

THE FUTURE  
OF  
SOUND RADIO AND  
TELEVISION



**PRODUCED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE  
CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON BROADCASTING BY THE  
CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION**

**This booklet is a summary of the Report of the  
Committee on Broadcasting, published on 27th June, 1962,  
as Cmnd. 1753 (H.M.S.O., price 18s. net), to which  
reference should be made for further study.**

## THE COMMITTEE ON BROADCASTING—1960

The Committee was appointed by the Postmaster General:

*“ To consider the future of the broadcasting services in the United Kingdom, the dissemination by wire of broadcasting and other programmes, and the possibility of television for public showing; to advise on the services which should in future be provided in the United Kingdom by the BBC and the ITA; to recommend whether additional services should be provided by any other organization; and to propose what financial and other conditions should apply to the conduct of all these services.”*

The Government's decision to set up the Committee was announced in both Houses of Parliament on 13th July, 1960.

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## FORM OF THE REPORT

The Report, which is unanimous, is in five Parts. Part I, an introduction and general survey, sets out the basis on which broadcasting is now conducted and goes on to examine the purposes of broadcasting. Part II considers the services provided and whether they succeed in realising those purposes. It examines and judges the 'product' of broadcasting. Having examined and judged the product, the Report turns in Part III to the producers; it considers the constitution (including the methods of providing finance) and organization of each of the two broadcasting systems. It does so in order to find out how far success and failure are ascribable to constitution and organization, and what changes are required to remedy failures. Part IV—one Chapter only—deals with the technical considerations; the coverage and reception of the present services; the possibilities for additional services in the future; whether line definition standards should be changed; and whether a service of colour television should be introduced. Part V deals with the future, the various proposals for additional services and who should provide them.

### Part I (Chapters I to III)

#### INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL SURVEY

Chapter I records the terms of reference of the Committee and draws attention to two limitations imposed by them. First, they exclude the External Services of the BBC. Second, they ensure the continued existence of both the BBC and the ITA. The effect of the second, the Committee record, is to preclude a return to a monopoly of broadcasting, but not to require that either of the two services should continue to be organized and financed as it now is.

#### The Principles of Broadcasting

In Chapter II, the Committee outline the technical considerations and constitutional principles on which broadcasting has hitherto been based in this country and the developments which have occurred since the Beveridge Report. Two principles are noted as being especially significant. The first is that, in recognition of its social significance, broadcasting in this country is in the charge of answerable public corporations, established as trustees for the national interest in broadcasting and independent of the Government. The second principle is that the duty of each of the public corporations is to provide a service *comprehensive* in its character; one which will inform, educate and entertain. "The concept has never been," the Report records, "of a means of communication to be shared out among those with a claim to communicate; that is to say, among organizations specially qualified to present particular classes of programme item—the press, for example, or churches or universities. The subject matter of broadcasting is, in principle, all embracing; and each of the two public corporations is to treat all of it."

#### The Purposes of Broadcasting

Of the developments in broadcasting since the Beveridge Report, the Committee mention the displacement of sound broadcasting by television as the major medium; the end of the BBC's monopoly and the introduction of a competing service financed from advertisement revenue; the setting up of a National Broadcasting Council for Scotland and another for Wales, and the vesting in them of control of the Home Service in sound radio:

The Committee note as major technical developments the adoption in Europe generally of the 625-line definition standard and the introduction of colour-television services in the USA, the USSR and Japan.

Chapter III discusses the purposes of broadcasting. Here, as elsewhere in the Report, the Corporation's main concern is—what makes for good broadcasting? From the evidence and representations submitted to the Committee, it considers the product. It then judges the producers, considered as organizations constituted to provide a public service, by reference to it. What it does *not* do is to formulate principles of constitution and organization first and then apply them to the BBC and independent television.

The Committee record that the submissions entered by viewers showed much disquiet and dissatisfaction. The disquiet derives from the view that the power of television to influence and persuade is immense, and that there is a lack of awareness of, or concern about, the consequences. The dissatisfaction springs from the conviction that many of the best potentialities of television are not being realised.

Discussing the disquiet about television, the Report asks first what the effects of broadcasting are likely to be; records the view of those who gave evidence to the Committee that they are likely to be profound; observes that this is opinion and not proven fact—if, indeed, proof is possible; strongly refutes the argument that, failing proof, the broadcasters can ignore the issue; and concludes that, unless and until there is unmistakable proof to the contrary, the working assumption must be that television in particular will be a potent factor in influencing the values and moral standards of our society.

#### Disatisfaction with television

The Chapter goes on to consider the cause of dissatisfaction with television. In doing so, it examines the view that the broadcaster must choose whether to "give the public what it wants" or "what he thinks is good for the public." It rejects these alternatives as gross over-simplifications of a complex and continuing problem, as statements which present unreal extremes as though they were the only choices. The Committee record that they put the two views to both broadcasting authorities and to all the main programme companies; none of them regards either alternative as tenable. The Report concludes that the broadcasters should present, for viewers and listeners to choose from, the widest possible range of subject matter, treating as much as possible of the whole scope and variety of human awareness and experience. At the same time, the broadcasters must care about public tastes and attitudes in all their variety and in all kinds of programmes; they must be constantly aware of them as they now are and must also be aware of their capacity to change and develop.

### Part II (Chapters IV to IX)

#### THE SERVICES PROVIDED

On the BBC's services of sound broadcasting, Chapter IV reports, comment was generally favourable and often laudatory. The general view was that there was no need for any additional national network, whether provided by the BBC or by any other body. But one broad issue of policy was raised: whether the

segregation of programme material into the Home, Light and Third Programme/ Network Three had gone too far in separating popular and accepted programme material from the less well-known and more demanding. The Committee comment that the BBC's policy has its dangers. "From segregating programmes into classes, the next step might well be to segregate listeners, to assume that there are large numbers of people who like only one sort of programme and different people who like only another, to think not of overlapping majority and minority tastes, but to distinguish sharply between 'majorities' and 'minorities', to think of present tastes rather than of capacities." The Committee believe that the BBC has not altogether avoided this danger. But, the Chapter concludes, in general the Corporation's sound services succeed in realising the purposes of broadcasting; and the success is not accidental.

### **Evidence on the Television Services**

In Chapter V, the Report analyses the evidence and representation on the television services so as to establish what are the causes of the disquiet about and dissatisfaction with these services. It does not seek here to ascribe the faults and failings to either or both of the two services. Recalling the general view that the power of the medium to influence and persuade is immense, and that very often the use of the power suggests a lack of awareness of, or concern about, the consequences, the Committee note that the consideration which gives rise to this view is usually that, for the sake of an easy appeal, television portrays too often a world in which the moral standards generally assumed in society are either ignored or flouted. For a similar reason, television shows excessive violence. The Committee emphasise that these views cannot be dismissed as the unrepresentative opinions of a few well-meaning but over-anxious critics. They are held in all parts of the country, by many individuals, and by many organizations of widely differing kinds.

In weighing this evidence, the Committee recognise that broadcasters also have a responsibility to show society as it is and to allow writers to express themselves as they wish. Some critics, the Report observes, seem to pay too little attention to this responsibility; they do not admit that there is much violence and immorality in the world. But many, having recognised this responsibility, nevertheless expressed disquiet.

Dissatisfaction at the portrayal of violence was expressed on three main grounds: first, that scenes of violence frighten small children; second, that they may lead children to dangerous and even disastrous experiment; and third, that showing violence encourages anti-social, callous and even vicious attitudes and behaviour. There was special concern about the effect on children; and until 9 pm audiences include a great many children. This was not to say that until then programmes must be specially devised for children; and of course parents have a responsibility. It was rather that the period 6 pm to 9 pm should be regarded as family viewing time, and that the broadcasting authorities and parents shared the responsibility for what children viewed during that time.

On the portrayal of moral standards, the Report again points to the dual responsibility of the broadcaster: on the one hand to mirror actual ways of life and habits, and to portray the honest doubts of independently-minded people about traditional standards; and on the other to recognise that whatever is shown will help to create the prevailing moral climate and can, therefore, help to aggravate existing moral uncertainties and disorders. The Committee conclude that a failure fully to assess consequences is a main fault of television.

The dissatisfaction is, on the representations submitted to the Committee, attributed largely to a lack of "balance" in the whole output on a given channel.

This criticism is analysed into three elements. First, that the range of subjects dealt with is too narrow; that programmes are far too often designed to create a mass audience; that all the many tastes of the public deserve consideration but disappointingly few are catered for; that there are not enough programmes for minorities of all kinds; and that there is too heavy a reliance on tried, tired and interminable favourites. Second, even within the existing range, there is not sufficient variety of treatment. Each subject could be treated in many ways and must be so treated if the needs of various audiences are to be satisfied. It would be a mistake to suppose that the whole stretch of programming possibilities is covered because a comprehensive list of subjects is recorded in programme journals. Third, the range presented during peak-viewing hours is markedly narrower even than the overall range. Because these are the hours in which nearly everybody is able to watch, they are television's most valuable hours. During them, television must concentrate most of its service to the public; for effective choice is very largely limited to what is shown when people are free to choose.

Much in television is regarded by viewers as trivial. There is, the Committee were often told, a pre-occupation in many programmes with the superficial, the cheaply sensational. Many mass appeal programmes are vapid and puerile, their content often derivative, repetitious and lacking in real substance. There is a vast amount of unworthy material, and to transmit it is to misuse intricate machinery and equipment, skill, ingenuity and time. Triviality is not, the Committee emphasise, necessarily related to the subject matter of a programme; it can appear in drama, current affairs programmes, religious programmes or sports programmes just as easily as in light comedy or variety shows. Triviality resides in the way the subject matter—*whatever it is*—is treated. The criticism was not only that trivial programming is a waste of the medium, a sin of omission. Too often it has positive results and is therefore also a sin of commission.

Chapter V ends by recording criticisms of some more particular aspects of television programming. The first was that television in Scotland lacks a full expression of the distinctive Scottish culture in the widest sense of the word. The criticism was levelled not only at the amount and nature of the programmes devised for Scottish audiences, but also at the paucity of the Scottish contribution to the service for the whole of Britain. Welsh opinion, too, was that the television services do not meet Welsh needs. Some witnesses held that, unless in the very near future enough Welsh speaking programmes were put on in peak-viewing hours, the cause of the Welsh language and Welsh culture would suffer irreparable harm.

Another cause of criticism was the amount of time occupied by programmes produced in the USA; here the criticism was not an expression of xenophobia but a condemnation of the poor quality of the product and of the values depicted by it.

### The Television Service of the BBC

Chapter VI is a general appraisal of the services of the BBC. In it the Committee first compare the stated views of the BBC on the purposes of broadcasting with those formulated earlier in the Report (in Chapter III), and find that they accord closely. In particular, the Corporation are reported as considering that television is one of the main factors influencing the values and moral standards of our society; that the range and content of programmes should be comprehensive; and that a proper definition of "comprehensive" must give enough weight to information and education. It is, however, just as important to put

the best skills the Corporation can into entertainment. The Chapter goes on to consider how far the disquiet about television is attributable to the BBC's service. On the portrayal of violence and on the charge that much in television fails to recognise a responsible engagement with the moral condition of society, the Committee conclude that a sense of responsibility underlies the programming policies of the BBC. Taken as a whole, the evidence suggests that the BBC's performance accords reasonably with its stated policy. The conclusion is not wholly unreserved; not all the evidence distinguished between the BBC's programme and that of independent television. And there were, the Committee report, allegations that the BBC had "lowered its standards" in order to compete with independent television.

On how far the main causes of dissatisfaction can be attributed to the BBC and how far it can be said that the Corporation fails to realise the possibilities of the medium, Chapter VI records that, generally, submissions entered by viewers affirmed that the BBC's programme is balanced. The Corporation's policy is to develop programmes over the widest possible range of content and treatment, while preserving a reasonable balance between programmes intended for relaxation and amusement and those of a more thoughtful kind. By extending the range of subject matter treated and the variety of treatment, the broadcaster developed the possibilities of the medium and increased its value. The core of the BBC's policy was that the more important serious programmes should, for the most part, be offered when the largest audiences are available—in peak viewing hours. Over three recent years, about one-third of peak viewing hours have been given to serious programmes.

Generally speaking, the BBC's programmes were not regarded as trivial—but there were, the Chapter continues, some criticisms on this score. The Committee concluded that the BBC are well aware of the liability of television to fall into triviality, but have not always succeeded in preventing this from happening.

On the BBC's services in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and the English Regions, the Committee accept that the Corporation is concerned to see that these meet the special needs of viewers. Arguably, more might have been done; but because the BBC have to work within the limits of a single programme, it is not easy to take the argument far. In Northern Ireland and the English Regions there is no demand for regional programmes at the expense of the national programmes. So long as the service to Wales is transmitted by stations which also cover part of England, it is hard to see how it can be addressed more specifically to Welsh needs. It is technically easier to provide specifically Scottish programmes and, the Chapter notes, the aim is to produce more of them.

Foreign material accounts for about fourteen per cent of the BBC's total television output; it includes, the Report states, cinema film and entertainment, and documentary and discussion programmes designed primarily for television. Of this about three-quarters—some ten per cent of the BBC's total output—is American. In peak viewing hours, the proportion of American material is about fourteen per cent. The amount used is fixed, not by reference to a quota, but by the nature and quality of the material and the audience for it. The Report concludes that, though the BBC programme was not singled out for criticism on this score, much of the criticism was levelled at television in general. The Committee are unable therefore to suppose that none of it attaches to the BBC.

### **The Effect of Competition**

Chapter VI goes on to discuss the effect of competition on the BBC. The Committee observe that this cannot be known with certainty. But, in the representations put to them, firm opinions were offered. Some maintained that

the effect is neither wholly for the better, nor wholly for the worse, but mixed. Others held that the effect is wholly for the worse. The Committee record: first, that these opinions were widespread; second, that both classes were largely at one in the belief that the range of subject matter presented has not increased to an extent commensurate with the increase in the hours of television broadcasting; and third, that the criticism was not of competition, but essentially of misapplied competition. Where it has not been misapplied—in production technique generally, and in some classes of programme—the result was regarded as beneficial. But where the competition has not been in good broadcasting, realised through a successful and practical definition of balance and quality, the result has been for the worse. The Committee conclude that the BBC's views are sound in principle, but that the pressure of competition as practised has sometimes caused the Corporation to depart from its own ideal of public service broadcasting.

Summing up its examination of the BBC's service of television, the Committee record that on the whole the Corporation are providing good broadcasting. The causes of disquiet are not, to any great extent, attributable to their service—though they are not blameless.

On the evidence submitted, the BBC command public confidence; whatever criticisms viewers made of television, they nearly all went on to say that, if there were to be an additional television programme, it should be provided by the Corporation. In short, the BBC's service is judged (though not without qualification) to be a successful realisation of the purposes of broadcasting.

#### The Service of Independent Television

Chapter VII, a general appraisal of the service of independent television, takes the same form as Chapter VI. It notes first, however, that independent television is a duality, comprising both the Authority and the companies; and goes on to record that since the Authority is the answerable public corporation, it is to the Authority that the Committee had to turn for an answer to the question whether the service of independent television fulfils the purposes of broadcasting. "That this is so", the Committee note, "the Authority accepts". The Authority told the Committee that if anything is wrong with independent television this is the fault of the Authority. But the Committee add that this was not to say that they could ignore the views and performance of the companies.

#### The Authority's Views

The Authority's views on the purposes of broadcasting rated the likely effect of television on the values and moral attitudes of our society much lower than that generally ascribed to it. The Authority also rated the responsibility of the broadcaster lower; it considered that, though there is a duty to widen tastes and affirm standards, the broadcaster's task is essentially to mirror society and its tastes as they are. The Committee comment that since the broadcaster's responsibility, as seen by the Authority, is essentially to ensure that television reflects society and its tastes, it is not for them to ask: "What is television doing to society?" The Authority's attitude was rather: "This is what society is making of television". The Committee record that they are disturbed by these views; for the Authority so greatly to discount the effect of the medium and hence the nature of their responsibilities seems to them to be at variance with general opinion. And it runs counter to the Committee's conclusion that, unless and until there is convincing proof to the contrary, the working assumption must be that television is a considerable factor in influencing values and moral standards.

On the Authority's views on the range and content of programmes, the Chapter records that they are, in principle, similar to those formulated by the Committee. The Authority agreed that television should not only cater for existing tastes, but should give a lead to the acquisition of new ones. "But", the Committee continue, "the Authority seemed to us to attach less importance to the second of these aims than they should, and even less than several of the programme companies did". The Committee's general appraisal is that the Authority has too negative a conception of the purposes of broadcasting. Many of the programme companies took a more positive view.

### The Test of Performance

It would not, however, suffice to judge the service of independent television simply by the stated philosophy either of the Authority or of the companies. The test is performance, which the Chapter next discusses.

It considers first how far the disquiet about television is attributable to the service of independent television. On violence, it concludes that in amount, treatment and timing it is unsatisfactory. Generally, it depends "too much on the view that violence is part of life and must therefore be mirrored". Though there is validity in this view, it can easily become an excuse for the portrayal of too much violence for its own sake, rather than a justification for the portrayal of those incidents of violence that are properly part of an imaginative work. The policy on violence should be prescribed by the Authority. Further, the Authority should adopt the concept of family viewing time, so that the programmes up to a suitable break not earlier than 9 p.m., should be not unsuitable for children.

On the more general effect of programmes on moral standards, the Chapter concludes that the Authority's policies do not sufficiently reckon with this effect and that this is revealed in many of independent television's programmes of entertainment. "We conclude, too", the Chapter continues, "that the disquiet about television is mainly attributable to independent television and largely to its entertainment programmes. In recording these conclusions, we draw attention to the special difficulty deriving from the nature of the Authority's functions. The Authority does not plan and produce its own programmes, as does the BBC; and its control cannot be direct, immediate or so perceptive".

The main cause of dissatisfaction with television is recalled as this: that the range of subject matter provided is insufficient to meet the wide variety of viewers' interests. It attaches, the Chapter continues, very largely to the programmes of independent television. The amount of time devoted by independent television to serious programmes is much less than that devoted to them by the BBC, both throughout the day and during the peak viewing period. In the Authority's view the present amount and timing of serious programmes reflects its deliberate policy. The evidence of the companies suggests another reason—that it is commercially inevitable.

It was the programmes of independent television in particular which were criticised on the score of triviality, defined as lack of essential quality in programmes *whatever their kind*—light or serious. The Committee comment that the Authority seemed sometimes to assume that the charge was inspired by "high-brow" assumptions, and was levelled at certain classes of light entertainment programmes—quizzes were quoted as an example—rather than against a lack of essential worth in programmes of whatever kind. This, the Committee emphasize, is not their approach. After examining the Authority's views further, the Committee conclude that the Authority, though it has pronounced that light and serious programmes should always aim to be qualitatively as good

as possible in their respective ways, yet has not in practice shown a sufficient understanding of the nature of quality or of triviality. "Here again", the Committee observe, "we note that the worth of a programme is an aspect of production; the Authority's role is the negative one of regulation".

On the programmes of independent television in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and the English Regions, the criticism—especially from Scottish and Welsh organizations—was that the programmes do not contain a satisfactory proportion of matter calculated to appeal specially to the distinctive tastes and interests of the people who live in the area served by any particular company. And many of the programmes produced by the companies in Scotland and Wales do not satisfy the distinctive needs and tastes of the Scots and the Welsh. The Committee record that, just as the BBC's services to Wales are combined with services to England, so too are the existing services of independent television, and this must limit the extent to which the services can be addressed more specifically to Welsh needs. But, more generally, the reason why a regionally organised service is devoted so largely to the provision of a single service is to be found in the operation of the networking system. This the Report examines in Chapter XIV.

The Committee record that the obligation imposed by the Television Act on the Authority to ensure that proper proportions of the material included in their programmes are British has been met. The criticism of foreign material was not that it was foreign, but that it was poor in quality. Many of those who criticised American programmes were especially critical of independent television. The Committee conclude that the fact that it is not enough to have the right amount of foreign material if its quality is ignored has not yet been sufficiently reflected in independent television's programmes.

Summing up its appraisal of independent television, the Committee record that the stated views of the Authority on the purposes of broadcasting do not accord with those formulated earlier in the Report. The causes of disquiet about and dissatisfaction with television are justly attributed very largely to the service of independent television; this, despite the popularity of the service and the fact that many of its programmes command the largest audiences. This kind of success is not the only, and is by no means the most important, test of a good broadcasting service. It is one which can be obtained by abandoning the purposes of broadcasting. Of the organizations which, speaking as viewers, represented their opinions to the Committee, very few advocated that the "third television programme" should be allotted to independent television; and those who did were concerned to ensure that a third television channel should not be a direct charge to the public. Many urged that the service of independent television should on no account be extended.

The Committee conclude that the independent television service does not successfully realise the purposes of broadcasting. In recording this conclusion, the Committee add that, though the policies of the Authority seemed to be on several important points misconceived, this was not the whole explanation of the services' failure. It seemed as though the fault might be organic.

### Advertising on Independent Television

Chapter VIII appraises advertising on independent television. It notes that the Authority is responsible for the advertisements just as it is responsible for the rest of the programme. Before examining the discharge by the Authority of its responsibilities, the Committee draw attention to two points. First, that the Authority is obliged under the Television Act to appoint a Committee to advise it on advertising and, subject to its general duties and responsibilities, is further

obliged to comply with the advice tendered. Thus the Authority is not wholly its own master. Second, the transaction of buying and selling advertising time takes place between the programme companies and the advertisers. For practical reasons, the day-to-day business of inspecting advertisements to be broadcast is undertaken on behalf of the companies.

Advertising on independent television is meant to be incidental and secondary to its main purpose: to provide a service of broadcasting. On this, the Committee report, neither the Authority nor those of the companies questioned were in any doubt.

On the amount of time given to advertising, the Committee consider that the average permitted by the Authority (six minutes in the hour) is reasonable. On "averaging", whereby the amount of time given to advertising in any one hour may exceed six minutes so long as the average over the day does not, the Chapter reports two kinds of criticism. The first was that it is wrong in principle. This the Committee reject. The second was that, in the past, the companies have been able to save too much of the available time for use during peak viewing hours. The Committee note the progressive reduction of the maximum in any one hour to seven minutes; and conclude that though this could sometimes be too much, in most cases it is not so much as to detract from the value of the programmes. The Authority should, however, keep the maximum under review to see if it can be further reduced.

#### The Incidence and Content of Advertisements

Next, Chapter VIII deals with the incidence of advertisements. One of the Authority's duties is to ensure that advertisements occur only at the beginning or end of programmes or in natural breaks in them. Criticism focussed mainly on the interpretation in practice of the term "natural break". There is, the Committee record, evidence that some breaks are not only patently contrived but are ill-contrived in timing or frequency, and they note that, after much public criticism, the Authority took steps to tighten the practical definition of the term. The natural break should not be forbidden, but its practical definition should be kept under review and should always be subject to the over-riding needs of good broadcasting.

On the content of advertisements, the Chapter draws attention to two kinds of criticism. The first was that some advertisements make misleading claims; the second was concerned about the nature of the appeal made by some or even many advertisements. Advertising on television is governed, the Committee note, by the "Principles for Television Advertising" prepared by the Advertising Advisory Committee, whose advice is binding on the Authority, accepted by the Authority and administered by the companies. None the less, the Authority is responsible for the standards of the advertisements broadcast in its service.

The Principles are addressed precisely to the first of the two classes of criticism; but, the Committee conclude, either the Authority's assessment of the observance of its policy is too sanguine, or the definition in practice of a false or misleading advertisement is not strict enough. Because the ban, in the Principles, on misleading advertisements can be no more than a statement of the objective, it is case-law which must give it practical meaning. There can be no compromise on false claims. So, where there is a doubt about the truth of a claim, the benefit of the doubt must go to those who might be misled—the viewers. Further, the Authority's responsibility for the standard of advertisements requires that it should formulate the case-law, and be seen to do so.

On the second class of criticism—that the nature of the appeal made by some advertisements is socially undesirable—the Committee observe that the Principles

are not addressed to this kind of criticism. The Authority flatly rejects the case made by the critics. The criticism is not, the Report emphasises, prompted by antagonism to all advertising. It would be absurd to criticise advertisers because they seek to persuade. The criticism is of the means of persuasion adopted by some advertisements—the appeal to human weakness. Because of television's unique capacity to influence and persuade, these could well in the long run have a deplorable individual and social effect. The Committee recommend that the Authority's Principles be so revised as to make it clear that the intention is not to admit advertisements appealing to human weakness in the ways discussed in the Chapter, and that the Authority itself should give substance to intention by itself developing the body of case-law necessary to stand as a working definition.

The Chapter goes on to discuss Advertising Magazines, concludes that they blur in several ways the distinction, intended by the Television Act, between advertisements and programmes, and recommends their prohibition.

Finally, it reiterates the point that the Authority's obligation to ensure a high general standard of quality, and its responsibility to consider the social effect of television, apply to the advertisements as much as to the main programme items. "We recognise", the Committee continue, "that the Authority does not deal directly with the advertisers and can only regulate the actions of the companies from the outside. If in the result it cannot effectively exercise its powers in order to carry out its responsibilities, then this suggests that there are inadequacies of constitution and organization".

### **Particular Kinds of Programmes**

Chapter IX deals with some particular kinds of programme: religious broadcasting, party political broadcasting, the news, programmes for specific interests, foreign material, sport, and educational broadcasting.

#### **Religious broadcasting**

Discussion centred on the "main stream policy"; that is, that religious broadcasting should reflect the worship, thought and action of those churches which represent the main stream of the Christian tradition in this country. The Committee report that, crucial though the "main stream" concept is, no one expressly challenged it in principle. They add that it provides a useful practical device, but there is a risk that it will be too narrowly interpreted. "Nor can we," the Committee continue, "ignore the fact that the question of what churches are in the 'main stream' is determined by the BBC, and by the ITA, after consultation with CRAC" (the Central Religious Advisory Committee). Thus responsibility for recommending the continued exclusion of churches seeking admission to the "main stream" rests with the churches already included. However, the main stream churches were disposed to accept—and indeed to advocate—that the claims of those not yet included should be examined in the hope that the answer would be "Yes," rather than in the expectation that it would be "No."

#### **Party Political Broadcasting**

Two broad questions are noted: should minor parties be given the opportunity to broadcast in the series of party political broadcasts between general elections; and should the United Kingdom as a whole remain the unit for party political

broadcasts, or should Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and, for that matter, any English Region each get broadcasts of its own? Recording the view that it is impossible to draw up an exact definition of a "political party" for the purposes of affording the right to make party political broadcasts, the Committee conclude that it must remain a matter to be settled empirically. This favours existing major parties. But there are some safeguards. In particular, the BBC and ITA must see to it that minor parties are given a fair opportunity to take part in the normal programmes of controversial broadcasting.

The Committee accept the case for party political broadcasts for Scotland and Wales, and recommend that they be allowed, on the understanding that they are additional to those addressed to the whole of the United Kingdom.

### **The News**

The Committee report of both the BBC and of Independent Television News (ITN) that their services of news bulletins are adequate; that their criteria for the selection of news are right; and that the presentation is such as to avoid distortion. The country is well served by the national news services of both. For the television news services, the Committee comment, competition has worked well. Each is good in itself; each is different from the other in style and approach; hence they offer the viewer a worthwhile choice and stimulate one another.

### **Programmes for Specific Interests**

Here the Committee draw attention to representations advocating the use of broadcasting time for a wide range of specific interests; and to the need not only to explore the less usual possibilities for programming but to explore them often enough. By "less usual possibilities" the Committee do not mean only subject matter of the more intellectually demanding kind; the emphasis is on the extension of the whole range of subject matter and interests.

### **Foreign Material**

Under this heading the Committee examine and reject the arguments for a form of quota designed to limit the amount of foreign material used. Recalling that the principal objective is to provide the best possible television service, the Committee conclude that the inclusion of foreign items and the proportion of them to British should depend pre-eminently upon considerations of balance and quality. This is not to say there should be no control, but that it should be flexible and operated by the broadcasting authorities.

### **Sport**

The Committee reject proposals that Section 7 of the Television Act, which in effect prevents either broadcasting organization from securing an exclusive right to broadcast certain sporting or other events of national interest, should be repealed. They also report representations to the effect that attendances at sporting events are adversely affected by television; observe that the effect is not the same for all sports; and conclude that it must remain for the broadcasting organizations and the various sports associations to come to arrangements which will suit both their interests.

### **Educational Broadcasting**

Four ways in which broadcasting is concerned with education are distinguished. There are two kinds of specifically educational broadcasting: schools' broadcasts and educational broadcasts for those who have left school; then there are programmes which, though they do not aim specifically to teach, are clearly educative—for example, programmes on current affairs, medicine, the arts and sciences. Lastly, there is the generally educative effect of all programming. Schools' broadcasting apart, there is no sharp break between educational and generally educative programmes.

On schools' broadcasting, the Committee reaffirm the principle that responsibility for the content of the programmes should rest with the educationalists, and report that the standard of broadcasts on both sound and television is high. On educational broadcasting for adults, the Committee conclude that, so far as it goes—and in sound broadcasting it goes a long way—the adult educational programmes of the BBC are very good. In television, a start has been made by the BBC. Independent television, too, has made a start. A wide range of needs, interests and opportunities are waiting to be served; but it is difficult to see how they can be served so long as each broadcasting organization has only a one-channel service within which to provide educative programmes as part of a comprehensive service. How more educational programmes can be provided prompts a more general issue: whether the educational services should be separated from the comprehensive services for which the BBC and ITA are responsible, and vested in an educational broadcasting body. This issue is examined in Chapter XXIII.

## **Part III (Chapters X to XV)**

### **CONSTITUTION AND FINANCE**

Chapter X sets out the Committee's broad aim in this Part of the Report. This is to examine, in the light of the appraisal in Part II of the extent to which the two broadcasting organizations' performance succeeds and fails in realising the purposes of broadcasting, the constitution and organization of each of them. From this examination, the Committee go on to consider what, if any, structural changes are necessary so that the constitution and organization of the two broadcasting systems may make it as easy as possible to provide a good service of broadcasting and as difficult as possible to provide a bad one—not only in present circumstances, but in those likely to prevail in the future.

#### **The Powers and Duties of the Government**

Chapter XI examines the powers and duties of the Government. It notes that they are of two kinds: those relating to the conduct of broadcasting by the broadcasting authorities; and those relating to the technical means. The first kind stems from the Government's concern with the social influence of broadcasting. The Committee note that they are exercised by the Postmaster General, though they are extraneous to the general run of his business. But, the Committee continue, there is a compelling objection to the exercise of these powers by another Minister. "If a Minister's express responsibility were for the social aspects of broadcasting, he would address himself—and be expected to address himself—to the content of programmes. The effect must be to lessen

the broadcasting authorities' independence of the Government. Under the present arrangement, the Postmaster General's responsibilities for the social aspects of broadcasting derive almost incidentally from his responsibilities for its technical aspects. The basic constitutional problem of broadcasting has always been how to reconcile the Government's ultimate responsibility with the independence of the broadcasting organizations providing the services. The practical resolution of the problem is made easier by the fact that the duty of exercising the Government's responsibility attaches to this particular Ministerial office; an office whose natural concern is first with the means of broadcasting as an aspect of telecommunications. For this reason, too, the Committee reject the idea of a Broadcasting Act. They recommend that the present arrangements, whereby the Postmaster General is responsible for the exercise of the Government's powers under the general authority and direction of the Prime Minister, should remain unchanged.

On the independence of the two broadcasting organizations, the Committee record that this is accepted everywhere as fundamental to British broadcasting, and that both the BBC and ITA affirmed that they had no reason to suppose that, in the period under review, there had been any departure in practice from this policy. Its continuance calls not only for constant vigilance on the part of the Government of the day; it demands a no less unremitting discharge by the two public corporations of their responsibilities. The Committee observe that if there is any material failure by either broadcasting authority, it must promote the possibility that the traditional independence of both will be questioned.

On the exercise by the Government of its powers, the Committee comment that the broadcasting organizations can be free only so long as neither is free to take sides in public affairs. The veto on the expression by either of its own opinion on them is therefore necessary.

The second of the two vetoes forbids party political broadcasts other than those arranged in "agreement with the leading political parties for broadcasting throughout the United Kingdom". The Committee note that the veto will require amendment if, as they recommend, party political broadcasts addressed to Scotland and to Wales, and additional to the present series, are authorised.

In summary, the Committee recall that they described the basic constitutional problem of broadcasting as how to reconcile the Government's ultimate responsibility with the independence of the broadcasting organizations. "The arrangements now obtaining", the Committee continue, "are a practical resolution of that problem and it would be a profound mistake to alter them in any material way. We record the conclusion that no changes are necessary or desirable either in the powers of the Government or, in any major way, in the manner in which they are exercised."

### **The Role of the Public Corporations**

Chapter XII considers the role of the public corporations: the BBC and the ITA. The duty of providing a service of broadcasting, the Chapter notes, is vested in public corporations because the purposes and effects of broadcasting are such that the duty and responsibility could not be left to the ordinary processes of commercial enterprise, and because there are compelling objections to their being undertaken by the State. The public corporations are trustees for the national interest in broadcasting. The trustees are the corporations themselves: the Governors of the BBC, the Members of the ITA. Authority is vested in them and they are answerable for its exercise.

The Committee recall the parallel drawn between the functions of the Corporations and that of a Minister in keeping his department in touch with public opinion and subject to external criticism. The Governors' and Members' concern is to represent, care for and secure the public interest in broadcasting. To do so, they must keep aware of public opinion in every way open to them—through its expression in Parliament and in the Press, through the views of advisory committees, through letters from the public, through relevant audience research. This is not to say that they must define the public interest as the majority view on this or that element of programme content, for this would be to mistake "what the public wants"—in the misleading sense of that slogan—for the public interest. Having taken full account of public opinion, the Governors and Members must then identify the public *interest*, defined as the fullest possible realisation of the purposes of broadcasting, and secure it.

Lastly, they must preserve the independence of the corporations; each must ensure that its executive arm does not, to the detriment of the purposes of broadcasting, give way to pressures just because they can make themselves felt. They must always consider them; sometimes they will properly defer to them; but they must never compromise on the public interest in broadcasting.

The men and women charged with these responsibilities should, the Report continues, be remarkable. They undertake one of the most important national duties. The standing of the Chairman must be such as to command the respect and attention of Cabinet Ministers. The Committee reject proposals to prescribe specific categories of Governors or Members, other than those chosen to make the interests of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland their special care. There should remain the utmost freedom to appoint the person best qualified. The term of office, five years, satisfactorily reconciles two opposing considerations. It is not so long that Governors and Members cease to see their broadcasting organization from the outside, nor so short as to preclude effective control of the executive arm. The Committee consider that the fee appropriate to the post of Chairman is £6,000:

Various proposals for creating additional public bodies, to be charged with the duty of supervising or reporting on the performance of the corporations, were referred to the Committee. The bodies envisaged were of three kinds: regulatory bodies; consumers' councils; and censorship bodies. The Committee reject all three, on the general ground that they would diminish the authority and responsibility of the public corporations. The Committee draw attention to another argument. "The proposals for the creation of an external censorship throw into sharp relief a crucial defect in all the suggestions for the creation of new organizations, whether intended to regulate, or to admonish and encourage, or to censor. All these suggestions involve the separation, in greater or less degree, of responsibility for standards from the creative function in broadcasting . . . Yet it is through the exercise of this function that standards are made."

The Committee conclude that the public corporations will best succeed in carrying out their functions as trustees for the national interest in broadcasting if they have, subject only to the Government's reserve powers, full authority and full responsibility. "The national interest in broadcasting requires no less; if men and women of the stature needed to secure that interest are to be able and willing to serve on the public corporations, they must be given no less."

## The Constitution and Organization of the BBC

Chapter XIII examines the constitution and organization of the BBC and relates the criticism of the services to them, so as to ascertain whether changes are needed.

First, the Committee note certain advantages in the fact that the BBC is constituted by Royal Charter and recommend that this should continue. They recommend further that the term of the next Charter should be twelve years, which will provide a long—and yet not too long—period of working uninterrupted by investigations conducted by an independent committee.

Next, the Committee note that the BBC is an organic whole, with no objective express or implied other than to provide the best possible service of broadcasting. And, because the Corporation provides and is answerable for what it broadcasts, both the creative and regulatory activities—which together contribute to a realisation of the purposes of broadcasting—are its direct concern. To this the Committee attach great importance. "It makes, in our view, for a more perceptive understanding on the part of the Board of Governors, acting in its regulatory capacity, of the positive purposes of broadcasting."

### The System of Councils and Committees

The Report goes on to describe the system of Councils and Committees as a feature of the BBC's constitution. First, the National Broadcasting Councils for Scotland and Wales; each Council controls in its own country the Home Service of sound broadcasting. They exercise their control by "opting out" of the Home Service networked programmes and providing instead programmes of their own origination or choice; and they are, subject only to certain reserve powers retained by the Board of Governors, free to do so to the extent that they can afford. The amount they can spend annually is decided by the Board of Governors. For services other than the Home Service the Council's functions are purely advisory.

Besides the National Broadcasting Council, there are the General Advisory Council, the Northern Ireland Advisory Council and the English Regional Advisory Councils. These exercise no control over programming; their task is essentially advisory. There are, too, some twenty-five specialist committees, some organised centrally, others both centrally and regionally. Among them are, the Report notes, the Central Religious Advisory Committee (CRAC) and regional religious advisory committees, the School Broadcasting Council, and committees to advise on charitable appeals, music, agriculture and engineering. All but one are purely advisory; the exception is the School Broadcasting Council. Responsibility for the content of the schools' programmes rests with the educationalists, and they exercise it through the Council.

The Committee draw attention to the importance of the advisory role of these Councils and Committees. They relate it to the Governors' duty to keep themselves aware of, and to interpret, public opinion; to see from the outside the performance of the organization for which they are responsible; and to expound and explain their policies. But they have a right and duty to advance views of their own and must not identify themselves so closely with the BBC that they become reluctant to criticise. That would be to mistake their function.

There was, the Report continues, no criticism of the system of Councils and Committees except of CRAC. Here the criticism, founded on organisational principle, was that it served both the BBC and ITA. This, the BBC considered, diminished the value of CRAC. The Report finds that each broadcasting authority should have its own religious advisory Committee.

On the appointment, composition and effectiveness of the Councils and Committees generally, there was again little express criticism. The Report recalls, however, that there was a widespread feeling that a body to represent the interests of the consumer was necessary, observes that the General Advisory Council

should be capable of taking a sharply focussed, critical view of the BBC's policies and services, and invites the BBC to consider whether a Council as large as the present one—it numbers forty-nine people—succeeds in doing so.

### The Service in Scotland and Wales

But it was strongly represented in Scotland and in Wales—as indeed it was by the BBC—that the National Broadcasting Councils should assume responsibility for the BBC's television service in those countries. This representation is one of two which relate criticism of the BBC's services to its constitution and organization. Various bodies considered that changes of constitution and organization were necessary if deficiencies in the BBC's services to Scotland and Wales were to be made good. Some sought more than an extension of the powers of the National Broadcasting Councils, and advocated the creation of separate, independent corporations—that is, a Scottish and a Welsh Broadcasting Corporation—to provide the services in those countries. This the Committee reject. The idea of separate Scottish and Welsh Broadcasting Corporations does not in their judgment muster so much support as to suggest that there is a strong enough case. Even if it did, there would still be formidable objections. Administrative, engineering and operational costs would very greatly increase and only a small fraction of the present service of broadcasting in Scotland and in Wales could be sustained by the licence revenue collected there. The difficulties would increase with the development of additional services of television and of colour television. And, the Committee observe, the dangers of Londonisation are less than those of isolation. They go on to recommend that the National Broadcasting Council for Scotland be vested, in respect of the BBC's television service in Scotland, with rights and duties comparable with those it now exercises in respect of sound radio. They recommend, too, a similar extension of the powers of the National Broadcasting Council for Wales; in doing so, they observe that this will require the allocation of frequencies to a Welsh service.

The more general criticism of the BBC's services was, the Committee recall, that in order to ensure that audiences do not become too small, the BBC had narrowed the range of its television programming. This fault does not, however, stem from any inherent defect in the constitution and organization of the BBC. It is not found in the sound services, though they are governed by the same constitution and organization. And there is a better explanation of the fault, one arising from the present organization of television broadcasting considered as a whole. There are two services, independent of one another. Either they must compete or come to an accommodation. In general, they should compete; this is the intention. But in what? Evidently, in good broadcasting. Where this happens, as in the news bulletins and in religious broadcasting, the tendency is to prompt a widening, rather than a narrowing, of the range of programmes, and a development of the possibilities of the medium. But independent television's challenge is presented essentially as one of audience ratings. It cannot be ignored. So it operates against a widening of the range of programmes, the satisfaction of special interests and needs, and the development of possibilities.

Proposals that the BBC should not compete but should rather concentrate on the educative and educational aspects of television are vigorously rejected. This would, the Committee observe, abandon the principle of the comprehensive service, the service which seeks to open the whole range of programming possibilities for viewers to choose from. It would abandon the idea of competition, it would invite a public service, publicly financed, to give up a large part of its responsibilities. The proper course is to ensure that competition is of the right

kind, that there is competition in good broadcasting. On the same grounds the Committee reject a proposal to guarantee the BBC's income so that the Corporation need not feel that its financial security depends too much on audience ratings.

The Report concludes that the fault—a lack of the right kind of competition—at which the criticism was levelled is not ascribable to the constitution and organization of the BBC, and that major changes in them are not required. On the contrary, the constitution, including the provision of finance from licence revenue, has proved itself in all essentials.

### The Licence Fee System.

Because it affects the character of the service provided, the method of financing broadcasting is, the Committee observe, a matter of constitutional significance. Because the licence fee system, and only the licence fee system, carries no obligation other than to provide the best possible service, it is in principle to be preferred. But it must also bring in enough money. Can it continue to do so, or will the future developments proposed—another service of television, local sound broadcasting, colour television, the adoption of higher line definition standard, longer hours of broadcasting—if undertaken by the BBC cost so much as to make the licence fee too high? The BBC consider that a £6 combined sound and television licence, and a 30s. sound licence for sound only, will suffice. The £6 includes no excise duty—the present £4 licence includes £1 excise duty. Strictly it is a £3 licence plus £1 tax. The Committee compare the licence fee payable here with that in other European countries.

### Licence fees payable in some European Countries

	SOUND ONLY			TELEVISION ONLY			SOUND AND TELEVISION		
	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Austria .. .. .	1	7	2	8	6	8	9	13	10
Switzerland .. .. .	2	3	4	7	0	0	9	3	4
Sweden .. .. .	2	1	4	6	17	11	8	19	3
Finland .. .. .	1	13	6	6	14	0	8	7	6
Italy .. .. .	1	8	3	—	—	—	8	1	4*
Germany .. .. .	2	1	0	—	—	—	7	3	7*
Belgium .. .. .	1	0	7	6	0	0	6	8	8*
France .. .. .	1	8	11	—	—	—	5	8	6*
Norway .. .. .	1	10	0	3	15	0	5	5	0
Denmark .. .. .	1	5	10	3	17	6	5	3	4
Holland .. .. .	1	2	6	2	16	4	3	18	10
United Kingdom .. .. .	1	0	0	—	—	—	4	0	0*
							(including £1 excise duty)		
Luxembourg .. .. .	13	8		—	—	—			

\* Combined sound and television licence.

It is clear, the Report concludes, that the BBC's service is cheaper today, and for the most part very much cheaper, than services financed in the same way in other Western European countries. A £6 licence yearly would amount to less than 4d. daily. Taking into account the amount of broadcasting to be offered and the high quality of the service viewers and listeners could—on the BBC's

performance—confidently expect, 4d. a day would not, in the Committee's view, be too much.

It is not enough to consider whether viewers and listeners could and would pay the licence fees envisaged. Need they do so? If they can get one or more additional services of television free, if they can get local sound broadcasting free, why should licence fees go up? The Committee observe that services financed from advertising revenue would not call for any additional *direct* payment by viewers and listeners. But whether, and if so how far, viewers and listeners would pay indirectly is arguable. "We do not," the Report adds, "take it to be part of our task to pursue the arguments; we observe only that, however a service is financed, it costs no less to mount." And, finally, it cannot be supposed that the service financed by advertising revenue would be the same as that financed from licence revenue. For the "free" service cannot be offered except by an organization committed to use broadcasting for another purpose than the provision of the best possible service of broadcasting, and one which is, to a material extent, incompatible with it.

The Committee considered whether the BBC itself could safely accept some advertising revenue; this they reject as the thin end of the wedge. Nor do they consider that the BBC should engage in "subscription" television—that is, finance some of its programmes by making them available only to those who would pay for those particular programmes. The licence fee system encourages the provision of a balanced programme; the subscription system would discourage it and is therefore opposed to the purposes of public service broadcasting.

The Committee conclude the Chapter by stating that the constitution and organization of the BBC are, in general, well suited to their ends; that is, to afford the best opportunity to the Corporation of realising, as fully as possible, the purposes of broadcasting. No fundamental changes are called for. The Committee reiterate their conviction that it is an essential feature of the constitution of the BBC that it is financed solely from licence revenue, and recommend that this continue. The public service would, they believe, suffer if the BBC were financed, in whole or in part, by any other means.

### The Constitution and Organization of Independent Television

In Chapter XIV the Committee apply to independent television the treatment that was given to the BBC in Chapter XIII. They examine independent television's constitution and organization, relate their criticism of the service to them, and go on to consider whether changes are needed.

The Independent Television Authority is incorporated by Act of Parliament—the Television Act, 1954, expiring in July 1964. It charges the Authority with the duty of providing "television broadcasting services, additional to those of the British Broadcasting Corporation and of high quality, both as to the transmission and as to the matter transmitted." When the Act was before Parliament, the scheme it introduced was described as experimental. It would, at the end of the period of the operation of the Act, be comprehensively reviewed. The experiment has now been under way for some seven years.

Independent Television is a two-tier structure. It consists of the Authority and the programme contractors. The Authority's continuing functions are technical—to provide the means of broadcasting; and regulatory—to satisfy itself that the programmes comply with a number of requirements necessary to secure proper standards. The Authority does not produce the programmes; under the Act these are to be provided by commercial companies, known as

programme contractors. The companies earn their revenue by selling television advertising time. They pay the Authority for the right, under contracts with the Authority, to provide the programmes. The Authority's remaining function, not in its nature continuous, is to choose the companies to which it lets the contracts.

The Act also charges the Authority with the duty of ensuring that there is competition in the supply of programmes between a number of contractors. How this is to be done is left to the Authority.

### The "Plural" System

In organising independent television, the Authority adopted what it calls the "plural" system. It did so because it wanted to realise the benefits of a decentralized form of organization; that is, to encourage the development of a service which would tend to portray a variety, a diversity, of character and attitude, rather than concentrate on those of London and the Home Counties. The Authority in effect divided the United Kingdom into areas. For three major areas, the broadcasting time available was also divided: into a week-day franchise, from Monday to Friday; and a week-end franchise, Saturday and Sunday. In the result, four major companies hold part-time franchises for three major areas and eleven lesser companies hold full-time franchises for the remaining areas. The following table, derived largely from the ITA's 1960-61 Annual Report, summarises the disposition of the franchises.

AREA	POPULATION COVERAGE UP TO BOUNDARY OF "FRINGE" AREA	WEEK-DAY/ WEEK-END FRANCHISE	COMPANY
London .. ..	12,290,000	<i>Week-day</i>	Associated Rediffusion Ltd.
London .. ..		<i>Week-end</i>	
Midlands .. ..	7,450,000	<i>Week-day</i>	Associated Television Ltd.
Midlands .. ..		<i>Week-end</i>	
North of England ..	12,150,000	<i>Week-day</i>	Granada Television Network Ltd.
North of England ..		<i>Week-end</i>	
East Anglia .. ..	2,490,000	<i>Whole week</i>	Anglia Television Ltd.
North-East England ..	2,680,000	<i>Whole week</i>	Tyne Tees Ltd.
Southern and South-East England.	4,070,000	<i>Whole week</i>	Southern Television Ltd.
South-West England ..	1,541,000	<i>Whole week</i>	Westward Television Ltd.
South Wales and West of England.	3,240,000	<i>Whole week</i>	TWW Ltd.
West and North Wales*	1,000,000	<i>Whole week</i>	Wales Television Association.
Central Scotland ..	3,820,000	<i>Whole week</i>	Scottish Television Ltd.
The Borders .. ..	513,800	<i>Whole week</i>	Border Television Ltd.
North-East Scotland ..	872,000	<i>Whole week</i>	Grampian Television Ltd.
Northern Ireland ..	1,070,000	<i>Whole week</i>	Ulster Television Ltd.
The Channel Islands, ..	Not yet known	<i>Whole week</i>	Channel Television Ltd.

\* *Provisional.*

## Networking

Despite the decentralised form of the organization of independent television, the content of its programmes is determined very largely by the requirements of a network organised and controlled as a unit and serving the whole country. The same programme items are, for the most part, seen all over the country at the same time. For all practical purposes, the four main companies—Associated Rediffusion, Associated Television, ABC Television and Granada—arrange among themselves the provision of the programme items for the network. Because ABC Television has no week-day franchise, networking arrangements during the week are mainly settled by the other three on the following basis. Each contributes live network programmes approximately in proportion to its population coverage: Granada, two-fifths; Associated Rediffusion, two-fifths; and Associated Television, one-fifth. The general schedule of programming is settled jointly, but each company retains sovereign rights over the programme it originates and contributes to the network. They are not open to preliminary vetting or inspection by other companies.

Associated Television and ABC Television, the two major companies holding week-end franchises, share the planning of week-end programmes for the network.

The supply of network programmes to the minor companies, and payment for them, is governed by a series of agreements between the minor and major companies. Each minor company is "affiliated" to a major company. The major company acts for all four major companies in booking its affiliates' requests for the supply of network programmes. The affiliate pays only its own major company for these programmes. The total paid by all affiliates is pooled and shared by the major companies in fixed proportions.

Broadly speaking, minor companies are not bound to take the network programmes. In practice, they almost invariably do. Because there is only one programme on offer, they must either take it or produce their own or use an old, recorded network programme. Generally, the basis of payment by affiliates is this. They pay a relatively small charge—not the same for each affiliate—for each programme hour of networked material taken by them. And they pay a part of their total advertisement revenue, however many items they take from the networked programme. The effect is to discourage the minor company from providing more programmes for itself than it must. If it does provide more, the proportion of its advertising revenue paid to the major companies is not reduced.

Networking is desirable and probably inevitable. The best programmes should be available everywhere; and it would be wasteful to provide in each area the means of producing programmes to occupy the whole of broadcasting time when, in fact, the task of producing them could—and should—be shared by all areas.

It does not follow that, as practised, networking is satisfactory. It has been criticised for lack of diversity—for the fact that there is, by arrangement between the major companies, at any one time only one programme on offer from the network. But the main criticism was of its rigidity. Affiliates had little chance of getting a showing on the network for their own programmes. Planning of the network was inflexible and discouraged experiment. It was held on the other hand that not many programmes produced by affiliates were up to standard and that networking was already a very complicated business to plan and operate.

The Committee conclude that on the "plural" form of organization there has been superimposed a centralised control of programme planning. This is not to condemn the principle of networking, but simply to recognise the facts behind the form. It is also to recognise that there is little or no competition

between the companies for the supply of programmes; that the companies, though independent of one another in the sense that no one company has a financial interest in any other, are not otherwise independent. The major companies are interdependent; the minor companies are dependent on and, very largely, distributing agencies for, the major companies. Finally it is to recognise that the total franchise shared out by the Authority by areas among the companies has in effect been put together again by the companies—and then re-divided by time. This is the reality of constitution and organization, a reality resulting from the necessity for a centrally planned national service. Given that there is centralised control, as exercised it has cast programming into so rigid a mould that it is practically impossible to change it in any significant way. More than that: as organised, the system reinforces the companies' natural commercial incentive—to seek the largest audiences rather than the best service of broadcasting.

### The Authority and the Programme Contractors

Next, the Chapter turns to the relationship between the Authority and the programme contractors. As the regulatory body, responsible for the service, the Authority needs to be in effective control of the companies. But, besides the regulatory function, there is another: the creative, the positive business of programme planning and production. This is the companies' business, not the Authority's. On what they make of it must very largely depend the kind of service independent television will provide. And because it is the companies' business, it is they who hold the initiative. So the selection of the companies by the Authority and their composition are of crucial importance. The right company must be appointed in the first place; and thereafter nothing must happen to it to turn it into the wrong company.

As independent television is now constituted and organised, the Authority has to invite commercial companies to perform two functions: a public one involving expenditure—the provision of the best possible service of broadcasting; and a private commercial one bringing in revenue—the sale of advertising time. The Authority's task is, ideally, to choose only companies composed of people who will unfailingly make the second incidental to the first, despite their natural commercial interest and proper duty to their shareholders. And the Authority must make the choice on the evidence of the tendering companies' stated intentions. These intentions will have to be sustained year in, year out, for reasons of personal conviction. No doubt personal conviction operates in the companies to offset in some measure the commercial incentive. But it cannot be relied upon to ensure that the best possible service of broadcasting will be, in fact as in intention, the first objective of independent television. Yet it is upon the Authority's assessment of the strength of personal conviction underlying stated intentions that its decision to let a contract to this company or that must finally depend. Obviously, and much more easily, it will weigh the company's technical and financial competence. But personal conviction must be the essential ingredient. It can never be satisfactory that the conduct of the service should depend so largely and, for practical purposes, so irrevocably upon an assessment of this kind. The difficulty is too great. And, even if it is overcome, and the Authority picks a company owned by and composed of people whose personal convictions are so strong as to sustain good broadcasting against commercial interest and duty, for the whole period of the contract, these people will in time be replaced by others.

If the Authority could effectively enforce its directions and instructions, the choice of a company would not be so crucial. The Authority has the power to

fine a company up to £1,500 for breaches of contract. After three penalised breaches, it can give notice that the company's contract will be terminated or suspended. The real worth of these powers is questionable. The power to levy fines has little force. A small fine would be derisory. A very large one would follow from so serious an offence as to prompt the question whether the company should hold a franchise anyway. The power to end or suspend a contract is of little practical value. Because it is the extreme penalty, it would not be used save in extreme circumstances. Further, the offences which prompt the Authority to extreme action would be sins of commission rather than sins of omission. Sins of omission—failure to present the full range of programming possibilities, to experiment, to seek to develop the potential of the medium, could not attract so drastic a penalty. Lastly, the Authority could refuse to broadcast. But this power again could be used only where there is a fault of commission, or in an emergency; as a general disciplinary power it is obviously inappropriate.

In short, the Authority's powers are not such as to enable it to hold the initiative in its relations with the companies, still less to control them, once the contracts have been let. As independent television is now constituted and organised, nearly everything depends upon the act of selection and appointment.

Nor can the ownership and direction of the companies remain in practice completely within the Authority's control. As independent television is now ordered, its public service is liable to be affected by changes of ownership or direction imposed from outside.

### The Organic Weakness

The Committee are thus led to discuss the organic weakness of independent television, the fundamental constitutional weakness. The two purposes of independent television are these. First, to provide a service of television broadcasting such as will secure the public interest in broadcasting; a service which will use the medium with an acute awareness of its power to influence values and moral standards; will respect the public right to choose from among the widest possible range of subject matter, purposefully treated; will be aware of and care about public tastes and attitudes in all their variety; and will constantly be on the watch for and ready to try the new and unusual. Secondly, and incidentally, independent television is to provide a service to advertisers.

These two purposes do not coincide. The saleable product of the companies is advertising time, not the programmes. The commercial rewards will derive from making that product as desirable as possible to those who want it. This aim is largely incompatible with the essential aim of securing the public interest in broadcasting. Moreover, though the commercial success of independent television is phenomenal, its service of broadcasting has not succeeded in realising the purposes of broadcasting. The disquiet about, and the dissatisfaction with, television is attributable very largely to the service of independent television. Further, the disquiet about the content of advertisements on television is generally justified. In short, the secondary objective has been realised: the first has not. Given the present organization and constitution of independent television, can this situation be changed? Would it suffice to add to the Authority's regulatory powers? The Committee conclude that it would not. Additional powers of this kind would add to the apparent, formal authority and leave the reality unchanged. It is no use tinkering with a machine that can only turn out the wrong product. Because the natural inclination of the companies is to pursue as the main objective the sale of advertising time, because this private objective

does not coincide with the primary and essential public objective, the Authority must be able to constrain the companies to abandon the first for the second. But the initiative rests with the companies; it is precisely this—the unremitting pursuit of the purposes of broadcasting—which cannot be compelled. As independent television is now constituted and organised, the dynamic of profitability is applied to the realisation of the incidental objective; that is, to the production of desirable advertising time; and the regulatory function cannot be exercised positively to ensure that nevertheless the primary and essential objective is realised. So long as this is so, no system of controls by regulation will work. An organic change, a change of function, is necessary.

It must have the following effects:

- (i) to vest the reality of power in the Authority;
- (ii) to remove from programme planning and production the commercial incentive always to aim at maximum audiences and at maximum advertising revenue;
- (iii) to apply the incentive of profitability to the production of the best programmes;
- (iv) to promote real competition in programme production between the programme contractors;
- (v) to promote competition in good broadcasting between the BBC and independent television.

#### Major Changes Recommended

To this end, the Committee recommends the following major changes in the constitution and organization of independent television.

- (i) THE AUTHORITY TO PLAN THE PROGRAMMING
- (ii) THE AUTHORITY TO SELL ADVERTISING TIME
- (iii) PROGRAMME COMPANIES TO PRODUCE AND SELL TO THE AUTHORITY PROGRAMME ITEMS FOR INCLUSION IN THE PROGRAMME PLANNED BY THE AUTHORITY
- (iv) THE AUTHORITY, AFTER MAKING PROVISION FOR RESERVES, TO PAY ANY SURPLUS REVENUE TO THE EXCHEQUER.

The Report goes on to consider possible objections to these recommendations. To the objection that the system would be complicated, it observes that it is in fact fundamentally simple—simpler than the present system. The system would be more centralised in form than the present one, but not in fact. Programme planning would, it might be said, be taken out of the hands of producers and put into the hands of bureaucrats. But those who now plan independent television's programmes are not on the whole, and never solely, practising producers. Responsibility for programme planning would move from the companies' administrators to the Authority's. And the Authority would be expected to produce some programmes itself. The production of most items would remain with the companies' producers, who would be free from any need, implicit or explicit, to consider the market for advertising time. And because the commercial success of the companies would depend entirely on the worth of their programmes, producers would be encouraged to employ their talents as creatively and as widely as possible. Nor need independent television, revised and reorganised, be another BBC. The programmes would continue to come

from the companies; each would have the opportunity, and be encouraged, to develop its own distinctive style and approach. The changes recommended would create the circumstances in which a "plural" system would promote diversity of expression.

The Committee also considered whether charging the Authority with the duty of selling advertising time would be to "nationalize" the service. As the asset—broadcasting time—is already a national one, and at the public disposal, it cannot, they observe, be "nationalized" in the ordinary sense of the word.

Next, the Chapter considers some subsidiary but important defects of independent television. Because they are defects stemming from the present constitution and organisation, the organic changes recommended should remedy them. Again the alternative would be to apply specific controls; and again, because their purpose would be to constrain independent television, as now constituted and organized, to behave in a way alien to its natural disposition, they would be no more than palliatives—if they succeeded at all.

### Profits of the Programme Companies

First: the programme companies' profits. These are generally regarded as excessive, though the Committee emphasize that what is essentially wrong with independent television is not excessive profits but poor broadcasting. The Committee observe that since, if independent television is reconstituted and reorganized, profits from the sale of advertising time will accrue to the Authority, and since any surplus will be payable to the Exchequer, the problem of excessive profits would be automatically resolved. Nevertheless, the Report examines a series of other possibilities for reducing the profits: taxation, the Authority or Government to share the profits or revenues; the contracts to be sold to the highest suitable bidder; a "royalty" reckoned by reference to profits; an enforced reduction in the price of advertising time—that is, price control; and a reduction in the amount of advertising time. They conclude that all these ideas for reducing the profits, while leaving the constitution and organization of independent television essentially as it is, are open to serious objections. Some are ruled out on grounds of taxation principle and practice. Others would necessitate so complicated a system of controls as to make it doubtful whether they would work; and, if they did not, it is likely that the broadcasting services, considered as a whole, would suffer.

### Participation of the Press

The second subsidiary question relates to the participation of the press in television. In February, 1961, the Postmaster General wrote to draw the Committee's attention to the exchanges in the House of Commons about the concentration of ownership of newspapers and other media of communication. In doing so, he observed: "The question of the television contracts has two main aspects. First, there is the possibility that mergers or take-overs may result in significant changes in the effective control of programme companies which are inconsistent with the intention of the ITA in granting the contracts. Secondly, there is the general question of the relationship of the press to television, including the question whether control over newspapers and television stations should be vested in the same hands. Similar questions might arise with certain patterns of local sound broadcasting." The letter invited the Committee's views on these two questions. On the first of them, the Report observes that it is part of a wider issue already discussed. It had already concluded that

ownership and direction of the companies cannot, in the end, remain completely within the Authority's control. So changes inconsistent with the Authority's intention in granting a contract may occur and in time are likely to do so.

The second question refers to the threat which, some hold, is currently presented to democracy by the participation of newspapers in the television companies of independent television, a threat thought to reside in the fact that, because two of the media of mass communication are owned in some measure by the same people, there is an excessive concentration of power to influence and persuade public opinion. The Committee report that no evidence had been submitted of any bias or insufficiency in the presentation on independent television of affairs of public concern. They observe, however, that the concern was about the *threat* to democracy. It was seen as a risk, not as damage already done. The likelihood of the risk's materialising might be small; but the suspicion of too great a concentration in too few hands of the power to influence and persuade cannot be dismissed by the argument that the power has not been used and is not very likely to be used. It might be. So some limits must be set. The simplest rule would be to ban press participation altogether. But though the presumption lies, the Report continues, against press participation, it is not necessary to recommend an absolute ban. Hence a factual formula is necessary. It is satisfactory that, of the four major companies, there is no press interest at all in three. Although regrettable, it is of less consequence that press interests are found in a majority of the smaller companies. It would, however, be unnecessary to select any one of them and compel the surrender of the press interest. But in no company, however independent television is constituted and organised, should the press interest be dominant. In other words, it must not be the largest single interest.

Finally, the Committee observe that the problem of the participation of the press in the programme companies is important because the present constitution and organization of independent television vests the reality of power to influence and persuade in the companies, while the regulating arm—the Authority—can exercise little effective control. If the recommendation for reconstituting and re-organising independent television is adopted, so that effective power resides in the Authority, the participation of the press in programme companies will lose much of its significance.

The Chapter concludes by reiterating the Committee's view that the constitution and organization of independent television are defective and that the defects largely account for the failure of the service to realise the purposes of broadcasting. Nothing in the present circumstances of independent television suggests that the failings are those of an organization needing only time to correct them. On the contrary, time is more likely only to establish and reinforce them. They are not curable by adding to existing controls. To remedy them, the organic changes recommended are essential.

### Personnel Policies

In Chapter XV the Committee examine the principles governing the personnel policies of the BBC and of the ITA. They record that the policies are satisfactory and that there is no reason to suppose that practice falls materially short of intention.

## Part IV (Chapter XVI)

### THE TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Chapter XVI is called "Performance and Prospects." Under the first heading it examines the performance of the two broadcasting authorities in making their services available—that is, the extent of the coverage and the quality of the reception of the services.

#### Coverage and reception of the present services

First, the BBC's services of sound radio, the medium wave transmission of the Home Service, Light Programme and Network Three/Third Programme, must for many years continue to suffer from interference, particularly after dark, from European stations. For this reason, the BBC is duplicating the services on very high frequency (VHF) transmissions. These transmissions are free from such interference and from much background noise. The VHF stations so far built by the BBC serve 97 per cent. of the population: by the end of 1963, over 99 per cent. will be served. Complaints about the reception of the BBC's sound services were few, and mostly attributable to the unavoidable interference with the medium wave transmissions. Almost always, the remedy is to get a set capable of receiving VHF. By the summer of 1960 only one in five households, it was estimated, had VHF sets.

The BBC's television service covers 98·8 per cent. of the population. Planned extensions will push this figure up to 99·4 per cent. The coverage attained by the ITA, whose first station opened in 1955, is 94 per cent.; and their present plans should increase it to about 97 per cent. Complaints about the coverage achieved by, and the quality of the reception of, the television services were few. But, the Committee were told, the services should be brought as quickly as possible to the Scottish Highlands and Islands. Nor should the services to Wales share frequency channels with the services to England.

Within the frequency channels at present allotted to the broadcasting authorities the coverage they expect to obtain, the Committee conclude, will be a considerable achievement. This is not, however, to say that no further extension is needed; for those people who would otherwise remain unserved need the service most. Many of them live in the remotest and harshest parts of the country. Further, given the present allocation of frequencies, there has to be a common service to Wales and England. And, finally, reception is not satisfactory everywhere. The question this leaves is important; in considering what additional services should be provided, and what frequencies should be given over to them, one must not forget to ask first whether the present services should be improved by extending coverage to those who are not covered, by improving reception and by separating the transmission of the service to Wales from that of the service to England.

#### Room for more services

The next step is to consider what additional services *can* be provided. Any extension of sound broadcasting will need to use VHF, and there are available enough of these frequencies to enable a service of local sound broadcasting to be transmitted. Whether there should be such a service is another matter. The Report deals with that later.

For an extension of the television services, VHF and UHF (ultra high frequencies) are available. But the question is complicated by a further question: whether or not to change the line definition standard as used here from the present 405-lines to the 625-lines generally in use in Europe.

The amount of frequency space, or the channel-width, needed for a 625-line service is greater than that needed for a 405-line service. So, if the 625-line standard is adopted, the total number of television services *physically* possible will be reduced. But since, for reasons of international frequency planning, the United Kingdom has anyway to channel the UHF frequencies as if for a 625-line service, the number of television services it will be *practically* possible to provide on those frequencies—that is, four—will be the same, whether on 405- or on 625-lines. On VHF it would be possible to provide on 405-lines three programmes—the present services of the BBC and the ITA, and one new programme of about 95 per cent. coverage. But on 625-lines it would, if certain conditions are satisfied, be possible to provide two services of national coverage only.

### Line definition standards

It would, then, be a disadvantage of changing to 625-lines that a seventh programme, of some 95 per cent. coverage, would be lost. The main advantage of the 625-line over the 405-line standard is that, in the long run, the public will get a better picture at little if any extra cost. The cost to the broadcasting authorities will not be materially greater, and they should be able to sell programmes abroad more readily. The export of transmitting and receiving equipment should be assisted. For these reasons, the Committee conclude, it would be of great advantage if television in the United Kingdom were on the 625-line standard—provided that the short term difficulties and disadvantages of *making* the change do not outweigh the long term advantages.

Two methods of making the change are discussed: "duplication" and "switch-over". Under duplication, the two existing programmes, transmitted on 405-lines on VHF, would duplicate on 625-lines in UHF. Both transmissions—405-line and 625-line—of both programmes would continue until 405-line television sets had been replaced as through the normal course by 625-line sets. Then the 405-line transmission would stop. The two present programmes would continue on 625-lines on UHF only; the VHF bands would be re-engineered for use for 625-line transmission. Under the switch-over method, shadow plant and equipment capable of transmitting on 625-lines in the VHF bands would be installed. On an appointed day, transmission would switch from the 405- to the 625-line standard within that band.

Comparing the two, the Report notes that duplication necessitates two transmissions of each of the two programmes and therefore the use of UHF. The characteristics of transmission on UHF are different from those of VHF and, in some respects, more troublesome. If the difficulties proved too great, VHF transmissions could not be allowed to stop. In that case the change by duplication to 625-lines would not be possible. This is a risk: but the technical opinion, founded on large-scale experiment, available to the Committee is that an acceptable service could be provided in UHF. No doubt there will be difficulties; but the argument against duplication rests in the end upon an objection which only the opening of a public service could prove or disprove and which, on the technical opinion put to the Committee, is unlikely to materialise.

By contrast, the main objections to switch-over are certain. It will cost viewers more than changeover by the duplication method because all would need to buy 405/625-VHF/UHF television sets; that is, all would have to equip for all

possibilities. Under the duplication method, some would have to do so but some would in the ordinary way replace their old sets by sets receiving 625-lines only. Under switchover, much of the cost will be incurred in the few months immediately before the appointed day. Other objections are the likelihood that many viewers would be unprepared and would be deprived of the two services for some time; the burden on the servicing side of the industry in the period immediately preceding switchover; and the prospect that some viewers could find, after switchover, that they either had no service at all of the present programmes, or a worse grade of service than at present.

The Report concludes that the duplication method is to be preferred, but that it must remain for the opening of a public service on UHF to confirm the appraisal of its probable technical quality. But are there nevertheless any short-term difficulties and disadvantages such as would outweigh the long-term advantages of adopting the 625-line standard? It rules out the possibility of introducing a third national programme on 405-lines and in VHF. But a decision to provide for a third national programme in this way would preclude a separate service for Wales until a service on UHF was available. This would defer a Welsh programme for several years.

And there is the cost of change-over by duplication. The consideration to note first is that *any* extension of the services of television on a national scale will necessitate the use of UHF. That cost would have to be met, whether or not a change of line standards were decided upon. So the amount at issue is the cost of moving into UHF, on 625-lines, and the cost of moving into UHF, on 405-lines.

First, the viewers. Those who had, on account of the changeover, to buy 405/625-line sets, would have to pay some £12 or so extra. It might be less rather than more. Over the life of the set, it would amount to, say, thirty shillings a year. Viewers who did not need to buy 405/625-line sets would have to pay little, if anything, more for new sets on account of the changeover.

Second, the broadcasting authorities. For them, the need to duplicate each of the two existing programmes would mean higher costs during the duplication period. But it will be relatively little.

The Report concludes that the short term difficulties and disadvantages of change-over do not outweigh the long term advantage to be derived from the adoption of the 625-line definition standard. It recommends that a change from 405- to 625-lines be authorised forthwith.

### Colour Television

The main questions are: is there available a technically satisfactory system; if so, is it likely to be superseded by a basically different and better system in the foreseeable future; and is there available a television set which will receive colour satisfactorily?

To the first question, the answer is "Yes". It is some years since the NTSC system was reported on as satisfactory. Using this system, the BBC has conducted experiments in the transmission on 405-lines of pictures in colour: more recently it announced its intention of experimenting in 625-line transmission. But there is another system, the "SECAM" system. This, it has been said, might prove a serious rival to the NTSC system. The technical merits of the two systems are, the Report continues, already under examination and it should not take long to decide whether SECAM is preferable. Sets capable of receiving colour are likely to be expensive—perhaps three times as much as black-and-white receivers. Various kinds of colour receiver are now under development;

and by the time a colour service has got under way in some two or three years' time, they would be likely to be ready. They are likely still to be dear, so that demand may grow only slowly. But this would not be reason enough not to make a start.

The Report concludes that since a satisfactory system of transmission—the NTSC system—already exists, the means of providing a service exists. Accordingly, without recommending any particular system of transmission, it recommends the introduction of a service of colour television. The service would be compatible—that is, receivable as a black-and-white picture on ordinary sets. It is a condition of the recommendation that the service is on 625-lines.

## Part V (Chapters XVII to XXIII)

### THE FUTURE

Chapter XVII deals with the future of sound broadcasting.

The Committee recall the general view, reported in Chapter IV, that the number of national services of sound broadcasting were enough and that no one advocated that there was a need for more, whether provided by the BBC or by any other body. They conclude that there are in sound broadcasting no deficiencies such as could only be made good by providing additional national services.

#### Local sound broadcasting

But a number of proposals for local sound broadcasting were put to the Committee. The aim these proposals have in common is to provide any community of sufficient size, and with a recognizable identity, with its own transmitting station. The range might be from some two to ten miles radius—a typical range would be five miles. The station would transmit "local" programmes. But what is to be understood by "local"? It might mean only that a large number of stations would each serve a small area. Or it might mean that the programme broadcast by a local station would, for a sufficient part of the day, be of *particular interest to the locality served by that station rather than to other localities*. If local sound broadcasting is to mean what it implies, the second of the two definitions is the right one.

Almost all the proposals for a service fell into one of two classes. The first was that it should be provided by the BBC and paid for out of licence revenue, the second was that it should be provided by commercial companies whose programmes would include advertisements; the public service of broadcasting would be paid for out of proceeds of the sale of advertising time.

#### What could local sound broadcasting provide?

The Report recorded earlier that there are enough frequencies available for broadcasting a local sound service. But what worthwhile programmes would it provide which the existing sound services do not? There was no evidence of spontaneous public demand. However, if people do not know what they are missing, they cannot be said not to want it. What, then, might they be missing; what is the character and purpose of the service proposed?

The BBC saw the service as essentially one of local news and information. It would report local affairs, discuss local controversies, report local and

parliamentary elections, and provide a local information service on sport, weather, traffic problems and shopping facilities. There would also be items of a more generally educative kind, drawing material from schools and universities, museums and art galleries, industry and business. The Corporation expected that services from churches of all denominations would be broadcast. So, too, would reports of church activities. Programmes of adult education in the evening were another possibility. From the experience gained from their experiments, the BBC estimated that programmes from local sources could be expected to build up to four or five hours daily. Material to fill-in the service when local items were not being broadcast would be obtained by switching in to one or other of the three national sound services or by drawing on the Corporation's own resources of recorded music. Generally, the companies proposing to engage in local sound broadcasting had not developed their views about the character and content of the service; some were quite unespecific. Bristol and West of England Radio Ltd. envisaged a number of programming possibilities. Southdown Radio hazarded the guess that local programming might average one hour daily, apart from the news. The Committee record having heard extracts from the BBC's experimental "broadcasts" in six towns, and extracts from a "broadcast" prepared by the South Coast Broadcasting Company Ltd.

Summing up, the Committee conclude that the evidence of available local material justifies a sustained and broadly-based trial, in the expectation that an extensive pattern of local stations might follow.

#### **Who should provide the service?**

The next question is: who should provide the service, the BBC or the commercial companies? It would have to be the responsibility of a public corporation, a requirement that would be met automatically if the BBC provided the service. If the companies were to do so a regulatory public corporation would have to be made responsible for the service, much as the ITA is responsible for the service of independent television. But this would create just the same kind of problems as have arisen in independent television. It would, the Committee believe, be impossible for a public corporation to exercise positive responsibility for the content and character of the service. And as there might well be some scores of companies, it is highly unlikely that an authority could exercise its regulatory responsibilities effectively; there would be too many companies for it to be able to supervise them all. Further, if local commercial sound broadcasting were introduced, the need for a networked "fill-in" programme and for the centralised sale of advertising time would result in a system of major companies, relatively few in number, which would supply the programme and sell advertising time booked nationally or regionally for the local companies. Groups of the local companies would be "affiliated" to a major company.

A service provided by commercial companies would not require any direct payment by the listening public. Whether it would be free, in the sense that the public would not pay for it indirectly, is debatable. If the BBC were to provide the service, the licence fee would go up by about five shillings a year. And the BBC would be under no obligation other than to provide the best service of local sound broadcasting, wherever it could best do so.

#### **Some outside factors**

Some other considerations were put to the Committee. First, what would be the effect of a local service, financed from the sale of advertising time, on the local press? It was strongly held that it must attract revenue from local news-

papers and many of them would no longer be able to support themselves and would die. Some representatives of local newspapers contended that they should provide or help provide the service. Others argued that, if a service were authorised, it should be provided by the BBC for a limited period. The ground common to both is plainly this: if local sound broadcasting financed by advertising is introduced, and if the local newspapers do not share in it and in the earnings, then they will feel the pinch.

But there is a strong argument against newspapers' going into local sound broadcasting. There is often only one local newspaper. If it operated a local station, the power to influence and persuade opinion would be concentrated into too few hands. True, the public authority would be responsible; and one of its responsibilities would be to ensure impartiality in the choice and treatment of material and that the companies did not use the stations to advocate their own opinions. Whether the public authority could effectively carry out these responsibilities is another question, one to which, earlier in the Chapter, the Committee answer "No". They conclude that local newspapers should not take part in local sound broadcasting companies. And they note that, if the BBC were to provide the service and it were financed from licence revenue, there would be no question of competition with local newspapers for advertising revenue.

Another consideration put to the Committee was that, on grounds of principle, the BBC's monopoly of sound broadcasting should be broken; so companies should provide the service. The Committee's view is that, whether one believes that all monopoly is objectionable or not, the effect of authorising companies to provide the service will not break a monopoly. Local sound broadcasting, properly defined, is different from national sound broadcasting. So, whether the BBC or companies provide the local service, it will be, in each locality, a monopoly. If the BBC provide it the local monopoly will be in the same hands as the national monopoly. If the companies provide it the two monopolies would be in different hands; but it would be a mistake to suppose that a monopoly would be broken. Another would be created. Nor would the monopoly stop at programming. It would include a local monopoly of the sale of advertising time. Finally, because a commercial service would threaten the existence of local newspapers, it would tend itself to develop into a monopoly of the means of influencing local opinion.

Of course, if in any one locality two local services were provided by separate organisations, there would in that locality be no monopoly of the local service. But to provide two services would, broadly speaking, halve the number of localities served. This the Committee reject, because a public service should be as widely available as possible.

In short, the argument based on a rejection of monopoly defeats itself. Further, it is not the best way to tackle the question of who should provide a service of local sound broadcasting. The best way is to ask who, all things considered, will get the results wanted; who is most likely to provide a service which will broadcast for a sufficient part of the day a worthwhile programme of particular interest to the locality served by the local station?

The Committee consider that the BBC can confidently be expected to do so. The BBC would have no obligation except to provide the best service. Their experience and tradition would guarantee first principles: that local controversy will be expressed, but expressed impartially; that there will be no expression of the local station's opinion on matters of public moment; and that the independence of the service will be deserved and defended. A service provided by commercial companies and financed by advertising revenue would not, in the Committee's judgment, get the results wanted. The obligation to satisfy the needs

of advertisers would, very largely, go against the main obligation—to provide the best possible service of local broadcasting. The public corporation responsible for the service would not be able to ensure that the main obligation was met. And, if a service were provided by commercial companies, they would either include the local newspapers—which would be undesirable; or exclude them—and so threaten their existence.

The Report recommends that one service, and one service only, of local sound broadcasting be provided; that it be provided by the BBC and financed from licence revenue; and that the frequencies available be so deployed as to enable it to be provided for the largest possible number of distinctive communities.

### Television

Chapter XVIII deals with the future of television. If the 625-line definition standard is adopted, it will eventually be possible to provide six national programmes of television. If changeover from 405- to 625-lines is based on the duplication method, *during the changeover period* it will be possible to provide the following—

- On VHF (*Bands I and III*) { The two present programmes on 405-lines; and either an additional national programme on 405-lines, or a separate Welsh programme and the improvement and extension of coverage of the present programmes—all on 405-lines.
- On UHF (*Bands IV and V*) { Two programmes duplicating on 625-lines the two existing 405-line programmes; and two additional programmes.

### A Welsh programme

Which of the two possibilities on VHF should be adopted—an additional national programme on 405-lines; or a separate Welsh programme on 405-lines—plus improvements here and there of the existing programmes? The additional national programme could be provided almost at once in this way; otherwise it will have to wait for some years until a 625-line service on UHF is available. But another national programme on 405-lines would so greatly complicate the changeover from 405- to 625-lines as probably to rule it out. A separate Welsh programme would not do so. And this offers the only immediate prospect of separating the BBC's service to Wales from its service to England. The Committee conclude that it would be fairer to provide the first programme designed to meet Welsh needs and aspirations before providing a third programme for nearly everybody. So practical requirements and fair dealing point to the same answer: the Committee recommend that, in allotting the uncommitted frequencies in the VHF Band III, the first priority be given to separating the BBC's service to Wales from that to the English Regions; and the second to improving the reception and completing the coverage of the two existing programmes.

When the changeover has been completed and VHF Bands I and III have been adapted for 625-line transmission, it might not, in the two national programmes which could then be broadcast in these Bands, be possible to separate the Welsh from the English programme. But UHF coverage would then be complete; and in all four UHF services the programmes for Wales could be separated from those for England.

### Additional national services

Ultimately, six programmes will be possible; an ultimate total of six programmes should be planned. For some years, two will duplicate the two existing programmes. So, it will be possible *in the near future* to provide two additional programmes. How many *should* be provided, and by whom? Most of the submissions sent to the Committee assumed that only one extra programme—the third television programme—could be provided; and the overwhelming volume of opinion was that it should be. The demand and the material are, the Committee consider, enough to justify two additional programmes.

What sort of programmes? Should they be comprehensive, covering the whole range of programming, or should they specialise on this or that aspect of it? There were some proposals for a service specialising in education; and these the Committee examine and reject later in the Report. Generally, the Report continues, there was opposition to the idea of a “cultural” service for its own sake; it was held rather that each programme should be balanced, each should treat the whole range of subject matter. The Committee conclude that it would be wrong to depart from the concept of the comprehensive service.

Next, should the programmes be national or regional? The Committee rule out, as impracticable, proposals for autonomous regional and local television broadcasting.

Or should they be “complementary” or “competitive”? Should an additional programme complement an existing programme; or should it compete with an additional programme? The BBC argued for complementary programming. Under it, the content of the two programmes—one existing, and one extra—would be planned overall. They could be so planned as to allow different kinds of item to be broadcast at the same time. In this way, more viewers would at any given moment find something to their taste. It would also help Regional broadcasting: it could give regional viewers the opportunity of seeing items produced for them without depriving them of the opportunity of seeing the national programme. The ITA argued for the additional competitive programme. The argument was that, on grounds of good constitutional doctrine, it is wrong to put the production of two programmes in the hands of a single organisation; the important thing is that there should be as many different suppliers of programmes as possible.

In considering these two opposing views, the Committee ask what is more likely to result here and now in the best possible service of broadcasting. Complementary programming would provide more choice at any given moment, and wider range of programmes. It would make it possible to broadcast programmes addressed specially to Scotland, Wales, or Northern Ireland, or English Regions without depriving viewers there of a national programme if they wanted it. It would at best be a matter of chance whether competitive programming had these results. And, because of the kind of competition which would occur, they are very unlikely. Whatever other kind of competition there might or might not be, there would certainly be competition in the sale of advertising time. Experience in other countries is that this kind of competition, so far from promoting the purposes of broadcasting, or extending the range of programming, or helping to realise the potential of the medium, serves rather to restrict them.

The Committee conclude that the additional, complementary programme would certainly and greatly improve the service of television. In their judgment, the additional competitive programme would not.

By whom should additional services be provided?

The memoranda sent to the Committee variously suggested that "the third television programme" should be provided by the BBC; by the ITA; by both together; and by a new public corporation.

With few exceptions, those who proposed a new corporation proposed also that it should be publicly financed. But there are formidable objections to the idea of a new corporation. It would cost much more in men and material. During the period of changeover only two new programmes are possible; if one went to a new and untried corporation then either the BBC or the ITA would have to go without a second programme—and so would be unable to engage in complementary programming. Further, the problem of sharing licence revenue between two corporations would lead in time to a situation in which the Government would have to justify, by reference to the standards and quality of programmes, the way the money had been allocated. And this would threaten the independence of the broadcasting authorities. On these grounds, the Report rejects the idea of setting up a new corporation. The Report also rejects, as impracticable, the proposal that the BBC and the ITA should share a third programme. The practical possibilities are, then, these: either the BBC should provide an additional television programme, or independent television should do so, or both should provide one each.

The Committee are convinced that the next programme should be provided by the BBC. First, all the organizations which wrote to the Committee as viewers and which, in commenting on the programmes provided, distinguished between those of the BBC and independent television, considered that the BBC were providing the better—and, in most cases, by far the better service. In their own examination of the services provided by the two organizations, the Committee concluded that the BBC's service was on the whole a successful realisation of the purposes of broadcasting, but that of independent television was not. Second, the BBC's conception of the uses to which to put a second programme—the complementary service—is right, and better calculated to make good deficiencies in the present services. Third, of all the organisations which entered submissions as viewers, the overwhelming majority said that the next service should not be "commercial"—that is, financed from advertising revenue. Most advocated that it should be provided by the BBC.

The Report recommends that the BBC should provide the next television programme, and that this should be authorised as soon as possible.

On independent television, the Committee recall their conclusion that its failure to realise the purposes of broadcasting is due to the nature of its constitution and organization. They recommend that, so long as it is constituted and organised as at present, it should not provide any additional services of television.

If, however, it were reconstituted and re-organised as the Committee recommend, it would be advantageous if independent television were in due course authorised to provide a second programme. It would offer the Authority the opportunity of providing complementary services, and so of extending the range and interest of both. And it should help to promote competition *of the right kind* between independent television and the BBC—that is, competition in good broadcasting.

The Report recommends that if, after independent television, reconstituted and re-organised, has had sufficient time to adapt itself to its new constitution, it has proved its capacity to realise the purposes of broadcasting, it should be authorised to provide a second programme. The Committee hope that it will be possible to authorise this within five years of the reconstitution.

### The monopoly of advertising time on television

Some advocates of a second service of independent television rested their case on the proposition that the monopoly of advertising time held by each programme company in its own area should be broken. If there were a second service, so that there were in any given area two companies, they would compete. The Report observes that proper competition—that is competition between the BBC and independent television in good broadcasting—has not been achieved except in a limited way. It is highly desirable that there should be competition of this kind. But competition designed to end the companies' monopoly of advertising time is something quite different. The service of advertising is the secondary and incidental purpose of independent television. The desirability of ending the monopoly of the supply of this service would not justify a step which would virtually rule out competition between the BBC and independent television in good broadcasting and which would be likely to lower the standards of the present programmes.

### Hours of Broadcasting

With regard to sound radio, the BBC submitted, the Report records in Chapter XIX, that the existing services had two shortcomings. First, many people went to work before broadcasting began, and others were at work after it ended. Second, present-day audiences for sound radio were larger in the day-time than they were in the evening, yet the three-programme system did not start till the early evening. The Corporation wished, therefore, to start the Light Programme at 5.30 a.m. instead of 6.30 a.m., and to carry it on beyond midnight until 2.0 a.m. And it wished to use the Network Three/Third Programme frequencies during day-time hours, when now they were unused. In this period, from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. they would be used mainly to broadcast serious music.

The Report comments that sound radio can have much to offer people at work. An increase in the hours of sound broadcasting would not be nearly so expensive as a corresponding increase in television hours. Sound broadcasting very late or very early will, on the other hand, be a nuisance to many people. But, on balance, the case for some increase is made out.

For television, the main question is whether the hours of broadcasting should be, broadly speaking, the same for the BBC and independent television. The BBC's case is that competition should mean fair competition, and that fair competition requires not exact parity of hours, but no large disparity. If there were unfair competition, the television services to the public would suffer as a whole. The ITA's case is essentially that, since independent television can afford a large increase in hours, it is unfair to prevent it from providing them and unfair to the public to prevent it from receiving them, just because the BBC cannot keep step.

If, the Report observes, the Committee's recommendations are accepted, there will be provided in the course of the next few years two additional television programmes: one by the BBC, one by independent television reconstituted and re-organised. There would certainly be more television, and it would be provided in the way best calculated to offer viewers a greater range of subject matter to choose from. This is how best to develop the services to the public. Attention should first and foremost be concentrated on the provision of the complementary programme. But this could not go on at the same time as a major increase in the number of broadcasting hours without too greatly dispersing effort and resources of all kinds. The quality of the television services, considered as a whole, should be the first consideration, rather than the amount of any one

programme. The present eight or nine hours of programming daily on each of the two services can hardly be called scarcity. If any increase is called for at present, the Report concludes, it should be moderate.

### Relay Services

In Chapter XX the Committee consider the terms under which the relay services are provided. The programmes broadcast by the BBC and the ITA, and sound programmes broadcast from abroad, can be picked up by a receiving station and re-distributed by wire. Commercial companies have built and operate such stations for the purpose of re-distributing—or relaying—broadcast programmes by wire to viewers and listeners. These companies earn revenue by charging viewers and listeners for the service. Before they can operate these relay services, the Companies must hold a licence from the Postmaster General. The Chapter considers the terms on which licences are issued. The main conclusions were that in future the licence should require the Companies to relay all the national sound services of the BBC before relaying foreign services, and that the practice of relaying the sound content only of television programmes should cease.

### Subscription Television

Broadcasting in this country, Chapter XXI points out, is paid for either out of licence revenue or out of advertising revenue. "Subscription Television" (or "toll" or "pay" television) involves a third method of paying. In order to get a particular programme—a play, variety show, sporting event—the viewer must pay or promise to pay the broadcasting organisation providing it. Just as one pays to go into a theatre or cinema, so one would pay to see a programme—by putting coins in a meter or by clocking-up a debt against oneself.

A service of subscription television could either be transmitted by wire or broadcast. A number of systems have been developed, or are under development. Essentially, subscription television is a *method of paying*; and it has become possible because the means of metering and of barring viewers who have not paid, or not committed themselves to pay, are now becoming available. But is it a desirable method of paying? In broadcasting, the method of payment affects the character of the service provided. What will be the effect of subscription on the service it provides? And what will be its effect on the existing services to the public?

### The cost of a service

As a method of paying for a television service, subscription must always be dearer than the licence fee method. Metering and access-barring apparatus must be installed and maintained for every subscriber. Arrangements must be made to collect cash or to bill subscribers. These costs are the costs of getting in the money. It is plain that, whatever allowances are made, they must be very many times greater than the cost of licence fees. And because of the high cost of subscription as a method of paying, the direct overall cost to the viewer of a service of subscription television will be greater than the cost of a service financed in any other way. One company wishing to provide a service suggested that the charge for a particular programme item would work out at about half-a-crown. Another company stated that single programme prices might range from 6d. to 10s. 0d. As examples of what programmes might cost, the following examples have been given: the film "Snow White and the Seven

Dwarfs", 2s. 6d.; a play from a London theatre, 7s. 6d.; the Bolshoi Ballet, 5s. 0d.; a world title fight, 10s. 0d. In the experimental service in Etobicoke, Toronto, charges generally range from 25 cents to one dollar. By contrast, an annual licence fee of £6 amounts to nearly 2s. 4d. a week, or rather less than 4d. per day. The BBC envisages a £6 licence fee as necessary to sustain two complementary television programmes, to extend the hours of some national sound services and to provide a service of local sound broadcasting. The licence fee would, of course, remain payable if subscription television were introduced.

A *broadcast* subscription television service will not be an *extra* service; it will mean one less broadcast service financed in any other way. Because it is the dearest way of paying, it would have to bring in worthwhile advances that a service paid for in any other way could not. Is this likely?

#### The programmes a service would provide

The companies wishing to engage in subscription television founded their case on the better programming they expect it to provide. It could, they argue, afford programme items of a kind or quality which the present services cannot or will not provide: the "live" showing of some sporting events, new cinema films, plays and other stage events featuring leading performers; and items which would attract minority audiences. In summary, the argument is that a service financed by subscription will make good deficiencies in the present services.

There are three major reasons for these deficiencies: first, the cost of some programme items; second, the shortage of broadcasting time at the right time of day; and third, the present constitution and organisation of independent television. The cost of a few possible programme items is always likely to be prohibitive, usually by design; new cinema films and stage successes in full are examples. But each of these items is a special instance within a large class of programme matter, a class already represented on television. Thus, the drama is well represented. Sport is, on the whole, well served. For the shortage of broadcasting time at the right time of day, the remedy is the complementary service. The Report recalls its earlier recommendation to authorise the BBC to provide a complementary service; and its further recommendation that if independent television were reconstituted and re-organised it too should provide one.

Nor do the Committee consider that the range of subject matter would be better extended if one of these services were allotted instead to subscription television. It would be a commercial service in the ordinary usage of the word. It would offer programmes for sale to viewers. It would have every incentive and duty to do so as profitably as possible. Though minority programmes bought by some hundreds of thousands of viewers would be profitable, majority programmes bought by several millions would be far more so.

The Committee conclude that a service of subscription television would not in the event either widen the range of programming or complement the present services. It could provide a few items which a service financed in any other way could not, but it would not make good the deficiencies viewers find in the present services.

#### A wired service

Should a wired service, as distinct from a broadcast service, be regarded separately? Some said that a wired service could not properly be regarded as a service of television, but rather as an extension of the box-office and auditorium. But the Committee record the view that whatever appears on television screens

is television, whether transmitted by wire or by radio. All the social implications and all the responsibilities are the same.

#### **The effect on existing services**

Because the cost of providing a service of subscription television is high, it must earn large revenues in order to survive. To earn large revenues it must command regular payments from very large audiences. So it could not depend only on programmes which the present services do not provide—these are few in kind. Subscription television would have to sustain a service largely, if not mainly, from programmes of the kind already provided by the present services. A commercially successful service of subscription television could afford to pay more for these programmes than could the existing services and would be bound to deprive the existing services of some of their more popular items. In short, programmes which viewers now see for the price of the annual licence fee would be withheld from them, unless they paid.

There is a further very important point. If a service of subscription television were transmitted only by wire, the result would be not only that some viewers would have to pay for programmes they now see for the annual cost of the licence fee; it would also be to rob many viewers of a chance to see them at all. For a wired service could not attain to national coverage. Viewers living in areas not served would have lost programme items now available on the present services and would not have the chance to recover them by paying, even if they wished to pay and could afford to do so.

In summary, subscription is necessarily much the dearest way of providing a service. It is highly unlikely that it would bring any marked increase in the range and quality of programming. But if it were commercially successful, it would certainly and significantly reduce the value to viewers of the present services. Some viewers would, if the services did not have national coverage, be unable to make good this reduction by paying for the subscription service; others would not be able to afford to pay; the rest would pay where now they do not. The Committee recommend that no service of subscription television be authorised, whether by wire or, if frequencies become available, by radio.

#### **Television for Public Showing**

In Chapter XXII the Committee discuss television for public showing, that is to say a service televised from a central point to one or more buildings, such as cinemas, at which people pay admission. In the Committee's view such a service could offer little that is not already available to the public through the existing services. The effect of a successful service would be to deprive viewers of programmes they now see in their homes.

#### **Educational Broadcasting**

Chapter XXIII deals with educational broadcasting, and the major question examined is whether, in future, the provision of educational broadcasting should be separated from the comprehensive services for which the two public corporations are responsible. Broadly speaking, two kinds of proposal were put to the Committee. Both concentrated on television. The first was that

there should be an "educational channel", different from the channels on which the existing services of the comprehensive kind are receivable. A new national authority would be created to assume responsibility for the service. The second also envisaged an educational channel, but did not envisage the creation of a new authority.

The case for a specialised service was developed by the ITA in a memorandum published in December 1961 under the title "Educational Television". Recalling its belief that three comprehensive services were perfectly adequate to meet public demand, the Authority argued that, rather than provide a fourth, it would be better to provide a service specialising in education. It would be mainly a teaching service, though it might also contain cultural items. The service might or might not include the existing broadcasts for schools; the Authority leave this question open. They observe that the method of paying for the service would need further study. It might draw resources from statutory and other bodies responsible for education. Industrial and commercial organisations might contribute. So, too, might some of the major charitable foundations in the United Kingdom. There might also be some form of payment, whether direct or indirect, by viewers using the service.

At first sight, the Report comments, the idea of a specialised educational service of television, and for that matter of sound radio, is attractive. There is an increasing demand that more resources and broadcasting time should be devoted to education. Education is one of the three major purposes of broadcasting. But it is another question whether this purpose is better achieved by introducing a specialised and predominantly teaching, or by introducing a fourth comprehensive, service.

As a major purpose of broadcasting, education must be defined in its most liberal sense; as the development of the imagination, of the spirit of enquiry, of the critical attitude; as promoting breadth of interest and understanding; as making for the greatest awareness of the possibilities of mind and feeling open to human experience; in summary, as an essential part of a full life. Teaching by broadcasting can help to this end. So, too, does the truly comprehensive service; by putting the widest possible range of subject matter before the viewer, it makes a major contribution to education in the liberal sense of the word. It does so not only in its specifically educational—and educative—programmes, not only in its programmes of information, but also in its programmes of entertainment.

Perhaps more important is the overall impact of the whole programme. If it does not make its full contribution to the educational purpose of broadcasting—because that purpose is catered for by the specialized programme—then the picture it presents will be of a society deficient in, or careless about, or hostile to, education; or of one which thinks of education as being in an exclusive compartment of its own and having nothing to do with life as a whole.

Many of the leading educational organisations, the Committee report, argued strongly that it would be harmful to separate education from general broadcasting. This could result from the introduction of a specialised service. The Authority states that a specialised service must not be made the occasion for reducing the serious content of the existing services. But it is likely that this would be the result: for, from being unchallengeably a proper purpose of all broadcasting, education would have become demonstrably the particular business of one service only. If one service specialised in educational broadcasting, then the others would tend to specialise in "other" broadcasting.

And if a service were labelled "educational", it would tempt very few of those for whom broadcasting had most to offer.

The Authority does not, the Committee recall, envisage educational television solely as a teaching service, though it was on teaching that they put the stress. It might be said that a teaching service would not be liable, as would an educational service, widely defined, to harm the educational purpose of broadcasting as a whole. The Committee do not consider that a line can be drawn between the teaching programme and the generally educative programme. But, even if it could be, it would still remain true that a comprehensive service would have served much wider purposes of education and offered opportunities to much wider audiences.

#### The American example

Some advocates of a specialised educational service refer, in support of their case, the Committee reports, to the example of these services to be found in the United States. The Committee observe that the American example is not applicable in this country. If the general services there have materially neglected the educational purposes of broadcasting, then a specialised service is necessary if that purpose is to be served at all. The deficiencies in this country are not the same in degree; and they would be made good by the introduction of a complementary BBC television programme, and—if independent television is reconstituted and re-organised—the introduction in due course of a complementary programme of independent television. It would not, therefore, be necessary to introduce a specialised service of educational television here. And if one were introduced it would in all probability induce just that deficiency which, in the United States, it seeks to make good.

The Committee conclude that the educational purpose of broadcasting is much more likely to be realised by providing educational broadcasting as a part of comprehensive services. A specialised educational service would not help towards, but rather frustrate, that purpose. They recommend against the introduction of a specialised service of educational broadcasting, whether provided by a new organisation, or by either of the existing broadcasting authorities.

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#### Main Recommendations of the Report

Among the more important recommendations made by the Pilkington Committee are these:—

- (i) that the line definition standard should be changed from 405 to 625 lines, the internationally agreed standard in general use throughout Europe.
- (ii) That a service of colour television on 625 lines should be introduced as soon as possible.
- (iii) That the BBC should be authorised as soon as possible to provide a second programme of television.
- (iv) That independent television should be reconstituted and re-organised so that the Authority should plan programmes and sell advertising time. The programme companies would produce and sell to the Authority programme items for inclusion in the programme planned by the Authority.

(v) So long as independent television is constituted and organised as at present, it should not provide any additional services of television. But if, after independent television has been reconstituted and reorganised as the Committee recommend, and has had sufficient time to adapt itself to its new constitution, it has proved its capacity to realise the purposes of broadcasting, it should be authorised to provide a second programme.

(vi) The National Broadcasting Council for Scotland should be given in respect of the BBC's television service for Scotland rights and duties comparable with those it now exercises in respect of the Home Service on sound radio.

(vii) The rights and duties of the National Broadcasting Council for Wales should be similarly extended. In allotting the uncommitted frequencies in Broadcasting Band III, the first priority should be given to separating the BBC's service to Wales from that to the English Regions.

(viii) One service, and one only, of local sound broadcasting should be planned; it should not be financed from advertising revenue; it should be provided by the BBC and financed from licence revenue; and be planned to serve the largest possible number of distinctive communities that technical considerations will permit.

The Committee reject proposals for a service of subscription, pay-as-you-view television.

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