any reprisals and acts of revenge, but in another paragraph it decrees that a prisoner of war is personally responsible under the laws of the country which has taken him a prisoner.

"Most countries—including the United States, as everyone knows—condemn the mass murder of helpless children. In these circumstances Japan undoubtedly had a right to punish those American prisoners who deliberately murdered helpless civilians."

Goebbels has also found special use for Vichy in his propaganda war against us. I am not referring to the general expressions of adherence to the new order which French traitor broadcasters send out regularly or to Laval's repeated expressions of faith in an Axis victory (in which that astute horse-trader can scarcely still believe, in spite of his words). I am referring to a use to which Goebbels has put Vichy in a field which his own radio cannot penetrate, namely French Canada. Vichy has done yeoman service in trying to exploit the latent anti-British and pacifistic leanings of many French Canadians and by so doing interfere with the Canadian war effort. At one time the Vichy radio worked on the idea of stirring up the French population of the United States, but that was appar-

ently given up as futile, since the French population here was not an entity which could be easily identified and worked upon.

The fight over conscription in Canada in 1942 provided Vichy with just the ammunition it needed. French broadcasts to Canada openly advocated non-co-operation with the attempts of the "British masters" of French Canada to force them into the war. Léon Broussard, a Vichy political commentator, urged all Frenchmen on this continent to perpetuate the "ancient tradition" and reassert their right to an important position here. He claimed that the original 306,000 French colonists on this continent have grown to 7,000,000, of which 3,000,000 were in the United States, and suggested that they organize an autonomy movement.

The French know how annoying autonomy movements can be, even if they lack any real political substance, for in prewar France there was such a movement in Brittany, in which the German propaganda ministry gladly played ball with a handful of fanatically anti-French Bretons and provided them with funds in order to stir up trouble.

Although of secondary importance the appeal to the French Canadians from Vichy has been a sustained campaign. The line has been that the French Canadians are persecuted for their opposition to the war, and that "the mother country" will not forget them, or the fact that it was a "British robbery" in 1763 which cost France her sovereignty over French Canada.

All that will be remedied someday, Vichy says.

"French Canadians are French, our brothers by blood and tongue," Vichy tells them, and assures them that there is a solidly founded hope that a French Catholic state will arise in the valley of the St. Lawrence.

One of the most irksome features of the anti-American line

taken by Vichy was for long the fact that two French stations in the western hemisphere took part in it. These were the stations on the French islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe, right in the United States' back yard. The pro-Vichy governor of the islands, Admiral Georges Robert, discovered early in the war that we intended to maintain a policy of appeasement in regard to him and would do nothing more than "neutralize" the islands from a naval standpoint. He ascertained that we would not interfere with his radio broadcasts, so he proceeded to make them as anti-American, pro-Vichy as he pleased. Even after the occupation of all France the Martinique station was still using a phrase about loyalty to Pétain in every broadcast.

An indication of how pleased the Germans were with Robert's defiance of the United States was given at the time we announced that food shipments to him had ceased. A Paris broadcast expressed "relief and joy" because Robert "did not budge an inch" during negotiations with the United States. He was praised for obeying the orders of Marshal Pétain, and it was said that his attitude condemned that of other high French officials who had refused to adhere to the Vichy government.

The only concession Robert ever made to the United States was the forcibly extracted one of immobilizing his fleet, for which the Paris radio was very grateful but grudgingly realistic.

"It was obvious that the State Department would not be satisfied for long with so little," one broadcast explained. "New negotiations were started. Admiral Robert did not budge an inch. We know that Sumner Welles took the decision not to send any more food to Martinique as long as this stubborn officer would not give in."

Admiral Robert was finally ousted in July 1943, in favor of a

governor appointed by the new French Committee for National Liberation in Algiers, and Martinique ceased to be a thorn in our side and a gap in our Caribbean defense system.

Apart from following the broad lines of propaganda set forth by Berlin, Paris and Vichy occasionally come up with a bright idea of their own, which they think will serve either to interfere with our prosecution of the war or lower us in the eyes of radio listeners somewhere. One of the silliest of such broadcasts was that in March 1943 describing an air raid on the west coast.

"There was an air-raid warning in San Francisco and Los Angeles," said the Paris radio, with typical French disregard of geography. "We may say that there was a panic. A plane was flying over the great city celebrated for its photogenic fire and the city which is the sophisticated kingdom of the stars. A single plane in the sky, and immediately there was a blue funk among thousands of Americans. They hastened into shelters at the risk of renewing the recent tragic stampede in the London subway station.

"With the photographic tendency necessary to normal life in Hollywood, they howled with fright. Imagine the stars of Beverly Hills running to their super de luxe shelters beneath the swimming pools of their private grounds. And all for a single plane, which was American at that. Like vulgar assassins, the Yankees are afraid of their own shadows."

But, we might add, who wouldn't be afraid of a plane that was able to fly over Los Angeles and San Francisco at the same time?

CHAPTER NINE

THE VOICE OF JAPAN

AT THE FAR END of the Axis a corps of slant-eyed little men carry on a great propaganda war of their own against us. They have been late in learning some of the finer points of Dr. Goebbels' technique, and many of their efforts are rough about the edges, but they work hard on many themes and it is not for us to say that they are not effective. Sometimes they appear stupid as a result of the things they try to make us believe. Sometimes they are funny. Sometimes they are grim. Always they are energetic and tireless in their radio war.

In general the aims of Radio Tokyo and the stations under Japanese control throughout the conquered areas of the Asiatic mainland and the far west Pacific are to do these things:

1. Frighten us into restricting our ambitions to the protection of our own shores.
2. Intimidate our fliers so that they will not attempt another raid on the Japanese mainland.
3. Play up race hatred on the mainland and the conquered islands so that the white race will be forever discredited. The fact that the Germans would be hated along with the rest of us is quite all right with the Japanese.
4. Convince us of Japanese invincibility.
5. Make the world believe that the war guilt is ours.

6. Destroy our morale in English-language broadcasts to this country by shortwave.

Besides working by shortwave on these themes, the Japanese radio goes diligently about the business of bolstering the war effort at home. This job includes some striking contradictions. The Japanese people are warned repeatedly that they must expect direct attacks by us but are told also that our Navy has been annihilated and that we are at the mercy of Japan in the Pacific. A sustained effort is made to convince the individual Japanese that he is something of a superman, but he is warned of the fighting qualities of our troops and Japan's other enemies. Sometimes our military and industrial potential is held up as a warning, and sometimes we are ridiculed as an ineffectual lot. It all depends on the propaganda task of the moment.

Some of the best material Tokyo propagandists have had in this war for putting across point three in the above list was provided in June 1943 by the race riots in Detroit and the so-called zoot-suit disturbances on the west coast. Those affairs, with a little embroidery, were perfect material for the Japanese campaign to discredit the white race in Asia and convince the nations there that Japanese domination is by far the lesser of two evils.

In a broadcast on June eleventh Tokyo turned the zoot-suit riots into an indictment of American servicemen as well as a vehicle for stirring up race hatred against the Americans.

"The fighting started when a group of gangsters beat up several soldiers and sailors for behaving in a loud manner in all public places," Tokyo said. "The ruffianlike behavior of the American doughboys and sailors is so well known that it has almost become a tradition in the American armed forces. This unruly behavior was well exemplified in Los Angeles when a

few hundred soldiers and sailors engaged in a common street brawl.”

The Tokyo radio then went on to say that in order to take revenge the armed forces mobilized hundreds of their men and engaged in a miniature battle with Mexican civilians. “Police intervention meant nothing to these troops, who severely wounded several of their rivals,” the broadcast went on. “The fact that a few innocent Mexican bystanders were injured in the fighting has aroused the indignation of the Mexican community.”

Japan made capital of the Detroit race riots in a Domei agency dispatch which was transmitted to this country as well as Asia, quoting an editorial in the *Nippon Times*. “The Americans,” said that paper, “are giving vent to their psychopathic race prejudice by hunting down innocent Negroes as they would wild beasts.” The broadcast said that this was nothing unusual, however, because race prejudice existed in the United States in normal times as well, and it cited the Exclusion Act against Chinese and Japanese immigrants as proof. “As the United States proclaims she is fighting for freedom and racial equality,” the broadcast concluded, “the rest of the world cannot help but wonder why it is that the United States does not set her own house in order before she presumes to preach to other people.”

Tokyo has always regarded the vast population of India as a fertile field for propaganda against the United Nations and has found much material in the perennial conflict between the British authorities and Mohandas Gandhi's Congress Party. At various times during the war Tokyo has used the extreme Indian nationalist Subhas Chandra Bose for broadcast purposes. It has never been entirely clear whether Bose himself did the broadcasting for the Axis or whether someone else broadcast

in his name. In either case, he was the peg on which anti-Allied propaganda beamed to India from Japan was hung. Sometimes broadcasts in Bose's name have played on the pure race-prejudice line and sometimes they have been modified to make the point that the Indians ought not to have any grievances against Japan's allies, Germany and Italy. The two lines were obviously not always easy to reconcile.

Typical use of Bose was a campaign in June 1943 which coincided with the appointment of Sir Archibald Wavell as Viceroy of India. The campaign began with the announcement that Bose had arrived in Tokyo, that his presence in Japan was a great blow to Britain and that Indians generally were rejoicing as a result. Where he had been before he reached Japan was not made clear.

"With Bose in East Asia the day of Indian independence may not be far off," the Tokyo radio said, and assured India in an English-language broadcast that the Allies did not have a chance to win the war, that India could never attain independence under the British anyway and that the "government of Japan through its worthy Premier Tojo has repeatedly declared its fullest support to Indian independence."

Tokyo sought to make Bose a rallying point for anti-British elements in India, particularly in view of the appointment of Wavell, which Tokyo said was made "because Britain saw that the weapon is the only way of suppressing the anti-British movement in India."

To make sure that the Indians and other Asiatics did not turn the anti-British feeling which Tokyo sought to stir up into a general wave of anti-European sentiment which would include the Axis powers, the Japanese radio had Bose say some nice things about Italy and Germany. Regarding the latter Bose said in a broadcast on June twenty-second that "the In-

dian people have always shown a great inclination toward the German people during the war," and Italy was praised for allegedly standing up so well under Allied aerial bombardment.

Tokyo has been by far the frankest member of the Axis when it comes to defining the aims of her propaganda. For example, a recent Tokyo broadcast carried instructions given by Premier Tojo to Japanese newspapermen and propagandists on how best to use "thoughts as bullets and arguments as bayonets." Tojo called for intensification of Japanese "thought warfare" against the Allies and urged Japanese propagandists to "begin attacks boldly and with all your might."

"At present the enemy's schemes in thought warfare are clever and keen," he said. "In thought warfare we are in the stage of devouring and being devoured. Individual antagonisms and differences which we cannot say were absolutely absent in the past can never be permitted now. Now is the time for thinkers and men of the press to unite and solidify their total efforts to prosecute the holy war for the destruction of America and Britain."

In general Tokyo divides its "thought warfare" into three channels, one beamed at the United States, Australia and New Zealand, another for home listeners in Japan and a third for the Asiatic mainland and the conquered islands. The news and comments broadcast to us hold a little more strictly to the truth than the material sent out over the other two channels. Tokyo broadcasters try not to make their broadcasts to us too flagrantly inaccurate for the reason that they think there is a limit to what we are likely to believe.

Likewise the news and propaganda report to the home front is on the sober side, although it leaves out all mention of Japanese defeats except where these must be played up in order to wring a bigger war effort from the people. Tokyo appears very

sensitive to the possibility that some of its own propaganda will play it a bad turn on the home front. Years of drumming into the minds of the Japanese people that they are a super-race destined to rule the world is useful in some respects, but it risks causing overconfidence and that is something Tokyo cannot afford to have at a stage of the war when the tide is turning in favor of the United Nations. Hence the sobriety and the warning about the potential power of the Allies.

It is in the broadcasts to Asia that the Japanese radio really lets itself go, to the extent that on a given day neither listeners to the Tokyo shortwave radio in this country nor people in Japan would recognize the news as the same they had been listening to. In speaking to Asia the Japanese put no limit on their claims of successes or on the size of their lies. A broadcast from the Hsinking station in Manchuria, monitored on March 27, 1942, will give you an idea of what Japanese propaganda to the Asiatic continent is like.

The speaker claimed that two waves of Japanese bombers had flown over Los Angeles and its adjacent aircraft factories without interference from American aircraft two days after President Roosevelt's speech of the previous month.

"Roosevelt is a liar," the broadcast said. "He said in his fire-side chat that the United States would be safe from enemy attack and from submarines. Yet as he spoke Japanese submarines were destroying the California coast."

The reference was to the brief shelling of some oil derricks near Santa Barbara by a Japanese undersea craft, mentioned in Chapter I. Tokyo added that the attack "had completely unnerved the entire Pacific coast of the United States," and that the American authorities had failed to reveal the extent of the damage wrought.

The aim of the Santa Barbara shelling was twofold, first to

convince the Asiatics that Tokyo had us at her mercy, and second to try to get us to pull the fleet back home. In the interest of the second objective Japanese radio commentators have repeatedly warned us of an impending attack on our shores.

Early in the war the Tokyo radio gave wide currency to a speech by Hisao Okumura, an official Japanese spokesman, who warned us: "We will not only command the communication lines of Britain and America but we will carry the war even to Washington and London. We must destroy their power. We must also destroy them politically, economically and even culturally."

In August 1942 the Japanese radio warned us that the attack on our mainland was just about fully prepared and ready for launching. It was to be a two-front attack, with the German and Italian fleets storming our shores from the east and the Japanese landing troops from the Pacific. At that time the spokesman of the Japanese navy press section did most of the talking. He said that Japanese occupation of bases in the Aleutian Islands exposed the United States to a direct threat. All the groundwork for the two-way attack had been prepared, and Japanese naval operations in the eastern Pacific (which were limited to the Santa Barbara shelling and one or two submarine attacks on our shipping) had ended American hopes of advancing against Japan by the "only route remaining," the northerly route by the Aleutian Islands.

Exactly six months later the Japanese people were warned that the very northerly route by which we were threatened was going to be used by us for an attack on Japan. This time it was the spokesman of the army press section who took to the microphone to explain that we were planning "a mortal attack upon the mainland of Japan" and that it was "common knowledge" that this attack would come from the north.

He warned the Japanese people that "according to the recently announced Roosevelt message, America is preparing to make the year 1943 a year of final battles of the decisive war." Perhaps the army press section spokesman was right. In any case his warning came at a time when the first land defeats on New Guinea and Guadalcanal had to be explained to the home audience and when some important modifications had to be made in the line that Japanese fighters were invincible. The lameness of the Japanese explanations of those defeats and the tone in which they were made revealed the Japanese to be like the Germans—unable to take defeats without whining about them.

In its propaganda treatment of a military action the Tokyo radio has proved time and again that it is no more consistent than its Axis partners and that it hopes listeners will not remember what had been told them in previous broadcasts.

Take for example the American reconquest of the island of Attu in the Aleutians. In June 1942, when Japan originally took the island, Tokyo announced triumphantly that our Dutch Harbor base had been destroyed at the same time (which was not true) and that "the destruction of Dutch Harbor and the occupation of Attu have taken the enemy's outpost for attack and have pointed a dagger at the throat of the United States mainland."

They held to that line for a while, but when nothing was done with the alleged dagger they began to hedge cautiously and finally to warn the Japanese radio audience that they were on the defensive and not the offensive in the north. America, they said, was planning an attack on Japan from Alaska and would try to use the Aleutians as stepping stones.

Regarding Attu itself, OWI monitors listed the following

statements from late April, when Tokyo began to be apprehensive, until the end of May, when the island was lost:

April 26: "Japanese bases in the Aleutians have been strengthened. Enemy attempts to recapture them belong only in the realm of remote possibility."

April 30: "Our garrison is fully prepared for such an occasion [an American attack]."

May 19: "No matter how the situation on Attu may develop, the attempts of the American forces will be easily frustrated."

May 26: "The American forces have achieved nothing since they landed."

May 28: "There is a strong conviction that our losses can be minimized."

May 30: "Every Japanese hero on Attu has been killed."

As for the use to which we intended to put Attu, the Tokyo radio had assured home audiences during the campaign that it would be impossible for us to attack Japan along the northern route "for geographical reasons." However, a week after that assurance was given, broadcasts for foreign consumption—for instance one in Spanish on May twenty-ninth—admitted that our aim was not only to retake Attu but "also to attack us [Japan] by the route of the Kuriles Islands and the north." That military commentary made no mention of the idea that geographical reasons would make such an attack impossible.

Up until February 1943 we had been used to reports from the Pacific area painting the Japanese as terrific fighters who knew all the tricks of jungle warfare and who never surrendered. Then Tokyo suddenly informed us that we were pretty tough ourselves. For example, it turned out that the Japanese did not like our men fighting back when attacked. The American and British "are willingly committing violent actions on the battlefield," Tokyo complained.

For the home audience Tokyo put before the microphone a Japanese correspondent back from the New Guinea front, and he broke the sad truth this way:

"I have been sent to several fronts in the past, and the one thing I felt during the New Guinea operation was that the enemy's fighting strength has been constantly reinforced. I assume that our enemies have been carefully studying the characteristic strategy of the Japanese army, due to their horrible experience in the Malay campaign.

"For instance let us consider our night operations. The enemy does not immediately give up his bases as he used to do when our forces attacked him, but he withdraws for a while and then makes a frontal counterattack. The enemy has added a strong elasticity to his fighting character."

After describing New Guinea as "utterly beyond the scope of the imagination of people living in Japan," with 9,000-foot mountains between which a stream flows rapidly, the reporter continued:

"The enemy waits for us to cross completely the bridge we built across a valley, and as soon as we reach the other side they ambush us from the jungle with automatic guns and rifles. They never come out of the jungles but throw hand grenades.

"I think the Australian army has made a very careful study of jungle fighting. For instance, the enemy sentry builds a seat in a large tree and shoots at us, so we cannot detect from where the bullet comes."

Then there was the weather. "In New Guinea we had rain every day," the home folks were told. "It poured suddenly about 4 P.M. We set up our tents while the rain poured, but the water penetrated from the bottom. So we placed an extra tent over the bedded leaves and slept on it. It was plenty tough, for the minute we started cooking enemy planes at-

tacked us by following the smoke. Due to the rain the wood was all wet and it was very difficult to keep the fire going. Therefore our rice was merely rice in name, and most of us ate half-cooked rice. We didn't find a single piece of meat no matter how hard or where we looked."

Alternating warnings to the Japanese people that we were about to launch an all-out attack on them, and warnings to this country that it was vulnerable to Japanese attack have presented one of the outstanding characteristics of Tokyo broadcasts since Pearl Harbor. Our attack on Attu made it clear that the warnings to the Japanese people had some foundation, but at this writing there is still nothing to indicate that the threats made by the Japanese to us have anything but bluff as their basis.

As the possibility of American attack on the Japanese mainland has been presented to home audiences by Tokyo radio propagandists, there appears to be an underlying fear of panic and confusion. The Doolittle raid in April 1942 very likely caused more trouble than the Japanese have been willing to admit, and showed that the people are not nearly so well able to withstand air raids as the government would like them to be.

That underlying fear might explain in part the Japanese stooping to the barbarous execution of some of the fliers in a desperate effort to intimidate the U. S. air force and make our aviators unwilling to attempt a second raid over Japan.

"It is important that we should not become frustrated in an air raid," the Tokyo commentator Fumio Goto warned the people in April 1943, when the anniversary of the Doolittle attack brought to Japan the acute fear of a repetition. "It is most vital that we move about in air defense maneuvers fearlessly and with confidence, without frustration and without

clamor. We must hold to a minimum the number of accidents occurring from enemy bombs."

Warnings to us that we can expect Japanese attacks are probably designed as much to bolster home morale as they are to intimidate us. One such warning came in April 1943 in the form of a speech by Major General Kenryo Sato, chief of the military affairs bureau of the war ministry in Tokyo. There were two versions of the speech as monitored by Federal Communications Commission listening posts, one for the Japanese people as put out on the home radio and another in English-language broadcasts to the outside world.

To the Japanese Sato said that it would take "some time" for the Japanese forces to make the necessary preparations for bombing expeditions against the United States, but in the English-language version of his speech, which, incidentally, was not broadcast until three days later, Sato was quoted as having said that the only obstacle, "the wide span of area between Japan and America," had already been solved "technically," and that before long Japanese, German and Italian planes would join in the attacks upon us.

On the lighter side, Tokyo propagandists spend many hours trying to tear us down in the eyes of the Japanese, seeking to destroy our confidence in ourselves, laboring to make us think more favorably of the Japanese than we do, and trying to convince the people of Japan themselves that they really have the qualifications of a super-race. It is remarkable how much time the propaganda bosses of the super-races spend in telling the people how wonderful they are. And the fact that so much radio time has to be devoted to disparaging analyses of our shortcomings indicates that our prestige causes no little concern to the men in charge of "thought warfare."

In promotion of the master-race idea the Japanese home audi-

ence was recently treated to a broadcast by one Dr. Naoki Shinta in which he recited Japanese virtues as follows:

Their love of peace: "The Japanese love peace. There is no historical record that Japan has exploited other nations." (Apparently they don't keep very complete historical records in Tokyo.)

Their patience: "The Japanese have patience. It is a special characteristic of the Asiatics, but it is especially strong in the Japanese."

Their brains: "The Japanese have a better brain, as Dr. Tanaka has proved."

Their health: "The Europeans conquered the southern regions but their health was not adaptable, so they enslaved the people. However, the Japanese body is fit for the southern regions. This proves that the Japanese are the most capable for the reconstruction of these regions."

And finally, as a crowning glory, no doubt, their sweat pores: "While the Europeans have few sweat pores, and the southern people have many, the Japanese people take the middle path. This shows that the Japanese can stand more than other races."

So much for Japanese racial characteristics. In addition to these, Shinta had many things to say about Japanese culture, the gist of which was that "the Japanese have a strong character for the assimilation of other culture, but they are not overcome by other culture."

To supplement Dr. Shinta's enlightening discourse on the master-race one Yusuke Tsurumi went on the local Tokyo station at about the same time to assure the Japanese that the Americans are bound to lose the war because of their shortcomings. These, he said, include overoptimism, quarrelsomeness and egotism in addition to the fact that we "crumble when facing defeat." He gave the Japanese this comforting analysis

on a basis of a visit to the United States in 1930 in which he found out all about us during a lecture tour.

"I believe that the nature and quality of the people, both on the fighting front and on the home front, determine to a large degree the outcome of a war," he explained. "This quality is a far more potent factor than any amount of material strength. It is vital then that we know America, which is our enemy."

America's outstanding characteristic, he continued, was our "practical nature."

In one hundred and sixty years America built a rich and busy nation out of a "country of wide plains with no roads or houses," he told the Japanese. "It has been the primary habit of the people to fight for their living. The American educational system attempts to make people of utilitarian efficiency rather than to train them in theoretical fields. This has resulted in a people who have no time to think things over."

America was blessed "with stimulating weather" which kept the people "industrious but restless," he said. It also made them take "twenty or thirty-mile automobile trips though they have nothing particular to do when they get to the end of the trip.

"The American people are extremely optimistic. This was brought about because of the riches of America, which were not seen elsewhere. As America had no hostile nations around her, she had no need to spend her money in national defense and could utilize it instead for expansion of her industries without exerting herself."

These riches led to egotism, Tsurmi continued, and the egotism bred impatience and "lack of elasticity." The result of this has been that "America seems to be a powerful nation but in fact she has never met and fought with a strong nation. This is the first occasion on which she has come face to face with a formidable force."

There would be more comfort for the Japanese in Tsurumi's involved and not too logical analysis if other Japanese propagandists had not used quite different estimates of us to exhort the Japanese people to a greater war effort.

On the anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack, for instance, Kazuo Aoki, Japanese minister for greater east Asia, issued the following warning in regard to American economic strength and political unity:

"Now they have ceased every political battle in America and have become reconciled to the ways of war," he said. "And the workers are giving their utmost in order to bring about a victory, devoting themselves to the wartime needs of the nation in the fight against the empire."

Part of that particular broadcast, incidentally, was devoted to trying to shift the war guilt to the shoulders of the United States—not an easy task considering the treachery of the attack on Pearl Harbor. But like the Germans the Japanese must continually try to get out from under the war-guilt burden, for guilt of any kind does not fit in at all with the idea of a super-race endowed with the ability and moral fiber to lead the world.

Our failure to admire the Japanese sufficiently is frequently reflected in Tokyo's shortwave broadcasts to this country, which come over the air several times a week identified by the scratchy gramophone recording of "My Bonnie Lies over the Ocean" which precedes the commentary.

One such broadcast recently admonished us as follows:

"There aren't any Americans who know anything about the Japanese or fully understand their modesty, their patience and their tolerance toward other races. A little thought will make Americans see clearly how patiently Japan stood the abuses of the Washington government before the outbreak of this war.

"Even in reflecting on past relations between Japan and

the United States since the arrival of Commodore Perry, can Americans think of one incident wherein Japan attacked the Americans? However, now that the die is cast every Japanese is burning with anger at the methods of Roosevelt and the American soldiers at the front.

"The slogan, 'Crush the enemy!' is now surging forward in Japan.

"Today Americans have got to expect the consequences of their selfish greed, which they so generously poured out to the Japanese.

"Happiness is no longer the lot of the Americans. You Americans who, we thought, were intelligent, have suddenly proved to be a very, very sorry lot."

A good idea of how our fighting men in the South Pacific feel about Radio Tokyo, to which they listen frequently for lack of something better to do, was given by an open letter to Tojo recently written by a squadron of U. S. fliers. The men addressed the letter through the International Red Cross, and they hope Tojo gets it.

It reads as follows:

"DEAR TOJO:

"Due to conditions beyond our control, it is sometimes our misfortune to listen to your programs over Radio Tokyo. However, we are not complaining too much, because the Japanese version of the truth in your newscasts is always good for a laugh, and Radio Tokyo is throwing the world into a convulsion of laughter these days.

"However, as inadvertent listeners to your programs, we feel we are entitled to better service, so we would appreciate getting it. This is one of our complaints: Either change your Radio Tokyo theme song, 'My Bonnie Lies over the Ocean,' or have your piano tuned. Of course, the Japanese war machine probably could not spare a few yen for piano-tuning, so our next

best suggestion is to get someone who can play 'My Bonnie Lies over the Ocean' without massacring it. You are even torturing your allies with your rendition.

"We also suggest that some of your radio announcers either do a little studying of the English language, or be provided with new sets of false teeth so they can at least approach reasonable accuracy in the pronunciation of English words and terms.

"We further recommend that you make some effort to establish a musical library of popular pieces which can be obtained from any good American music store.

"If you can take care of these minor adjustments for only a short time, we will attend to the matter ourselves when our own radio technicians and announcers get to Tokyo. Of course, you may not be in a position then to enjoy your own programs, because 'The Star-Spangled Banner' will supplant 'My Bonnie Lies over the Ocean' as a Radio Tokyo theme song.

"In the meantime, we recommend that you and the other members of your military clique who seek world domination begin a thorough study of both the words and music of 'The Star-Spangled Banner,' because after a United Nations victory we are going to recommend that you, Mr. Tojo, lead the community singing of America's national anthem in a world-wide network hookup from Radio Tokyo. That will constitute your first lesson in freedom and democracy.

"So long, Tojo! We'll be bombing you!"

CHAPTER TEN

THE BOTTOMLESS PIT

WE COME NOW to the point where Dr. Goebbels begins to squirm, where some of the quicksilver magic of Nazi propaganda turns to lead, where we may well begin to wonder whether victory depends on propaganda or propaganda on victory. Into the arrogance and sureness of Nazi propaganda begins to creep a doubt, accompanied by a characteristic Prussian whine. Instead of constantly and ruthlessly attacking, Goebbels is forced to defend, and he doesn't like it. He writhes and he perspires. He flails about looking for a way to regain the propaganda offensive again, but it is hard to find, for he has fallen into the bottomless pit of the eastern front, where millions of German soldiers have been swallowed up.

By the summer of 1943 it was clear to everyone that Germany had won vast territories on the Russian front but that victory there was farther away than ever. The territory was proving less than useless, and the millions of lives it cost were irreplaceable. The stubborn Russians refused to be defeated no matter how great their own losses in men and land. On the contrary, they displayed amazing powers of recovery and in two successive winters proved more than a match for the once invincible German army. The Allied military experts who, in June 1941, had predicted that the Red army would last three

weeks in the face of the Nazi blitzkrieg doffed their hats in apology to the Russians—and Dr. Goebbels squirmed.

The study of Axis radio propaganda and the Russian front is our first glimpse of the machine in action during a battle since we watched it help the tragic defeats of the small nations in western Europe and of France. The change is as remarkable as it is heartening, for it shows what a long way we have come since the black days of 1939 and 1940. For our purposes we can skip the job of the radio propagandists from the moment of the surprise attack on Russia until October 3, 1941. Their task at the moment of the attack followed the set pattern of similar aggressions, with one change. The similarity was in the use of the threadbare formula that Russia, ostensibly a friend who had signed a nonaggression pact good for at least ten years, had betrayed Germany so thoroughly that Nazi patience was at an end. Soviet provocations were screamed over the air in a score of languages by Nazi announcers with the appropriate apoplectic fury peculiar to such occasions. It is safe to assume that nobody outside of Germany believed a word of those allegations, because even the most gullible among us had heard them so often that they could hardly register as anything but nonsense.

The change from the prescribed formula, which Goebbels added for the occasion of the attack on Russia, was a peace appeal based on the anti-Communist theme. To Britain—for we were not yet in the war—the German radio blared the peace formula, and the following month Rudolf Hess, Hitler's deputy, flew to England to try to get in contact with the right people and concoct a plot for getting rid of Churchill, ending hostilities and paving the way for a joint attack on Russia. Hess, it seems, fell into a trap. Nobody listened to the peace appeals of the German radio. The Wehrmacht marched forward in Russia at a pretty fast clip and victory after victory

was reported to the folks back home—but no final victory. The German people were beginning to be a little uneasy about these victories, for there is a saying about victories which the Germans always recall. The saying is, “We win all the battles and we lose all the wars. The British lose all the battles except the final one, and they win the wars.” Because it was clear to everyone that the Germans were uneasy, with the three weeks everybody gave the Russians growing into months, Hitler decided to reassure them and by so doing delivered to Dr. Goebbels’ propaganda machine what was probably its most damaging blow.

On October 3, 1941, Hitler returned to Germany from the eastern front and announced in a speech to the German people that “Russia is already broken and will never rise again.” To make matters worse, Dr. Otto Dietrich, head of the press section of the propaganda ministry, told the foreign press the following week he pledged his personal honor that “for military purposes Soviet Russia is finished.” Nobody cares much about Dietrich’s personal honor, but it is safe to say that the propaganda office never fully recovered from that one-two punch. For just eight weeks later the first Soviet winter offensive was launched, revealing that the finished Russians had enough power in reserve not only to strike back but to retake a major city like Rostov. Furthermore the Russian ally, winter, joined the fight, and stories about intense suffering, frostbite and death by freezing among the German troops began to leak back into the Reich.

The first lame explanations began to come in January, when the people at home finally had to be told that the blitz was no longer driving forward. “The German winter lines have been occupied according to plan and stand unshakable from Schluesselburg to the Crimea,” said Radio Berlin. That was

something quite new for the German people. That business about unshakable lines sounded fine, but it turned out, on closer analysis, to mean that the German armies were halted. For the German troops there was comfort in the announcement that they had become accustomed to the winter cold and that they "can now withstand the Russian mass attack in the consciousness of their own fighting and technical superiority." That was literally very cold comfort, both for the frostbitten troops and for the home radio audience, which had been led to believe that nobody could make mass attacks but the Germans.

All through December and January Goebbels' ministry did its utmost to turn the attention of home listeners, and those abroad as well, away from Russia. Great play was given alleged U-boat successes in the Atlantic. All possible publicity was given the successes of the Japanese in the Far East. Everything, in short, was done to keep people's minds off the embarrassing eastern front. While the propaganda ministry and the general staff prayed for spring, the Axis radio began to develop the line that perhaps Russia had managed to do the impossible in 1941 and survive, but that this next time it would surely be all over.

"The day is not far off when the German forces will wipe the remains of the Russian army from the face of the earth," the Berlin radio announced in March.

"Hitler's Germany is now preparing one of the greatest offensives—perhaps the greatest offensive in history—an offensive which will condition the history of the world for a thousand years to come," said Lord Haw Haw to England.

In early April Berlin explained that there was a little interlude which had to be negotiated before the spring action could begin, and in retrospect they finally admitted that the Soviets themselves had carried out an offensive, hoping that listeners

with short memories would not recall that they had scoffed at the idea only a few weeks earlier.

"The Russians," said the Berlin radio, "clearly show signs of exhaustion as the result of fruitless efforts during the winter battle. The German units that had to bear the brunt of the Russian winter offensive in snow and ice cannot be compared with those units of the German army that are fresh, reposed and ready for the attack."

The spring offensive was finally launched, a little behind schedule, and Axis propagandists again turned on the steam, but soon they had to backtrack again. The magic touch was decidedly gone. Winter, it seemed, was after all not the only thing the German armies had to contend with.

One broadcast at the end of May gave the following picture of difficulties on the Kharkov front:

"The hot summer sun blazes down on the dry and dusty, hilly and rugged landscape. This is a most peculiar country. In the winter the cold is unbearable; in May there is stifling heat, which is just as unbearable as the cold of the winter. The ground is tough. Long stretches of this hilly country are covered with gray smoke clouds; over there on the enemy side of the elevations German grenades are bursting. Here on the German side, where our troops are concentrated, Soviet shells are exploding. Great stretches of scorched, blackened, gnarled brushwood are in flames. Amid the dense smoke clouds which are rising over the valleys one can occasionally see tufts of green in the distance. Innumerable filthy brown dust clouds are drifting along the heights and hollows of the countryside."

Axis radio propaganda continued in that minor key for some weeks. Occasionally it was given a bracer, but only a short one. For example the German break-through at Voronezh was exploited to the full—too thoroughly exploited, as it turned out,

for the Nazis, by then hungry for something to crow about, could not resist overdoing it, so that another climb-down had to follow. About Voronezh the German radio boasted: "The proportions of the Soviet disaster are enormous. The battle of Voronezh has been one of the greatest, perhaps the greatest, fought on the east front. It was undoubtedly one of the greatest battles in history."

The fact that victories were no longer succeeding one another regularly was only one of Goebbels' problems. He had another, more fundamental one. For years he had been hammering into the minds of the Germans and anybody else who would listen that Bolshevism was Asiatic barbarism and that Soviet Russia was something like a prison in which the people were held down by ruthless masters. How then was it possible for the Russians to put up such a fight? Not only did those barbarians turn out to have a military machine that was almost, if not quite, the equal of the German, but, what was even harder to explain away, they fought as if they really liked what they were fighting for. They were defending Russian soil as if they were not merely a poor deluded mass but a people with an idea of what was worth defending.

All through the summer of 1942 Goebbels wrestled with the propaganda problem which that circumstance presented. He devoted many broadcast hours to discussion of the baffling "Russian soul" and to the reasons which made the Soviet citizen fight. The discussions were not a little obscure, probably intentionally so, and sometimes downright silly.

"It must seem surprising that our troops in many cases meet a resistance on the part of the Soviet armed forces to which they were not accustomed in their previous campaigns," Goebbels said in one broadcast. "The Soviet soldiers fight sometimes with a dull, almost animal-like toughness. The Bolshevik

soldier occasionally shows an indifference to death which must be regarded as really exceptional, but this quality is only distilled ferocity, too greatly honored by being called bravery.

“There is a kind of primitive toughness which it would be too much to call creativeness. It is something quite different. The tenacity with which the Bolsheviks defended their bunkers at Sevastopol was more a kind of brute instinct, and nothing would be further from the truth than to assume that it was a consequence of Bolshevik views or education. We need not talk about the so-called social achievements of the Soviet system, which compared to our social standard of living can arouse only disgust or a smile. But it is a matter of taste to admire the fact that Bolshevik propaganda succeeded to a great extent in making the masses of Russian workers and peasants believe that they had a paradise on earth. They achieved this by cutting them hermetically off from the outside world and constantly repeating their phrases about bringing happiness to the world.”

Germans who risked long jail terms if they listened to foreign broadcasts must have got particular comfort from the last sentence of Goebbels' explanation.

There were military difficulties too which the propaganda ministry had to explain away. General Kurt Dietmar told the German home radio audience with not a little annoyance in July 1942:

“The vastness of Russian spaces permits the Russians to evade decisive battles. These spaces enable the Soviets to continue retreating along their lines of communication until such a time as our advances lose their impetus owing to the long distances and our attacks are thus halted.”

But most revealing were the broadcasts to Germany which came directly from the front by Goebbels' corps of front-line radio reporters. Time had been a few short months before

when these broadcasts were one long peal of triumph, when their descriptions were of overwhelming victories, of relentless advances against a bewildered foe. Now, in August 1942, a typical one went like this (and the reporter perspiring in his dugout didn't seem to care whether the folks at home were as frightened as he was by it or not):

"This is no longer a war on the ground. It is a war carried on from the deep underground. The earth is no longer earth but a thin cover for underground fortifications and pillboxes from which the enemy is incessantly firing at our tanks.

"Even the thin veneer of earth is infested with thousands of mines. There can be no question of forward march. Our tanks creep along in Indian file. Then the foremost tank hits a mine and becomes a casualty.

"We try to make for a village which we think we can see in the distance. But no houses confront us—it is a high wooden wall. Invisible antitank guns fire at us from behind the wall, and suddenly a flood of liquid fire seems to shoot out from the wall. Flame throwers which fire automatically have been built into the wall. One of our tanks must have hit a wire leading to the automatic release of the flame thrower. We have never seen anything like it before. It is hell—devilish hell."

And, they might have added, quite out of character for the stupid, dull-witted Russians to have thought of it.

Things were going so badly from a propaganda standpoint by the fall of 1942 that the Germans grasped at Stalingrad as at something which might change the whole color of things, only to find that it was too hot to hold. They grasped at it so desperately that they again made the mistake of claiming too much for it, with the result that the eventual retraction was one of the most amazing developments of the psychological war. But that did not come till later. For the moment, in early

autumn 1942, the German troops reached the Volga and both Berlin and Rome triumphantly announced that this time it really was just about all over for the Russians.

"The capture of Stalingrad will mean the defeat of Russia," said Radio Rome confidently. Berlin went even further and announced that Stalingrad was already won.

"Upon reaching the banks of the Volga north and south of Stalingrad the basic part of the strategic objective of the battle of Stalingrad was achieved. Even though the fighting is going on along the banks of the Volga for the purpose of annihilating the Soviet opponent, it seems to have lost some of its former character. Stalingrad is no longer of the same strategic importance. The game at Stalingrad can be said to be virtually over."

That was in early September. By midmonth German propaganda had to begin to admit cautiously that the Russians at Stalingrad, in their blundering way, refused to understand that they had lost the city and were continuing to fight there. It was not really serious, Berlin said, merely annoying. It did not really prove anything except that the Russians turned out to have a genius for "delaying the decision." Soviet tacticians, moreover, failed to behave the way the German general staff thought they should, with the result that on September twenty-fifth Berlin was forced to admit reluctantly that "the German high command does not make predictions concerning Stalingrad," whereas only ten days before it had confidently announced that the city's days "were numbered."

"The German task in Russia is difficult and the struggle for decisions must progress slowly," said the Berlin military commentator. "The reason for the slowness of progress is that the Russians have raised the tactically unexpected and improbable to the level of a basic principle."

Moreover, Berlin added with a straight face, unorthodox

Soviet methods "subject both the command and the troops to a severe nervous strain. The Russian soldiers resist to the last cartridge and to the last hand grenade. No adversary is able to delay decisions like the Soviet troops."

These explanations make it quite clear that in regard to one subject at least the German propaganda machine was foundering. From there on in, Russia had Goebbels stumped most of the time, and his explanations became more and more difficult to swallow as the days passed. They came thick and fast, incidentally, and lost all trace of consistency. While one commentator was telling his home audience just why the Nazis weren't getting anywhere, another was telling them that victory had already been won. Sometimes a commentator covered both angles in one commentary. Dietmar did that on September thirtieth.

"The decision has already been reached," he announced at the beginning of his commentary, and a few minutes later got around to explaining that the Germans were handicapped by the fact that they had only very scarce rear communications while the Russians were fighting on an inner line, were getting plenty of reinforcements and "have raised the fortress of Stalingrad to a symbol of victorious resistance."

Apparently noticing that he was being slightly inconsistent, he quickly added: "The fortress, however, is in German hands and the battle now goes on only for ruins of the city."

In a sense what Dietmar said was true, because some months later Field Marshal von Paulus was captured by the Russians in the very central square of Stalingrad, which had actually been in German hands for a long time. But apparently nobody had explained to the Russians that they had lost the real Stalingrad fortress and that the piddling little defenses they still held were useless to them.

Another thing Dietmar didn't like at that point was the fact that the Russians kept on fighting despite their losses.

"Bolshevik nonrespect for all sacrifices and their complete insensitivity to the suffering of the inhabitants insure them the great freedom of decision," he said. "This gives the fighting a special note of hardness and bitterness." In other words, the Germans did not like the conception of total war when it was used against them instead of by them.

As regularly as the days passed with Stalingrad still standing Nazi radio propagandists invented new excuses for the failure of the German army to capture it.

"Stalingrad is more than a fortress," said the Frankfurt radio in late October. "There is system in a fortress. A fortress can be systematically and methodically attacked. But this city of a million inhabitants is an unsystematic chaos. Where is one to look for the enemy? In every heap of rubble, in the midst of ruined houses, in ravines, in cellars and even in the sewage system, the enemy hides. There are countless possibilities, as numerous as the treacherous malice concealed behind them. No. Stalingrad is more than a fortress, and there has never been a comparable struggle."

Besides thinking up excuses the Nazis began to deny that they had ever predicted the early fall of the city.

"Any listener with a spark of honesty will have to admit that no authoritative German source has ever predicted the date of the fall of this city," one indignant commentator said. "Long before the battle began it was appreciated that the struggle would be long and hard."

But that commentator forgot a broadcast to Britain late in September in which the official Berlin radio said: "The Soviets won't get very much out of the few days' fighting that remain." He also forgot a broadcast to South America early in

October in which the Nazi radio said: "The fate of Stalingrad has been decided. Its hours are numbered." He forgot a broadcast of October thirteen in which it was said: "Fighting there is in the nature of mopping-up operations."

By the end of November the lameness of the excuses was painful, for the situation at Stalingrad had become black indeed. An estimated 375,000 German troops were facing encirclement. The biggest disaster of the war for the Nazis was just around the corner. The propaganda problem was all but insuperable. And the propagandists perspired at their microphones.

"One of the basic points of German strategy is to open gaps from time to time so the Bolsheviki will be tempted to rush in and risk destruction," said a Berlin commentator in one of his more imaginative efforts. "It can be safely assumed that this is what has been happening the last week or two in the Don elbow."

Unable to create anything like a bright picture by close analysis of the battle itself, the Nazi military spokesmen fell back on broad generalities and tried to convince the German people that tremendous things had already been won in Russia. Desperate efforts were made to paint the gains of the Ukraine as something which would solve all of Germany's food problems. Perhaps that would take people's minds off Stalingrad.

"German troops are requisitioning fine geese in every steppe village and any German officer or soldier can freely take them from the owners," said one broadcast, taking up the mouth-watering technique. "All meat stocks have been confiscated and nothing has been lost. Five carloads of Ukrainian furs have arrived in Germany and six more carloads have been sent."

But that failed to help. The Russian winter offensive continued to gain momentum. The German situation at Stalin-

grad became more desperate by the day. Bad news leaked back to Germany, and the people had to be fed more excuses.

Nazi domestic broadcasts hammered away at the "unspeakable hardship" suffered by the German troops in the Russian winter. One commentator in early January complained bitterly: "Our lines held for days in cold and amid snowstorms. Our men had no dugouts or trenches that would have afforded protection. The Soviets came on, even amid the most frightful snowstorms."

A curious thing about this emphasis on the cold was that in broadcasts abroad the Nazis told quite another story. While German audiences were being given the extreme cold as an excuse for the military defeats, foreign audiences were being told that the weather in Russia was not so bad compared with the winter of 1941.

"This winter temperatures up to Christmas were about zero," said a Transocean news agency broadcast to North America, "and only since Christmas have lower temperatures been registered on the eastern front, which is absolutely normal for this time of year." By mid-January 1943 German commentators were trying to get the people to discount the winter defeats in advance and to look toward spring—when it would all be patched up again. A General Hesse assured the home audience that even if the German armies were being pushed back a little (some three hundred miles on many parts of the front) it would all be ironed out in time.

"Next spring will show how much remains of the Soviet striking power," he said, and he explained that the German reverses had really only been due to the fact that there were unavoidable "vacuums" between the strong points of the advance lines, and that it was always possible for the enemy to penetrate into these voids a little if he concentrated his power.

Hans Fritzsche, Goebbels' number-one commentator, added a philosophical note. You may be sure that whenever a Nazi speaker gets philosophical things are going badly.

"We know the fickleness of war," he said, "and that is why we are so happy that the thrusts and counterthrusts do not take place close to our frontiers in this war, and that the military events, which cannot determine the life and death of a nation, can be fought in the vast spaces out there."

Then Stalingrad fell, and well over 300,000 Germans were taken prisoner, including a field marshal and many generals. All the boasts of the Nazis crashed about their ears. There had to be some great changes in the propaganda line. Some comfort had to be found at all costs, and if possible the defeats themselves had to be put to some use. Almost everything the Nazi propaganda ministry had had to say about the Russians in the first twenty months of the war had to be forgotten.

The tremendous Nazi "gloom campaign" which resulted from the defeats on the Russian front and which was used to try to wring a greater war effort from the German people by driving them to desperation will be treated in another chapter. Here we want merely to see what the military commentators had to say about the defeats, and to note how differently they sounded from the time when their only fare was victory.

"We must form a new estimate of our Soviet enemy," said General Dietmar, who had been one of the specialists at vilifying the Russians. "Perhaps we have judged him too much by the western standard and have not realized how sudden can be the transition from disorderly flight to furious counterattack. Their main weapon, however, has been their numerical superiority. The moment now comes when we can and must give to the Soviets a dose of their own strong medicine. The legal

basis for the necessary mobilization of reserves has been created, but the measures need the inner consent of the whole nation."

It was to get this "inner consent" that the propagandists sought to use the Stalingrad defeat, and with that in view Dietmar was able to continue on almost a funereal note (indeed, the announcements of the defeat at the Volga city had been made to the accompaniment of a funeral march on the Berlin radio).

"The bitter experience of Stalingrad still weighs heavily on our soul," said Dietmar. "For the first time we are experiencing the full tragedy of reverse. For the first time an entire German army has ceased to exist. What we used to inflict on others has happened to us. We have been encircled, attacked from all directions, compressed into a narrow space split into pockets. It is still difficult to realize. We feel it like a sharp pain."

Note that the commentator actually appeared to wallow in the misery of defeat, so much so that even the inevitable silver lining which he had to add on every broadcast looked a little leaden in hue.

"Three years of unparalleled victory lie behind us," he recalled. "The worst of our trials so far was the unusually hard winter of 1941-42, but up to late autumn of last year the thought of a reverse or defeat never crossed our minds. Yet we must remember that both victories and defeats belong to the fortunes of war and that the way to final success leads both over the height and the depth. War is full of uncertainties, but Moltke was right when he stressed that while chance has its place in shaping the fortunes of war, in the long run fortune favors only the more efficient side.

"May our enemies understand that this painful loss gives us a new will to victory. These last days have made our people fully aware of what the struggle means. They have deeply felt its fateful importance."

As if this type of gloom was not sufficient, the fall of Stalingrad caused Nazi propagandists to feed the German people large doses of the familiar "Asiatic hordes" medicine and to supplement it with warnings that the Americans would not help Germany keep from being over-run by the Russians and that it was up to the Germans, therefore, to do something about it themselves. The purpose was to increase the war effort, of course, but how it must have frightened the German who had understood himself to be one of the super-race defended by a super-army, the greatest military machine the world had ever known! How he must have perspired to hear his own Hans Fritzsche on February second warn that the Soviets intended "as in the time of the great migrations and the Mongol hordes to over-run Europe, to destroy its civilization, to root up its people in order to obtain slave labor for the Siberian tundras." What a contrast with propaganda matter of only a few months before in which the Germans were promised that large and fertile areas of Russia were to be given them—that the Asiatics were to be driven out and the super-race settled there.

"We have always doubted that England and the United States were in any position to save Germany and Europe from Bolshevism," he said. "After England declared war we knew that the plutocracies lacked not only the power but the will to do so. And now we have received new proof of the intention of the plutocracies to deliver Europe over to Bolshevism. In a number of North American newspapers, among others in the *New York Herald Tribune*, there appeared yesterday an article by Constantine Brown. From it we learn that the Americans now believe Soviet rule over all Europe to be the best solution obtainable. Mr. Brown declares he would not be surprised if the Soviets pushed on to the Atlantic and the Mediterranean and extended their rule as far as the Persian Gulf. This Constantine

Brown of Washington belongs to Mr. Roosevelt's circle of friends and does not think up these things by himself."

That was the thought left with the Germans after Stalingrad. But it was only part of the black picture being sketched in at the beginning of 1943 by the United Nations. There was Africa too, there was the Allied air offensive, and there was the acute threat of invasion from the west and south. Goebbels had his work cut out for him.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

PURSUIT OF THE FOX

THE ERRONEOUS LEGEND grew up about Erwin Rommel that he was not a career officer but a Nazi militant who had been an expert street-fighting tactician and who found that his talents lent themselves equally well to the more formal type of combat engaged in by the Wehrmacht. The legend was not true. Rommel was a career officer with as shiny a brass hat as other high officers in the German army. The legend was just one of many that arose when he appeared to be phenomenally successful—and which are bound to disappear now that his success is over. He had a prominent part in the blitz tactics which led to the fall of France. He nearly inflicted on the Allies what would have been a major catastrophe, perhaps a fatal one—the loss of the Suez Canal. He did exceedingly well until he came up against a thin and puritanical little man named Montgomery. Up to then he had been known as the Desert Fox, and the mere mention of his name brought admissions among amateur strategists throughout the Allied world that here was a Nazi strong-arm man who really knew his stuff. But by the time Montgomery was finished with him and had prepared him for a magnificent *coup de grâce* administered by Americans and British together at the northern tip of Tunisia, Dr. Goebbels had to muster every available trick of his propaganda machine to save Rommel's reputation.

Our business here, however, is not to argue about Rommel's reputation or even to trace in detail the progress of the fighting in North Africa from its beginning to the moment in April 1943 when it culminated in the greatest Allied triumph of the war in the west. What we want to do is to follow the machinations of the Axis propaganda organization through the battles of Africa, to see how radio served as a weapon of combat when Rommel thought he was going to present Hitler with the Middle East, to follow its use when things began to go badly for the Desert Fox, and finally to study its desperate effort to minimize the Axis disaster when, after the Allied landings in French Africa, Rommel's armies were cut to pieces and taken prisoner.

Before Rommel came upon the scene the fighting in Africa was a contest between the British under Sir Archibald Wavell and the inept Italians. Wavell struck out from Egypt and swept beyond Bengasi in Libya before he was halted, while to the south other British forces restored to the Negus the free kingdom of Ethiopia. Then came the attack on Greece early in 1941 and the withdrawal of British troops to help the Greeks. That caused a dangerous weakening of the British African armies, and at the moment of greatest British weakness Rommel, who had taken over in Africa, struck. More quickly than they had advanced, the British were swept back toward Egypt. Only Tobruk remained to them beyond the Libyan border. The African lines see-sawed back and forth, until in June of the following year Rommel struck again, and disaster stared the Allies in the face this time. Rommel seemed unbeatable, and it looked as though General Auchinleck, who had taken over from Wavell, would be driven beyond Suez into Palestine.

Somehow—the full story is still not available at this writing—a line was formed at El Alamein deep in Egypt, and it held, at

the very moment when Rommel was confidently boasting that the great naval base at Alexandria and the Suez Canal would soon be his.

With the British ostensibly on the run, the job of the Axis radio in June 1942 was to try to turn the Egyptians and the Arabs of the Middle East against England. They sought to stir up unrest and revolt, create chaos behind the British lines and cause a collapse in the rear at the same time that Rommel hammered at El Alamein.

"We are now on our way to Egypt and Iraq," Berlin boasted. "Those Arab traitors Nuri-es-Said [Premier of Iraq] and Prince Abd Allah [Regent of Transjordan] will be punished for all the blood they have unjustly shed to please their masters. Those who have tyrannized the Arabs shall soon know what a bitter end shall be theirs. We do not cry like women, moaning and wailing the loss of their beloved, but like real men we are determined to avenge soon the death of those who were unjustly hanged by Arab traitors."

The Italian radio at Bari, which for some years before the war had specialized in anti-British propaganda to the Near East, took up the effort to cause trouble, using the familiar anti-Jewish line and urging the Arabs to throw off the British yoke to get rid of Jewish domination. As usual, it set Mussolini up as the defender of Islam.

"News from Ankara by way of Beirut informs us that the Jews in America control 76 percent of American trade, 90 percent of the commercial and legal fields, 90 percent of the United States industry, 98 percent of the governmental offices and 97 percent of the press," said Radio Bari imaginatively on June 15. "The Jewish influence is the reason why Roosevelt is sending a huge army to the Near East, and why he is trying to make it over into a Jewish state. The Fuehrer would not like his friends

the Arabs to be humiliated. The Duce will not tolerate that his friends the Mohammedans be subject to the Jewish yoke. By the grace of Allah and the will of Mohammed, whom the Jews have persecuted, we will throw all the Jews out of Arabian lands, Roosevelt or no Roosevelt."

Vichy chimed in with the announcement to the Arab world that the French had always been their friends, and that France had built two mosques for them, one in Paris and one in Bordeaux.

"France always has loved and always will love her friends the Mohammedans," said the Paris radio.

Radio Bari assured the Egyptians that Axis penetration of her borders was not directed against her and that Egypt's independence would not be affected. "Italy has no intention of colonizing Egypt or dominating it in any form or manner," said one broadcast. Berlin however, was not that reassuring, but aimed its main propaganda guns at that stage of the fight to inciting the Arabs against the British by way of the Jews.

"At present all commerce and industry is in the hands of the Jews," said Berlin, working on its favorite theme. "The land is now also owned by them. The Arabs are forced to labor all day for them in order to earn a crust of bread. They lend money at usurious interest. All the wealth of Palestine is now in their hands and they have become the rulers and the masters. The British and Roosevelt are responsible for the Jewish domination."

By July 1, 1942, the Axis was engaged in an all-out effort to stampede the Egyptians into an open break with the British. As Rommel's armies neared the Nile delta, Axis broadcasts hammered away at the theme that the British had no hope of saving the Suez Canal and that the moment had come for the Egyptians to make their choice.

Axis stations broadcast stories with various datelines, particularly from neutral Turkey, which reported in detail the alleged fears of the Egyptians for their future, the alleged gains of anti-British elements in Egypt and general Egyptian opposition to the "scorched-earth" policy proposed by the British—a pure Nazi invention. The broadcasts contended that there was a great surge of pro-Axis feeling among the natives, which had reached the point where the government had to agree to release political prisoners to calm it. But there was no chaos behind the lines. Nothing happened to interfere with the British defense, although Axis broadcasts did their best to give the impression that panic prevailed.

"Now is the time for the Arabs to start their great revolution!" a Berlin broadcast said on July 5. "Rommel's army will enter Cairo and Alexandria at the same time. One division is heading for Cairo and the other pressing along the coast. There is a strike in Alexandria. Egyptian workers refuse to work any longer under British command.

"Arabs, organize and pillage all you can! Speak Arabic! Despise the British! Organize and stop the British from destroying your harbors, demolishing your bridges, burning your food supplies and stealing your gold and silver!"

The Axis-operated station Arab Nation also urged the Arabs to try to get the Hindus in the British army to cease fighting "because the British are their enemies as well as ours."

Rome called upon both the Christian and Mohammedan God to "save us from the British with the help of the Axis." A patriotic song was sung calling on the Arabs to arm themselves and undertake a holy crusade against the British.

To convince the Arabs of the urgency of revolt and its assurance of success, the Axis radio told them that the British army was "routed, fleeing, cowardly and utterly defeated."

"The Egyptians do not conceal their pleasure at this swift Axis advance in which they see the approach of their day of deliverance," said Berlin. "There is an ever-growing anxiety in Egypt. A fleeing mob from Alexandria is blocking all the roads of the Nile delta."

That last was wishful thinking and indicates what the Axis was really trying to accomplish. They had done very well with the help of panic-stricken, fleeing mobs in France, which had interfered so effectively with the movement of French troops and material to the front. They were trying to do the same in Egypt. But they failed. The line at El Alamein held. The calls to revolt died down. Suez remained in Allied hands as Rommel battered his head in vain against the British defense positions. And as he did so the propaganda ministry began to make its excuses.

"The task of General Auchinleck at the moment is relatively easy," said the Italian commentator Mario Appelius. Any Arabs who heard that must have been startled indeed, and they must have been a little confused by the explanation which followed.

"The British effort is one of major proportions," Appelius continued. "Driven out of Europe, driven out of the Far East, threatened in Australia and in India, discredited in the dominions by its military inefficiency, ridiculed in the United States as a stupid and incapable ally, morally stigmatized by its military flights, branded with a mark of infamy by its vile complicity with Bolshevism, undermined in England itself by the tentacular infiltrations of Russian propaganda, the British Empire cannot afford to lose the Egyptian pillar because this pillar is now the central support of the whole British imperial structure. We add that the task of Auchinleck at the moment is relatively easy. The English command is operating at a short distance

from its bases, with its rear literally supported by all the military and logistic comforts of the Nile Valley."

That was one of Appelius' best efforts, and we really must have it in full.

"The El Alamein bottleneck, the sea and the Qattara Depression all constitute a short front of about sixty kilometers on which it is easy to amass men and guns," he continued. "It is certainly easier for those who have to prevent a break-through at the El Alamein bottleneck than for those who have to break through and conquer this bottleneck. If it had not been for the Qattara Depression the doom of the British Army in Egypt would have already been sealed."

(If it had not been for the mountains Switzerland would be a flat country.)

"It is the first time in Egypt's military history that the Valley of the Nile has been invaded from the west. The road taken by the formidable Italo-German soldiers of the African army has always been avoided by all the conquerors, including Napoleon, because it was too difficult. We had no other choice, and therefore we went ahead solving the most difficult tactical and logistic problems, so difficult as to test the mettle of any of the great generals of history. The history of the Italo-German African campaign of 1942 will be, for the learned ones, one of the greatest military novels of humanity's historical warfare. The Italo-German soldiers in Africa are real lions. Their roar brings shivers up and down the spines of Auchinleck and his generals."

If the failure to break through at El Alamein after the tremendous build-up prepared for it strained Axis propagandists and caused commentators like Appelius to fall back on all the rhetoric they could muster, the British attack at the end of the summer was a disastrous blow indeed to Goebbels' office. In

many respects it was much more of a headache to the propaganda ministry than the American occupation of French North Africa, which came almost at the same time. The reason was that in Rommel's precipitous flight before General Sir Bernard Montgomery's British Eighth Army the myth of German invincibility was badly shaken, while until the armies on the other side of Africa took Tunisia in April of the following year Goebbels did not have to explain away any German defeat at arms there.

The principle of invincibility of German arms had been the keystone of Nazi propaganda since long before the war began, as we have seen, and it had been highly useful in softening up Germany's potential enemies. The formula had been that the German army is never beaten; and its opponents always are.

That was the reason Hitler has always insisted that the German army was never beaten in 1918, although his accounts of what happened then were varied. Sometimes he said that there was "a desperate revolt plotted by Marxist, center, liberalistic capitalistic elements, with the Jews a driving force behind it." Sometimes he blamed the leadership, saying, "The Kaiser was a man lacking in strength." But he always made the point that Germany's enemies were not victorious over the German armies.

The German reason for not admitting reverses in the field in this war is even stronger. If nobody could defeat Germany before she became Nazi, how could anybody possibly defeat her afterward? That is why the Germans have never acknowledged that the German air force was beaten by the R.A.F. in the battle of Britain. That is why they could not acknowledge that their touted Afrika Korps had been beaten by the Eighth Army in the battle of Egypt. It was not a matter of vanity but a matter of policy. We should bear that in mind as we follow

the twists and turns of Nazi propaganda from October twenty-third, when Montgomery attacked, until November fourth, when Cairo announced the break-through at El Alamein. For days the German command kept saying that the British attack was being held and the Nazi radio treated the attack as a failure. As late as November third a German broadcast in English spoke of it as a fizzle. But on November fifth the German communiqué announced a withdrawal to "prepared second-line positions." From that time on Nazi broadcasters went all-out to show that everything was going according to German plans. It was a little labored, but they did it.

They said that Rommel's retreat was not being made against his will and that he was merely executing a clever maneuver. His withdrawal was a "free strategic decision," one broadcaster explained.

The Axis radio insisted that Rommel retained his freedom of movement, and that it was he who was determining the place and the form of resistance.

"Rommel is still moving about the desert without restriction," said a Nazi broadcast on November eighth. He was—westward.

The withdrawal was the application of a new "elastic German defense," said another broadcast, inventing a convenient phrase for retreat. Rommel still had the situation completely in hand, the German people were assured, and he was in a position to take the initiative at any moment he considered it necessary and advisable.

"Rommel retreated south of El Alamein in order to reorganize his army and then take the initiative when he sees fit," said Berlin on November seventh. "The German high command said today that the German troops had to be withdrawn in Egypt to disentangle them from a situation which was very

confused. Rommel's tactics of movement were hitherto most feared by the English, and there is no reason at all to believe that this fear will prove unfounded in the future."

Another Berlin broadcaster had one of those remarkable metaphorical explanations in which German propagandists take refuge when things are going badly.

"The North African war is like a pot half filled with liquid," he said. "When the pot is shaken the liquid leaps to the rim and drops spill out here and there, but nobody is able to say that the liquid is shifted to one or the other side and stays there. That is what is happening in North Africa. War there has its own laws which can't be compared to other war theaters, and with each kilometer the British advance the more vulnerable their supply lines become to Axis planes."

Italy was frankly apprehensive, however, and Italian broadcasts following the break in Axis lines were devoted to assuring the Italians as well as us that they were not frightened.

"An announcement that the German and Italian troops had withdrawn to positions in Egypt situated farther west was received in Italy with the greatest calm," said Rome. "The violence of the third offensive launched by the British gives heroic expression to the unanimous will of the nation. The gallant armed forces of the Axis know that in these days full of history they are holding the formidable onslaught of Anglo-Saxon might. The British Eighth Army has again launched unceasing attacks, throwing in preponderant forces of infantry and armored vehicles, and with powerful employment of artillery and the air forces."

Vichy, which usually plays the Axis game more efficiently, got its orders crossed up and struck a discord: "The British are winning in Egypt. Rome and Berlin admit a retreat to new strategic positions. American planes are pursuing the fleeing

Axis forces. Nine thousand Axis soldiers were taken prisoner.”

Rommel advanced westward to new strategic positions by stages until he got to Tripoli and then the Mareth Line. But meanwhile a new element was added. On the morning of November eighth American and British troops landed in Algeria and French Morocco. It is fair to say that the Germans had long suspected that something of the sort was being planned, for it had been reflected in their propaganda broadcasts since August. Most of those broadcasts dealt with Allied intentions to take Dakar and there were repeated warnings to the French about our plans for this “aggression.” These broadcasts were probably fishing expeditions, trying to get us to indicate what we were actually up to, if it was not a landing at Dakar. French stooges in Vichy co-operated throughout the late summer in warning of the growing threat to Dakar and French West Africa and gave assurance that measures were being taken to forestall a repetition of the Allied occupation of Syria and Madagascar.

An important thing to bear in mind in studying Axis radio propaganda in connection with the occupation is the fact that Goebbels had repeatedly assured the world that our shipping situation was so bad we could not possibly undertake anything like that. For months before the landing occurred, particularly since the German armies were stalled in Russia and the propaganda office had to find some comfort somewhere, the German people had been told that we had lost so many ships we could never get a sizable army to Europe. Even if we succeeded in building up a formidable military machine in the United States, which was most unlikely considering our inefficiency, we could never do anything useful with it except guard our own shores. With the invasion of North Africa this entire propaganda argument was shot to pieces, for even the most gullible German had

to realize that it had been done with shipping. The expedition, according to official figures given out later, was made with 850 ships of all types. This puncturing of a favorite Nazi argument was one of the reasons why Axis propagandists floundered so before they hit upon the lines they intended to develop. They must have felt the debunking of their argument about shipping keenly, for it had been put out for the last time only a few hours before the occupation was announced. Otto Dietrich, the man who had pledged his honor the previous October that Russia was done for, had gone on the air on November seventh and announced confidently:

“The existing shipping position of Britain and the United States makes it impossible for them to start any further military operations.”

It is not difficult to see, therefore, why Axis radio propagandists ranted and fumed all over the air waves in the hours following the landing, denouncing President Roosevelt from one side of the world to the other and trying desperately to find something favorable to talk about. Official Nazi indignation was based on the charge that the American action was “immoral” and was a “violation of human rights.” Tokyo took up the same line, terming the Allied offensive “a brand of international banditry approved and pursued by Roosevelt and Churchill.”

Tokyo indignantly dismissed the American explanation that the action was undertaken to forestall an Axis move into the French possessions. “That is the excuse of a thief caught red-handed,” said the perpetrators of the attack on Pearl Harbor. “When someone is reaching for your purse, you would say, I picked your pocket before he did.” Tokyo also provided a little unconscious humor when it announced: “All attacks in the

landing operations have been repulsed on the African coast except where they have succeeded."

Rome sought far and wide for the silver lining.

"In Italy it was noted," said one Italian broadcast, "that the landings were made in zones as far as possible from our air and naval bases."

Meanwhile the Axis could not forget Rommel's continued flight. A new explanation was that the marshal had been a virtual victim of claustrophobia at the Alamein line, for it was too confined for a man of his temperament. He had therefore expanded—backward—and taken up a more favorable position from where he had room to carry out his specialty, a war of movement.

Berlin announced that its heart was "torn with wrath" at the Allied landings and that Hitler, in a spontaneous gesture of European solidarity, was rushing troops into hitherto unoccupied France to protect the defenseless French against any attempt on our part to cross the Mediterranean to Marseille or Toulon.

"Roosevelt's allegation that by landing troops in North Africa America and England wanted to forestall an assault on the part of the Axis powers is a blatant lie," said Berlin indignantly. "Since the signing of the armistice no threat directed against metropolitan France or the French colonies has emanated from the Axis powers. French authoritative quarters have expressly confirmed this fact. [That was true, for Laval and his fellow-traitors played the Axis game wholeheartedly in connection with the landing.] In preparing their treacherous attack America and England have had recourse to drastically unfair methods. Large numbers of Anglo-American agents poured into North Africa in order to establish shady organizations on the

spot. . . . America and England have given proof of the fact that they have no respect for the sovereignty of others."

Even the battered ears of German radio listeners must have pricked up in surprise at the sound of their propagandists protesting against the presence of foreign agents in a country after boasting so often about how such German agents had helped in the conquest of Poland and the countries in western Europe.

Lord Haw Haw managed to find some comfort in the landings, however. "The Fuehrer is looking into the future with a special degree of confidence," he said. "And there is good reason for it. The war strategy which the enemy is now employing is the best proof that he despairs of an attack on Europe, where the war will finally be decided."

Other Berlin broadcasters chimed in with more proof that everything was still well in hand—after they had caught their breath.

"If today we ask the question what consequences can the struggle for the coast of North Africa have for the continental fortress of Europe," said Berlin on November fifteenth, "we must emphasize the principle continuously stressed by German circles. However much it may form a functional part of Europe in the political and economic sphere, it can only be valued as an extension of the continent so far as military considerations are concerned. If the Anglo-Saxon aggressor can hold his North African position and even if he extends it—something in no way decided yet—he has, of course, advanced nearer to the southern wall of Europe. The attack proper has not become more promising, however, as the leaks in the European defensive front have been closed through the quick action of the Axis."

German propagandists worked feverishly, meanwhile, at the job of trying to alienate French sympathy for the United States

and counteract secret French approval of the occupation. That the average Frenchman was delighted with the American move was amply demonstrated by the bitter comments of Vichy and the Paris radio.

Knowing that the German occupation of southern France was going to bring an even more serious food shortage to the French people than they had hitherto suffered, the Nazis tried to pin the responsibility for that on the Allies.

On November fifteenth Radio Paris said: "If the French do not understand the language of honor, then let us speak to them in the language of grocers." The language of grocers as spoken by the Nazis meant telling the French that since November eighth the Americans had cut off from France large supplies of foods. Actually the average French radio listener was probably puzzled by this, since it had been a long time since he had seen any of the foods supposedly imported from French Africa, because they had all gone straight to Germany.

The Paris radio announced that we would extend the Lend-Lease Act to Algeria and Morocco and remove foodstuffs to America in exchange for surplus industrial products. Food stocks in North Africa were put under American guard at the moment of the landing, said Paris, and nobody could get any until the demands of the occupation forces were fully met.

There were atrocity stories too, in addition to the one reported in Chapter I. Radio Brussels announced that "Arab refugees from the Anglo-Saxon terror have reported on the barbaric measures of the present rulers." Radio Rennes put out the following fantasy:

"Shortly after the Germans recaptured Tebourba in Tunisia the German troops made a sad discovery. They found the bodies of twenty-seven French officers and soldiers horribly mutilated. Their eyes were gouged out and their limbs cut off.

Investigation revealed that they were Frenchmen loyal to the Pétain regime, who had been turned over to the Jews by the British."

Another broadcast said that General Eisenhower had refused to receive an African delegation, "which was supposed to take steps against the brutal actions of the occupying troops."

In an effort to turn the Arab population against the American troops Berlin in late November put out the following invention:

"The various mosques in Morocco and Algiers have had to hang up signs in English requesting the American soldiers not to spit their chewing gum on the floor.

"Indignant Mohammedans threw three dead-drunk Americans into a sewer from which their comrades rescued them in bad-smelling condition.

"American troops are circulating false money in great quantities.

"The American soldiers stalk women and try to tear down their veils."

Incidentally, at the same time that the American boys were being painted in broadcasts to Europe and Africa as a bunch of unspeakable roughnecks, a Nazi broadcast to this country portrayed them quite differently. "Franklin D. Roosevelt shipped tens of thousands of fine young men off to Africa, there to bleed and die," said a Berlin broadcast beamed at North America.

Just when that sort of line had about worn thin the Axis radio was given a bracer by the assassination of Admiral Darlan in December. Darlan had already been denounced by Vichy, which he had previously served all too faithfully, but his honor, in broadcasts except to France, was temporarily restored. The principal use of the event was in the familiar

divide-and-conquer campaign. Axis propagandists hammered away at the charges that Churchill had plotted the killing, much to the annoyance of the Americans, and that President Roosevelt had openly attributed it to him. We were told in special Morse-code transmissions to this country that the death of Darlan had resulted in Anglo-American tension and that the choice of General Giraud as his successor was a blow to the British.

Rome chimed in with the announcement that the murder of Darlan had been planned by British Intelligence but it departed from the Berlin line by adding that the act had taken place "with the approval of Washington."

For Frenchmen inside France the line was quite different. A Berlin broadcast to France quoted the newspaper of the Fascist traitor Jacques Doriot as warning that Darlan was one of the first "guilty men" to receive his punishment and that other French leaders also would answer for their acts eventually. Stephanie Lausanne, venal commentator of the pro-Nazi Paris paper *Le Matin*, said, "We must believe in justice. Sometimes it is tardy, but in the end it always comes. Crime never remains unpunished." I would not be surprised if Lausanne had a little uneasy feeling as he wrote those words.

Tripoli fell to Montgomery's peerless Eighth Army on January 23, 1943, and the Mareth Line was pierced on March twenty-ninth. The stage was rapidly being set for the final blow, and Goebbels was having a bad time of it. Confusion became more and more clearly the order of the day, particularly after the once-vaunted defenses of the Mareth Line failed to halt the British. Berlin came out with one of the lamest propaganda efforts of the war, claiming that there had never been such a thing as a Mareth Line and that we had simply invented it. Rome, however, was not informed that it had been

abolished and continued to speak of it as in the past, although it explained that "the Mareth Line is really far from constituting the powerful defensive bulwark described by the British and Americans."

Paris took a different line and announced in early April that "the double Anglo-American offensive was launched by General Montgomery and General Patton only when both of them were certain that they would be able to win." That, it seems, was a shameful way for generals to behave.

The Germans began to blame the poor Italians for the breakthrough. One Berlin broadcast beamed to Africa admitted that fighting was taking place deep in the defensive zone of southern Tunisia (not the Mareth Line, of course) and that "Italian units which are for the most part manning this section of the front, are disengaging themselves from the enemy."

With Goebbels' propaganda machine reduced to recrimination against the Axis partner to the south it was clear that it would soon all be over in Tunisia. It soon was. In early May the British and Americans and French launched a blitz offensive against Tunis and Bizerte and in a few days had scored one of the most striking victories of the war. It was more than a military victory. It was a heartening foretaste of things to come, for the German will to fight suddenly disappeared, and the great Afrika Korps, the Hermann Goering division and other erstwhile invincible units of the Wehrmacht surrendered in droves. The despised Italians, it turned out, fought on longer than the Germans who had been so contemptuous of them. Well over 100,000 prisoners were taken in those last hectic days, including the German and Italian commanders, von Arnim and Messe. Rommel, it developed, had left Africa nearly two months before. The terms given the Axis troops—another foretaste of things to come—were nothing short of un-

conditional surrender. They capitulated, and their radios had their biggest job of explaining in history.

At first, keeping in character, Axis broadcasts refused to admit the fall of Tunis and Bizerte, except in transmissions which they were sure would not reach their home audiences. Domestic broadcasts kept insisting that the cities were still in Axis hands on May seventh, although the Allies were said to be approaching, but the tone was none too confident.

"Faced with such a situation, it may be surprising that we write any commentaries, but why not?" a Berlin announcer asked himself. "Is the battle already lost? Is there a single sign of evacuation of Bizerte or Tunis by the Germans or the Italians? None to our knowledge. The fighting is still hard and the battle remains stubborn." But they could not keep that up for long, and they were forced to fall back to the next propaganda barricade, the argument that maybe we did have Africa but that it would be of no use to us. To employ that line the Axis had to dwell entirely too much on the theme of invasion, but there was no way of avoiding it.

"If in circumstances so favorable to him the enemy is suffering such losses and experiencing such resistance, he will be confronted with an overwhelming resistance if he ever takes the risk of invading the continent on European soil," said Berlin. "The Axis would possess not only a splendid system of fortifications but also superiority both in numbers and equipment at any given point."

"There are some people in Britain," said another broadcast, "who profess to see in the North African campaign a favorable omen for the invasion of the continent, but those who consider its lesson impartially and scientifically will very much rather form the opinion that the battle in Tunisia should be

taken as a serious warning against an attempt to set up a second front.”

Axis broadcasters began to talk almost frantically of what fine defenses the Germans and Italians had built up along the Mediterranean coast of Europe. They had been talking for nearly two years about the defenses in the west—the Siegfried Line and the Atlantic wall—but the Mediterranean defenses had never been mentioned to any extent before. Anyway, it was too late for us to make a successful invasion of Europe, said Hans Fritzsche on the Berlin radio.

“In November 1942,” he said, “the British and Americans said that after occupying Africa they would open a second front in western and southern Europe at the same time that Russia would begin its winter offensive. Today, now that this great danger is over for Germany we can discuss it openly and frankly. Those were days of great danger, when we had to take our best troops from southern and western Europe and send them to Russia to stem the Russian advance, which was continued despite heavy losses in men and material. Our western and southern flanks were at that time almost naked. That was the moment for the great chance of our adversaries. That was the moment when the second front, discussed and promised for years, would have been realized cheaply.”

Italian commentaries were different. They did not say that an invasion could not be attempted. On the contrary, some high Fascist officials admitted early in May that invasion was almost inevitable and that Italy’s defenses were not enough to cope with it. That being the case, Rome broadcasters dwelt on the question of morale rather than that of physical defenses. What they did really was try to whistle away the danger, on the one hand, while on the other they did a little recriminating

of their own, blaming the final African defeat on the arrogant Germans.

“A less resilient people than the Italians would perhaps have lost faith and hope,” said one Rome broadcaster in a distinctly minor key. “It would be futile to believe that the Italians after the events in Tunisia have lost confidence and faith in final victory. On the contrary, the more the war approaches their homeland the more the Italians are firmly determined to resist and fight until final victory.”

Said Virginio Gayda, Mussolini’s chief spokesman: “The war approaching Italy’s soil makes the Italian people more determined than ever. The power of resistance of the Italian people has grown and their will for victory is growing with the knowledge that the Allies are suffering each day more and more at the hands of Italian power for resistance.”

He neglected to mention what that suffering consisted of, but an Italian soldier taken captive on the Tunisian front in the final battle indicated what Gayda may have had in mind. The soldier was all smiles as he surrendered, and his American captors asked him what he was so cheerful about.

“I’m cheerful because I’m going to New York,” he said, “while you have to go to Italy.”

As for Italian recrimination, a Rome broadcast on May eleventh announced that if the Germans had followed the advice of the Italian general staff at several stages of the battle things would have turned out differently. The Italian general staff, said Rome, had been opposed to Rommel’s order to abandon the Mareth Line. Then the English attack on El Hamma could have been held had Rommel given more aid to the Italians in that sector. Transport, said Rome, which was in the hands of the Germans, was deplorable, and first-line Italian troops were allowed to run short of food, water and munitions.

When the Mareth Line was evacuated, Rome further complained, German headquarters ordered the Italians to make a stand at Wadi Akarit, to which the Italian general staff was strongly opposed, and finally the Italians were left without tank support during vital phases of the campaign.

Perhaps with these recriminations in mind, the Nazi radio took as its last job in connection with the African defeat the saving of Rommel's reputation. For one thing it announced that he had not been in Africa since March eleventh and thus sought to dissociate him from the defeat. Rommel had already been home once the previous October when the British launched their attack at El Alamein and had returned to the African battle against the urgent advice of his doctors, Berlin said. And sick as he was, he carried out a "model evading operation" against a vastly superior enemy. But his health continued to deteriorate and Hitler ordered him to Germany as soon as he had lost Gabes. There was something wrong with that explanation, for Gabes did not fall until March thirtieth, but the Nazis, as usual, hoped that nobody would notice that discrepancy.

Thus, with the Desert Fox home sick, Africa lost and invasion fears the order of the day, Berlin radio propagandists had nothing more to say about the place. But Rome still had nostalgic thoughts to express from time to time, for after all, Africa had been the materialization of her mad dream of empire.

"We must never forget it," said a Rome commentator sadly in late May. "We must talk about Africa wherever possible, wherever we are, whatever the conversation, and we must write about it. It must be the constant topic of the day, for the Duce recently reaffirmed our right to it and the certainty of our return to it."

But the minds of the Italian people were on other things. Their cities were being relentlessly bombed by Americans and British from those lost African shores. Invasion was at hand, damage was tremendous and anything like reconquest of Africa seemed an idle dream indeed.

CHAPTER TWELVE

WE CALL HIM MEYER

IN 1939, shortly before the war began, Goering made a fatal boast about Germany's ability to ward off air raids which the Nazi regime has never been able to live down.

"No German city will ever suffer the disaster of being bombed, or my name will be Meyer," said Goering.

German cities have been bombed. The greatest weight of bombs ever amassed by an air force has been dropped on many German cities. Cologne has been nearly bombed off the map by raid after raid of the R.A.F. Essen has been hit nearly sixty times at this writing. Duesseldorf, Dortmund, Bremen, Kiel—almost every important German city that you can mention—has been struck. And Berlin has not been forgotten. Many times Germans who had been assured that it could never be done have had to dig their way out of debris. Thousands have no doubt been killed. Tremendous damage has been inflicted on German industry. Nothing the Luftwaffe was ever able to accomplish over England during the worst days of the blitz in 1940 has compared with what Germany has undergone from R.A.F. raids and then from the U.S. air force as well. And to the south Italy has more and more been the center of devastating air attack as the moment of invasion approached in the first half of 1943. In mid-May 1943 the biggest single disaster of the war was suffered by the Germans when giant British

bombers blasted the Mohne and the Weser dams in the center of the Ruhr war industries and flooded vast areas. Casualties were put as high as 70,000 in addition to the industrial damage.

All this has been hard for the Germans to take, especially in view of Goering's ill-advised assurances to them that it could not be done. And they have repeatedly shown that they cannot take it. They have whined more than they have threatened. They have made ridiculous accusations. They have promised reprisals so often that the German people must wonder what has gone wrong with a Luftwaffe that promises but does not deliver. They have sought to make propaganda capital out of the raids, as their broadcasts show, but it has been an ineffectual effort. It has worked perhaps with the French collaborationists but with few others. In spite of the fact that some of the most damaging raids have been on German military objectives in France, Belgium and Holland, the inhabitants of those countries still wave to passing aerial raiders, always welcome them and sometimes signal to them. This has added fury to the German frustration at the inability of the Nazis to repeat their effort of the Battle of Britain and retaliate in kind.

The propaganda line followed in regard to the raids has not been either very subtle or very effective but it has been the best the Nazis could do in the circumstances.

First of all, of course, they insist that the raiders never hit anything but civilian objectives and that they are therefore barbarians. The fact that thousands upon thousands of Britishers died in the blitz on London and other English cities, that cathedrals, hospitals, schools and hundreds of thousands of dwellings were leveled in random bombing does not prevent the Nazis from using that argument.

Then they tell their people that it is the Bolsheviks who have put the English up to the mass raids, although occasionally

they vary the technique and blame the Americans. For example, in January 1942 the 1,000-plane raid on Bremen was, according to the Berlin radio, carried out by the R.A.F. at the direct instigation of General Eisenhower.

And finally, they tell us, if not the Germans, that the more we bomb the better German morale becomes, and as a corollary our own power weakens.

The argument that the raids weaken the British and ourselves is based on the fact that the R.A.F. loses planes in every attack, and since the attacks hit nothing but "residential quarters and cultural monuments," Berlin speakers say, "What use is it to sacrifice planes for such a purpose?"

Hans Fritzsche recently referred to the raids in a home broadcast as "Churchill's most costly measure," and Lord Haw Haw, speaking to Britain in his best sarcastic style, said: "Churchill may hold the theory that by destroying hospitals and dwelling houses and monuments of culture he is advancing toward victory."

The Allied raids on Germany had been going on for nearly a year in full force before the Axis radio was forced to admit that retaliation would have to wait. Until September 1942 the German home audience had been led to believe that the British were undergoing raids as devastating as those to which they were being subjected themselves. The explanation was given by the air-force spokesman General Quade.

"We must provide at all costs a bigger air force in Russia," he said. "In fact we cannot be strong enough there. Every plane we can spare must be used in this battle, for the stronger we are the more quickly we shall be able to win. For this reason the secondary fronts must give up all they can. They must be stripped to the lowest possible limit that is endurable. Germany and the whole of the Greater Reich is just such a second-

ary front. In those areas which are subjected to heavy bombings by the R.A.F. people should remember that they give their lives for final victory. The civilians suffer in the interests of the community.”

General Quade promised that Germany's bomber strength would eventually be turned on the British, but he did not say when, and he added, “The morale of the people of the bombed areas is excellent, the more so because these people know that in a long war the strategical situation will change. When we are finished in the east thousands of bombers will be freed for operations over Britain and for other duties in the west.”

In dealing with Allied raids over France the Germans have done their best to compensate for the loss of important factories and railway centers by using the attacks to turn the populations against the Allies and see to it that they are unfriendly at the movement of invasion.

An example of that type of propaganda effort is the following, made last April after highly successful American and British raids on Rouen and the Renault works outside Paris. The speaker is a French collaborationist broadcaster:

“The day before yesterday Rouen was burying its dead. Today Paris is counting its own dead, and is not over counting them. Alas, under the pretext of attacking military objectives the Yankees have deliberately attacked Paris. Paris replies to them by the hate of its people, painfully, unjustly hit. . . . This is war for the Americans! This is war for the British! How well we understand them! The job of butchers is less dangerous than that of soldiers.

“Under pretext of waging war against Germany it is against us that the British are waging it—against France, the traditional target of British hatred, the object of British greed. Hatred of Frenchmen who refused to be killed to the last man

to enable Great Britain to escape her due punishment or to allow Roosevelt and his Jews to plan in peace their designs of world domination."

This kind of propaganda line was strongly supported by Pétain and Laval from Vichy every time there were civilian French casualties as the result of an Allied raid. Never once were the French people given the idea from official quarters that military targets or industrial plants working for the Germans had been the object of Allied raids over French soil.

By June of 1943 Axis propagandists seemed almost to be writhing in agony under the impact of the Allied aerial offensive. In the absence of something concrete with which to reassure their own people and of some valid argument to get us to relax the increasing pressure of mass bombing they resorted to the lowest type of name-calling and the most fantastic of arguments.

The Berlin radio, for example, lashed out against American bomber pilots on June first with the following ridiculous charge: "United States fliers are the scum of Chicago's underworld. They all have been released from prison under the condition that they will serve in the American air force. A big comb-out of American prisons took place at the outbreak of the war. The purpose was to obtain air crews of reckless, brutal pilots capable of every crime. That is why we welcome measures taken by our Japanese allies against these criminals."

The following day the Rome radio referred to the Americans as "lynchers, murderers, gangsters and kidnapers," and both Axis partners put out imaginative atrocity stories about our bombers dropping explosive pencils, fountain pens, lipsticks, cigars and women's handbags for the purpose of "crippling children, women and harmless peasants."

Rome on June third rasped furiously: "What the British and

Americans are doing in their attempt to wipe our ancient and modern civilization off the face of the earth may rightly be termed a vendetta against man and God!"

Paris aped the tone of the Axis capitals but revealed in its exasperation that the average Frenchman did not share the official indignation at the bombing offensive.

"We have here in France," said a Paris commentator bitterly, "the spectacle of people cheering at bombs raining down."

When the Allied spokesmen cautioned the world against taking at its face value the Axis whining over the bombings and reminded people who might have short memories that the Germans nearly wiped Warsaw, Rotterdam and Belgrade off the map, German radio broadcasters indignantly explained that that had been different.

"In Warsaw and Rotterdam it was not a question of open towns or defenseless civilians but of defenses and fortified bridgehead positions lying almost directly in the military zone of operations."

That argument sounds very hollow indeed to anyone who happens to recall that some 25,000 people were killed in a single lightning bombing of Rotterdam *after the Dutch had surrendered*.

Another Berlin commentator, broadcasting to the United States on June second, put it this way, after some bitter warnings to the Americans:

"All we regret is that you in America cannot be given some of your own medicine. All we will be able to do when the time comes is to let your British friends have it, and they will get plenty of it. Of that you may rest assured.

"The day of reckoning is drawing near. It will be a day of sorrow for the entire civilized world. It will be degrading for our whole country. Do not come to us with talk of Warsaw,

Rotterdam and Belgrade. Those were different. They had to be destroyed to stop destruction [you figure it out] to end the fight and soften the misery of war; and we did it successfully.”

On July 19, 1943, a fleet of American Flying Fortresses subjected Rome to its first bombing of the war, and the full fury of the Axis propaganda machine was released against us barbarians from the western shore of the Atlantic. Goebbels quickly saw the propaganda possibilities of an attack on the shrine city of the Catholic world, and every available outlet was used to pour vituperation against the Americans over the airwaves and to add to the hate campaign which was being redoubled in Italy following the invasion of Sicily.

The Rome raid was carefully planned by the American air force command. Two targets were selected—the Littorio railway yards and switching hump and the San Lorenzo yards. These were chosen because they were a vital link in the Italian north-south transportation system and their destruction would complicate immeasurably the sending of troops and supplies from northern Italy to the southern regions under direct threat of invasion, and to Sicily. The raid was highly successful, for the Littorio yards were so badly damaged it was estimated that it would take two years to repair them, and the San Lorenzo yards were similarly smashed. Official reconnaissance photographs revealed exactly what had been hit in the raid. They showed that no civilian targets or churches had been hit with the exception of the San Lorenzo Basilica, which was so close to the yards that it could not be spared.

The Nazis and the Italians, however, screamed to the world that we had gutted irreplaceable religious shrines and historical monuments and that we had committed sacrilege against the Church of Rome. They sought to arouse the indignation of Catholics throughout the world—in our own countries as well

as abroad—and they sought by deliberate lies to give the impression that the Pope was associating himself with their protests. They said, for instance, that the Pope had protested directly to President Roosevelt against the bombing—a statement which the Vatican radio went on the air later to deny. The Pope also did much to counteract Nazi propaganda regarding the buildings hit in the raid, for in a plea that Rome be spared he said specifically that the only church structure to suffer damage was the San Lorenzo Basilica, and he did not claim that it had been destroyed.

The fact is that whatever damage was suffered in Rome was the fault of the Axis leaders, for the Allies had repeatedly urged that Rome be declared an open city but that plea had been consistently ignored. Proclaiming Rome an open city would have involved an undertaking not to leave any military objectives whatever there—not to quarter troops there or move them through the city—and the Axis apparently felt that the Vatican and the churches of Rome were antiraid insurance. Why declare Rome an open city if we refrain from attacking it because of our desire not to attack the church, they reasoned. But that was before the discovery that we could employ daylight precision bombing against the city, and that miscalculation may account in part for the apoplectic fury which followed our first raid.

One of the propaganda inventions in connection with the raids, brought out when Germany began to be on the receiving end of most of them, was the story that “years ago Adolf Hitler offered an agreement which would outlaw the bombardment of civilians, but Churchill and others frustrated and even scorned this offer.”

It would take a historian quite a while to find out when and in what circumstances Hitler ever made such an offer only to

have it rejected by Churchill—who did not accede to power until some months after the war began.

That thought was put out in 1942 and allowed to die then, but the following year the Germans were still seeking by devious means to get the Allies to call off the raids. This effort brought to light one of the best indications given during the war of how General Franco, the Spanish dictator, was playing the Axis game. During the German aerial assault on Britain in 1940 Franco had nothing to say about the horrors of mass raids, but in the spring of 1943 when the Ruhr valley, Berlin, and Italian targets were being badly hit, Franco discovered that it was not right to have civilians die from air raids and urged the British to call them off.

The British government, which openly labeled Franco's effort a German propaganda trick rather than a humanitarian initiative, told him he should have thought of that when British lives were being lost by the thousands, and not waited until Allied aerial strength had surpassed that of Germany and begun to make the Nazis pay.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

SLAVE PEOPLES, FREE SPIRITS

MANY HOURS OF BROADCAST time which the Nazis no doubt could use for some purpose less annoying to themselves have to be spent in trying to turn the footsteps of the over-run countries of Europe back onto the path of the New Order. No matter how sugared the propaganda pill or how glowing the promises, the people of France, Holland, Denmark and the others—the common people as opposed to a handful of Quislings and Lavals—refuse to see the New Order as anything but the hoax it is. They refuse to accept Nazi propaganda talk of Greater Europe as anything more than a hollow device of Goebbels' ministry. Better than any underground reports, Nazi broadcasts day after day indicate the extent of spiritual resistance to the Axis which is kept alive in the occupied countries. They show that the bodies of the people may be enslaved to work for the Axis war machine, but their spirits remain free and ready for active revolt when the moment comes.

Axis propagandists have done their best to delude the conquered Europeans into identifying themselves with Germany. First they talked of the New Order, and when that failed they invented the Greater Europe theme. By hammering away day after day at the idea that Britain, Russia and the United States were fighting Europe rather than Germany they hoped to get emotional if not rational acceptance of the German cause.

Chances of success were small in view of the solidly pro-democratic feelings of most of the conquered peoples, and particularly in view of the German terror and enslavement which everyone could see. But Goebbels was never one to shrink from trying to put across a far-fetched idea, and besides he had another aim in view as well.

Even if he could not convince the conquered peoples to make common cause with Germany against the "dollar imperialism, the Bolsheviks and the Jews" who were fighting the Axis, perhaps he could make us think he had. Perhaps he could give us the discouraging idea that all Europe really was lined up on his side, and that if we attempted invasion we would not find there people willing to help us but a solid European bloc ready to defend that continent. It has been to give us the illusion that such a bloc exists that the Germans have, for example, gone to such pains to give publicity to the troops from occupied and satellite countries which fought for a while on the Russian front, like the Spanish Blue Division, or the corps of French and Danish Nazi volunteers. Because of the determined Axis propaganda effort in that direction it is useful for us to prove conclusively that they are trying to convince us of something which does not exist. And we need go no further than their own broadcasts for that proof, as we shall see presently.

As a BBC commentator remarked recently in discussing this subject, the Axis broadcasts prove clearly that there is not any unity under Germany except in hatred of Germany. He pointed out that when Goebbels in March of 1943 complained that "Europe lives today largely in a narcotic state," and when an Italian commentator referred to "those who are voluntarily blind, who don't appreciate the defense of European civilization," they were acknowledging the failure of their propaganda to put the Greater Europe idea across.

This has been repeatedly acknowledged in Nazi broadcasts to the occupied countries. For example a broadcast by the Nazi-controlled Brussels radio complained: "Later generations will refuse to believe how much trouble it was to make the inhabitants of Europe realize that in 1941 Germany and her allies performed an historic mission of deliverance."

Even more bitterly a Paris commentator broadcast early in 1943: "People now loudly cheer the Red army whenever a communiqué announces further Soviet progress. It is hopeless trying to make them realize that by fighting Bolshevism Germany is fighting the battle of Europe."

In July 1941 the Germans found enough fanatical Nazis in Denmark, followers of the traitor Fritz Clausen, to raise one battalion of volunteers for the Russian front, which they called the Danish Free Corps. American radio listeners were told at the time that the enrollment had surpassed all expectations, but at the same time local broadcasts to Denmark reproached the Danish press for "incredible lack of interest."

It had been announced that a second battalion was to be formed, but it never reached full strength, if it was ever constituted at all. The corps was sent to the northern sector of the Russian front, where Moscow later reported that it had been smashed. The Germans admitted 121 dead, and in September 1942 the remnants were finally returned to Denmark on leave. German propagandists tried to make a great public demonstration of this homecoming, but it fell deplorably flat. The volunteers were welcomed by the German minister to Denmark, the German military commander and the leader of the Danish Nazis but no representative of King Christian or his government was present.

The Nazi radio announced in several languages that the Free Corps was given "a hearty welcome" and that "flowers were

thrown to the soldiers by the crowds." The Italian radio, always willing to help but often getting its signals crossed, announced twenty-four hours before the volunteers reached Copenhagen that "the population gave the corps a rousing welcome."

The real story came out in German broadcasts to the Danes, which complained that the volunteers were not appreciated. One commentator remarked bitterly that the only notice the Danish press took of their return was the publication of the names of those killed. The attitude of the public was so hostile that the commander of the Free Corps had to admit that even relatives of the men failed to understand what they were fighting for, and he had to call upon the volunteers to display "patience and steadiness."

"I want everybody to understand that we do not want pistol shooting in the streets," he announced revealingly.

There have been many indications of Nazi exasperation at the attitude of the Danes. Last December a broadcast over the German-controlled Friesland radio complained that the Danes were "following an individual foreign policy," distinct from that of their government and hostile to the occupation authorities.

"The Danes are filled with hate of all things German," said the commentator. "The government must counteract all forms of provocation and sabotage and everything directed against the occupying authorities."

In another broadcast the Danish traitor-commentator Sven Barsk put it this way: "There are a number of people outside Germany, especially in Denmark, who could benefit from getting the German slogan 'victory at any price' knocked into their heads once and for all. They want to have done with the blackout, with ration cards and with early closing of restau-

rants. They want hot water, coffee and whisky. They want to whoop it up all night at the Adlon night club. Many of the blue-eyed dreamers imagine that the belligerent powers might suddenly agree to some sort of compromise in the good old parliamentary way. There is no chance whatsoever of a compromise."

But most revealing was the Danish reaction to a British air raid on the Copenhagen district in February 1943. The Friesland radio expressed strong displeasure at "the tolerance with which the Danish press treats the British terror attack," and added:

"We have already expressed our surprise that in certain circles the night of terror was depicted as a grandiose scene, a subject for lyrical and dramatic journalism."

Recalling pictures published in the Copenhagen press showing crowds laughing in the air-raid shelters, the commentator continued: "It is nothing to laugh about, and when a paper puts a picture of this sort on its front page eight days after the terror attack it shows an almost criminal thoughtlessness."

In conclusion the commentator announced that a listener had given him "some very interesting information" about the behavior of a group of students during a fire in a sugar factory after the raid. These students, it seems, "had the brazenness to act as cheerleaders and attempted to get spectators to shout 'Hurray for the harbingers of spring and liberty!' while the factory was ablaze."

Finally, the Germans accused the Danish clergy and school-teachers of spreading an "unlimited" amount of "secret pro-British propaganda inciting against the Axis powers." As an example the Nazis cited the case of a schoolteacher of Bjer-ringbo whom they accused of "devoting considerable time to informing pupils about British radio broadcasts." She taught

the children how to find the British stations on their radios and instructed them to ask their fathers to help them tune in if they were unable to do so themselves.

The Dutch clergy have been the particular *bête noire* of the Nazis. Despite three years of persecution their courageous opposition to the occupation authorities remains as strong as it was after the fall of Holland. Warnings and arrests have not changed matters.

Arthur Seiss-Inquart, the Reich Commissar for the Netherlands, had repeatedly gone to the microphone himself to express his displeasure with the behavior of the Dutch clergy.

"I think the churches ought to be able to understand the significance of this struggle," he said in February 1943 in voicing a complaint against a congregation which had sent him a letter protesting several death sentences imposed by the Nazi authorities. "To this I can say only that it is intolerable that at a time when our men are fighting on the eastern front there are organizations whose aim is to endanger the safety of the territory in the rear. Whoever does that is inevitably doomed. We must be hard and we must become harder still against the enemy on the field of battle. This is a duty which is perhaps difficult for a human being but it is a sacred duty. We do this duty by destroying our enemies. I believe that they [the churches] are under a moral obligation at least not to hinder the prosecution of this struggle."

As for the general public in the Netherlands, Max Blokzijl, the director of publicity for the Dutch Nazi party, gave some revealing information about the contempt in which his party is held. In a Radio Hilversum broadcast he advised the Nazis "not to be so gloomy" because of public hostility to them and

he professed that far from being downhearted he was highly amused by incidents reported to him.

"I have spent and still spend priceless moments seeing people stand up in the trams or trains for an hour or longer," Blokzijl said, "struggling with their heavy bags and getting pale in the gills as a result, while one or two vacant places remain alongside a fellow countrymen in the black shirt wearing the triangular [Dutch Nazi] insignia. I laughed myself to tears listening to a friend who told me that when he was walking in his uniform in The Hague a lady—a complete stranger to him—on noticing him walking toward her passed him walking backward, obviously to show her inner revulsion for the political opinion that differed from hers. When she had walked past him safely she turned around so as to exhibit her posterior. Such merrymakers are worth their weight in gold."

The Netherlands Information Bureau in New York recently published an amusing pamphlet which it called *Mein Kampf in Holland, or Straight from the Horse's Mouth*, devoted to showing the extent of resistance to the Nazis in the Netherlands. Instead of giving underground reports or stories of resistance on the part of Dutch patriots, the booklet limited itself to quoting the Nazis themselves. The propaganda speakers of the Hilversum radio were extensive if involuntary contributors to the book. Following are a few of their contributions:

"Grownups in the Netherlands love to act like little boys. Do you know what the latest sign is? To put up the index and middle finger of the right hand. Now guess what it means. Do you get it? The letter V." (June 9, 1941.)

"Real Hollanders will pay a guilder to a street musician if he will play for a solid hour in front of the home of a political enemy in the hope that this enemy will be annoyed." (May 13, 1941.)

“All kinds of people now act like Jews, in evident sympathy with them.” (May 21, 1942.)

“Every day I doubt more and more whether Dutch priests and pastors understand the signs of the new times. We see the remarkable fact that high church authorities are praying for the Allies and preaching resistance. They all do it—Roman Catholics, Protestants and members of the Reformed Church—but especially the first.” (April, 1942.)

“In a well-known village in the province of Utrecht lives a wonderful boy. A few months ago this good fellow wanted to volunteer for the eastern front to fight the Bolsheviks. He registered and passed his physical examination. When the evil neighborhood heard about the intentions of this brave and idealistic young man, it lay in wait for him in the dark, beat him up and left him half crippled. On this account the young man can no longer meet the physical requirements for the army. He must stay in bed and has been ill now for months. Maybe he will never recover. It makes you cry when you read it.” (January 27, 1942.)

“I have spoken of our young heroes, hundreds of whom have fallen on the eastern front. Their families, parents, wives and children are steeped in mourning. But what happens? I feel I have to apologize for the fact that the writers of the letters I am going to quote are Netherlanders. This is what they have to say to the bereaved families:

“‘Our sincerest congratulations on the death of your Fascist son. He has come to a sorry end, the wretch, but it was too early. He should have lived a little longer to see the Huns lose the war; then he should have been hanged.’

“Here is an excerpt from another letter: ‘Our people and country may be glad this villain is done for. Once more, our hearty congratulations.’” (October 11, 1942.)

“Every morning father goes to his office. There is he forced to listen to all sorts of hateful remarks concerning his political principles. He is generally the target of his fellow workers’ jokes; even the boss laughs with them. His wife has much trouble with storekeepers who make things difficult for her because she is a member of the National Socialist party. The children go to school with great reluctance, not because of the lessons but because of the other pupils, who make life miserable for them.” (May, 1941.)

“Frequently National Socialists have been assaulted and wounded, sometimes even murdered. They have been subjected to terror without precedent; terror in government, provincial and municipal offices, terror in industry at the hands of small and big bosses; terror in banks and business offices, in schools, and in universities and in homes.” (March 18, 1943.)

Even in the satellite countries there are occasional indications of resistance, and we have already seen instances of it in France. The radio in Poland, where repression defies description, can give nothing but a weak and watered-down version of what actually goes on there. The radios in southeastern and central Europe seldom tell us anything worth knowing, but once in a while a revealing little story comes out of the blacked-out regions under Nazi control. Such a story was one last winter published in the Hungarian paper *Nepszava*.

The story was about a very thin and weak old man who fled in panic from every restaurant in which he discovered a radio. Finally he came to an inn where there was no radio. He sat down and ordered fish. The waitress looked at him in astonishment and asked whether he had a fish card. When the old man explained that he had no such card and did not even know that one was necessary, the waitress told him that the card system had been explained on the radio. The old man said that he

never listened to the radio because he had just come out of prison, where he had been held for twelve months.

“But why?” asked the waitress.

The old man sighed. “I was always a good boy at school,” he said, “and I was taught that when there is a controversy both parties must always be heard. So I used to switch on my radio and listen to foreign broadcasts to find out what the other side was saying. For that I got twelve months in prison and I have been afraid of radios ever since.”

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

TROUBLE ON THE HOME FRONT

ONE PLACE TO LOOK to see if we are winning the war is the field of battle. Another is the German Propaganda Ministry. If studied carefully both give good indications of where we stand, but both can be deceptive. In examining Dr. Goebbels' troubles on the home front as reflected in his propaganda broadcasts for home consumption, we must be careful not to confuse the facts with what he wants us to *think* are the facts. We must be on guard against being too elated when he plunges into the depths of gloom, because often he speaks gloomily not because he really is depressed but because he wants to gain something by appearing so. Even in what seem to be straightforward instances of official annoyance with the way the German people are behaving in wartime Goebbels often has an ulterior motive.

For example, if the official Nazi propaganda organs suddenly lash out against the rich, as they did in January 1943, it may be not simply because the rich are delinquent in their contribution to the war but for a much more obscure reason. It may be, as has been suggested by propaganda analysts, that Goebbels is trying to identify the Nazi party with the people on the wrong side of the tracks, the common people as opposed to the plutocrats, at a moment when a rocky war situation makes it imperative for the party to see to its support.

The great Nazi propaganda gloom campaign which began in the spring of 1943 was evidence that the war of nerves, a weapon which the Germans had used so successfully on their enemies for years, had recoiled and struck Goebbels in the face. For years he had sought to frighten other people in the hope that they would collapse. In 1943 he sought to frighten his own people in the hope that they would not. That was the real meaning of the gloom campaign, which many interpreted wrongly as an indication that the Germans as a whole were in deep despair and that their state of mind was reflected in the Nazi press and radio. That interpretation was based on the belief that the organs of opinion in the Reich are the mouthpieces of the Germans and not merely the mouthpieces of Goebbels.

If the Germans thought the situation was critical and the radio and press said so, it was not in spite of Goebbels but because of him. It would thus be a mistake to ignore the fact that the German sense of crisis was not spontaneous but imposed on the people for a purpose. Goebbels had his orders to wring an ever greater effort out of the hard-pressed population of Germany, and he decided that the best wringer at his disposal was gloom. He decided to capitalize on German difficulties—which were real enough—to play up the dangers and defeats instead of play them down as had been his custom in the past, and to warn that Germany's survival was at stake. Instead of minimizing the disaster at Stalingrad and the defeats in Africa he allowed the full force of their impact to strike the German people. Then he called for a superhuman effort to swing the balance back in Germany's favor.

Ironically, Goebbels had to look to England for his inspiration, although he indignantly denied that British resistance in the Battle of Britain had ever been held up to the Germans as an example. Actually the astute Goebbels could not help but

learn the lesson of Britain and apply it when Germany was in a tight corner, even though in so doing he was forced to take a chance on a technique which had never been tried before on the Germans. Their reaction to concentrated gloom, it must be noted, was unknown.

Goebbels saw that after Dunkirk Britain was in dire straits and that British leaders made no secret of the fact. On the contrary, they told the people that their existence was at stake and asked them to act accordingly. The result was a display of determination and energy that saved Britain and will probably prove eventually to have saved the rest of the world as well.

When Goebbels sought popular support for the total mobilization program early in 1943 there were two kinds of home broadcasts devoted to the purpose. One was an effort to impress the people more than ever with the tremendous sacrifices being made by the men on the Russian front in comparison with their own at home, and another was a somewhat ludicrous attempt by Goebbels to shame some people into going into war industries. Goebbels devoted one of his weekly articles in the paper *Das Reich* to the effort and later had the article broadcast, as is his custom. In his article of January twenty-third he said:

“In many respects we are living lives not suited to a time of war. Many businesses now being carried on profit nobody, or at least very few; they use up labor and materials but contribute nothing to the result we are striving for.

“We all know that there are many shops in which practically nothing can be bought. They are worthless for the war effort. Let them go out of business and their employes transfer to more useful occupations. . . . I have been informed that the bars of the great cities offer no comfort to anyone. Scarcely anything to drink can be obtained in them. An aging pianist pounds a weary instrument. The patrons face each other in

blank silence. Why should this go on? Let the pianist provide recreation for the troops. Let the waiters get work in a war industry."

An example of the sacrifice motif was a broadcast by Hans Fritzsche about the same time. "We can only imagine with what heroism the German soldier is giving his all to parry the latest Bolshevik blow," Fritzsche said. "Those for whom this sacrifice is offered can well be proud. But their very pride creates the obligation to be worthy of the sacrifice. The German people, a part of whom have remained almost untouched by the war, must now mobilize all their strength and throw it into the balance. There still exists in Germany a great reserve of workers. Only when all hands, men and women, are doing vital war work intelligently and according to plan will the mobilization be complete. Out of the bitter struggle comes the challenge: 'Stake everything!'"

Before leaving the subject of the sacrifices made by the German soldiers on the Russian front as reported in Nazi home broadcasts, consider one use of that theme which was genuinely revealing of the attitude of the German people toward the war after the victories began to disappear from the news. A broadcast on the progress of the fighting in Russia late in 1942 was prefaced by an explanation that it was designed for "narrow-minded people who stand aloof with bored expressions on their faces and say, 'I don't want to hear any more about the war and politics. I'm fed up with the whole affair.'"

The broadcast began with the following description of an action on the eastern front by a soldier-reporter: "Grenadiers who took up positions on this barren steppe had cut pits into the frozen soil before it was covered with snow. They passed through days which demanded their utmost efforts—days without respite—when they let tanks pass through the main fight-

ing line and remained in their pits to fight supporting infantry, repulse their attack and inflict losses.”

Another reporter then told the German audience: “Cold fills every limb. They [the soldiers] get stiff. No one must forget or fall asleep. It is sometimes easier to attack than stand at the machine gun for two hours in pitch-dark. They must not fire too often. They must economize their ammunition. Listen and observe. It is difficult to get used to it. It gets on your nerves.”

Then a wounded soldier took the microphone and complained: “We do not notice discourtesy any longer, but it hurts one inside to experience such treatment. We get our bones smashed to win victory and peace for the homeland and to save it from enemy invasion, but for all that many people do not seem to consider us at all. People walk in the street three and four in a row and none gives way when a wounded soldier wishes to pass. Frequently one must push and squeeze one’s way through people as well as one can. Apart from that one is stared at in an embarrassing way.”

Although things had begun to go badly long before, it was on the third anniversary of the war that the German Propaganda Ministry’s home service made it clear to the German people that the days of blitz victories were over and that it was going to be a defensive war—for the most part at least—from then on. That change from offensive to defensive was no easy task for a propaganda organization nourished on victory, but it had to be done, and there also had to be a clear indication to listeners that sacrifice was going to be the order of the day.

“At the beginning of the fourth year of the conflict it cannot be said when peace will be restored to mankind in the

atmosphere of political, economic and social justice," said one commentator.

"The men and women of Germany and Italy know perfectly well why they are forced to bear heavy sacrifices and why they have to fight and work so hard," said another.

A speaker introduced as a German general said over the Berlin radio: "The Wehrmacht is still faced with hard fighting and the German people are faced with hard trials. Victory must be deserved. No one is going to give it to us as a present."

That theme was a remarkable change from the triumphant, arrogant tone used in 1940 and 1941. Even more remarkable was the sudden emergence of comparisons with Germany in 1917. For example one broadcast said:

"Once again our armies are far from the German frontiers, but today the occupied territories are greater and more important strategically as well as economically. How different from then, when our troops and our allied troops were on the defensive!"

As a matter of fact that was not true, because the Germans were still on the offensive in 1917, but the point to be noted is that the propaganda office thought the comparison necessary at all.

Then Goebbels began being metaphorical and, as I have remarked before, when a Nazi propagandist is metaphorical or speaks in broad general terms he is trying to say something disagreeable in an agreeable way, or to hide something.

"We still have a long way to go," said Goebbels. "We know the obstacles which face us but we are also keenly aware of our chances. We are before a steep mountain which we have to climb. Since our people have practiced mountain climbing in previous years it will be easier for us to climb the mountain

than for those peoples who only learned mountain climbing in the plains."

Two months later he was still being vague. "Germany must and will succeed in winning the war," he said, without explaining how. "In centuries to come this struggle between giants will be handed down in song and story. We must fight it out and emerge the victors."

To Germans who were by then fully aware of what another grim winter on the Russian front meant, Goebbels waxed philosophical: "In the east the fate of our continent is being decided and we are again faced with the eternal law of life and death. Where life is hardest and most grim its eternal goodness is also manifest. It is only cruel for those who do not understand. War is the final test, and we are put to this test today. The road which lies behind was more stormy and more full of thorns than the one which lies before us. When we have reached the top we shall be able to see far and wide and everywhere we look we shall see land that belongs to us."

German propaganda broadcasts at the close of 1942 were even more revealing. The most important contribution they made for our purposes was the fixing of the official explanation for what was happening. The explanation was that there were no more big German offensives, no sensational successes, because this was a "war of attrition." We have used the term, and the British and French used it in those sad days of late 1939 and early 1940 during the *sitzkrieg*, but at that time a self-respecting Nazi propagandist would have laughed in the face of any German using it. In the fourth year of the war, however, they felt differently.

Hitler and the high command had not planned a war of attrition, for in 1939 Berlin had accepted the fact that Germany could not win such a war. She had neither the population nor

the food nor the industrial resources for it, especially if there was to be air opposition from the enemy. That was why the high command had worked out the blitzkrieg technique to bring quick victory—as it almost succeeded in doing—before the tremendous weight of the United States was thrown into the balance against Germany. But at the beginning of 1943 they wanted to forget that.

Efforts to convince the German people that everything was still all right led to an intensive press and radio campaign. To people who had been assured for years that the initiative remained firmly in the hands of their armies was made the startling statement in the *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* that “we have been able to secure all that we need for our future welfare and now a war of attrition has been forced on the Allies; now the *burden of the initiative* has to a large extent passed to our opponents.”

A broadcast addressed to the British at the same time said: “You would have been far more content if the German command had tried attacking all the time without ever exploiting the defensive. Now it is up to you to act, and to act under the most unfavorable circumstances.”

To listeners who had been bred on stories of the German offensive in Russia the Berlin radio said: “The Russians have failed to realize that the German defensive strategy forces them to attack where the Germans want them to.”

Three days later Goebbels was back again with another pep talk in which he alternated vague reassurances with not so vague warnings.

“There is no way back,” he said. “The Reich is being defended by a front which is capable of withstanding any pressure. We could lose now only through our own fault.”

That business about “we could lose” must have given chills

to German listeners even if it was qualified, for Goebbels was not in the habit of admitting even the remotest possibility of defeat unless he had a disagreeable job to perform.

“What three years ago was merely a matter of courage and national enthusiasm has now also become a matter of tenacity and moral resistance,” he continued, “and that is exactly what the enemy is speculating upon. He believes that we may be materially but not mentally equal to a long war. He is speculating that, as he frankly admits, one merry day the miracle of November 1918 will repeat itself for him. Of course he will be deceived in this assumption, for our nation has given so many proofs of moral resistance in this war that there should not be any doubt about it any longer.”

Goebbels then sounded his warning: “This is a war for our life and we all know it. Everything is at stake. The entire nation has built up a strong and indomitable national defense at the front line as well as at home. Let us keep our heads and make every effort. If the elements rage around us, let our nation be a firm rock in the stormy ocean of time. Let us be on our guard and face our fate squarely. If we remain unshaken then its goddess will hand us the laurels at the happy day when the war will be over.”

Late in January alert monitors of the Federal Communications Commission discovered some peculiar behavior of the German propaganda ministry in its dealings with the home front. It apparently sought to keep as a private family matter its annoyance with Germans who tried to avoid sacrifices for the war effort. Goebbels' article for *Das Reich*, which was broadcast over the Frankfurt radio for home consumption, contained an extended tongue-lashing of idlers inside the Reich, but the version beamed abroad omitted the text of the scolding

and merely said that Goebbels had briefly reprimanded "the few sluggards and idlers at home."

What Goebbels actually said was this:

"These [idlers] at home are the same citizens who regard the war not as a struggle for our national and individual lives but as an annoying interruption of their permanent state of being amused. They usually respect the National Socialist state only insofar as it brings them advantages. They contribute unwillingly and stingily to the winter relief, they try to evade the duties of the community and even try to make the government responsible for the weather. The high command communiqués bore them, and they only listen to the radio if there is some dance music on. God knows where they still get their butter and eggs, shoes and clothes, but they do get them. They live almost as in times of peace while we are waging war—also for them."

Other propaganda speakers, meanwhile, revealed what may have been a growing hope among Germans that defeat would rid them of the Nazi regime but not harm the individual German—an idea which the Nazis must always desperately combat.

"There is hardly a sensible German left today who believes that things might not turn out so badly even if we were not victorious on the field of battle," one commentator said. "We see examples of the blind, raging hatred of enemies who in their sadistic wishful dreams picture to themselves how they would starve, maim, shoot and sterilize our women and children in case of victory. The enemy makes it easy for us to hate him from the bottom of our hearts. We must steel ourselves against the sentimental feeling such as has sometimes proved to be the undoing of the Germans."

The home audience was warned that all trace of humanitarianism had disappeared from American policies, for instance, and that the Americans were a "diabolical enemy" plotting to

transfer German youths to our colonies for forced labor at the same time that we let loose against Germany forces "ranging from subhuman Bolsheviks to degenerate Negroes." We scarcely recognize ourselves. But we know that this stirring up of hate, which was treated in more detail in a previous chapter, has been an important part of the German effort to convince the individual that he must fight to the end, or else. And since Goebbels would not waste propaganda time on it if he did not think it necessary, we may conclude that the individual German has just a little hope in his heart that defeat will cost him his dictatorship but nothing more personal.

A survey of Berlin broadcasts in the spring of 1943 revealed that grumbling on the German home front on at least six subjects had become prevalent enough for the Propaganda Ministry to act against it. Wives and sweethearts complained about separation from the men at the front, for example, and propagandists sought to counteract the complaints by organizing domestic programs glorifying solitude and spiritual communion with the absentees. Complaints about lack of mail from the eastern front led the Nazi radio to explain that the soldiers had no time to write frequently. Grumbling by farmers about the numerous forms and blanks they had to fill out was revealed in a broadcast telling them that the red tape was necessary for planning food production. Soldiers on leave complained about the conduct of civilians, as we already noted they had done the preceding year, chiefly about idlers in cafés, and Goebbels cited those complaints as justification for closing down the night clubs and restaurants. Soldiers' protests about those who stayed at home and obtained advancement in civilian careers led to the announcement of a new law for a six-month study period for law students in the army and for their right to re-examination if they failed in the first test. Other broadcasts persistently

pointed out that large families have one son exempt from military service, indicating increasing fears by parents that their families would die out.

In late May 1943, as the threat of Allied invasion of Europe was becoming increasingly acute, Goebbels had nothing to do but continue with his generalities.

"We Germans are a young great nation without experience," he said on May twenty-eighth. "In the past we have run the risk in hard times of falling back on our individualistic ways of thinking. A long historical training will be necessary to cure us of this evil tendency. Only those who are able to think in historical terms will see and understand this great danger in time.

"In World War One we succumbed and were defeated by this lack of national thinking. In this war we must and we will master this disease. A second 1918 must not arrive. We must win this war. It is not only a question of arms. It is a question of nerves."

To a nation suffering more and more from air raids, Goebbels said: "Germans may sometimes overrate personal hardship and sorrow. Many people lack today the perspective of distance from their time. These people are preoccupied by their hardships and troubles, but that will by no means become a reason for those in power to conduct this war from any other viewpoint than the historical one.

"We must first of all get acquainted with the great rules history has prescribed for the great nations. It requires patience, time and great political training. But anyway there is no reason for political doubt or skepticism. The small group of doubting Germans is opposed by the healthy, tough resistant majority of Germans."

A curious angle of Goebbels' propaganda to the German home front in 1943 was his persistence in carefully giving Hitler credit for everything. That would seem like normal procedure in the Nazi dictatorship in which people have been urged and often browbeaten into practically worshipping the Fuehrer. But it seemed much more reasonable in the days when everything was going well for the Reich than it did in times when the German war machine was on the defensive, and for that reason propaganda analysts thought that perhaps Goebbels may have had another idea in mind.

Edward Montgomery, radio news analyst for the BBC, put it this way in a broadcast in April 1943: "A speech of adulation was made by Goebbels tonight on the eve of Hitler's birthday. I wonder whether Hitler can be altogether happy about the way his lieutenants nowadays are piling it on about giving him all the credit for everything. I wonder if it doesn't cross his mind sometimes whether they are not doing it in order to make it easier for them to blame him for everything when the crash comes.

"I wonder if it hasn't occurred to Goebbels' nasty little mind that Hitler will make a very convenient scapegoat to explain to the German people how they came to be defeated a second time, and I also wonder why it is that Goebbels has suddenly started insisting so hard that Germany never really wanted this war, that poor, dear Germany is the innocent victim of the brutal pluto-democratic warmongers. I wonder if perhaps the egregious little doctor hasn't begun to think about the war-guilt clause in the next peace treaty and isn't already starting the process of whitewashing Germany in anticipation. I wonder if some of the big industrialists and the great landowners and the generals of the high command haven't been suggesting to

Goebbels that he had better start getting the German people into the right frame of mind to write off World War Two as lost and to begin getting themselves organized for World War Three. I wonder."

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

THE SOFT UNDERBELLY

IN GOING THROUGH my records of Italian propaganda broadcasts, particularly those since the Allied landing in North Africa in November 1942, I was reminded of a remark Ring Lardner once made of a certain ballplayer. "Although he was a weak hitter," said the immortal sports writer, "he was also a poor fielder." That seemed to me a very apt if not entirely grammatical way of describing the frantic efforts of the Italian leaders to convince their people that they are really conquerors and empire builders despite the evidence; of their efforts to stick out their chins in Caesarian poses and whistle at the same time; of their ineptitude in trying to explain away the loss of their empire and yet assure themselves that everything is really going to turn out all right in the end.

Three things made the task of Italian propagandists extremely difficult, apart from the fact that the Allies were winning the battle of the Mediterranean and that the propaganda office in Rome never could master all of Goebbels' tricks. One was the fact that the Italians just were not the type to be conquerors and that the effort of Mussolini to make them look like conquerors was never a success. Another was the fact that no matter how much chest-thumping the Italians permitted themselves, their country simply did not have the resources to carry out the Duce's wild dream of reconstituting the Roman

Empire. The third was that the average Italian hated the Germans much more than he hated the British or the French. I was given clear enough evidence of that hatred in 1934 when I went down to Trieste during the attempted Nazi *putsch* in Austria. The Italians still hoped to keep Austria an independent satellite of Italy then instead of a part of Germany, and they massed troops at the Brenner Pass to show Hitler's government that they would march across the border if German troops dared enter Austria from the north. The Italians in Trieste appeared so generally delighted with the possibility of a clash with the Germans that there was a festive air about the place and an even more marked air of pleasant excitement at Bolzano, near the pass. I noticed another thing too on that trip which fitted into the later picture of the ineffectual Italian efforts to hold onto their empire in Africa. The most remarkable thing about the Italian officers who were so conspicuous in Trieste was the elaborateness of their uniforms and their obvious effort to impress civilians with their dashing military bearing. I think it has been borne out generally that the more powerful an army, the more genuine its military merit, the simpler its uniforms. Italy fell unconsciously into the category of small countries which needed a kind of peacock exhibitionism to make up for military power.

The possibility of invasion was, of course, the first thing that entered the minds of the Italians in November 1942 when the Allies landed in Africa. Later Italian propagandists sought to minimize that possibility by boasting of the strength of the Mediterranean defenses—a subject into which we shall go in more detail in the next chapter—but for the moment their concern was to prevent a general wave of defeatism throughout the country. The method chosen was in imitation of Goebbels'

efforts in Germany when things were going badly—to dangle the specter of defeat before the people in an effort to whip up fighting spirit.

A few days after the Allied landing Mario Appellius, the best-known commentator of the Rome radio, told the Italians, “Our victory is assured but in order that we ourselves may rally the necessary strength to attain this victory we must visualize the frightful picture that would await us were we to be defeated.”

He continued: “Many important measures and decisions have been taken by Axis leaders in the past few days but their nature cannot be disclosed. News of the Anglo-American landings had but one effect on the Italian people—it made them harden their hearts and it gave them the will to show the enemy exactly of what stuff they are made. We may of course be in for a storm. We cannot say, and it is wise therefore to prepare our boats well—just in case foul weather lies ahead.”

Two weeks later Rome was still hard at work on the defeat theme. “In case of an Allied victory,” said a broadcast of a Stefani Agency dispatch, “Italy’s position would be absolute slavery. The Allies would reserve only four professions for the Italians: singers, waiters, refugees and makers of souvenirs.”

If on the other hand the Axis won, said Stefani, Italy would have “a permanent guarantee of security in the new military, economic and political organization of the Mediterranean area and would therefore enjoy economic prosperity.”

The above broadcasts reflected relatively mild apprehension, but by January 1943 propagandists in Rome were going all out to keep morale from tumbling to depths from which it could not be rescued. The reason, of course, was that General Montgomery was methodically wiping out the last remnants of the Italian African Empire while Allied armies were getting ready

for the final push against Tunis and Bizerte, which would give them jumping-off places for attacking the Italian islands and the mainland itself.

In early January 1943 Aldo Valori exhorted his listeners: "To resist in order to win is an unquestionable necessity. He who does not feel this for love of greatness, let him feel it through reasoning and calculation. Anything will do as long as we do not fall under the subtle influence of enemy propaganda and can counteract the suggestive power of its evil forces."

Valori was referring to the increasing weight of the Allied propaganda campaign being waged from London, North Africa and the United States to get Italy out of the war.

Another broadcaster at the same time warned: "Let this obvious truth be considered by those, if there be any, who are considering with indifference the hypothesis of defeat. Let them tell us how and with what means a defeated Italy could undertake the enormous task of rebuilding our great and beautiful cities into greater and more beautiful ones. We should probably have to resign ourselves to looking on powerless at their ruins in the picture of national desolation.

"Let them tell us what purpose the work of the Italian veterans of the late war would have served if after this war Italy found herself without money, work, colonies, without any allies or friends, and probably with more limited boundaries—reduced, in other words, not only to what she was before the fateful day of May 24, 1915 [when Italy entered the First World War] but to what Italy was in 1880, with the problem of having to feed a double population on a very restricted area."

At the same time acute uneasiness of Italy's leaders for their personal fate was reflected in broadcast reactions to Allied radio appeals in which the Italian people were urged to rid themselves of their Fascist overlords.

"It is impossible to conceive," said the Rome radio indignantly, "that ignorance could have reached such a level as is evidenced in a message that the United States is not fighting against the Italian people but only against the Fascist regime. It is difficult to believe in this twentieth century that a people like the Italians, who have had such a tradition and long experience with both good and bad governments, could tolerate an obnoxious regime for more than twenty years."

A later direct appeal voiced by President Roosevelt in June 1943, coincidental with the fall of Pantelleria and Lampedusa to Allied air assault, brought the unique announcement by the Rome radio that the President's call for Italy to get out of the war was "an address that we regard as nonexistent."

In February 1943, with things going from bad to worse, Italian listeners were invited to get what comfort they could out of the prediction that "the destiny of the Italian empire will not be decided in Tripoli or in Zuara but on the great battlefields of Europe and Asia and on the seven seas infested with submarines."

"The spring will be hard," Rome home broadcasts warned. "Every Italian must take up his post on the battlefield. The enemy prepares to pounce upon us. The gravity of the hour does not admit of desertions, errors, doubts, uncertainties, sophistries, paradoxes, deceit, or the grotesque Machiavellisms that are an insult to Machiavelli's race. The year 1943 will be a year of blood and sorrow. We must face it with stout hearts, with all our material and spiritual strength. Losing 1943 means losing the war, the historic fatherland, home, the reason for living."

In addition to this rather pathetic campaign Mario Appellius tried another tack with a series of broadcasts in which he attempted to stir up Italian pride by pointing to the contempt

in which they were held abroad. The British, Appelius taunted his listeners, thought that the Italians had no personal attributes of greatness, that they were not warlike but that on the contrary they had "sweet blood, jellylike nerves and muscles of milk chocolate."

Then followed what appeared to be the first open Italian feeler for a negotiated peace with Britain and the United States—an appeal which was given wide currency on the Axis radio one day and just as publicly disowned the next. The feeler, which was carefully wrapped up in the correct amount of Red-menace coverings, was made by Mussolini's spokesman, Virginio Gayda, as follows:

"Italy must resist until the moment when England realizes that her debt to America is growing ever larger, that her world markets are being destroyed and the risk of Communism becomes overwhelming if peace is not made rapidly. We then could consider a compromise peace with Britain and America but never with the Soviets.

"The real danger for both belligerents is Soviet Russia. Axis capitulation would mean heavy territorial losses and impoverishment for their people. The single way out is continued resistance, even if it appears completely hopeless, especially resistance on the Axis borders, which should in no case be crossed."

Gayda's words added to the growing weight of evidence that Italy was war-sick, but his use of the old Axis propaganda trick of implying that Britain was being submerged by the United States sounded like a move in a Hitler peace offensive as well as an expression of Italian hopes. Every previous Axis peace offensive had also been based on the premise that Britain and America should drop the fight against the Axis so Hitler could save the world from Communism. Another re-

markable feature of Gayda's statement was the reference to the necessity of holding the Axis borders—an indication that some Axis authorities at least thought the Russian threat acute and that they had given up hope of waging anything but a defensive war.

Even more remarkable, however, was the apparent effort to get out from under Gayda's peace feeler as soon as it was made. The following day a Transocean Agency Morse-code transmission to the United States said that Gayda's suggestion "represented the entirely personal views of the writer," although for years he had been recognized universally as Mussolini's principal press spokesman.

By spring of 1943 Rome propagandists were devoting many broadcast hours to attacks on defeatist elements in the country and on the "upper classes" in a striking parallel to Berlin's own campaign along that line reported in the preceding chapter. One Rome commentator took up the following editorial comment from Mussolini's own paper, the *Popolo d'Italia*:

"We shall mark down as a defeatist, as a treacherous coward and a lingering absenteeist any man or woman who asks, 'When is this war going to be over, this year, next year or when?' Wars are never over. They are either won or lost."

As for the upper classes, the Rome radio complained: "A few days ago the prefect of Forli was justified in issuing a timely warning to certain people of the higher classes who used that most tragic and heart-rending phase of the war—the bombing of our cities—to idle and show off. These people, having evacuated the bombed cities of northern Italy under false pretenses, have installed themselves in the best hotels and villas on the Adriatic where they are idly passing the time. Among many hostile looks the so-called ladies shamble along the beaches in men's clothing—even in men's trousers. It ap-

pears as if these women had been in such a hurry to flee from their houses that they forgot to take their skirts with them."

It was the old story of the Fascist party seeking at a low ebb in its fortunes to identify itself with the common people, and hoping that thereby the wrath of the people would not be turned against it at the moment of defeat. And meanwhile party propagandists sought far and wide for something that would convince their listeners that all Italians were pulling together to stave off defeat. Having apparently run out of encouraging items of that nature at home, they sought to keep up Italian courage by telling the people what foreign sympathizers thought about them.

In early April Rome quoted a Swedish paper as saying: "The harder and more ruthless the war becomes and the nearer it approaches the Italian coasts, the more the people, far from giving way to depression and panic, grow stronger in their will and determination to resist and bear whatever sufferings war involves."

A Spanish paper was quoted as follows: "The community in sacrifice of all Italians, whether common soldiers or highly placed commanders, is a source of moral strength to the Italian army."

And a German paper was quoted as saying: "The military virtues of the Italian soldier and the spirit of self-denial and self-sacrifice of the Italian people show Italy's iron determination to resist and win the war."

In late May the acute danger of Italian collapse was apparently causing concern among Axis propagandists in both hemispheres, for Tokyo beamed a broadcast to Italy assuring the Italians that the war of nerves against them would fail.

"The anti-Axis has initiated on the occasion of the change in the war situation a propaganda campaign on a large scale, with

the object of destroying the fighting spirit of the Italian people by spreading everywhere wicked propaganda statements that are completely false and tendentious," Tokyo said. "In spite of this neutral countries have wholeheartedly supported the opinion expressed in the *Giornale d'Italia* as follows: 'The fact that anti-Axis troops have started the battle of nerves is only proof that it will be very difficult for the anti-Axis troops to carry out the offensive by really military means against Italian territory.'"

That, it will be recalled, was only two weeks before the victorious assault on the Italian Mediterranean islands began.

A Hungarian contribution to the bolstering of Italian morale was the following from the Budapest radio: "It is stressed by the German foreign office that the British and Americans would like to exploit fully their Tunisian success. They were well aware of the fact that the Italian nation has been closely linked with Africa and therefore hoped that the loss of Tunisia would be a mighty blow inflicted on the Italians. Berlin is more certain today than ever that this method is doomed to failure. The answer given by Italian towns, the united spirit of the population, and the resolution of the Italians all prove that Italian nerves are in order, as stated in Berlin."

The Nazis made their contribution in a Morse-code transmission to the United States which tried to convince us too that Italy was not cracking and that our air assault was therefore useless. "The idea of an Anglo-American invasion attempt in Europe, and especially in Italy, has become such an open topic in official speeches, in the press, in radio broadcasts and in talks by the man in the street," said Berlin, "that Italians have already taken a firm stand toward such a possibility. The Italian people are thus psychologically prepared for the expected new turn of events in the Mediterranean."

In early June Rome again imitated Goebbels by holding up

Britain as an example of a country which withstood a terrific air blitz without collapsing. For this purpose Rome used Carlo del Croix, head of the National Association of Disabled War Veterans.

"The enemy, which was beaten and abandoned and faced with invasion amid ruins, not only continued to resist but would have refused to negotiate with the victor, who nevertheless never asked him to surrender," Del Croix recalled. "Let our attitude be such as not to make us ashamed. The Fascist government is arming a people whose material inferiority and ill luck never prevented them from fighting to the very end."

Only two days before the first of the Italian islands fell to the Allies the Rome radio put Alessandro Pavolini, former Minister of Popular Culture, on the air to prove that it couldn't be done, and particularly to reassure the Italians who, it appeared, had been alarmed by the American reconquest of the island of Attu in the Aleutians.

Attu is a small island near the United States and very far from Japan and hence difficult to defend, Pavolini explained. "Attu is not an example of a possibility; rather it is an example of extreme difficulties faced in a landing. If the Allies strike [against the Italian islands] they will have to overcome successive obstacles of the undersea torpedo, the air torpedo, the mines and the fleet before they come within firing distance of the coastal guns and the elan of the onrushing defenders."

On Pantelleria, you will recall, the onrushing defenders bore white flags, while not a single ship or a man was lost to a torpedo.

The reaction of Italy, and of the Axis propaganda machine in general, to the dismissal of Mussolini on July 25, 1943, will be treated at the close of the next chapter, in which we trace

the handling of the invasion theme from the first threat of it to its realization with the landings on Sicily on July tenth.

One night in December 1942 there was a lively word battle between a harassed announcer on the Rome radio and a ghost voice which kept cutting in on his news broadcast. That exchange, it seems to me, gave an accurate picture of how things were going and of what the Italians had a right to expect in the future.

“The Germans are victoriously counterattacking in Russia!” the Rome announcer declared.

“The Red army smashes on!” the ghost voice interjected.

“Mussolini and the Italian people arm in arm with Germany are marching toward victory!” cried the announcer.

“Mussolini is murdering and sacrificing the Italian armies to please Hitler!” the ghost voice retorted.

With that the Rome radio gave up and the ghost voice subsided into a high-pitched whistle, leaving the Italians to ponder over the fleeting glories of the Fascist empire, the wonders of radio and the fatal year 1943.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

GERMANY'S NIGHTMARE

INVASION FROM THE WEST—that was Germany's nightmare since the winter of 1941 when it became clear that Russia was not going to be knocked out of the war. That fear of invasion was deep-rooted in the hearts of the German people. It meant a two-front war, and a two-front war by the admission of their own leading strategists through two generations meant defeat. Hitler had gambled in attacking Russia because of the fear that once the Allies had massed their power in the west Russia would present an unbearable threat to Germany's rear. He had hoped to destroy that threat well in advance of the time when the United Nations had sufficient strength to strike. But he failed, and when he failed the specter of invasion loomed large and ominous in the mind of every German. To banish that specter and to frighten off the Allies every possible propaganda device was brought into play.

In the spring of 1942 and again in 1943 the German propaganda machine was set in motion to deal with the threat of invasion. Its casting about in search of a line that would serve its purposes presented the best available example of how far from the truth the propaganda office was willing to stray to find something it could use. Records of Axis broadcasts on the subject of invasion through 1942 and 1943 show that sometimes the Nazis sneered at the threat and sometimes they warned

their people that it was acute. Sometimes they boasted of the impregnability of the "Atlantic Wall" and the "Mediterranean Wall." Sometimes they admitted that these might be pierced but that the secondary defenses would hold. One day they invited the Allies to invade Europe and be defeated, and on the next day they urged us to be their friends and turn our common strength against Communist Russia.

The Nazi radio indicated that the most acute fear of invasion during 1942 came in August, after the launching of the second German offensive in Russia had raised a concerted cry among the peoples of the United Nations for a second front to relieve the pressure against the Soviets. Against this rising clamor for a second front Axis propagandists set to work to convince us that we would head into disaster if we tried to create one. The Vichy radio was given the main job in that particular campaign.

"It is necessary to emphasize," said Vichy in early August, "that German troops have arrived in France recently—fresh troops, highly trained and disciplined. Their presence is a decisive answer to the wishful thinking about the second front."

To try to turn the French people against an Allied invasion army—an effort which we will discuss in more detail later—Vichy added: "French people are not deceived by appeals and propaganda about the second front. The second front will mean no end of misfortunes for our people. Once more we recommend that they place their confidence in our Chief of State Pétain and our Chief of Government Laval, who never were traitors to France and our people."

To convince all concerned that the western fortifications were formidable barriers Berlin quoted a French engineer as saying that they were bigger than the Maginot Line. In fact, he said, they were the most gigantic forts in history.

Berlin described a parade of troops passing through the capital on their way to the west, dwelling on their shiny new tanks, their powerful guns, their vigor and enthusiasm. Rome added an announcement that hundreds of new airdromes had been built along the European coast from Kirkennes in northern Norway to Biarritz in southern France. To make the picture complete Fred Kaltenbach urged us not to try such folly as an invasion.

“Why are you fighting your own flesh and blood?” the traitor from Iowa wanted to know. “Germany is not threatening the United States. Germany has neither the time nor the inclination to undertake adventures in the western hemisphere [the old standby argument of the prewar isolationists]. Germany’s eyes are turned toward the east, where she is building a great German Reich. So why not give your German cousins a break?”

The new defenses along the French and Belgian coasts became without doubt the best publicized string of forts in the world. Broadcast after broadcast was devoted to describing their strength.

“The fortifications on the Atlantic coast are far more gigantic than the Westwall [the Siegfried Line] ever was,” said a broadcast in late August.

The French engineer mentioned above was brought into one commentary after another to give the impression that European radio listeners did not have to take the word of Axis propagandists for it but could rely on the eyewitness account of an “impartial” observer.

The purpose of this Nazi campaign was, of course, to show that an invading army could not possibly get past the fortifications. Putting that point across effectively involved burying as deeply as possible any memory of what the Nazis had had

to say previously about fixed fortifications, notably the Maginot Line. For example, on June 15, 1940, two days before France fell, the Nazi radio had said: "With the piercing of the Maginot Line the conception of the invincibility of a defensive line has collapsed in the eyes of the world. Under the ruins of the fortifications a painful illusion lies buried." The Nazis hoped that we and their own people would forget about that.

The pattern of Axis discussion of the second front through the autumn of 1942 went from displays of arrogant confidence to the admission of apprehension, and back again—with the latter accompanied in typical Nazi style by denials that there had ever been any overconfidence.

On August thirtieth Berlin broadcast: "The United States and Britain have but one hope of victory—opening a second front. But this possibility can be ruled out, thanks to the strong defense of the Atlantic coast and the U-boats."

On September tenth Berlin said: "The British themselves say that a second front is an impracticable daydream."

And on September twenty-eighth Berlin said: "Idle talk of a second front dissolves in the face of hard facts. Germany and her allies are prepared to such a degree that a second front is ruled out."

But in mid-October the Paris radio announced that the German garrisons along the coasts of France were on the alert day and night, and added: "The entire west army knows it may be involved in fighting at any hour. The German soldier's performance in the west is therefore a question of nerves."

Forgetting all about the scoffing at the possibility of a second front a Berlin commentator broadcasting to the United States said: "I can't recall anyone in Germany ever saying that a second front was impossible."

Nazi propagandists in general ignored this transition, but

one explained that the outlook had changed because of the tremendous pressure on the Allies from Moscow, which caused the former to plan a second front although it would surely end in disaster.

All through this autumn campaign and on into the winter there was a running fire of admonitions to the French against helping an invasion army and arguments that their fate was linked with that of Germany.

One French commentator in late January warned: "Germany, which is fighting for its very life, would in case of defeat use any means to defend itself. Before it perishes others will have perished in Europe. Our country, already cruelly hit, would know again the horrors of the most implacable of all wars. We live at present only in relative quiet because the German armies are victorious in the east."

The pro-Nazi French speaker admonished his countrymen: "In case of defeat, woe to us! France will become the theater of the most terrible fighting. In case of German defeat nothing would stop devastation and complete ruin of our country. We are in Europe and let us never forget it. We are one with our neighbors and in this war more than at any other time our fate is tightly bound to that of the greatest of our neighbors. We will be the first sacrificed by Germany in defeat. Before the Reich crumbles France will be annihilated, and it is on its dead body that the body of Germany will fall."

After that grim warning the Frenchman added the remarkable anticlimax: "Fortunately, this possibility is not even envisaged."

The reason for the kind of warning quoted above was made clear in March. The Nazi-controlled Paris radio at that time quoted an editorial by the collaborationist Robert de Beauplan, who complained that "the good bourgeois" were hoping for an

invasion even though it meant that part of France might be laid waste by the fighting.

Beauplan, attempting to cool these hopes for liberation, said that the French people ought to remember Stalingrad and the bombings of French cities themselves in order to understand what a military campaign would mean. He conceded, however, that an invasion on the north coasts of France was not unlikely.

To those who would welcome the invasion as a move that would catch the Germans "like rats in a trap," Beauplan recited the hardships which it would bring for France.

"From the first alerte," he said, "the Communists can be expected to attempt their big stroke. What better occasion, as the Germans will be busy elsewhere? In turn the De Gaullists will join the dance, as the London radio gives the order to rise."

This was a striking admission that opposition elements inside France, which were always called Communists as a matter of propaganda policy, were strong enough to worry the Germans and the Vichy authorities.

"You can well believe that the Germans will not allow themselves to be sat upon," Beauplan continued. "They no doubt have already taken their precautions. They will deal with the situation with a hard hand. They will suspect the whole country. You know the fate of a suspected people. They are arrested and interned. A fighting army cannot take the chance of being stabbed in the back. These are enticing prospects which an Anglo-American landing offers us. And now, if you still wish, bring out of hiding your flags with the Cross of Lorraine (the De Gaullist symbol), prepare your victory lanterns. You will have enough smoking ruins on which to hang them."

Admonitions of that kind were accompanied by an intensive

campaign to stir up hatred of the British and Americans as spring approached and the invasion threat again became acute. The air raids offered the best material for the late campaign, as we have already noted in a previous chapter. One Paris commentator, tying up the air raids with invasion, was so carried away by his assignment of deprecating the Americans and the British that he actually found some kind words for the Russians.

“We have never heard tell of even the Bolsheviks sending their air squadrons over open cities to slaughter for the sadistic pleasure of mass assassination,” he said, forgetting what had been charged against the Russians in Finland by the propaganda machine which employed him. “In the west it is a war of barbarians. In the east it is a war of gentlemen.”

Rome helped out by calling the America raids “the banditry which created and immortalized itself with the rape of children, with refined judicial proceedings culminating in lethal chambers and electric chairs. This residue of a degenerate humanity is let loose on the Italian cities.”

“What a lesson for us!” said a Paris commentator. “What a lesson for those who await the ‘liberators’ from day to day!”

And Berlin added: “The ones who are still expecting a so-called liberation of territories by Anglo-American troops are invited to visit the part of Antwerp which has been attacked by British-American bombers and completely destroyed.”

There were Norwegians too who had to be persuaded that it would be the wrong thing to welcome invasion. The propaganda line for that part of Europe was set by the Reich Commissioner Joseph Terboven, who said in a speech over a domestic Norwegian hookup in early March: “He [the German soldier] would fight fanatically and stubbornly for every square foot of Norwegian soil, for every single house and every single

cottage. But in any case the bill would have to be paid by the Norwegian people."

Regarding actual Allied invasion plans, Axis radio propagandists were still busy at the beginning of April handing out reassurance on the one hand and warning us off on the other.

Lord Haw Haw told the British that "in Germany there is no anxiety, no excitement whatever concerning this question," and added, "Mr. Churchill can be quite sure of the willing cooperation of the German forces, which are ready to meet any such attack at whatever point it may be launched."

Another German broadcast at the same time said: "The assumption of the German command is that he [Churchill] will attempt invasion and the fullest preparations have been made to deal with the contingency. Indeed, the German army will be greatly disappointed if this opportunity does not arise."

To the Americans Kaltenbach said: "We expect an attempt of invasion to be made. In fact we will be terribly disappointed if our invitation to land is again snubbed."

The above were more or less isolated broadcasts, although they did follow the same line, but in mid-April the Axis radio launched an intensified campaign to convince all hands that an invasion could not succeed. The reason apparently was that invasion jitters among Axis nationals had become so prevalent that something had to be done. German radio broadcasts for foreign consumption spoke constantly of the impregnability and inviolability of the German continental fortifications, while broadcasts to domestic audiences made a point of this reassurance, of the U-boat campaign and of the remoteness of the United States from the theater of operations, which was counted upon to cut down any American participation in an invasion force.

German newspapers published new photographs of fortifica-

tions along the English Channel showing "gigantic concrete forts built into solid rock, with huge gun barrels sticking out," and Italian papers assured readers that several thousand miles of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean coasts had been strongly fortified. It was said that these defenses, moreover, extended far inland, since it might be expected that the Allied attack would come by air as well as by sea.

Incidentally, Rome in its anxiety to stress the strength of the defense in depth nearly tied a knot in the entire Axis propaganda line. The Rome radio on April nineteenth quoted the newspaper *Corriere della Sera* as saying: "Defenses have been built on the assumption that the first line will not hold. A defense system of great depth has therefore been created. Even if this obstacle should be overcome, there is a third solid defense line with artillery of all calibers."

That remark about the first defense line not being expected to hold must have jarred the nerves of any Germans who heard it, and they also might have been tempted to ask how close to their own borders that defense in depth might bring an Allied invasion force before the "artillery of all calibers" came into play.

The Berlin radio inaugurated a feature called "From Europe's Defense Wall." In one broadcast the invasion preparations were dramatized by sound effects imitating a loud explosion, which German radio listeners were told was the destruction of a casino on the French coast to make way for new Nazi fortifications. That too may have been something of a boner, in view of the fact that the Nazis had assured everyone that the fortifications had already been completed.

Another Axis stunt was the quoting of alleged neutrals to support the story that an invasion could not succeed. The Berlin radio announced that the correspondent of the Swedish

paper *Bund* had written a long article telling how much he was impressed by the "strength of the defensive installations at Scheveningen [Holland]." Another Berlin broadcast for American consumption quoted the Paris correspondent of a Madrid paper as saying that the fortifications he saw were "simply staggering." The Swiss paper *Tribune de Genève* was used to spread the story that the "soft underbelly" of the Axis was being adequately protected, reporting that lines of forts were being built along the French Mediterranean coast from Nice to the Spanish frontier. The Stockholm *Dagens Nyheter's* Berlin correspondent was given the story that all along the Mediterranean coast artillery of all calibers (a favorite German phrase, it seems) had been installed and that many railway batteries were permanently on the alert, with locomotives under steam.

The Moscow radio, which makes a practice of refuting German propaganda claims while they are still hot, had this to say about the campaign: "The gamblers of the Wilhelmstrasse are old hands at the game of bluff and the more they expose occupied countries the more they try to brighten the world with allegedly impregnable fortifications and imaginary super-guns that will supposedly stop an invasion of the continent. This is no new trick, for all Hitler's strategic moves have been surrounded by a great aura of bluff. Before making a real attack the Hitlerites launched hundreds of psychological attacks, and before beginning the real war of bullets and shells they bombarded the world with the myth-of-invincibility bubble. But the German braggarts were made to eat their words on more than one occasion. The time will come when all German air bubbles about their powerful defenses in the west will likewise be punctured."

Axis confidence expressed in April gave way to something approaching panic in the broadcasting studios in May, when

the final Allied victory in North Africa obviously opened the way for an attack on the European continent at many points along the Mediterranean, with particular emphasis on Italy and the Balkans. In broadcasts to Europe as well as to the United States Nazi propagandists did everything they could to make listeners believe an invasion was still impossible or at least could not succeed. But the German military commentator Captain Ludwig Sertorius on May thirteenth gave the show away in a broadcast to the Far East.

Axis commentators broadcasting to Europe and America dwelt more heavily than ever on the Mediterranean fortifications, which were promoted to the status of impregnable bastions for propaganda purposes. They pointed out that the Mediterranean was much wider than the English Channel, so that if the great German armies could not get across the latter the piddling forces of Britain and the United States could not possibly cross the former. Before the capture of the Italian islands below Sicily under tremendous Allied air assault made it clear that the Allies had complete air superiority in that area the Axis also sought to put over the argument that "it would be much easier to bring material across an ocean than across straits." For that reason, they implied, we could never mass for an attack on the Italian mainland.

The desperation of the commentator who came up with that one becomes clear when you remember that the original Nazi argument against the possibility of a successful invasion was that the United States could never get her material across the ocean. The difficulties of the ocean were suddenly forgotten in the effort to dramatize the defensive usefulness of the Mediterranean waist.

Then we were told that it was too late for invasion anyway. In November 1942 it might have been possible, said Axis com-

mentators, who pretended suddenly to be revealing the real truth about the Axis predicament the previous autumn. But in May 1943 it couldn't be done. Hans Fritzsche struck the keynote of that line.

"In November 1942 the British and Americans said that after occupying Africa they would open a second front in western and southern Europe at the same time that Russia began its winter offensive," Fritzsche said. "Today, now that this great danger is over for Germany, we can discuss it openly and frankly. Those were days of great danger, when we had to take our best troops from southern and western Europe and send them to Russia to stem the Russian advances, which were continued despite heavy losses in men and material. Our western and southern flanks were at that time almost naked. That was the moment for the great chance of our adversaries. That was the moment when the second front, discussed and promised for years, would have been realized cheaply."

That was not the story we had been told in November. Monitoring records show that on November eighteenth Fred Kaltenbach had broadcast the following: "This possibility [an Allied landing in southern Europe] is so remote and so improbable of success, if it were tried, that it scarcely deserves the time I am giving it in my talk. Axis Europe is like a porcupine. It has no vulnerable side and stalks through the land defying its enemies. I therefore invite Churchill and Roosevelt to try their luck anywhere along the shores of southern France, Italy or Greece."

Sertorius' broadcast mentioned a moment ago was without doubt the gloomiest discussion of the invasion threat up to that time. Its contradiction of the previously carefully nourished line is difficult to understand, unless it was for the purpose of impressing the Japanese with the urgent need for doing some-

thing quickly at the Asiatic end of the Axis to draw off British and American strength.

Sertorius admitted that with the conquest of Tunisia the whole of North Africa had become an Allied invasion base and there were "well-founded views" in Berlin that operations would be started very soon. Sertorius said that he did not agree with the view held in the neutral press that a pause might be necessary to reorganize the Allied forces in Africa and repair Tunisian ports before they could move against Europe.

"At the very most one week may pass until the armies will have reached their full fighting strength again," Sertorius said. The fact was that the first of the Italian islands to fall—Pantelleria—surrendered to the Allied air forces exactly a month after the battle of Africa ended.

Sertorius added that even if the Tunisian armies did have to undergo extensive reorganization, "nevertheless an immediate attack on Europe would not be beyond the reach of possibility, since there are still large masses of Allied troops in Algeria, Morocco and Egypt." He concluded that the invasion need not necessarily come from Africa at all, but that an attack from that direction was most likely, and he named the preliminary objectives as Sardinia, Sicily, Crete and the Dodecanese Islands.

Sertorius, from the standpoint of his employers at the propaganda ministry, was all too accurate in his predictions. At 3 A.M. on July 10, 1943, the greatest armada ever assembled landed an invasion army on the southern shore of Sicily. It was the first act in the invasion of Europe. It was an actual landing on European soil and the final step toward bringing the war onto the continental mainland itself. When it happened other German and Italian propagandists floundered about looking for a silver lining. They insisted that the invasion came as no surprise but gave clear indication that they

had been very much surprised indeed. On the one hand they deprecated the strength of the Allies and on the other they frantically sought to convince the Italian people that all was not yet lost. But for some reason Sertorius was thoroughly consistent—and thoroughly pessimistic. His first broadcast after the invasion sounded as though he had just turned a page of his script at the conclusion of the remarks quoted above, and kept on reading.

“The war has entered a new phase,” he said. “The enemy possesses on the north coast of Africa a base of operations with many good harbors. His navy secures for him mastery of the Mediterranean. He doubtless has sufficient transport. He has at his disposal sufficient tonnage to carry several strong invasion armies and keep them supplied. His landing troops are well rested and magnificently equipped and his air forces have considerable superiority. We should not be justified in thinking that the enemy intends to make the southeastern coastal strip [of Sicily] the center of gravity of his attack. It is rather possible that the main landing is still to come. It is highly probable that the Allied command will start one or more diversionary actions against southern Europe. British and American forces in North Africa and the Near East are big enough to make possible invasion operations at other points in the south European front or against Mediterranean islands such as the Dodecanese, Crete and Sardinia.”

That gloomy prediction was a far cry indeed from previous Nazi assurances to the peoples of Europe that invasion from the south was impossible because an impregnable “Mediterranean Wall” had been created. One of the most striking omissions of Axis propaganda after the invasion began was the matter of that Mediterranean Wall. It was never mentioned.

It is hard to say, after the invasion began, why Axis propa-

gandists made such a point of its having been no surprise, especially since all indications pointed the other way. Probably the reason was that the Axis high command could not admit having been caught napping, although listeners to Axis broadcasts needed to stretch their memories back only nine hours before the attack on Sicily to call to mind proof that the landings had come as a surprise. During the evening of July ninth the official DNB agency in a broadcast for European press and radio consumption had been discussing recent Allied troop and ship movements along the southern shore of the Mediterranean. These movements, said DNB, were made "partly to make the question of supplies easier," and "partly to be able to rest the battle-weary troops in the area beyond the range of German and Italian bombers by bringing up reserves." To that explanation, which was about as far from the truth as any on Goebbels' black record, DNB added a little divide-and-conquer tidbit to the effect that another reason for shifting the troops around was to reduce "the constant clashes between American and British troops."

Next the Axis radio assigned itself a threefold task: first, to prop up the frightened Italians; second, to assure the world that the invasion army was getting nowhere; and third, to make the point that the attack on Sicily was only a makeshift that would satisfy nobody on the Allied side, especially the Russians, who would not consider it a real second front.

The first ostensible battle reports broadcast from Rome on July eleventh announced that "operations were proceeding satisfactorily and that the enemy is gradually being pushed back."

"The behavior of the Italian troops is marvelous, especially that of the officers," said Rome, leaving the impression, in-

advertently no doubt, that the rank and file might have done better.

Paris added to the chorus with the assurance that "the spirit of the defenders and of the civil population was claimed to be excellent, and it was absolutely certain that the struggle on Italian soil would be a struggle to the death."

A Portuguese language broadcast to Portugal sought comfort from the point that the Allied prospects for success had been "reduced" by the fact that the landing had taken place only on the southeastern coast of Sicily rather than on the southwestern coast, which was said to have been "most exposed to invasion."

Several Axis broadcasts announced during the first two days of the fighting that the invasion forces were being annihilated on the beaches and that the Sicilians (whose apathy toward the defense of the island was the subject of many comments by correspondents who had gone ashore with the troops) were joining in fierce resistance.

Tokyo went all out for this line, reporting: "Along the southern shore of Sicily, where the British are boasting of success, the invaders are being wiped out by being forced into the sea. There is not a single enemy troop in this area."

Even for the Axis radio that was going a little too far, and it added to the difficulty in the ensuing week of explaining how the annihilated troops were not only still there but were successfully fighting their way inland. The Nazis and the Italians were forced to admit finally that the Allies had won initial successes, but they quickly added that they were empty successes because inland the defenders would be in a better position than the invaders, with superior lines of communication, greater familiarity with the terrain and more facility in moving troops.

Tokyo itself was forced to backtrack and when it did it put the gloom on rather thick.

"Today Italy is fighting like a lion; Mussolini is imposing iron discipline not only upon the people but upon all Fascist leaders, the government and especially himself," Tokyo said. "Italy today finds herself in an extremely grave situation. The enemy is already treading the sacred soil of the fatherland. Despite this temporary gravity the Axis is on the road to victory. Therefore we offer our best wishes that Italy may hold fast and resist for the last quarter-hour in order to break the Anglo-Saxon forces and secure final victory. We are sure of the heroic resistance of the Italian people."

As for the significance of the campaign as a whole, Axis commentators sought to put across the point that Sicily was only a compromise second front. It was launched to appease the Russians, they said, but the Soviets would not be satisfied with it because it was only a halfway measure, the outcome of which would have no effect on the main fight in Russia. Fred Kaltenbach told America that the attack on Sicily was made prematurely because of clever strategy by Hitler, who unexpectedly launched the summer offensive in Russia and thus threw Allied plans out of gear. Kaltenbach did not explain how it was that the Germans lost the initiative on the Russian front only a week after their offensive was opened.

However, all this talk about the certainty of Axis victory and the firmness of its grasp on the initiative could not disguise the fact that Italy was near panic. If any clear demonstration of that was needed, Carlo Scorza, Secretary General of the Fascist Party, provided it on July eighteenth when he gave the Italians their first pep talk after the start of the invasion. That talk was made in the whining, nobody-loves-us tone with which followers of Axis propaganda have become familiar and

which they recognize as a certain sign that things are going badly.

Forgetting that Italy entered the war by making an unprovoked attack on France when Mussolini thought he was getting in on the kill, Scorza cried: "The richest and most greedy of the plutocracies has thrown itself against our country, trying to take everything from her! . . . Today Italy is in danger. The two richest empires want to destroy Italy!"

Seeking to justify Fascist party policy in the eyes of the Italian people—a sure indication that the leaders were becoming uncomfortable in their hot seats of power—Scorza could think of nothing better than the following: "Should we have remained neutral Italy would have become a battlefield between two bitter enemies and we would have been reduced to a second-rate power. We are not trying to justify ourselves—we are explaining the facts. Only guilty people look for justification. We are taking full responsibility for this war."

And with that he urged the Italian people to resist or die, and he informed them that the odds were against them. Three years earlier Mussolini had assured his people that they were on the winning side without the slightest doubt and that they were a part of the most powerful military coalition the world had ever known. On July 18, 1943, Scorza modified that a little. "Together with Germany and supported by Japan," he said, "Italy—a mere handful of men against millions of the enemy—has for three years faced and is facing now more than ever the cruelest aggression in her history."

We know now how desperately close to collapse the Italian war effort and the Fascist regime were at the moment Scorza made his appeal, but at the time it was difficult for even the most optimistic among us to see how strongly the wind was blowing our way. In the ensuing week, however, there were

several good indications that the end was near—even before a single Allied soldier had set foot on the Italian mainland.

One of these indications was a frantic warning put out by Rome propagandists on what would happen to Italy in case of defeat. It was a kind of bill of particulars, setting forth in twelve points what Italy, if the propagandists were to be believed, must expect. These were:

1. The Italian fleet and air force would be eliminated.
2. The metallurgical, iron and engineering industries would be abolished.
3. The strength of the Italian army would be reduced to that of a police force.
4. Pantelleria, Tobruk, La Maddalena (Sardinia) and other bases would be taken over by Britain.
5. Istria and the naval bases of Pola and Trieste would go to Yugoslavia.
6. The possessions of Italy in the Ionian and Aegean Seas would go to Greece.
7. The Italian colonial empire would be lost permanently.
8. Italy would lose her rank as a great power.
9. Italy would be under military occupation indefinitely.
10. The cultivation of cereals would be abandoned.
11. Many Italian universities would be closed.
12. Classical education would be abolished to prevent “the youth from being inspired by the greatness of Rome.”

But even more revealing were complaints in the Italian press that Germany would not commit herself to an all-out defense of Italy. One of these complaints was noticed by Ugo d'Andrea, editorial writer of the *Lavora Fascista*, who said that no one should lose sight of the fact that the attack on Sicily was “the first move in the battle of Europe” and that “Italy, all by

herself with the aid of only limited German forces is bearing the brunt of the huge conflict in Sicily."

Another, even clearer, was voiced by the Italian paper *Corriere della Sera* which urged that Germany "cannot fail to ignore what an immense peril would confront the entire central and southern part of the continent as a result of the presence of Allied troops on the Italian isles or in Italy herself."

"In attacking Italy," the newspaper continued, "the Allies are in reality knocking at the doors of Germany. By defending Sicily to the utmost our ally Germany would be protecting herself against the inevitable blows which the Allies are preparing to deliver against her. Although far away the Japanese too realize that their cause is absolutely connected with ours."

The fact that Germany very definitely did not realize that, and had told Mussolini that she would not help defend Italy in anything greater than a delaying action, appears to have accounted for the events which followed.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

THE END OF IL DUCE

BENITO MUSSOLINI, whom a Frenchman once aptly dubbed a circus Caesar, had a clear picture of his doom by July tenth when the Allies invaded Sicily after systematically seizing all of the empire of which he had once dreamed. He had sought like a jackal to share a more powerful animal's kill in 1940 just before the fall of France, but as it turned out there was no kill. As disasters succeeded each other he had sought frantically to keep up the chins of his people and make them want to stay in the fight by the use of an unending series of propaganda injections, as we have seen in the last two chapters. He made repeated shifts in the Fascist Party to keep it loyal in the face of the obvious blunders which he had made, and he carried out many purges for insurance against overthrow. But none of his measures could take the place of armed strength. Propaganda might under certain circumstances increase the will to fight but it can never conjure up the troops and the material to fight with.

On July nineteenth, when well over half of Sicily was already in Allied hands, when Italy was being subjected to devastating air attack and a landing on the mainland seemed but a matter of days, Mussolini went to Adolf Hitler, his erstwhile imitator who had become his master, to plead for help. We do not know for sure, but it is safe to assume, as we remarked

in the last chapter, that Mussolini told Hitler that he needed much more powerful forces than were on hand to defend Italy. He wanted many German divisions and many more air squadrons. Otherwise, he said, he could not hold his country. Hitler told him that the plans of the German army high command did not call for an all-out defense of Italy, we may assume, and that the Wehrmacht had made its provisions to use the Brenner Pass, on the northern frontier of Italy, as the central bastion of the so-called European fortress. Or Hitler may have urged Mussolini to abandon the southern part of Italy and try to hold the northern part, at least for a while.

Even a dictator as thoroughly entrenched in power as Mussolini can scarcely hold on after bringing his Fascist Grand Council and his King the disastrous news that their northern partner is abandoning them—that the war will go on but that it is planned for the Italian fatherland to be behind the enemy lines.

These developments were naturally not made clear in so many words on the Axis radio in the days following that July nineteenth meeting, but there were good indications of them. For example, all previous Hitler-Mussolini meetings had been accompanied by a great fanfare both before and after and great pains had always been taken to make it clear that Axis solidarity left nothing to be desired. This time there was no such fanfare. The Rome radio had nothing to say about the meeting at all except to give the bare communiqués, and the Morse code transmissions of the DNB made only one rather weak allusion to Axis solidarity, saying, "It scarcely need be stressed that this meeting epitomizes the community of destiny which connects the two nations."

The Turkish radio in a domestic broadcast noted this change of tone, remarking: "The peculiarity about this meeting is that there is no exact report of what they talked about. Always

before there have been reports saying how friendly and amicable their meetings were. There is nothing like that this time."

On July twenty-fifth Mussolini was dismissed. It is not our business here to study how the little King found the courage and the strength after he had remained in eclipse to the Duce for nearly twenty-one years, nor do we know at this writing just how it was engineered. Our task is merely to see how the Axis radio handled this most momentous development of the war.

The world was given the news Sunday evening by the Rome radio. The Rome announcers, we may well assume, were pale and trembling as they stood by for several minutes before their orders came to transmit the words on the little piece of paper in their hands. The announcement said simply that Mussolini had resigned and that Marshal Pietro Badoglio had been named premier. In giving the date at the end of the announcement there was not the usual reference to "the year 21 of the Fascist regime." Later, when the King's announcement, a proclamation accompanying it and a proclamation by Badoglio were read, the Italian national anthem was played but the *Giovannezza*, the Fascist hymn, was omitted.

The German propaganda services in Berlin appear to have been caught flatfooted by the dismissal of Mussolini. It was several hours before Berlin had anything to say about it at all, presumably because that much time was needed to decide on the line to take. Finally Berlin came on the air and said that Mussolini had resigned because he was ill. That was all for the moment, but a few hours later Berlin took up the theme that it was to develop with almost desperate persistency in the days that followed. That theme was that the change in the Italian government did not mean Italy's withdrawal from the war.

Berlin apparently thought it best not to rely on its own authority for the assurances that Italy was not going to surrender, and accordingly it adopted the device, used many times previously, of attributing its information to foreign neutral sources. For example, one of the first Morse-code transmissions by the Transocean Agency to the Americas quoted Swedish papers for "emphasizing Italy's unchanged determination to continue the war."

Much was made of the point that nothing but illness caused Mussolini to resign. Swedish papers were quoted by Transocean as saying that the Duce was about to be sixty years old. A Morse-code transmission to the far east was sent out under a Helsinki dateline and quoted the Stockholm correspondent of a Finnish paper as reporting that "Mussolini is very seriously ill."

At the same time every effort was made to convince the world that Badoglio was not only going to carry on the war—as his proclamation and that of the King had, indeed, promised—but that he was a good Fascist. As a matter of fact Badoglio was a member of the Fascist Party, having joined after the Ethiopian campaign in 1936, although he was generally regarded as an enemy of Mussolini and had often been mentioned as the man who would take the helm in Italy when the moment became ripe to overthrow Mussolini's regime. For support of the story of Badoglio's loyalty to Fascism Berlin turned to Turkey and put out the following:

"It is learned in political quarters at Ankara that Marshal Badoglio's appointment to the Italian premiership must be considered as a symptom of the will to continue military resistance. The Marshal is regarded here as a representative of the Fascist Party as well as the army. The King's and Badoglio's procla-

mations, it is further stated, also showed the unbroken will to resist."

According to OWI monitoring records there was a marked difference between Axis propaganda for home consumption immediately after the event and the material they sent abroad. Home audiences were given little but the bare announcements as they had been originally transmitted by Rome. Berlin admitted that Germany considered the fall of Mussolini as "very important," but told America that Germany did not regard it as "justifying any particular uneasiness or nervousness." In an effort to explain away the fact that home audiences were being given little or no information DNB said that "it is merely pointed out that the Rome proclamations were published everywhere in Germany and that in view of the floods of alarmist rumors from enemy sources, it was better to wait for more precise details from Rome before any definite attitude could be assumed toward this event."

Tokyo followed faithfully the line set by Berlin. For example, a Japanese broadcast over the Saigon radio, in an English-language broadcast to India said: "That the resignation of Mussolini does not mean that the people of Italy are not behind their government is borne out by the fact that Marshal Badoglio has replaced Mussolini, and Marshal Badoglio is a very prominent member of the Fascist Party." Saigon added that Mussolini "had the right to resign owing to ill health."

There was one incident on the Berlin radio that may have been an unconscious indication of how Germany really felt. A Berlin commentator, in reading the text of Badoglio's first proclamation made an interesting slip of the tongue. The proclamation said: "I shall see to it that my orders are carried out scrupulously." The German announcer read it: "I shall see to it that my orders are carried out unscrupulously."

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

PROPAGANDA AND PEACE

ONE OF THE MOST effective weapons in the hands of the Allies as the prospect of ultimate victory becomes clearer would be concrete and specific peace aims. These would be invaluable in counteracting the lies of Axis propaganda agencies and in making clear to the countries we intend to liberate exactly what we will help them achieve besides liberation. They would be of equal value in breaking down the will of Axis nationals to fight for their discredited leaders. They would give Axis satellite nations something to look forward to in place of the vague misgivings of retribution they now have, which come from the knowledge that either out of greed or wrongly construed necessity they backed the wrong side. They would be of value to our own people, who have not failed to notice that the passing years of war have not brought any specific indications of what we intend to achieve beyond the destruction of Hitler and Mussolini. Our own nationals cannot have found any reassurance in the explanation that the business at hand is to win and that other considerations must wait. They as well as our friends and our enemies want to know what we intend to win.

The German people could be reached by propaganda from our side telling them what degree of responsibility we intend to place on the individual German citizen, what specific guarantees we intend to extract to see to it that German aggression

is not repeated, what reparations for the tremendous damage wrought we intend to obtain. The Finns, the Rumanians, the Hungarians, the Bulgarians and other satellites would be highly susceptible to clear indications from our governments through our propaganda services of what we intend to do with them. The Italians know that we would have rid them of Mussolini and his regime had they not done it themselves following our landing in Sicily, but we have never told them whether we will rid them also of their discredited royal family or whether, on the contrary, we will see to it that the House of Savoy remains in its palaces even if an Italian republican movement springs up. And we have even been decidedly too vague on the subject of Fascism itself when it has come to discussing our postwar plans although a proclamation by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in July 1943 did specifically exclude the Fascist Party in Italy from a part in any postwar government which we would approve. The ostensible reason is that there are neutrals like Spain and some of the South American regimes which are so similar to Fascism that attacks on that form of government would be attacks on them too. It seems this has been a deterrent. Even in regard to the idea of dictatorship itself we have been all too vague. President Roosevelt has attacked dictatorships repeatedly, but there has been no follow-up in our propaganda in regard to eventual peace. Again, the ostensible reason is that we would not only offend neutrals but even some regimes on our side, like the Greek.

Our peace aims have been vague about France. We have not said whether our aim is to impose on France a government headed by a Giraud, who is our own political creation. He may or may not be what France needs. The fact is that we chose him, not the French, and we have never said in our propaganda to France that France after the war will get the regime

it wants. General de Gaulle has said that France's postwar regime would be chosen in a free election held under an impartial provisional government, but we have never said so.

Formation of the French Committee for National Liberation in Algiers has not yet solved this problem, although it would appear to have forestalled Giraud's emergence as the sole leader of a French provisional government.

The Czechs are uneasy over our peace aims too. We have not said that we intend to see to it that Czechoslovakia's old borders are restored. The British government has said so, but we have not. Moreover, the Czechs have an even more acute cause of uneasiness in the fact that the War Department has taken into its bosom Otto of Hapsburg and allowed him to help form an Austrian Legion to fight on our side. The Czechs and the Yugoslavs have a right to be uneasy over that, because the Hapsburgs to them mean the loss of their sovereignty and their return to the Austrian empire.

To date the only peace aims we have adopted and used for propaganda purposes have been the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms. These have been given wide currency in our propaganda broadcasts abroad, but they are obvious generalities and no matter how noble do not fulfill the desire of millions for concrete indications of what the peace will bring.

The official reason for our not formulating and using in our propaganda specific peace aims covering the questions of our enemies as well as our friends is that President Roosevelt does not wish to set them forth only to have Congress repudiate them, now or later. For that reason our propaganda cannot be too precise on the problems of the postwar world. We do not know what kind of Congress will be in session when the time comes to ratify a peace treaty, and we do not know what kind of peace terms that Congress will accept. We do know, on the

other hand, that President Wilson's Fourteen Points were a tremendous propaganda asset in the closing months of the First World War, but that Europe underwent an equally tremendous disappointment when Congress refused to ratify the Versailles Treaty. President Roosevelt is taking no chances with a repudiation such as Wilson suffered, and so our propaganda with regard to the peace makes no promises to friends or enemies except that the world will benefit from our victory. That goes for what we tell the enemy as well as our friends and the conquered peoples. We are making no promises either of easy terms or of dire punishment for the enemy. All we are telling him is that the longer he fights the worse it will be for him later.

Of the three great western powers Soviet Russia is the only one with a specific line to the German people which has concrete propaganda value. That line is that the German people will not be held responsible for the sins of the Nazi government—that only the Nazis will be punished and that the end of the war will amount to a liberation of the German people as well as the rest of Europe. The value of that line lies in the fact that it refutes a Nazi argument with which we have already dealt on several occasions—namely that the German people must fight to the very end because defeat would be a disaster for each individual German.

Axis propagandists have many times made capital of our vagueness about the peace. They have told radio listeners all over the world that we do not know what we are fighting for. They have done their best to puncture the Atlantic Charter for propaganda purposes and to make out that even that declaration of intention is either valueless or an empty promise. At one time they spoke of formulating a European Charter as an antidote to the democratic poison contained in the Atlantic

Charter, and they have told various groups of listeners, particularly the Asiatics, that we intended the Atlantic Charter to apply to other people but not to them.

In April 1943 a Hitler-Mussolini meeting was used for the specific purpose of counteracting the Atlantic Charter. The statement issued by the two dictators at that time explained that the Axis was fighting for "the rights of nations to free development and collaboration" and the Nazi-controlled Paris radio said that "the conference is a positive reply to the ill-famed Atlantic Charter." Another Nazi broadcast sought to convince European listeners that "it is not our enemies who are the revolutionaries of the century; it is not our enemies who are the pillars and heralds of a new future." The official *Deutsche Diplomatische-Politische Korrespondenz* put the propaganda argument this way:

"Everybody in the world knows today what is at stake, even the simplest European has been enlightened by London, Washington and Moscow about the tyranny and exploitation and slavery and misery and destruction it would have to face in case the plot of plutocracy and Bolshevism should have a favorable outcome. However, in order that this alternative may never arise, all human material and moral efforts are being mobilized in Europe to guarantee the continent's freedom, independence and security against any and every menace."

Fortunately for us, with regard to peace aims, the Nazis gave themselves no insurance against hard times when everything was going their way. In 1940 and 1941 when they were sure they were winning they made no effort to gain support and sympathy either among their satellites or the occupied countries, let alone their enemies. The result was that in 1942 and 1943 when they needed support desperately and began to ask for it by holding out more attractive pictures of the peace, their

arguments were hollow. In the early days of the war Berlin and Rome were highhanded and arrogant in their approach to the other peoples of Europe. They made it clear that the master-race would rule and everyone else would not only follow but accept the place assigned to him without any possibility of argument. In 1942 they began to be a little easier on the rest of the world, and in 1943 they realized that in the business of selling peace aims it was clearly a buyer's market, but then it was too late.

An indication about how Germany's satellites felt about the peace at the end of 1942 was given by several Finnish broadcasts at that time. One, for example, contained outspoken criticism of German propaganda policy in connection with the war in Russia. The fighting morale of the Russians was stronger than ever, the Finnish commentator said, because of "inept German propaganda." He explained that the Nazis invading Russia and the Baltic states had held out no prospect of independence or autonomy for the occupied regions but instead had talked of converting the "Ostland" into a European granary.

"This has created the impression among the peoples in those areas that Germany has really invaded Russia in order to bring her people under an alien yoke," the broadcast continued. "No wonder Bolshevik propaganda has used these thoughts with great success."

The Finnish speaker knew what he was talking about. Read the following German plan for the eastern territories as published in the *Koelnische Zeitung* in August 1942 and broadcast to the United States:

"If the newly won eastern territories are to become really German it is not only necessary that hundreds of thousands be brought there from the old Reich but also that foreign elements

be driven away. It is also necessary that the Nazi spirit enter the minds of these people."

Another Finnish broadcast at the close of 1942 replied to an article in the *Voelkischer Beobachter* on the future of small nations, which had promised that Finland would be given "a leading place in the new Europe." The Finns, it seems, did not want a leading place. They just wanted to be left alone.

"Finland is of course flattered," the broadcast said. "But the idea of playing a leading part is entirely strange to Finland. Our war has been a war of defense from the beginning. We have not fought for power. After the war we shall be so busy with reconstruction that we won't have time to occupy any leading position. What Finland wants is peaceful collaboration with other countries, and especially with the Nordic states."

That last sentence was a particularly marked rebuff to the Germans and an indication that there still existed in Finland a strong current of opinion in favor of the traditional link with the Scandinavian countries and opposition to anything like a new European order that would replace it. The opinions expressed in the broadcast, however, admittedly were taken from a social democratic paper and may not have agreed with the more Fascistlike ideas of Baron Mannerheim or President Risto Ryti.

In January 1943 a small propaganda war carried on between the Finnish and German radios on the subject of the peace gave a clear indication that the Nazi line was softening up under the impact of defeats and that the Germans were anxious not to alienate their erstwhile friends any more than they already had. The controversy began with the publication in the *Voelkischer Beobachter* of an article, which was later broadcast, saying that

the small nations would have to take the role assigned to them in a Europe led by Germany and Italy.

“The small nations must abandon sham parliamentarism and turn themselves back to *grossraum* economy [meaning economic union with Germany],” the article said. In return for that they were promised the general benefits of peace, prosperity and religious toleration. The last named must have startled many people, but its meaning is clearer when it is remembered that the Germans have several times promised freedom of religion “as long as it does not work in opposition to the National Socialist state.” With a joker like that the Nazis need not worry about having promised too much.

When the Nazis newspaper article became known in Finland, Finnish papers were allowed to comment on it and their remarks were carried by the Helsinki radio. One Finnish paper put it this way:

“The present situation is not very bright for small nations. In both belligerent camps there are tendencies to express a belief that the majority of small nations cannot defend themselves or manage on their own. It is stated therefore that they must either submit to the protection of the bigger powers or unite in great federations in which, as members, they would have to give up part of their sovereignty.”

Another, more frank Finnish commentator, referred to the idea as “the well-known German plan to divide the postwar world into certain large living spaces, each administered by a great power.” He agreed that Europe could not risk a new war on account of the differences among small nations. “But,” he added, “the reasons for starting world wars can more frequently be found in the ambitions of the great powers than among the aspirations of the small nations.”

These comments got back to Germany, but instead of crack-

ing down on the Finnish newspapers and radio for daring to contest the views of the leading Nazi paper, the Germans apparently decided that appeasement was the better policy for the moment. Accordingly, three days later the Finnish radio was able to announce that the Wilhelmstrasse had "found it necessary to declare the *Beobachter* article was not inspired by official circles." Helsinki explained further that "according to the Wilhelmstrasse the article contained many remarkable passages, but several others could have been expressed differently."

The propaganda line making things more attractive for the small nations as they looked toward the peace was officially set by Dr. Goebbels in March 1943 when he told representatives of the foreign press in Berlin that wartime conditions should not be taken as a precedent for peacetime, and that Germany did not intend to retain military domination of Europe. The statement was given wide publicity on the German radio, particularly in broadcasts to the occupied countries, and commentaries in a similar vein were continued for weeks after. For example, the Dutch were told in a discussion of the Hitler-Mussolini meeting which took place about the same time: "When the Fuehrer and the Duce meet there is no need for the small nations to clasp their hearts in fear of the fate which is going to be meted out to them. They know that their interests are safeguarded."

Contrast that assurance with the following, taken from another broadcast to Holland early in 1942: "The German nation must make it clear to all other nations that it is not for them to make demands, but for Germany and her allies alone."

Or contrast it with this, from a broadcast to Belgium, also in early 1942: "One must realize that the sovereignty of the smaller nations cannot return to its old form."

With contrasts like that fresh in the minds of the peoples of

Europe, German peace-aims propaganda cannot be very attractive. That is fortunate for us, but it still does not give us an answer to the Nazi argument that we cannot possibly offer the world anything concrete and substantial because we do not know what we are fighting for. The urgent necessity is for us to state our aims and get them across to the peoples awaiting liberation, because a statement of those aims will be of tremendous value in supporting morale in the face of barbaric repression and in stiffening organized resistance when the time comes for it.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

PROPAGANDA GEMS

BEFORE TURNING FROM the machinations of the Axis radio to a study of our own propaganda organization and those of our friends let us pause for a moment to look at the lighter side of what the Japanese refer to as thought warfare. Some sunshine enters the life of even the most overworked listening-post monitor, if only in the form of occasional beams that break through the cloud of Axis political campaigns. Those beams have become known as propaganda gems—little items on a variety of matters ranging from cooking to ethnology. I have taken a few representative ones from my records and listed them by subjects.

ORATORY

First let us record a tribute the Tokyo radio paid in March 1943 to one of its shortwave propagandists who, it appears, literally talked himself to death denouncing President Roosevelt.

“He died a happy death,” Tokyo said of the man, whom it failed to name. “He was a young Japanese who was educated in America, so that he was as well acquainted with America and things American, including American psychology, as the average American himself.”

Night after night, the Tokyo radio reported, he denounced

President Roosevelt on the air. But he "overstrained" himself, and "his condition steadily worsened until he finally succumbed."

The case of that young man, said Tokyo, was typical and was an inspiration to the other members of the overseas department of the Tokyo radio, who redoubled their efforts in tribute to his death.

SEX AND FASHIONS

"Too many American women have won the vote but lost the love of their husbands. Japanese women must obey their parents when little, then their husbands and in their old age their sons. To American and European women this may seem like slavery but actually it is not, for a good wife helps her husband, and what is better than family affection?" (The Tokyo radio, April 27, 1943.)

"The women of America recognize only the laws of fashion imposed on them by Hollywood. They are not inclined to give way to a great passion or look for more in marriage than material happiness. Their love is a formula. It is their ambition to have more than other women in the same position. They are colder than ice, and this cold they radiate more effectively than any refrigerator." (The Allouis radio, in France, April 10, 1943.)

"The latest things in Paris millinery are enormous hats shaped like a cartwheel and made of the lightest and daintiest material imaginable. Such frivolity is out of place. One cannot help thinking that our [German] women have had to renounce such playthings of fashion, so why should the French women be allowed them? France has already had to contribute to the Nazi war effort and she will have to make an even bigger contribution in the future. When France has carried out

her responsibilities to Germany there will be no objection to Paris hats being bigger than Berlin hats." (Frederich Sieburg, on the Allouis radio, in May 1943.)

POETRY

"Japanese officers and men at the front as well as wounded soldiers will be comforted by poems to be written under the guidance of the Japanese Literary National Service Association. All poetical circles will be totally mobilized and works of poetry will be enhanced. The subject matter will embrace the destruction of America and Britain and the construction of Greater East Asia. The musical association will co-operate in this plan and by mobilizing famous composers, various new compositions will be sent to the troops." (The Tokyo radio, April 9, 1943.)

MUSIC

"Some one thousand American and British melodies, including such jazz pieces as 'Dinah,' have been blacklisted in Japan because they are inappropriate to the times. Songs like 'Home, Sweet Home,' 'Auld Lang Syne' and 'The Last Rose of Summer' will be permitted because they are well assimilated with Japanese sentiments even if they are of Anglo-American origin." (The Tokyo radio, January 1943.)

FRANKNESS

"The secret of Germany's strength and moral superiority is that the public is always told the truth." (The Berlin radio, April 11, 1943.)

CAUTION

"With every mail I receive dozens of letters all ending with

the plea, repeated by several of the correspondents to the point of monotony, that much to their regret they must conceal their names as they do not wish to be taken to a concentration camp." (Max Blokzijl on the Dutch Hilversum radio, February 1943.)

SNACKS

"Don't you think it's time to be home and relax with hot dogs?" (The Tokyo radio, after a program of Tommy Dorsey recordings, February 1943.)

RELIGION

"The Americans will have no Christmas trees this year because Christmas trees are too German. The Christmas tree is a German custom which would remind Americans too much of Germany. If they don't have a Christmas tree this year they won't sing German Christmas songs either." (The Berlin radio, December 1942.)

ETHNOLOGY

"The German god Wotan and the Japanese God of the Sun and Wings are both symbols of the same pure Aryanism. Both gods are watching over their people to keep them in military and patriotic spirit." (The Berlin radio, February 1942.)

CULTURE

"America, discovered by a European and spiritually nourished by European ideas, betrayed the mother continent by failing to understand the new spirit of Europe and allying herself instead with the capitalistic and plutocratic coalition. What do American skyscrapers know about the soul of Europe? American museums would be empty but for the treasure of European culture. The Metropolitan Opera had to close [which

it didn't] as no more European works were available. Coca-Cola and chewing gum will not replace European culture. That continent, once called a new world, is now an old world where reaction reigns." (The Berlin radio, October 1942.)

THE INVINCIBLE WEHRMACHT

"One shell after another is exploding here! Huge columns of dust and smoke are rising! We are in the thick of it. Our first battery has been silenced. It cannot be helped. The Russians have concentrated more guns than ever before. Fresh reserves—young Communists from Stalingrad—have been brought up by Timoshenko and are charging into our lines. They have driven a wedge into our flank. Our infantry is being rushed to the danger point." (A front-line reporter's broadcast over the Berlin radio in August 1942. The broadcast was hastily switched off before the result of the action became known.)

BEAUTY

"Our trip was one of the most beautiful we ever had. It was especially gratifying for my crew that in a number of cases they could actually watch ships go down." (A Berlin broadcast by a U-boat commander, August 1942.)

COOKING

"Thousands have died of the errors of English cooking. It has thrown humanity back by centuries in the field of morals." (The Berlin radio, May 1942.)

CHILD WELFARE

Radio Berlin, discussing President Roosevelt's recommendation that high-school students use part of their summer vaca-

tions to help farmers harvest crops: "This shows what America understands by socialism and juvenile welfare." (October 1942.)

TRANSPORTATION AND ETIQUETTE

One of the curiosities of the propaganda war has been the Bangkok radio. Any monitor wishing to brighten his day need but tune in Bangkok and be assured that he will hear something interesting. The most startling of Bangkok broadcasts—was made in March 1943. It voiced a complaint by the Japanese occupation authorities that the Siamese were causing no end of trouble by going to sleep on railroad tracks—a practice which obviously interfered with the wheels of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

The radio did not reveal how the people of Siam happened to begin sleeping on railroad tracks, but the tone of the appeal indicated that Siamese trains under Japanese rule are slower than the famous slow train through Arkansas.

The announcer began by pointing out to the public that a railroad track is no place to store parcels. From this we gather that the Siamese began in a modest way and gradually worked up to putting themselves on the tracks. After his first admonition the broadcaster said that it was "sheer carelessness" to lie down on a railroad track and go to sleep, and he pointed out that if the Siamese would only exercise prudence to the extent of waking up and getting off the tracks when a train approached, there would not be nearly so many accidents.

Another Bangkok broadcast announced in April 1943 that the Thai Office of National Culture, headed by Premier Luang Pibul Songgram had prescribed the following standards of behavior for employees in private industry: 1. Be well dressed and clean. 2. Be mannerly and agreeable to customers. 3. Be honest

and do business with a smile. 4. Do not smoke or be intoxicated.

Songgram announced the same month that his culture office was prepared to do something about the way Siamese husbands were treating their wives. The Women's Division of the cultural institute, would, as a part of its family welfare work, "assist women who have been bullied by their husbands," he said.

Finally the Bangkok radio in May 1943 issued a lesson in table manners. No citizen of Thailand should eat more than four meals a day, it announced. Thailanders should always wash before meals, eat with clean forks and spoons and sit in a chair instead of squatting in a corner while eating. In short, it explained, "good manners must be observed."

CHAPTER TWENTY

THE VOICE OF MOSCOW

CONTINENTAL EUROPEANS with enough courage to listen to foreign broadcasts learn the truth about the war from three sources—the British Broadcasting Corporation, our own short-wave organization, and the Moscow radio. The Russians are old hands at the technique of propaganda and the men in charge of their information services know the continent well, with the result that they have made some highly useful contributions since the German attack on the eastern front in June 1941.

A study of Moscow broadcasts shows that the Russians have gone methodically and systematically about the business of puncturing Axis propaganda lines as soon as they become clear. With a kind of bowling technique, the Germans set up the pins and the Russians knock them down for a vast audience on the continent. Like the British and ourselves the Russians broadcast in many languages and their transmitters not only cover the countries in eastern Europe that are their immediate concern but penetrate to the shores of the Atlantic to make sure that all the occupied territories receive their messages.

In 1943 the Russians assigned themselves three main tasks. 1. To break down Nazi arguments intended to prove the impossibility of an invasion from the west and south. 2. To carry the point to western Europe that German military might is

on the wane. 3. To hammer away at the barbarism of the Nazi regime and at the corruption of the men who compose it.

A glance at a few typical Moscow broadcasts on those subjects will give a clear picture of these Russian aims and the technique used. On May 15, 1943, for example, in the midst of the frantic German effort to bolster the confidence of Axis nationals in the ability of their fortifications and armies to repel an invasion, Moscow dissected and made ridiculous the German figures put out in support of Nazi arguments.

Broadcasting in Dutch, Moscow assured western Europe that neither the Atlantic Wall nor any other fortifications could prevent an invasion of Europe "or save Germany from being utterly crushed." The broadcast noted that "not so long ago" Axis propagandists were asserting that the fortifications around Tunis and Bizerte would hold out indefinitely. Moscow pointed out that the Germans had boasted they were using cement at the rate of thirty million tons a year in the Atlantic Wall, while the entire German production of cement before the war, according to official German figures, had been only twenty million tons.

"It must not be overlooked that the Germans used further large quantities of cement in the building of the East Wall, which they also vaunted as being impregnable," Moscow said.

Giving another German official figure, Moscow recalled that the German radio had put the amount of fortification work being done in the west on the 5,000-kilometer Atlantic Wall at a rate which would have kept 2,500,000 workers busy for an entire year—"a clear absurdity," even if the Germans had not also boasted that they were at the same time fortifying 8,000 additional kilometers of the Italian and Balkan coasts.

On June 1, 1943, Moscow leveled a broadside at the German military organization, announcing that Hitler's war machine

was "reeling and tottering" under tremendous blows from the air and was about to be "crushed and destroyed forever." Broadcasting in German, Moscow told Hitler's people that Germany's war plans had been based on the superiority of her air force but that like all of Hitler's other plans, it had failed completely.

"The Luftwaffe is now vastly inferior both in quantity and quality," Moscow said. "The Luftwaffe has lost more than 9,000 planes on the Russian front alone. Hitler's air losses over North Africa and during the final battle for Tunisia have also been catastrophic, and the British and American air forces have swept the enemies from the skies."

The broadcast then told the German people (who scarcely needed to be told by that time) of the increasing poundings that German industrial centers were receiving from the British and American bombing forces stationed in Britain. Replying to renewed German assurances that industries were being transferred out of the danger zones, Moscow said, "In trying to transfer war plants to Central Germany and the east, Hitler merely admits his inability to carry out counterbombing attacks in the west. But there is no security in the east for him either, for Soviet bombers there are shattering his war potential."

Moscow added that the air war has already been won by the Allies and that Hitler's most serious problem was the loss of trained air crews. "His experienced airmen are all dead by now and existing personnel is undertrained and inexperienced," Moscow said. "The purpose of this gigantic air offensive is plain enough. It heralds the invasion of the continent."

In April 1943 Moscow made a series of broadcasts designed to acquaint the German people with the widespread corruption among Nazi officials. The Soviet radio in the first of the series told the Germans that corruption in present-day Germany had

dwarfed the petty scandals of the pre-Hitler Germany, and then the Russian commentator asked his German audience:

“Do you still remember the prominence given by the Nazis to certain financial scandals in pre-Hitlerite Germany? Bribery and corruption have become the normal standard of behavior in Germany under the Nazis and are no longer the exception but the rule. Some bacon and butter will today secure a privileged position in the ranks of apartment seekers. In exchange for razor blades and a safety razor the manufacturer now secures leave for his son from the front.

“This last statement is not invented. A letter to this effect from a razor manufacturer in Solingen, Germany, to his son lies before me. The fact that the boy could not take his leave was not due to the failure of his superiors to accept the bribe, but to a Red army bullet.”

Moscow works tirelessly at breaking the German grip on the countries of eastern Europe and preparing for the day when the Nazi armies will be swept out. A typical broadcast toward that end was one to Rumania in late April based on a thirty-paragraph military order issued by the military commandant of Bucharest. A Moscow broadcast announced that “this order clearly testifies to the anxiety predominant in the Rumanian ruling clique in connection with the growth of antiwar sentiment in the country, hatred for the Germans and their Rumanian lackeys, and increase in sabotage.”

The Moscow broadcast continued: “The number of rulings in the order are aimed at suppression of antigovernment agitation in the country and at forcing the population to stop discussions on various political matters, including questions of internal politics and the country’s foreign policy.

“Growing hatred of the population for Germans, Italians and the Antonescu clique is borne out by paragraphs 19, 20,

and 22 in the order, which declare, 'Any criticism and speeches against Rumanian allies are forbidden as are those against army leaders, government leaders, and heads of military commands of such allies. It is forbidden to express disdain for the army or to encourage young people to disobey orders regarding military training and service. It is forbidden to tear down, destroy or deface proclamations, orders and instructions of military or civil authorities posted in the city.'

"In connection with numerous acts of sabotage which have taken place the orders forbid the population not only to enter railway stations, ports, trains, stores and other forbidden places without permits, but even to be in their vicinity. In conclusion, the order states that failure to obey the measures enumerated will result in the severest punishment."

One of the Moscow radio's original contributions to propaganda warfare has been the development of the "ghost voice" technique. Time and again a ghost voice has exasperated German and Italian announcers at crucial points in their broadcasts and has effectively rendered ridiculous some of their best efforts. One instance of the use of the ghost voice against Rome by Moscow was cited in Chapter XV. After having been repeatedly burned one Rome broadcaster got the idea of twisting the ghost-voice technique to his advantage. He had a fake ghost voice interrupt his broadcast on cue with questions that would play into his hands and then, ostensibly extemporaneously, he proceeded to score telling debating points against the offender. Even for much-abused Axis listeners that was a little too transparent, however, and the practice was abandoned after a couple of feeble tries.

Moscow still uses the technique from time to time and is careful not to overdo it and not to strike too often in the same place. The technique, of course, is based on tuning the Moscow

transmitter onto the same wavelength as one in Berlin and having the Russian speaker (in German) come in at strategic moments. The ghost voice had a highly successful evening on May 14, 1943, during a broadcast in which a Nazi commentator was trying to explain away the disaster in Tunisia.

When the Berlin announcer said the Axis had been forced to cease fighting because food and ammunition stocks had been exhausted the ghost interjected:

“They had plenty of ammunition and food.”

When the announcer said that the Axis, in spite of surrender, had carried out its tasks, the ghost queried:

“What tasks?”

When the announcer reached his climax with the hollow boast that the Tunisian campaign had “added new laurels to a proud military tradition,” the ghost cried:

“A total defeat for Hitler’s conduct of the war!”

And with that the ghost departed.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

THE VOICE OF AMERICA

“THIS IS THE VOICE of America.” Many times each day these words are heard by listeners throughout Europe and Asia, introducing broadcasts which are our artillery in the propaganda war. We have been latecomers in the field, we have been working under certain handicaps and we have a long way to go to overtake our enemies, who saturate the globe with their propaganda. But we are expanding and improving with every passing month. As new transmitters and new facilities are built, our voice penetrates to many points which either never heard it before at all or heard it only through British Broadcasting Company relays. Technically we are employing our characteristic American skill with excellent results, but we still have a fundamental weakness which must be overcome before we can compete in the propaganda fight on even terms. That weakness is a lack of concrete policies either for the postwar settlement—as we have already noted in Chapter XVII—or in the choice of psychological and political weapons to use against our enemies now.

Our lack of policy is no fault of the Office of War Information, which conducts our propaganda war as efficiently and thoroughly as its handicaps permit. At the outset of the war the OWI operated several hours a day over thirteen shortwave transmitters in the United States which were privately operated.

As the months passed the government began acquiring its own transmitters and subsequently leased all the privately operated ones, until by the end of 1942 there were twenty-three short-wave stations in operation and fourteen or fifteen more being readied for action. Eventually there will be about forty-five shortwave transmitters carrying on our share of the propaganda war.

Our shortwave broadcasts are in the hands of Robert Sherwood, Director of the Overseas Branch of the OWI; Joseph Barnes, Associate Director; and John Houseman, head of the Radio Program Bureau. These men sit on the Overseas Planning Board along with other OWI officials and work out our broadcasting technique on a basis of directives obtained from the State Department, from military developments, from reports of the OWI's own Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, from the Office of Strategic Services and from Army and Navy authorities. Broadcasts are directed at four types of listeners: our enemies, our allies, the people of the Axis-occupied countries, and neutrals. There are two broad aims: first, to weaken Axis morale; and second, to build the morale of the conquered peoples awaiting liberation by the Allied armies.

Because of our inability to present concrete peace aims in our broadcasts we are limited to general directives. We tell the enemy little of what is in store for him except that the longer he holds out the worse it will be for him. We assure the occupied countries that liberation is certain and that at the end of the war there will be some kind of international organization which will see to it that the aggression against them will not be repeated.

To the Allied countries and neutrals our job is to disseminate news and to acquaint them with the United States as it really

is and not as it has appeared in the movies, in fiction and in versions put out by our enemies.

Most of our shortwave broadcast time is devoted to giving straight news—accurate reports of military and political developments—not distorted or angled but presented from the Allied point of view. The theory behind devoting most of our broadcast hours to news is that the peoples of Europe and Asia need accurate reports on the developments in the war more than they need anything else that our propaganda services can give. As for our enemies, it is felt that they will become more and more convinced that victory for them is impossible as they are given correct versions of the progress of the war day by day and are told of such matters as rising American production and the growing military might of the United States. Our propaganda strategists believe that dwelling on American power will bring back to the minds of Europeans more graphically than any purely propaganda broadcasts could do the memory of American entry into the First World War in 1917 and the subsequent defeat of the central powers. This concentration on news, which has made the OWI shortwave system something of a super-news service, has been referred to as the strategy of truth.

There are other features as well—dramatizations and commentaries—but these are given a small proportion of broadcast time compared with similar features of the British and of the Axis. Axis nationals and others able to broadcast in foreign languages are used to a great extent by the OWI for straight news broadcasts and to a small extent for commentaries and political appeals to audiences in Europe and Asia. Occasionally an American with some special qualification is also used, but these features are limited. There is no official explanation for this beyond the argument that news is the main thing, but

unofficially it appears that there are two reasons for it. One is the lack of fixed political policies beyond the broad aim to defeat the Axis and put into effect the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms. The other is the constant fear of investigation by one type of opponents of the administration, who are always on the lookout for something to investigate. The OWI has already had several bad moments at the hands of opposition members of Congress who do not like Elmer Davis, the director of the OWI, and who in any case would attack any official appointed by the President if it served their ulterior purpose of trying to discredit the latter.

These instances of sniping have not yet hit the shortwave broadcasting system of the OWI, but they have struck at other types of propaganda sent abroad and have been particularly damaging to the OWI domestic services which were practically put out of existence in July 1943 when Congress lopped most of the appropriation for its operation out of the budget. For example, a magazine published by the OWI for distribution outside the country was bitterly attacked by some Congressmen and the opposition press because it contained photographs and not unflattering texts about President Roosevelt. The charge was made that the publication was going to be used by the administration for vote-getting. Elmer Davis caustically replied that the magazine was not being distributed in the United States but was going exclusively abroad—to Turkey, for instance, where the population did not vote in American elections. Incidentally, the people at whom we direct our propaganda would have been completely bewildered by the controversy. They would never understand why a magazine devoted to picturing the United States in the most favorable light should not have the President's picture in it, especially since they regard Mr. Roosevelt as the leader of the democratic

world and they would naturally assume that we did the same.

Another handicap faced by the OWI which has limited its ability to go on the air with political commentaries has been the policies of the State Department. Opinion in many countries to which commentaries might usefully be directed has been so thoroughly opposed to our foreign policy that we could say little of which those listeners might approve without running counter to the line set by Mr. Hull. The Darlan deal in North Africa was an example. If we made broadcasts to France defending it the French people would have been profoundly shocked—they were not a little disheartened by our making the deal as a “military expedient” in the first place. If we allowed Free French speakers to use our shortwave facilities to attack the deal, or even to attack former Vichyites whose intentions were suspect, we would be attacking our own policy. So we kept silent.

There actually was a clash between the OWI and the State Department on the subject of North Africa, and several OWI men, including Edgar Ansell Mowrer, resigned because they could not obtain visas from the State Department to go to North Africa and because their usefulness generally was nullified by their opposition to the State Department’s pro-Vichy policy.

Also with regard to France, the OWI has been under a severe handicap because of the opposition of the State Department to General de Gaulle—either because of personal enmity as a result of the Fighting French occupation of St. Pierre and Miquelon or because some ultraconservative functionaries felt that the former Royalist de Gaulle had surrounded himself by too many liberals. Some of the most effective broadcasts to the continent have been those of the Fighting French from Lon-

don—made with the facilities of the BBC, of course—but there has been no American counterpart.

On rare occasions a qualified American has been used directly by the OWI for propaganda broadcasts to an enemy country. For example, Mayor La Guardia of New York made a series of talks to Italy in 1942 which, judging from the furious reaction of the Italian propaganda office, were highly effective. The texts have never been published in this country, apparently in order to avoid trouble with members of Congress or others who do not like the Mayor and who would attack anything he said because it was he who said it. On July 25, 1943, however, a broadcast which La Guardia made on the occasion of the eclipse of Mussolini was allowed to be published in this country—presumably on the theory that opinion was unanimous at least about the ex-Duce and that La Guardia's remarks about him could scarcely offend anyone in this country.

Rome's bitter objection to La Guardia's broadcasts and consequent proof that they were effective was voiced in the following broadcast in October 1942: "That false Italian clears his throat every night on Radio New York to launch in his bad Italian language appeals to the Italian people to sabotage the war and the German-Italian alliance," said Rome in a desperate effort to discredit him. "Emigré La Guardia tries to pass for an Italian in order to exploit Italians better in New York. He exploited the Italians in peacetime. Thanks to these Italians he made his political career and became rich. Now he tries to exploit them during the war in order to satisfy his political ambitions and to make more money. This Jewish pirate has no idea of the Italian people and consequently speaks to Italians in a language which our people do not understand." Rome then assured itself that La Guardia's broadcasts were quite ineffective and that in any case "he is just a gangster inciting his thugs to

kill our noble, chivalrous soldiers, which proves the kind of people Americans are—murderers and cowards.”

In November 1942 a broadcast to Italy by A. A. Berle, Assistant Secretary of State, urging the Italians to throw off the Fascist regime, was also effective, judging from the reaction. At that time Rome insisted that everything remained calm in Italy and that “the morale offensive against the Italian people has completely failed.” Obviously, Berle’s broadcast hit its mark or there would have been no need for the Fascist propagandists to insist that it was falling short.

The Nazis too have shown themselves to be highly sensitive to American broadcasts and have on several occasions sneered at the “Jewish propaganda broadcasts from the New York radio.” Goebbels showed marked uneasiness at the propaganda broadcasts of Britain and the United States in one of his commentaries in December 1942, when he said: “The situation today is by no means to be compared with the situation in 1917, when the specter of revolution already had begun to raise its ugly head in Germany. The community of German peoples is firm and unshakable, and the German soldiers know that they are fighting for life and for the existence of the nation. The enemy’s propaganda slogans this time are meeting with deaf ears in Germany.”

Apart from broadcasting to Europe by shortwave our aim is to carry on the propaganda war against the Axis from less remote points every time we are able to get a transmitter. Thus when the Allies occupied North Africa there were OWI radio speakers and technicians on hand to begin immediately the job of directing our radio attack on Hitler’s fortress from a new vantage point. In that particular instance there were a few snags, but the procedure, at least, was thoroughly worked out and there were indications that what one writer has referred

to as "the radio squadron" would go right along with our armies in the future. The trouble encountered in Africa was due to the fact that the State Department and the OWI failed to see eye to eye and that the former therefore failed to make the French authorities under Darlan turn over radio facilities to the American technicians at once. The French took their time about it consequently and it was at least a month before our radio men were able to do any work at all. Even with Darlan out of the picture it is still not clear how great a role we are actually playing in Africa with regard to radio. The assumption is that all the news, at least, which is broadcast in French and Arabic from those stations is American in origin, but the actual control of the stations does not seem to be in our hands. However, the radio in Algiers has given several indications of what we can do with broadcasting facilities just a short distance from France.

On April 21, 1943, for example, Radio France in Algiers broadcast the following appeal for mass sabotage in France to take place of the traditional May Day celebrations on May first:

"On Saturday, May first, the young must carry out their patriotic mission of ceasing all work for Hitler and continuing resistance until the liberation of France. To unite youth in the struggle against deportation and to encourage them in all demonstrations of national unity to take place on Saturday, May first, it is necessary to form May first youth committees. These committees, to include representatives from various sections of young people fighting on the national front, must be formed everywhere, in the big towns and the smallest villages. Their aim will be to prepare demonstrations, to allocate tasks to be accomplished, to distribute orders of the day by writing them on walls, pavements and benches, and to distribute pamphlets and post leaflets. Thus May first will give a new impetus

to the fight of all young people against deportation, the ejection of the Hitlerite invaders and the liberation of France.”

One of the urgent reasons for establishing transmitters close to Europe as quickly as we can is that shortwave receivers in the continental countries are rapidly disappearing, but there are still hundreds of thousands of sets capable of receiving ordinary long-wave and medium-wave transmissions. The short-wave sets are not only being confiscated by the Nazis as fast as they can lay their hands on them but they are wearing out and new parts are not to be had. The BBC has done a valuable service in broadcasting instructions to listeners on how to take parts from two or more worn-out sets and construct one usable one, but even that expedient will not serve indefinitely.

One of the best examples yet afforded by the war of what can be done with a transmitter at close quarters during an actual military campaign is the little known story of the exploit of a British naval officer during the occupation of Madagascar in the spring of 1942. This man became a veritable one-man radio squadron and helped substantially to prepare the population and the small French armed force, which was resisting in the name of Vichy, for the British conquest. I believe the story is interesting enough to warrant digressing for a moment from our discussion of the OWI to give the whole of it.

The battle for the naval base of Diego Suarez at the northern tip of Madagascar lasted three days and all during that time the Axis radio was particularly active trying to discredit the British. They charged that the town had been heavily bombed, that many inhabitants had been killed and that the streets were practically running with blood. It was essential that these lies be refuted in broadcasts to the remainder of the island, for the occupation would be immeasurably more difficult if the in-

habitants were given the impression that the British were conducting a massacre instead of an occupation with as little bloodshed as possible. An indication of the alarm spread throughout the island by these Axis broadcasts was given by the French radio at Tananarive, the capital, which sent out desperate appeals for news of the inhabitants of Diego Suarez, with which communications had naturally been cut.

A British officer on one of the warships in the harbor had a broadcasting set powerful enough to reach the entire island, and it was decided to set up a station. As it was explained later in the BBC magazine, *The Listener*, by the officer (who unfortunately wished to remain anonymous), the only thing to do was to become a radio pirate and borrow the wavelength of the Tananarive radio. Accordingly, he listened for the next broadcast, made certain that he had the exact wavelength and prepared to come in at the end of the Tananarive broadcast. With the aid of a signal sergeant who worked the controls, which had been set up in a small cabin on the warship, Radio Diego Suarez was born. The officer knew enough French, including the vernacular of radio, to get by.

As soon as Radio Tananarive signed off he came on with his introduction in orthodox French radio style: "*Allo! Allo! Ici Radio Diego Suarez! Ici Radio Diego Suarez! Ne quittez pas l'écoute. Un officier anglais vous parle.*" Then the officer began to read from a prepared script, which, he recounts, was grammatically correct thanks to editing by a French chef who was aboard the warship. He told the inhabitants that Diego Suarez was normal and that there had been no civilian casualties, and to prove his assurance he read about twenty-five messages from French civilians reporting that they were in good health. These had been hastily collected as soon as the landing was made.

He learned later that the effect had been immediate. Moni-

tors at the Tananarive radio, who had tuned in out of curiosity to see what the English officer might have to say, had taken down the names and the messages and repeated them in their next broadcast.

The officer had not planned to begin a regular service but merely to make one or two broadcasts to set the population right as to what was happening at the northern end of Madagascar. However, he appears to have been carried away with enthusiasm for his first broadcast and announced that he would be on the air again the following day. He realized after his first effort that his French was much too shaky for him to do the job alone, even with the help of the menu-French provided by the chef. Somebody got the idea of canvassing the ship in the hope that a man with better French than that of the officer might be found, and he was lucky enough to find a Royal Marine who spoke it perfectly. From then on things were easier. The new Diego Suarez station began to come in regularly at the end of the Tananarive broadcasts—putting on a record of the "*Marseillaise*" right after Tananarive had finished playing its own record of the anthem, and holding its audience with the bait of personal messages. The service was enlarged to include a news bulletin, which the ship's radio operator recorded from London broadcasts and which the marine translated into French. In the field of propaganda Radio Diego Suarez began to counteract Vichy broadcasts which reached Madagascar by inaugurating a feature called "*Paroles de Churchill*," quotations from speeches by the Prime Minister either stressing confidence in an Allied victory or predicting the rise of France again after the war. The personal-message business became so good that the officer had to open an office in town to take them from the inhabitants.

When the ship left the harbor the officer and his radio station

were put ashore and ordered to keep Radio Diego Suarez going. He installed a broadcasting studio in the projecting room of a disused movie theater, which had a few drawbacks but was satisfactory on the whole. The officer says that the most important of the drawbacks was the fact that outside the studio was a farmyard where there were some chickens who seemed particularly radio-minded. On one occasion the signal sergeant left the window of the projecting room open, and while the officer was on the air a hen jumped onto the window sill and began to cluck into the microphone right at his ear. To shoo the hen away the sergeant left the controls without turning them off, which caused all Madagascar to hear the hen's violent protests at being driven away.

While the occupation of the remainder of the island proceeded slowly, the British officer and his radio station held forth in Diego Suarez. They fought methodically to eradicate the effects of Axis propaganda with which the island had been saturated in the preceding two years. They broadcast in Malagash, the language of Madagascar, as well as French, and they managed to scrape up a variety of programs which interested the inhabitants. These included music by British military bands and various French features.

When the British armies moved south the officer remained at Diego Suarez with orders to move to Tananarive when it was occupied. That finally occurred on November fifth, just six months after the start of the campaign. Radio Diego Suarez then ended its remarkable career and the facilities of the British officer were merged with those of Radio Tananarive. Despite the fact that the island had resisted occupation, the French radio men readily co-operated with the British, and a successful Anglo-French broadcasting team carried on until the military

administration of the island was withdrawn in favor of civilian rule.

I am sure there has been no better example during the war of what a so-called radio squadron can do, how it can carry on a highly useful job and particularly how it can improvise to meet unexpected and unforeseen developments. That anonymous British officer certainly deserves a tribute for showing the way.

To get back to the OWI, let us look at our situation in the Far East. There Japan has blanketed the area with radio programs which not only present solely the Nipponese version of war developments but are gradually discrediting all occidentals and adding immeasurably to the task of postwar reconstruction. An indication of how we stand in the Orient was given in June 1943 by Gerald F. Winfield of the OWI office in Chungking on his return to this country. Winfield said that the United States was "barely holding its own" in the radio war to influence Chinese opinion, which is only a part but a very important part of the Asiatic audience.

Winfield disclosed that the two shortwave stations used by the OWI in San Francisco, KWID and KGEI, were broadcasting Chinese programs only three hours, which is small indeed compared to Chinese transmissions sent out by the Axis. A dozen Berlin stations and even more Japanese stations are on the air almost all the time with Chinese broadcasts, Winfield said, and the only thing that saves the situation at all is the fact that there are six BBC stations devoted to Chinese transmissions.

As for our propaganda to Japan itself, we are handicapped by the fact that most Japanese radios are equipped for long and medium-wave reception but not for shortwave, with the result that although the signals from our San Francisco stations

reach Asia easily, there are few Japanese sets capable of picking them up. Therefore we are faced with the problem of getting transmitters closer to Japan—a problem which should eventually be solved as in Europe, by sending radio squadrons along with our troops.

Experts on Japanese psychology and susceptibility to our propaganda say that there is little we can do in any case until the fact that we are winning the war in Asia is impressed on every Japanese. Meanwhile we can merely prepare the facilities and lay the groundwork. The substance of our propaganda line to Japan is in general not made public, but Selden Menefee, an expert on Japan, has reported that the main points include the stressing of American military might and power of production, the attacking of the Japanese military clique, and the effort to divide the Japanese from the Germans by pointing out fundamental antagonisms between the two powers. There has been much controversy over whether we ought to attack the Emperor of Japan, who is sacred in the eyes of the Japanese people. Thus far the OWI has adopted the policy of avoiding anything which might be regarded as an insult to the Mikado. There seem to be two reasons for this: first, that nothing would be gained by outraging the Japanese people in that regard by attacking the man who embodies their religion, and second, that the Emperor, if his prestige is held intact, might at some future time be used as the rallying point for an opposition movement which would rid the country of the military clique responsible for the war. The second point is similar to the argument against attacking the King of Italy.

Opponents of the policy have insisted that breaking down the prestige of the Emperor, far from outraging the Japanese people to no account, would cause the collapse of the entire system on which the theories of Japanese superiority are based,

and hence would remove the props from under the structure of conquest built by the Japanese leaders. Mr. Menefee's opinion is that there are good arguments on both sides but that at this stage of the war our present policy seems justified. There will be time enough to reconsider, in his opinion, when the tide has definitely turned against Japan, and victory in Asia is in sight. Meanwhile, he recommends that our propaganda tasks in the East should include, first, finding ways of reaching Asia more effectively; second, keeping the Asiatics informed of American successes; third, exposing the real aims of Japan; fourth, instructing the people on the technique of resistance and sabotage; and fifth, describing our postwar plans.

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

LONDON CALLING

GERMAN TROOPS ON PATROL in a town in Holland not long ago found hanging from the neck of a bronze statue a placard which read, "This is the only man in Holland who does not listen to the BBC."

That was a striking tribute from the defiant Dutch to the British Broadcasting Corporation's tremendous job of giving the peoples in blacked-out Europe the news and words of encouragement for which they hunger. Just as the British people won the Battle of Britain and kept the war going in 1940 when it seemed worse than hopeless, so the BBC carried on the propaganda war alone and untiringly until our own OWI facilities could enter the field and take over some of the burden. That job of the BBC was more than a matter of hard work twenty-four hours a day. It was heroic front-line fighting amid the crash of bombs. It was hardship and the risk of death for the entire personnel, from the most obscure little telephone operator to the ace news commentators. Payment for that hardship has been the knowledge that effective propaganda war has been waged on the Axis, that much has been done to crack the morale of the Germans and Italians and that even more has been done to keep the spark of resistance alive among the peoples of the occupied countries. Payment has been the receipt of proof that thousands of courageous men and women on the

continent have risked their lives daily to hear the BBC news and commentaries and to spread it among their friends—proof like the legend on the placard hung from the neck of the Dutch statue.

Through underground channels to London not long ago came the following message from Czechoslovakia: "In spite of threats of the death sentence, the English radio is always listened to, and the Jews also learn what is said."

Moscow informed London that its intelligence services found thirty-two anti-German papers secretly published in Warsaw, each of them regularly reporting the news sent out over Soviet and BBC broadcasts.

A saying has arisen in Norway: "You can judge a man according to his radio set. If he has a very good shortwave radio you can be sure that he is a good patriot. The broadcasts from London are the lifeline of the Norwegians."

From Belgium came a story of a German officer who asked a little girl on the street what time it was. When she replied correctly without looking at a watch, he asked her how she knew. She replied that it was obviously a quarter past seven "because there is nobody in the street—everyone is at home listening to the English radio."

From Italy long before the invasion came this report: "Everyone we know listens to the English radio, and an American friend married to an Italian says that in the little country town where they live everyone, including the police and the *cara-binieri*, listens eagerly to the British radio every afternoon, gathered together in a crowd in the street by the open door of the room where the radio is."

The BBC makes certain that nobody on the continent who wants news or encouragement will fail to find it in its broadcasts, no matter what language he speaks, no matter what time

of the day or night it is safe for him to listen. The European service broadcasts in 45 languages, and there are 107 news broadcasts every 24 hours in addition to 22 special weekly overseas bulletins. Total broadcast time amounts to more than 38 hours, of which about four hours daily are lend-leased to the OWI for relaying American programs. There are four news broadcasts in English to continental Europe daily, and literally dozens of short commentaries, dramatizations and sketches in foreign languages, usually broadcast by Allied nationals and transmitted at regular times throughout the twenty-four-hour day on three medium-wave bands and numerous shortwave bands. For Germany itself there are five hours in the German language, sent out in eighteen transmissions.

The BBC neglects no means of reaching the enemy countries, the satellites or the occupied lands. While news and news commentaries are the backbone of the continental service, there are many other types of programs which have proved highly effective in the propaganda war. For example, there are often talks by leading personalities—Queen Wilhelmina speaking to the Dutch, Thomas Mann speaking to the Germans (on a relay from New York), the two famous Czech comedians Voskovec and Werich broadcasting words of humor and encouragement to their tragic country. To France there are often talks by members of the Fighting French forces in training in England or addresses by leading French personalities—apart from the regular Fighting French program broadcast daily from London.

Programs to Greece strike a touching note—the Athens call sign which was turned over to the BBC when the Greek government went into exile. It is a distinctive call, the horn of a Greek shepherd in the hills, mingled with the bells of his flock—a call that cannot help find a response among listeners in the starving land of Greece.

To Germany the BBC broadcasts sketches and stories—for example, a sketch of the career of Napoleon emphasizing effectively the parallel between that conqueror and Hitler, the point that Napoleon conquered all Europe but lost the war, that his first defeat was suffered at the hands of the British fleet and that his downfall was brought on by his invasion of Russia. There are broadcasts featuring a certain Frau Wernecke, who speaks in Berlines vernacular and is more Nazi than the Nazis in her approach to the business of waiting in line for food or sitting in an air-raid shelter, but who manages to heap ridicule on the heads of the Nazi leaders.

There is a Flemish character named Jan who talks stock Flemish and combines humor with telling blows against the Nazi conquerors of Flanders. And there is a revived and always funny version of the Good Soldier Schweik, who became a veritable Czech national hero at the end of the last war and is holding his laurels by way of the London radio in this one.

There is music and there are colloquial songs which can be used effectively either to bolster morale or shake it, as the need requires. For example, the BBC Germany staff has composed a popular song which tells in the words of a German soldier what his experiences have been like. The chorus goes roughly like this:

“We’re on the move from morn till night,
Our wives forever lost to sight;
And far from hearth and far from home
We’re forced through distant lands to roam.”

The verses tell of the soldier’s homesickness, of restless nights and foreign food, of the lack of beer and of being treated everywhere as “a robber bandit,” etc. An interesting point about that song, according to BBC officials, is that it was the actual work

of a German soldier in Poland, who wrote it in chalk on a railway car, where it was seen by a Pole, copied and sent to England in a smuggled letter.

There is a highly popular French song called "*Boum*," which was one of Maurice Chevalier's favorite numbers before the war. New words have been written for it, describing how each *boum* caused by German bombs in Britain is being repaid by twenty *boums* caused by the Royal Air Force in Germany. The new Fighting French song "*Battez les Coeurs*" is now well known in France as a result of being broadcast by BBC, and there is a striking new version of the ever-popular *Auprès de Ma Blonde*, which has been sung since the days of the French revolution. Nursery rhymes and new songs are quickly adapted by BBC experts in what we might call musical propaganda, and hardly a week passes without some telling point being put across to the continent in words and music.

Then there are Englishmen who have become experts in the ways of psychology of the Axis countries and who are used with good effect in special commentaries. For example, Colonel Stevens, once a member of the staff of the British Embassy in Rome and a well-known figure in Roman society, speaks regularly to the Italians. In his sustained effort to drive a wedge between the Italians and their German masters Stevens makes broadcasts like this:

"It looks as if Hitler wants to do everything by halves in this war. Or perhaps he cannot do otherwise. For this pure-blooded Austrian appears to have assimilated Teutonic thoroughness only in order to develop to the full that carelessness and superficiality which were the predestined characteristics of Hapsburg Austria."

Sefton Delmar, who speaks perfect German, who spent many years in Germany as correspondent for the *Daily Express* and

knows many Nazi officials personally, broadcasts regularly with the special assignment of replying to German commentators. An example is the following, addressed to Hans Fritzsche: "And this war, that Hitler first stamped as a defensive war against treacherous England, has now become a war of world deliverance. My dear Fritzsche! Do you really think that even one of your listeners will be taken in by your talk and believe that you are really an armor-clad crusader? For two years you talked your head off three times a week trying to explain to your listeners that the Hitler-Stalin, Ribbentrop-Molotov, Himmler-Beria pact constituted an ingenious, unique, unalterable and brilliant diplomatic move such as had never been heard of before and which was to last for all time."

One of the most remarkable features about the BBC's war-time operation is the fact that its transmitter system is so organized that it never once had to interrupt broadcasting service on account of enemy air raids. The Axis was never able to equal that achievement, for German and Italian stations have been forced off the air repeatedly when Allied planes have been over the continent. The story of this achievement and others was told to me by William M. Newton, former European news editor of the BBC and now its representative in the Middle West. There was no improvisation when the war broke out, for everything had long been prepared. Plans for war were secretly laid in the days following Munich in 1938, and the BBC went on a wartime basis thirty-six hours before war was declared on Germany—that is, on September 1, 1939, the day Poland was attacked. Sealed orders had been in the hands of officials all over the country, and an hour and a half after these were opened a complete engineering change-over was effected. The television service was closed down for the duration, and

the eight regular BBC programs sent out from various parts of the British Isles were cut to a single program. The prime consideration in the new setup was to avoid anything which would give guidance to enemy aircraft, and successful solution of that problem by arranging transmitters in groups and synchronizing them on certain wavelengths made it possible to avoid program interruptions during raids.

The next problem, to make sure that bombings would not disrupt the service, was solved by dispersing BBC facilities throughout the country. This problem was solved despite innumerable technical complications and not a few snags which arose as a result of the ever-present human element. For example, as Mr. Newton explained, it was easy enough to draw up a paper plan for scattering broadcasting units and technical staffs all over the country, but things can happen when a hundred strangers are suddenly set down in some obscure village. Billeting officers were called upon to find accommodations for them, telephone and program lines had to be laid out, the blackout and defense system had to be organized and arrangements had to be made for food and such commonplace items as bedclothing. That unusual side of broadcasting put the BBC in the catering business in a big way and caused it to run no less than seventy-four catering establishments. Mr. Newton recalled that one canteen in the first week of the war had to provide meals for four hundred uprooted BBC employees instead of the sixty people it was equipped to serve. BBC officials even had to think of such things as providing proper meals for Indian broadcasters whose religion forbade them to eat anything on which a human shadow had fallen. Employees of practically every race in the world were included in the BBC's foreign-language and monitoring services, and many of them looked outlandish indeed to provincial villagers. In Mr. New-

ton's words, it is not always easy for a billeting officer to explain to an English village family just why it is important that they should take into their home a strange man from the East who works at night and sleeps during the day. One member of the staff was thrown out of his billet for being rung up on the telephone on urgent business at the immoral hour of ten at night.

The artists working for the British broadcasting services had many heroic deeds to perform as a result of the dispersal. As Mr. Newton put it, "It may mean getting top-notch comedians to make a dreary journey into the wilds to crack his jokes in some forlorn village hall. It may mean that when an orchestra arrives in a small town for a broadcast it is discovered that the drummer and two trombone players are held up on another train because Nazi bombers have blown up the tracks in front of it. In any London studio during the blitz there was always a nice question mark whether your speaker or artist had been blown to kingdom come on his way to the studio. So when the harassed program official greeted the arrival with 'Glad to see you!' he really meant it."

Because of the bomb hazard the BBC was forced to work out an elaborate system of recordings as well as arrangements to have all facilities in duplicate or even triplicate so that if bombs disrupted one set of telephone or teleprinter lines or electric power transmissions there was always another circuit available. Often recordings were made not for the direct purpose of broadcasting but as insurance. They were made during rehearsals to be used just in case the studios were bombed or a line was cut. The recording car became a BBC stand-by and did innumerable tasks not only in Britain but in remote theaters of war, where BBC correspondents recorded front-line dispatches and had them sent back for broadcasting later. BBC officials recall that once during the blitz a recording car on a

highway in the south of England was machine-gunned by a low-flying German plane. The operator remembered to hold the microphone above his head and obtained an all too realistic record of his experience. Another BBC man lay for three hours on an exposed plateau near Tobruk with shells falling on all sides in order to get a recording that would give the British people an idea of what the battle there was like.

The precautions which the BBC took against bombings were by no means superfluous. In October 1940 the BBC headquarters in London, Broadcasting House, received a direct hit from a heavy bomb and six people were killed. The main newsroom and many of the studios were wrecked. The main internal telephone switchboard was put out of action. The bombing occurred during the nine-o'clock news broadcast, but all the listener heard, if he noticed anything at all, was that the announcer made a sharp intake of breath, then went on reading the news without a tremor using a flashlight he had ready for such an emergency. All around him was darkness, choking smoke and dust and the crash of falling masonry.

Mr. Newton recalled that at six the next morning the news librarian was almost arrested by a policeman who found him trying to salvage the remains of his files from the rubbish heap in the street. Those files, accumulated for years, had been blasted by the bomb.

The indispensable switchboard system was shattered and small emergency boards, each carrying eight lines instead of seventy, were operated under harrowing conditions by telephone girls in the basement, with plaster falling in their faces and telephone calls coming in at the rate of eight a second.

The following month there was another bombing—an even heavier explosion than the first—and much of Broadcasting House was irreparably ruined. Many walls were blown away,

fire broke out and part of the building was flooded. The staircase was a waterfall and the main lobby a lake. Desks were floating around in the newsroom and again the news library and switchboard were wrecked. The program staff found their offices in ruins and spent hours rescuing from a litter of plaster, broken glass and slime the scripts they were supposed to use on the air that night. But the impossible was achieved and the programs went out on schedule.

At one time or another every one of the provincial quarters set up by the BBC was also in the thick of the blitz. Program officials, newsmen and artists told of rehearsals and transmissions in rocking buildings and there were many casualties among the staff, not to mention the wrecking of studios and vital machinery. Over and over again it seemed impossible that a particular program could be produced on time but somehow or other every one was.

For example, one Sunday evening in Bristol the raid was so violent that it was impossible to broadcast the religious program scheduled from the ordinary studio. The orchestra could not fit into the emergency studio, but Dr. Welsh, the BBC director of religion, was determined to go through with the program. The microphone was placed under a table, and with bombs crashing on all sides Dr. Welsh read quietly from the Bible as a violin accompaniment was played by an artist kneeling beside him.

An important but little publicized aspect of the radio war is the matter of making certain that the programs sent out to continental Europe by the British and ourselves can be heard. To do so we must contend with the jamming of broadcasts by the Axis propaganda bureaus and the dwindling supply of workable radio receivers. We have already noted in the case of the latter that the BBC has repeatedly sent out instructions

to listeners on how to use the parts of two or more sets which have gone out of order to reconstruct one workable receiver. Instructions have also been sent out by the BBC on how to receive broadcasts in spite of jamming, notably by constructing directional frame antennae which can be turned until the jamming is minimized if not eliminated altogether. An expert can hear a jammed broadcast through most types of jamming unless it originates in his immediate vicinity, and as the war has progressed many continental listeners have become experts—men and women who know they are depended on by hundreds of others to give them the news and who have become practically professional listeners.

A broadcast is jammed by sending out signals on the same wavelength which either drown out or distort its reception. There are seven or eight types of jamming practiced by the Germans, all of which have been identified and carefully studied by British engineers whose business it is to find ways of circumventing them. Jamming is done by regular transmitters at strategic points, mainly in large continental cities, and is effective for cutting out broadcasts within a certain radius. As the war progressed and more and more territory was overrun by the Germans the jamming problem became increasingly acute, for dozens of additional transmitters fell into German hands, particularly in France. It was possible by using a whole battery of jamming transmitters to cover most of the continent and interfere seriously with the BBC broadcasts.

As a matter of general practice, however, the Germans limited their jamming to the foreign-language broadcasts from England and did not interfere with the English-language transmissions. The reason apparently was that they feared reprisals and figured that if they did not interfere with the English language broadcasts to the continent, the BBC would not jam

the German broadcasts in English to Great Britain. The fact is that the BBC has never jammed any German or Italian broadcasts at all, for two reasons. First, the British do not feel that Axis broadcasts to England do enough damage to warrant jamming. The feeling of BBC officials is that if the appeasers had remained in power in Great Britain there might have been cause to fear the effect of Axis propaganda on the will of the people and their leaders to continue with the war, but that after the accession of Churchill to power and after Dunkirk nothing the Axis might have said could shake British determination to fight to the end. Second, the use of a transmitter for jamming purposes would mean that it was not available for regular broadcasts, and the BBC has wanted to use every available channel in the positive side of the propaganda war rather than the negative.

In order to get through to the continent in spite of jamming, the BBC makes the task of the German jammers as complicated as possible. No broadcast goes out on just one frequency, and as the months pass more and more facilities are becoming available for duplicating broadcasts. For example, by the summer of 1943 broadcasts to Belgium were going out on eleven frequencies, which made it fairly certain that in spite of jamming one broadcast would surely get through. Another precaution taken has been the broadcasting of all essential news in Morse code as well as spoken words—code transmissions sent out so slowly and carefully that even the rankest novice can take them down. The importance of that precaution lies in the fact that it is difficult to jam a code broadcast.

Because the number of transmitters the Germans can devote exclusively to jamming is necessarily limited, the British know that if some of their broadcasts in French to France do not get through, the French-language transmissions are received in

other parts of Europe—in Germany, for example, and in Italy and the Balkans. Thus even if not a single broadcast in French to France was received (which is decidedly not the case) it would still be worth while to continue French-language transmissions because there are plenty of listeners in other countries who can understand them and use them to good advantage in spreading the news. Similarly Italian jammers cut out some of the Italian-language broadcasts to Italy but do not hinder their reception in France and elsewhere out of the range of Italian jamming transmitters. In any case the British have found that the Italian jammers are characteristically haphazard and that all or part of many of the broadcasts to Italy get through because of Italian negligence. Italian engineers are often asleep at the switch and forget to turn the jammers on until part of the broadcast has been heard, or they waste their current by neglecting to switch their jammers off during the musical part of the program.

The Germans, who are notoriously methodical, do not make the same mistakes as the Italians, but their very rigidness often permits British engineers with a little imagination to trick them. For example, German engineers in charge of a jamming station in France provide what they think is blanket coverage of all BBC broadcasts in a given area. Then the BBC suddenly puts an extra transmitter with a new frequency onto that area and it is some time before the Germans discover it. Or the BBC turns the transmitters being jammed just a little off the frequency known to the Germans, and an entire broadcast may get through before the Germans discover that their jammers have not been effective.

Because of the jamming of broadcasts and because listeners generally may not be able to sit safely through an entire news transmission, the BBC has worked out the technique of writing

news scripts so that nothing essential is missed no matter how much of a broadcast is received or how late a listener tunes in. All the main headlines of a broadcast are given at the beginning of every news broadcast. Then there is amplification of the most important items, and the headlines are repeated at the end. Sometimes they are even given a third time in the middle of the broadcast. In that connection our own news broadcasts to Europe have often been criticized because they dwell at such length on details and do not concentrate sufficiently on giving continental listeners the most important facts often enough or in short enough form. A listener in an occupied country who is risking his life to hear an American news broadcast does not want any lengthy report on a speech in Congress to the exclusion of some important items of news. The entire business of wartime broadcasting must be an almost incongruous combination of sowing seeds so profusely through duplicate broadcasts that some of them are bound to take root, and at the same time economizing rigidly on the broadcast time of the transmitter and the listening time of the courageous man or woman at the receiver.

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

SHADES OF VICTORY

INTO THE OFFICES of the BBC in the spring of 1941 came a letter of unusual interest. It was a letter which had been smuggled out of Belgium and it said that in a little Belgian town the inhabitants had been writing the letter V on building walls—V-for-Victory.

The idea interested the Belgian program organizer De Lavelye and in one of his subsequent broadcasts he told his listeners about it. Chalk the walls with the V sign, he said—it would annoy the Germans. How much it would annoy the Germans he had no idea. It was only some weeks later that it became clear that the conquerors of Belgium were not only angered but rattled by those chalk marks. German officials began to rasp about penalties, began to threaten and warn the Belgians that the master race was not going to stand for nonsense like that.

That was all the BBC wanted to know. With the Germans having risen so readily to the bait it was decided to plaster V-for-Victory all over the continent. The possibilities of the idea became clear. It could be used as a striking visible symbol of the resistance movement. It could become a particularly effective weapon in the war of nerves against the Nazis.

Colonel Britton came into being and took charge of the V-for-Victory campaign. In a series of incisive broadcasts he

ordered the people of the continent to write the new watchword wherever the Germans might see it, be angered by it and above all be made uneasy by it. Colonel Britton was and is a mystery. His identity is known only to a few. Listeners on the continent were told merely that from the day of the beginning of the V-for-Victory campaign until the moment came for direct action they were to receive their directives from him. He was to broadcast them himself and to have them translated immediately into every European language and rebroadcast by his foreign assistants. The Germans sought to ridicule him, but they got nowhere. His personality had struck the imagination of the people, and the burden of his message was electrifying as it came over the air night after night in a simple, unaffected southern English accent. It was fortunate for the campaign that Colonel Britton's language was not identifiable either with the kind of English associated with David Low's Colonel Blimp or with any of the public schools. It was just the English of the average educated man. Colonel Britton, moreover, had spent many years outside England and he knew his foreign audiences.

Somebody got the idea of making V-for-Victory an audible watchword as well as a spoken one and the BBC began to use the letter V in the Morse code in its victory broadcasts—three dots and a dash. Then came a real inspiration by another anonymous person who discovered that the opening bars of Beethoven's *Fifth Symphony* had the V-for-Victory phrase repeated in them. It was more than an inspiration—it was prophetic, for V stood for five, or fifth, and an added bit of romance was added to the campaign. The use of this audible sign spread even more quickly than the visible one. People in continental restaurants began calling the waiters with three short taps and a long tap on their drinking glasses. They

rapped upon doors with three short knocks and a long. Everywhere the Germans not only saw the V sign but they heard it. Reports began to reach Dr. Goebbels of the seriousness of the situation. The occupying forces everywhere were getting the jitters—just from a sustained campaign hammering at their nerves and without any bad news from the front, for the attack on Russia had not yet begun. Goebbels is no fool, and it was readily clear to him that if the conquerors got the jitters as the result of a war of nerves which was yet unsupported by any victories in the field, a real military setback, if accompanied by the same kind of treatment, might cause an outright panic. He realized that something had to be done at once.

Threats and promises of penalties had merely served to increase the force of the campaign. Chalk marks and paint could be applied at night in relative safety. People in cafés calling waiters could easily plead innocent if accused of doing it in a way to annoy the Germans. In fact such accusations would play directly into the hands of the opposition and would be highly embarrassing in the face of a disclaimer. So Goebbels got another idea. It was a lame one but it was the best he could do. Victory, he announced, was a German word too—*Viktoría*. No German had used it in centuries, but that made no difference. The V sign was to be interpreted as a symbol of German victory, and anybody who interpreted it otherwise was just silly. The British and their listeners merely smiled and continued being silly.

In a few months V-for-Victory had done its job. Colonel Britton and its other leaders were careful to make it understood that there was to be no immediate follow-up, that it was to remain in the realm of the war of nerves, and that above all there was to be no open uprising, for the time had not yet come.

The campaign was officially closed, with the assurance that others were to follow.

In 1942 a new and equally striking campaign along the same lines was launched—the 1918 campaign. The figures 1918 began to appear on walls and fences throughout occupied Europe just as V-for-Victory had done, and wrathful attempts to halt the new campaign succeeded only in spreading it. The significance of 1918 was readily obvious to the captive peoples and equally clear to the Germans. Nineteen-eighteen was the year of victory in the First World War. It was the year of the collapse on the German home front and the defeats by the Allied armies in France. Adolf Hitler had spent twenty years trying to explain away the German debacle in 1918 by blaming it on the Jews and on any other handy people except the Germans and their allegedly invincible army.

Reports to the OWI showed that the 1918 symbol was appearing at many points throughout Europe, having spread from Paris where it was seen first and where it brought the following bitter protest by the Nazi-controlled Paris radio: "A figure is now the rallying sign of some brainless persons who find a personal reason for satisfaction in the misfortunes of France and in the American occupation of North Africa. There is much talk of 1918, and this figure is being written everywhere as a symbol of an American victory, which some people desire though it would be at the cost of France's survival."

An article in the Swedish newspaper *Nya Dagligt Allehanda* reported that the symbol had appeared on walls and been smeared over Nazi posters in Norway. It had so annoyed the Nazi authorities in Trondheim that civilians had been pressed into duty in a special lookout service to track down the Nazi-baiters who were responsible for it.

A German paper in Brussels complained that everywhere in

Belgium people were walking around painting the figures 1918 on every street corner and wall, "wherever there was room."

An enterprising patriot in one French town, according to a Swiss report, applied the figure in luminous paint to be sure that the Germans would see it at night as well as by day.

These campaigns and the tremendous response to the directives for them as broadcast from London had one highly important use besides that of weapons in the war of nerves. They proved to the BBC—and to the Germans—that thousands of people on the continent were ready, willing and able to carry out any orders given them by the British radio. With that highly useful knowledge acquired, the BBC has been able to do many small jobs while awaiting the orders for the final big one, and so to play on the misgivings of the Germans, to keep the wits of the patriots sharpened, to keep hope high and at the same time to do damage to the Nazi war machine in a small way.

For example, the BBC many times has broadcast careful instructions on how to carry out sabotage and on how to get under the skins of the big and small Quislings and Laval. It has organized many minor stunts, always being careful to do just one at a time. A broadcast to Czechoslovakia, for instance, ordered the people to boycott all the German newspapers on a certain Sunday as a demonstration of unity. Proof was later forthcoming that within five hours everybody in the towns designated knew about the broadcast, and that not a single German newspaper was purchased that day.

One day in the spring of 1943 the BBC announced that a certain butcher shop in Vichy was dealing with the Nazis with considerably more willingness than was required. That night the shop was smashed. Ordinarily the BBC does not order individual acts of sabotage or punishment, but occasionally it is

felt that it ought to be done just to keep their hand in and to prove that small orders as well as big ones are implicitly obeyed.

From time to time organized slowdowns in certain factories are ordered—slowdowns that are not sufficiently pronounced to cause mass reprisals by the German authorities but which nevertheless do substantial damage. If every worker loses just three-quarters of an hour, spread through his working day in such a manner that it is difficult to detect, he has done an important service to the Allies.

Following is an example of more comprehensive sabotage instructions which took their directives from BBC broadcasts and which were spread throughout France by way of the clandestine press in April 1943 and reported by the Algiers radio:

“1. Boycott all German and pro-German papers such as *Signale* and *Gringoire*.

“2. All Frenchmen in a public place must immediately leave when the Germans enter; deep silence must be observed when the invader is there.

“3. Boycott all restaurants, hotels and shops which show clear evidence of catering to the Germans.

“4. All those employed in an industry or trade connected with the war effort or supply system of Germany must cooperate with liberation by slowing down work and committing acts of sabotage.

“5. The buildings or houses of merchants working for Germany must be marked in every town or section of a town with a swastika in red chalk or any other material which can be used for such a purpose.

“6. Boycott all German films.”

The Algiers radio in reporting this list of instructions added that “these duties are performed to the letter, and even the

smallest hamlet in Brittany takes part in the resistance movement." It added that one of the ways little French girls have found to annoy the Germans is to sing the following rhyme when jumping rope:

*"Radio Paris ment,
Radio Paris ment,
Radio Paris est allemand."*

The words mean, "Radio Paris lies, Radio Paris lies, Radio Paris is German," and I believe they are sung to the music from the Mexican song "*La Cucaracha*," which certainly shows how far afield they sometimes go to find a stick to beat the Germans with.

The Algiers radio also reported that a new campaign along the lines of V-for-Victory has sprung up spontaneously in Paris and other parts of France. This campaign uses a symbol in the form of an Algebraic formula, which reads, "G plus G equals V plus V," meaning Giraud plus de Gaulle equals victory plus vengeance.

Here are two more examples of the broadcasting of instructions to the French by the BBC, which indeed are shades of victory and indicate what radio's role will be when the end is in sight. Both were broadcast in April 1943.

The first was as follows:

"London calling. The spokesman of the inter-Allied high command is talking to you. Here is a warning addressed especially to inhabitants of the coastal regions:

"You know how much the resistance by the French population exasperates the Germans. You cannot be ignorant of the fact that the Germans make use of every means to identify the leaders and animators of this resistance.

"We have reason to believe that the Germans have thought up the following trick in order to enable them to unmask the secret resistance in certain localities:

"They intend to make a simulated landing of Allied troops on the coast in the hope of seeing the resisting elements uncover themselves by going to welcome their friends. Those who revealed themselves would be immediately arrested and executed. It is enough to warn you to make sure that you will not be taken in by this trick.

"Meet rumors of an Allied landing with the greatest wariness. We have promised the French that they would be warned of the day when they are called upon to help. We will keep our word. In the meantime do not forget the advice already given and especially the last warning, which is of capital importance.

"Do not fail to listen for further instructions, which will be given to you by the London radio or by the American radio. Remain aloof from all the preliminary operations. On the day when the armies of liberation need you, you will be apprised."

Following is the text of the second:

"First, as far as possible try not to live in the neighborhood of buildings which shelter a German high command or which are used as barracks or depots for the German troops. Also if possible do not stay near important communication centers and especially train sheds and workshops for repairing engines. The factories and workshops working for Germany, depots and German U-boat bases, the large industrial centers in general, must also be considered as particularly exposed to attack.

"Second, the numerous Frenchmen who are forced to stay in a neighborhood susceptible of being attacked should as far as possible, send their families to relatives or friends living in less dangerous localities. Those who must stay behind should de-

mand adequate protective measures against the air attacks. You must not only ask for good shelters to which you must go as soon as the first warning sounds. We also ask you to insist that your protection be assured and be increased as the power of the raids increases.

“Third, do all you can to help secretly those in France who continue active resistance against the Germans. But do not forget that the enemy is watching you and is showing his nervousness. All communication between Frenchmen is watched. Your letters risk being opened, your telephone conversations risk being listened to. Therefore be extremely discreet so that you do not betray to the enemy the secrets of the resistance movement.

“Fourth, when you hear rumors about an Allied landing suspect all of them. The Germans are circulating such rumors in the hope of seeing the resistance movement come out into the open.

“Finally, and we cannot remind you too often of this most important advice, do not anticipate the final instructions which the London and the American radio will broadcast to you. Beware of all preliminary operations. You will be told the day on which the armies of liberation will want your active help.”

When the V-for-Victory campaign came to a close and Colonel Britton signed off the air, he said in his last message that he would be back when the time drew near for action. Soon that will happen.

One day soon listeners on the continent will hear as usual the deep, resonant chimes of Big Ben which identify the BBC for all the world, followed by the familiar words, “London calling.” Then will come the message which Colonel Britton promised.

“Men and women of France,” he will say. “This is Colonel Britton speaking to you. I speak in the name of the inter-Allied high command. Listen carefully. The hour has come. The armies of liberation have arrived. At this very moment American and British troops are landing at points X, Y and Z on the northern and western coasts of France. The time has come for those of you in the coastal regions to join them. Here are your instructions . . .”